What memory is

Integrity of autobiographical memory and episodic future thinking in older adults varies with cognitive functioning

Research has documented changes in autobiographical memory and episodic future thinking in mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and Alzheimer's disease (AD). However, cognitive decline occurs gradually and recent findings suggest that subtle alterations in autobiographical cognition may be evident earlier in the trajectory towards dementia, before AD-related symptoms emerge or a clinical diagnosis has been given. The current study used the Autobiographical Interview to examine the episodic and semantic content of autobiographical past and future events generated by older adults (N = 38) of varying cognitive functioning who were grouped into High (N = 20) and Low Cognition (N = 18) groups based on their Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) scores. Participants described 12 past and 12 future autobiographical events, and transcripts were scored to quantify the numbers of internal (episodic) or external (non-episodic, including semantic) details. Although the Low Cognition group exhibited a differential reduction for internal details comprising both past and future events, they did not show the expected overproduction of external details relative to the High Cognition group. Multilevel modelling demonstrated that on trials lower in episodic content, semantic content was significantly increased in both groups. Although suggestive of a compensatory mechanism, the magnitude of this inverse relationship did not differ across groups or interact with MoCA scores. This finding indicates that external detail production may be underpinned by mechanisms not affected by cognitive decline, such as narrative style and the ability to contextualize one's past and future events in relation to broader autobiographical knowledge.

The role of bodily self-consciousness in episodic memory of naturalistic events: an immersive virtual reality study

Recent studies suggest that the human body plays a critical role in episodic memory. Still, the precise relationship between bodily self-consciousness (BSC) and memory formation of specific events, especially in real-life contexts, remains a topic of ongoing research. The present study investigated the relationship between BSC and episodic memory (EM) using immersive virtual reality (VR) technology. Participants were immersed in an urban environment with naturalistic events, while their visuomotor feedback was manipulated in three within-subjects conditions: Synchronous, Asynchronous, and No-body. Our results show that asynchronous visuomotor feedback and not seeing one's body, compared to synchronous feedback, decrease the sense of self-identification, self-location and agency, and sense of presence. Moreover, navigating in the Asynchronous condition had a detrimental impact on incidental event memory, perceptual details, contextual association, subjective sense of remembering, and memory consolidation. In contrast, participants in the No-Body condition were only impaired in egocentric spatial memory and the sense of remembering at ten-day delay. We discuss these findings in relation to the role of bodily self-representation in space during event memory encoding. This study sheds light on the complex interplay between BSC, sense of presence, and episodic memory processes, and strengthens the potential of embodiment and VR technology in studying and enhancing human cognition.

Investigating the concept of representation in the neural and psychological sciences

The concept of representation is commonly treated as indispensable to research on brains, behavior, and cognition. Nevertheless, systematic evidence about the ways the concept is applied remains scarce. We present the results of an experiment aimed at elucidating what researchers mean by "representation." Participants were an international group of psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers (N = 736). Applying elicitation methodology, participants responded to a survey with experimental scenarios aimed at invoking applications of "representation" and five other ways of describing how the brain responds to stimuli. While we find little disciplinary variation in the application of "representation" and other expressions (e.g., "about" and "carry information"), the results suggest that researchers exhibit uncertainty about what sorts of brain activity involve representations or not; they also prefer non-representational, causal characterizations of the brain's response to stimuli. Potential consequences of these findings are explored, such as reforming or eliminating the concept of representation from use.

Mechanically primed cells transfer memory to fibrous matrices for invasion across environments of distinct stiffness and dimensionality

Cells sense and migrate across mechanically dissimilar environments throughout development and disease progression. However, it remains unclear whether mechanical memory of past environments empowers cells to navigate new, three-dimensional extracellular matrices. Here, we show that cells previously primed on stiff, compared with soft, matrices generate a higher level of forces to remodel collagen fibers and promote invasion. This priming advantage persists in dense or stiffened collagen. We explain this memory-dependent, cross-environment cell invasion through a lattice-based model wherein stiff-primed cellular forces remodel collagen and minimize energy required for future cell invasion. According to our model, cells transfer their mechanical memory to the matrix via collagen alignment and tension, and this remodeled matrix informs future cell invasion. Thus, memory-laden cells overcome mechanosensing of softer or challenging future environments via a cell-matrix transfer of memory. Consistent with model predictions, depletion of yes-associated protein destabilizes the cellular memory required for collagen remodeling before invasion. We release tension in collagen fibers via laser ablation and disable fiber remodeling by lysyl-oxidase inhibition, both of which disrupt cell-to-matrix transfer of memory and hamper cross-environment invasion. These results have implications for cancer, fibrosis, and aging, where a potential cell-to-matrix transfer of mechanical memory of cells may generate a prolonged cellular response.

