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Cheng FL, Horikawa T, Majima K, Tanaka M, Abdelhack M, Aoki SC, Hirano J, Kamitani Y. Reconstructing visual illusory experiences from human brain activity. SCIENCE ADVANCES 2023; 9:eadj3906. [PMID: 37967184 PMCID: PMC10651116 DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.adj3906] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/23/2023] [Accepted: 10/13/2023] [Indexed: 11/17/2023]
Abstract
Visual illusions provide valuable insights into the brain's interpretation of the world given sensory inputs. However, the precise manner in which brain activity translates into illusory experiences remains largely unknown. Here, we leverage a brain decoding technique combined with deep neural network (DNN) representations to reconstruct illusory percepts as images from brain activity. The reconstruction model was trained on natural images to establish a link between brain activity and perceptual features and then tested on two types of illusions: illusory lines and neon color spreading. Reconstructions revealed lines and colors consistent with illusory experiences, which varied across the source visual cortical areas. This framework offers a way to materialize subjective experiences, shedding light on the brain's internal representations of the world.
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Affiliation(s)
- Fan L. Cheng
- Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan
- ATR Computational Neuroscience Laboratories, Soraku, Kyoto 619-0288, Japan
| | - Tomoyasu Horikawa
- ATR Computational Neuroscience Laboratories, Soraku, Kyoto 619-0288, Japan
| | - Kei Majima
- Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan
| | - Misato Tanaka
- Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan
| | - Mohamed Abdelhack
- Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan
| | - Shuntaro C. Aoki
- Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan
| | - Jin Hirano
- Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan
| | - Yukiyasu Kamitani
- Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan
- ATR Computational Neuroscience Laboratories, Soraku, Kyoto 619-0288, Japan
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Francken JC, Beerendonk L, Molenaar D, Fahrenfort JJ, Kiverstein JD, Seth AK, van Gaal S. An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science. Neurosci Conscious 2022; 2022:niac011. [PMID: 35975240 PMCID: PMC9374479 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/17/2021] [Revised: 05/13/2022] [Accepted: 07/27/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jolien C Francken
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 XH, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Sciences, Radboud University, Erasmusplein 1, 6525 HT, Nijmegen, the Netherlands
| | - Lola Beerendonk
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Dylan Molenaar
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Johannes J Fahrenfort
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit, Van der Boechorststraat 7, 1081 BT, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Julian D Kiverstein
- Academic Medical Centre, University of Amsterdam, Meibergdreef 9, 1105 AZ, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Anil K Seth
- Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Sussex House, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Sussex House, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) Program on Brain, Mind, and Consciousness, MaRS Centre, West Tower, 661 University Avenue, Toronto, ON M5G 1M1, Canada
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
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Isham EA. Temporal experience modifies future thoughts: Manipulation of Libet's W influences difficulty assessment during a decision-making task. PLoS One 2020; 15:e0237680. [PMID: 33232317 PMCID: PMC7685477 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0237680] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/27/2020] [Accepted: 11/10/2020] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Past studies have employed the subjective experience of decision time (Libet’s W) as an index of consciousness, marking the moment at which the agent first becomes aware of a decision. In the current study, we examined whether the temporal experience of W affects subsequent experience related to the action. Specifically, we tested whether W influenced the perception of difficulty in a decision-making task, hypothesizing that temporal awareness of W might influence the sense of difficulty. Consistent with our predictions, when W was perceived as early or late, participants subsequently rated the decision difficulty to be easy or difficult, respectively (Exp.1). Further investigation showed that perceived difficulty, however, did not influence W (Exp.2). Together, our findings suggest a unidirectional relationship such that W plays a role in the metacognition of difficulty evaluation. The results imply that subjective temporal experience of decision time modifies the consequential sense of difficulty.
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Affiliation(s)
- Eve A. Isham
- Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, United States of America
- Center for Mind and Brain, University of California, Davis, CA, United States of America
- * E-mail:
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Carruthers G, Carls‐diamante S, Huang L, Rosen M, Schier E. How to operationalise consciousness. AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 2020. [DOI: 10.1111/ajpy.12264] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/28/2022]
Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Linus Huang
- Department of Philosophy, University of California at San Diego, CA & Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei,
| | - Melanie Rosen
- Department of Culture and Society, Aarhus University, Australia,
| | - Elizabeth Schier
- Department of Psychology, Charles Sturt University, Port Macquarie, Australia and Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia,
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Marić M, Domijan D. A neurodynamic model of the interaction between color perception and color memory. Neural Netw 2020; 129:222-248. [PMID: 32615406 DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2020.06.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/15/2020] [Revised: 05/03/2020] [Accepted: 06/04/2020] [Indexed: 12/17/2022]
Abstract
The memory color effect and Spanish castle illusion have been taken as evidence of the cognitive penetrability of vision. In the same manner, the successful decoding of color-related brain signals in functional neuroimaging studies suggests the retrieval of memory colors associated with a perceived gray object. Here, we offer an alternative account of these findings based on the design principles of adaptive resonance theory (ART). In ART, conscious perception is a consequence of a resonant state. Resonance emerges in a recurrent cortical circuit when a bottom-up spatial pattern agrees with the top-down expectation. When they do not agree, a special control mechanism is activated that resets the network and clears off erroneous expectation, thus allowing the bottom-up activity to always dominate in perception. We developed a color ART circuit and evaluated its behavior in computer simulations. The model helps to explain how traces of erroneous expectations about incoming color are eventually removed from the color perception, although their transient effect may be visible in behavioral responses or in brain imaging. Our results suggest that the color ART circuit, as a predictive computational system, is almost never penetrable, because it is equipped with computational mechanisms designed to constrain the impact of the top-down predictions on ongoing perceptual processing.