Episodic representation: A mental models account

This paper offers a modeling account of episodic representation. I argue that the episodic system constructs mental models: representations that preserve the spatiotemporal structure of represented domains. In prototypical cases, these domains are events: occurrences taken by subjects to have characteristic structures, dynamics and relatively determinate beginnings and ends. Due to their simplicity and manipulability, mental event models can be used in a variety of cognitive contexts: in remembering the personal past, but also in future-oriented and counterfactual imagination. As structural representations, they allow surrogative reasoning, supporting inferences about their constituents which can be used in reasoning about the represented events.

The homeless mind in a mobile world: An autoethnographic approach on cognitive immobility in international migration

The migration phenomenon, in which the mind travels ahead of the body, especially among would-be travellers, has received scholarly attention within migration studies. Research in this area has not unpacked the cognitive migration experiences of those who have already moved. This autoethnographic article explores the feelings, thoughts and experiences of an individual living abroad in the United Kingdom but cognitively imprisoned at his ancestral home in Igbo land. It draws on the concept of cognitive migration and the author’s own experiences and feelings to introduce and explain the phenomenon of cognitive immobility, which exemplifies the dialectical conflict between the aspirations of longing for and emotions of belonging to a place against a simultaneous desire to remain distant from it. This article advocates the recognition of this cognitive experience of being trapped in place while mobilised in-person elsewhere in migration studies, providing a lens to view such experiences that have erstwhile received inadequate attention. This article contributes to the growing body of knowledge in relation to cognitive migration processes and experiences of those contemplating or participating in human mobility.

Psychological Theory and the Illusion of Scientific Prediction

The attempt of empiricist psychology to achieve scientific respectability through reliance on quantification is deeply flawed. Not only does it come at the expense of the phenomena, which, in the study of the mind, must reference subjectivity, but it is incommensurate with the basic scientific principles on which it claims to operate. Specifically, psychological theory typically cannot support prognostication beyond the binary opposition of "effect present/effect absent." Accordingly, the "numbers" assigned to experimental results often amount to affixing names (e.g., more than, less than) to the members of an ordered sequence of outcomes. This, I contend, is one reason why psychologists find it difficult to discriminate between competing theories: without a well-specified theory capable of enabling precise and detailed quantitative prediction, inferring underlying mental mechanisms from experimental outcomes becomes a difficult, if not impossible, task.

Memory Modification and Authenticity: A Narrative Approach

The potential of memory modification techniques (MMTs) has raised concerns and sparked a debate in neuroethics, particularly in the context of identity and authenticity. This paper addresses the question whether and how MMTs influence authenticity. I proceed by drawing two distinctions within the received views on authenticity. From this, I conclude that an analysis of MMTs based on a dual-basis, process view of authenticity is warranted, which implies that the influence of MMTs on authenticity crucially depends on the specifics of how memory modification would eventually work. Therefore, I continue with a systematic analysis of possible properties of MMTs in which I distinguish between the dimensions of memories and the kinds of experiences that can be modified as well as the properties of the process of memory modification. The impact of MMTs on authenticity is analyzed regarding the possible properties of MMTs and based on a narrative approach to authenticity which fulfills the requirements of a dual-basis, process view of authenticity. Lastly, I explore the potential of MMTs to shift the balance between self-discovery and self-creation within authenticity and thereby alter the concept itself as well as the value of authenticity.

What memory is-Not!

Rejecting the received account, which includes procedural and semantic memory, Stanley B. Klein claims that only episodic memory is genuine memory. This is so, he asserts, because only episodic memory is partly constituted by a quale, a Nagelian "what it is like" feeling of the past. However, his actual position reveals a very different set of claims about memory, one that involves a distinctive feel, distinct from Nagelian qualia and other versions of what qualia are. We argue that Klein's actual position significantly differs from what he claims memory is. And we try to describe what Kleinian qualia should feel like. We suspect that they might not feel like anything at all. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Psychological Capacities.

Scoping review of tests to assess tactical knowledge and tactical performance of young soccer players

This scoping review aimed to systematically map studies/tests for assessing the tactical domain of young soccer players. The study followed the PRISMA-ScR and Joanna Briggs Institute guidelines. The databases searched were Scopus, SPORTDiscus, SciELO, LILACS, and BDTD. The eligibility criteria were defined based on the elements of population, context, and concept, without restrictions on the period, language, and type of publication. Twenty-four papers were included, from 1997 to 2020, totalling 29 tests/instruments for the assessment of the tactical domain, with the majority of studies having an European sample. Twelve terms were used to nominate the tactical component, regardless of the assessment method and approach. Six tests met eight or nine criteria in the critical appraisal: TCTOF, TACSIS Spanish version, Semi-Structured Interview, TCTP-OE, GPET, and FUTSAT. Thus, it is concluded that studies and tests for the assessment of the tactical domain of young soccer players are recent and mainly European; there is no consensus about the adopted terminology; and few tests met the majority of the quality criteria. Therefore, we suggest: a) the construction/adaptation of tests with samples from other continents; b) the use of the proposed criteria; and c) that the terms tactical knowledge and tactical performance are adopted.

Content-specific vulnerability of recent episodic memories in Alzheimer's disease

Endel Tulving's episodic memory framework emphasizes the multifaceted re-experiencing of personal events. Indeed, decades of research focused on the experiential nature of episodic memories, usually treating recent episodic memory as a coherent experiential quality. However, recent insights into the functional architecture of the medial temporal lobe show that different types of mnemonic information are segregated into distinct neural pathways in brain circuits empirically associated with episodic memory. Moreover, recent memories do not fade as a whole under conditions of progressive neurodegeneration in these brain circuits, notably in Alzheimer's disease. Instead, certain memory content seem particularly vulnerable from the moment of their encoding while other content can remain memorable consistently across individuals and contexts. We propose that these observations are related to the content-specific functional architecture of the medial temporal lobe and consequently to a content-specific impairment of memory at different stages of the neurodegeneration. To develop Endel Tulving's inspirational legacy further and to advance our understanding of how memory function is affected by neurodegenerative conditions such as Alzheimer's disease, we postulate that it is compelling to focus on the representational content of recent episodic memories.

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The functional anatomy of episodic memory segregates different memory content.

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Alzheimer's disease may cause content-specific loss of recent memories

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Content-specific memorability across individuals changes with Alzheimer's disease.

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Content-specific assessment could provide new insights into episodic memory in health and disease

Virtual reality for the enhancement of emotion regulation

In recent decades, a growing body of literature has focused on emotion regulation (ER), which refers to the ability to implement strategies in order to modulate emotional responses and reach desirable goals. To date, impaired ER (i.e., emotion dysregulation) has been identified as a transdiagnostic factor across a wide range of psychopathological conditions, which shows the importance of improving patients' ability to regulate negative and positive emotions in clinical practice. In addition to the increasing evidence showing its efficacy in the treatment of several clinical conditions, virtual reality (VR) has recently emerged as a potentially powerful tool for enhancing ER, thus breaking new ground in the development of cutting-edge transdiagnostic interventions. In the present narrative review, we will provide an overview of the existing evidence about VR-based interventions in the field of ER, emphasizing the promising findings and the barriers that still have to be addressed. To this aim, the available VR-based literature will be analysed in relation to four categories of ER strategies: situational strategies, attentional strategies, cognitive strategies, and response modulation strategies. Furthermore, new emerging fields of research targeting innovative aspects of ER will be highlighted, including the use of VR to promote positive emotions and interpersonal ER skills. Besides, its cost-effectiveness will be discussed, taking into account the costs for both developers (e.g., clinicians and researchers) and end-users. Finally, future directions in this promising field of research will be outlined.

Using virtual reality to target positive autobiographical memory in individuals with moderate-to-moderately severe depressive symptoms: A single case experimental design

So far, several aspects of autobiographical memory (AM) have been found to be impaired in depression. Among others, depressed patients show the tendency to recall more negative than positive events (i.e., negative bias) and usually retrieve memories that lack of specificity and details (i.e., overgeneral memories). Based on this, we designed an AM task enhanced by the use of virtual reality (VR) to specifically train the recall of positive memories. Using a single-case, multiple baseline experimental design, we explored the effects of a brief intervention consisting of two sessions of this training in a sample of 18 individuals with moderate-to-moderately severe depressive symptoms. According to the results, changes occurred at the short term only. In particular, almost all participants reported a significant improvement in at least one outcome measure 0-3 days after the intervention. However, these clinical gains were not maintained in the mid-term (from day 4 to 10). The present findings do not support the efficacy of our VR-based AM recall treatment as a standalone intervention. Nevertheless, it might represent a suitable procedure to obtain immediate and/or short-term improvements. It might also serve as a valid component to be integrated in broader protocols for patients with moderate-to-moderately severe depressive symptoms.