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Persuh M, LaRock E, Berger J. Working Memory and Consciousness: The Current State of Play. Front Hum Neurosci 2018; 12:78. [PMID: 29551967 PMCID: PMC5840147 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2018.00078] [Citation(s) in RCA: 29] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/29/2017] [Accepted: 02/12/2018] [Indexed: 12/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Working memory (WM), an important posit in cognitive science, allows one to temporarily store and manipulate information in the service of ongoing tasks. WM has been traditionally classified as an explicit memory system-that is, as operating on and maintaining only consciously perceived information. Recently, however, several studies have questioned this assumption, purporting to provide evidence for unconscious WM. In this article, we focus on visual working memory (VWM) and critically examine these studies as well as studies of unconscious perception that seem to provide indirect evidence for unconscious WM. Our analysis indicates that current evidence does not support an unconscious WM store, though we offer independent reasons to think that WM may operate on unconsciously perceived information.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marjan Persuh
- Department of Social Sciences, Human Services and Criminal Justice, Borough of Manhattan Community College, City University of New York, New York, NY, United States
| | - Eric LaRock
- Department of Philosophy, 751 Mathematics and Science Center, Oakland University, Rochester, MI, United States
| | - Jacob Berger
- Department of English and Philosophy, Idaho State University, Pocatello, ID, United States
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Abstract
Recent findings in neuroscience strongly suggest that an object's features (e.g., its color, texture, shape, etc.) are represented in separate areas of the visual cortex. Although represented in separate neuronal areas, somehow the feature representations are brought together as a single, unified object of visual consciousness. This raises a question of binding: how do neural activities in separate areas of the visual cortex function to produce a feature-unified object of visual consciousness? Several prominent neuroscientists have adopted neural synchrony and attention-based approaches to explain object feature binding. I argue that although neural synchrony and/or attentional mechanisms might function to disambiguate an object's features, it is difficult to see how either of these mechanisms could fully explain the unity of an object's features at the level of visual consciousness. After presenting a detailed critique of neural synchrony and attention-based approaches to object feature binding, I propose interactive hierarchical structuralism (IHS) . This view suggests that a unified percept (i.e., a feature-unified object of visual consciousness) is not reducible to the activity of any cognitive capacity or to any localized neural area, but emerges out of the interaction of visual information organized by spatial structuring capacities correlated with lower, higher, and intermediate levels of the visual hierarchy. After clarifying different notions of emergence and elaborating evidence for IHS, I discuss how IHS can be tested through transcranial magnetic stimulation and masking. In the final section I present some further implications/advantages of IHS.
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Abstract
In much of the debate concerning the philosophy and psychology of cognition and emotion, Aristotle’s theory is taken to support a functionalist, cognition-first account. This brand of functionalism emphasizes functional role over occupant, or supervenient over physiochemical, the so-called ‘software vs hardware’ distinction. We argue, instead, that this functionalist reading misrepresents Aristotle because it downgrades the significance of his ideas about the biological bases of emotions and, in particular, affect-first processes in emotions. In addition to presenting a detailed critique of this functionalist interpretation of Aristotelian psychology, we offer an alternative reading of Aristotle’s theory of cognition and emotion that brings to bear certain biological considerations evidenced in his arguments on the integration of form and matter (hylomorphism) and the hierarchical organization of the biological world. Based on this new reading, we identify affinities with contemporary research in the cognitive neuroscience of emotion and developmental research on emotion.