Personality and Authenticity in Light of the Memory-Modifying Potential of Optogenetics

There has been a growing interest in research concerning memory modification technologies (MMTs) in recent years. Neuroscientists and psychologists are beginning to explore the prospect of controllable and intentional modification of human memory. One of the technologies with the greatest potential to this end is optogenetics-an invasive neuromodulation technique involving the use of light to control the activity of individual brain cells. It has recently shown the potential to modify specific long-term memories in animal models in ways not yet possible with other MMTs. As the therapeutic potential of optogenetics has already prompted approval of the first human trials, it is especially important and timely to consider the opportunities and dangers this technology may entail. In this article, we focus on possible consequences of optogenetics as an MMT by analyzing fundamental threats potentially associated with memory modifications: the potential disruption of personality and authenticity.

Remembering the Personal Past: Beyond the Boundaries of Imagination

What is the relation between episodic memory and episodic (or experiential) imagination? According to the causal theory of memory, memory differs from imagination because remembering entails the existence of a continuous causal connection between one’s original experience of an event and one’s subsequent memory, a connection that is maintained by a memory trace. The simulation theory rejects this conception of memory, arguing against the necessity of a memory trace for successful remembering. I show that the simulation theory faces two serious problems, which are better explained by appealing to a causal connection maintained by a memory trace. Remembering the personal past is not the same as imagining.

The Phenomenology of Remembering Is an Epistemic Feeling

This article aims to provide a psychologically informed philosophical account of the phenomenology of episodic remembering. The literature on epistemic or metacognitive feelings has grown considerably in recent years, and there are persuasive reasons, both conceptual and empirical, in favor of the view that the phenomenology of remembering-autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving influentially referred to it, or the feeling of pastness, as we will refer to it here-is an epistemic feeling, but few philosophical treatments of this phenomenology as an epistemic feeling have so far been proposed. Building on insights from the psychological literature, we argue that a form of feeling-based metacognition is involved in episodic remembering and develop an integrated metacognitive feeling-based view that addresses several key aspects of the feeling of pastness, namely, its status as a feeling, its content, and its relationship to the first-order memories the phenomenology of which it provides.

Quo vadis 'episodic memory'? - Past, present, and perspective

The term 'episodic memory' was coined by Endel Tulving, who also created a classification in several memory systems. This classification is presented, and it is described which predecessors existed for the partition of memory into systems. The 'episodic memory system' is discussed as being in general equivalent with the 'episodic-autobiographical memory system'. It is seen as an emotionally colorized system. A special paragraph is devoted to the 'perceptual memory system', as this was not included in Tulving's previous schemes of memory systems. More recent sub-categorizations of the 'episodic memory system' are presented and a perspective on the future of the episodic memory system is developed.

Visual Perspectives in Episodic Memory and the Sense of Self

The connection between memory and self-consciousness has been a central topic in philosophy of memory. When remembering an event we experienced in the past, not only do we experience being the subject of the conscious episode, but we also experience being the protagonist in the memory scene. This is the “phenomenal presence of self.” To explore this special sense of self in memory, this paper focuses on the issue of how one identifies oneself in episodic simulation at the retrieval of memory and draws attention to the field and observer perspectives in episodic memory. Metzinger (2013a,b, 2017) recently introduced the concept of the phenomenal unit of identification (UI) to characterize the phenomenal property that gives rise to the conscious experience of “I am this.” This paper shows how observer-perspective remembering provides an interesting opportunity for studying the sense of self. It is argued that observer-perspective remembering is a stable state of consciousness that is distinct from autoscopic phenomena with respect to the dimensions of minimal phenomenal self (MPS). Together, the notion of UI and the particular style of remembering offer a way of understanding the phenomenal presence of self, and three possible ways in which phenomenal properties constitute UI in memory are raised. The study of perspectives in episodic simulation may prompt new empirical and conceptual issues concerning both the sense of identity and the relationship between MPS and extended self.

Episodic Memory as a Propositional Attitude: A Critical Perspective

The questions of whether episodic memory is a propositional attitude, and of whether it has propositional content, are central to discussions about how memory represents the world, what mental states should count as memories, and what kind of beings are capable of remembering. Despite its importance to such topics, these questions have not been addressed explicitly in the recent literature in philosophy of memory. In one of the very few pieces dealing with the topic, Fernández (2006) provides a positive answer to the initial questions by arguing that the propositional attitude view of memory, as I will call it, provides a simple account of how memory possesses truth-conditions. A similar suggestion is made by Byrne (2010) when he proposes that perception and episodic memory have the same kind of content, differing only in degree. Against the propositional attitude view, I will argue that episodic memory does not have propositional content, and therefore, that it is not a propositional attitude. My project here is, therefore, mainly critical. I will show that, if empirical work is to inform our philosophical theories of memory in any way, we have good reasons to deny, or at least to be skeptical, of the prospects of the propositional attitude view of episodic memory.

Episodic and semantic content of memory and imagination: A multilevel analysis

Autobiographical memories of past events and imaginations of future scenarios comprise both episodic and semantic content. Correlating the amount of "internal" (episodic) and "external" (semantic) details generated when describing autobiographical events can illuminate the relationship between the processes supporting these constructs. Yet previous studies performing such correlations were limited by aggregating data across all events generated by an individual, potentially obscuring the underlying relationship within the events themselves. In the current article, we reanalyzed datasets from eight studies using a multilevel approach, allowing us to explore the relationship between internal and external details within events. We also examined whether this relationship changes with healthy aging. Our reanalyses demonstrated a largely negative relationship between the internal and external details produced when describing autobiographical memories and future imaginations. This negative relationship was stronger and more consistent for older adults and was evident both in direct and indirect measures of semantic content. Moreover, this relationship appears to be specific to episodic tasks, as no relationship was observed for a nonepisodic picture description task. This negative association suggests that people do not generate semantic information indiscriminately, but do so in a compensatory manner, to embellish episodically impoverished events. Our reanalysis further lends support for dissociable processes underpinning episodic and semantic information generation when remembering and imagining autobiographical events.

On the primacy and irreducible nature of first-person versus third-person information

In this essay, we will support the claim that at the current level of scientific advancement a) some first-person accounts cannot be reduced to their third-person neural and psychophysiological correlates and b) that these first-person accounts are the only information to reckon when it is necessary to analyse qualia contents. Consequently, for many phenomena, first-person accounts are the only reliable source of information available and the knowledge of their neural and psychophysical correlates don't offer any additional information about them.

Hierarchical dynamics of informational patterns and decision-making

Traditional studies on the interaction of cognitive functions in healthy and disordered brains have used the analyses of the connectivity of several specialized brain networks-the functional connectome. However, emerging evidence suggests that both brain networks and functional spontaneous brain-wide network communication are intrinsically dynamic. In the light of studies investigating the cooperation between different cognitive functions, we consider here the dynamics of hierarchical networks in cognitive space. We show, using an example of behavioural decision-making based on sequential episodic memory, how the description of metastable pattern dynamics underlying basic cognitive processes helps to understand and predict complex processes like sequential episodic memory recall and competition among decision strategies. The mathematical images of the discussed phenomena in the phase space of the corresponding cognitive model are hierarchical heteroclinic networks. One of the most important features of such networks is the robustness of their dynamics. Different kinds of instabilities of these dynamics can be related to 'dynamical signatures' of creativity and different psychiatric disorders. The suggested approach can also be useful for the understanding of the dynamical processes that are the basis of consciousness.

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory

Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, 'autonoetic' character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms, and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken towards an event simulation. On this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in 'future-oriented mental time travel' neither do justice to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons for why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events.

Confabulating, Misremembering, Relearning: The Simulation Theory of Memory and Unsuccessful Remembering

This article develops a taxonomy of memory errors in terms of three conditions: the accuracy of the memory representation, the reliability of the memory process, and the internality (with respect to the remembering subject) of that process. Unlike previous taxonomies, which appeal to retention of information rather than reliability or internality, this taxonomy can accommodate not only misremembering (e.g., the DRM effect), falsidical confabulation, and veridical relearning but also veridical confabulation and falsidical relearning. Moreover, because it does not assume that successful remembering presupposes retention of information, the taxonomy is compatible with recent simulation theories of remembering.

Functional (dissociative) retrograde amnesia

Retrograde amnesia is described as condition which can occur after direct brain damage, but which occurs more frequently as a result of a psychiatric illness. In order to understand the amnesic condition, content-based divisions of memory are defined. The measurement of retrograde memory is discussed and the dichotomy between "organic" and "psychogenic" retrograde amnesia is questioned. Briefly, brain damage-related etiologies of retrograde amnesia are mentioned. The major portion of the review is devoted to dissociative amnesia (also named psychogenic or functional amnesia) and to the discussion of an overlap between psychogenic and "brain organic" forms of amnesia. The "inability of access hypothesis" is proposed to account for most of both the organic and psychogenic (dissociative) patients with primarily retrograde amnesia. Questions such as why recovery from retrograde amnesia can occur in retrograde (dissociative) amnesia, and why long-term new learning of episodic-autobiographic episodes is possible, are addressed. It is concluded that research on retrograde amnesia research is still in its infancy, as the neural correlates of memory storage are still unknown. It is argued that the recollection of episodic-autobiographic episodes most likely involves frontotemporal regions of the right hemisphere, a region which appears to be hypometabolic in patients with dissociative amnesia.