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Mylopoulos M. Conscious intention: a challenge for AIR theory. Front Psychol 2015; 6:675. [PMID: 26042082 PMCID: PMC4438162 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00675] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/04/2015] [Accepted: 05/08/2015] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Myrto Mylopoulos
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, Institute Jean Nicod Paris, France ; Philosophy and Institute of Cognitive Science, Carleton University Ottawa, ON, Canada
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Yatziv T, Jacobson H. Understanding visual consciousness in autism spectrum disorders. Front Hum Neurosci 2015; 9:204. [PMID: 25954180 PMCID: PMC4404836 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00204] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/14/2014] [Accepted: 03/27/2015] [Indexed: 12/04/2022] Open
Abstract
The paper focuses on the question of what the (visual) perceptual differences are between individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and typically developing (TD) individuals. We argue against the view that autistic subjects have a deficiency in the most basic form of perceptual consciousness—namely, phenomenal consciousness. Instead, we maintain, the perceptual atypicality of individuals with autism is of a more conceptual and cognitive sort—their perceptual experiences share crucial aspects with TD individuals. Our starting point is Ben Shalom’s (2005, 2009) three-level processing framework for explaining atypicality in several domains of processing among autistics, which we compare with two other tripartite models of perception—Jackendoff’s (1987) and Prinz’s (2000, 2005a, 2007) Intermediate Level Hypothesis and Lamme’s (2004, 2006, 2010) neural account of consciousness. According to these models, whereas the second level of processing is concerned with viewer-centered visual representations of basic visual properties and incorporates some early forms of integration, the third level is more cognitive and conceptual. We argue that the data suggest that the atypicality in autism is restricted mainly to the third level. More specifically, second-level integration, which is the mark of phenomenal consciousness, is typical, yet third-level integration of perceptual objects and concepts is atypical. Thus, the basic experiences of individuals with autism are likely to be similar to typical subjects’ experiences; the main difference lies in the sort of cognitive access the subjects have to their experiences. We conclude by discussing implications of the suggested analysis of experience in autism for conceptions of phenomenal consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tal Yatziv
- Department of Psychology, Ben-Gurion University of the NegevBeer-Sheva, Israel
- Zlotowski Center for Neuroscience, Ben-Gurion University of the NegevBeer-Sheva, Israel
- *Correspondence: Tal Yatziv, Department of Psychology, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Building No. 98, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel
| | - Hilla Jacobson
- Zlotowski Center for Neuroscience, Ben-Gurion University of the NegevBeer-Sheva, Israel
- Department of Brain and Cognition Sciences, Ben-Gurion University of the NegevBeer-Sheva, Israel
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Hobson JA, Hong CCH, Friston KJ. Virtual reality and consciousness inference in dreaming. Front Psychol 2014; 5:1133. [PMID: 25346710 PMCID: PMC4191565 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01133] [Citation(s) in RCA: 71] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/09/2014] [Accepted: 09/18/2014] [Indexed: 12/22/2022] Open
Abstract
This article explores the notion that the brain is genetically endowed with an innate virtual reality generator that - through experience-dependent plasticity - becomes a generative or predictive model of the world. This model, which is most clearly revealed in rapid eye movement (REM) sleep dreaming, may provide the theater for conscious experience. Functional neuroimaging evidence for brain activations that are time-locked to rapid eye movements (REMs) endorses the view that waking consciousness emerges from REM sleep - and dreaming lays the foundations for waking perception. In this view, the brain is equipped with a virtual model of the world that generates predictions of its sensations. This model is continually updated and entrained by sensory prediction errors in wakefulness to ensure veridical perception, but not in dreaming. In contrast, dreaming plays an essential role in maintaining and enhancing the capacity to model the world by minimizing model complexity and thereby maximizing both statistical and thermodynamic efficiency. This perspective suggests that consciousness corresponds to the embodied process of inference, realized through the generation of virtual realities (in both sleep and wakefulness). In short, our premise or hypothesis is that the waking brain engages with the world to predict the causes of sensations, while in sleep the brain's generative model is actively refined so that it generates more efficient predictions during waking. We review the evidence in support of this hypothesis - evidence that grounds consciousness in biophysical computations whose neuronal and neurochemical infrastructure has been disclosed by sleep research.
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Affiliation(s)
- J. Allan Hobson
- Division of Sleep Medicine, Harvard Medical SchoolBoston, MA, USA
| | - Charles C.-H. Hong
- Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Johns Hopkins UniversityBaltimore, MD, USA
| | - Karl J. Friston
- The Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College LondonLondon, UK
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Carruthers G. What makes us conscious of our own agency? And why the conscious versus unconscious representation distinction matters. Front Hum Neurosci 2014; 8:434. [PMID: 25002841 PMCID: PMC4066842 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00434] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/01/2014] [Accepted: 05/29/2014] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Existing accounts of the sense of agency tend to focus on the proximal causal history of the feeling. That is, they explain the sense of agency by describing the cognitive mechanism that causes the sense of agency to be elicited. However, it is possible to elicit an unconscious representation of one’s own agency that plays a different role in a cognitive system. I use the “occasionality problem” to suggest that taking this distinction seriously has potential theoretical pay-offs for this reason. We are faced, then, with a need to distinguish instances of the representation of one’s own agency in which the subject is aware of their sense of own agency from instances in which they are not. This corresponds to a specific instance of what Dennett calls the “Hard Question”: once the representation is elicited, then what happens? In other words, how is a representation of one’s own agency used in a cognitive system when the subject is aware of it? How is this different from when the representation of own agency remains unconscious? This phrasing suggests a Functionalist answer to the Hard Question. I consider two single function hypotheses. First, perhaps the representation of own agency enters into the mechanisms of attention. This seems unlikely as, in general, attention is insufficient for awareness. Second, perhaps, a subject is aware of their sense of agency when it is available for verbal report. However, this seems inconsistent with evidence of a sense of agency in the great apes. Although these two single function views seem like dead ends, multifunction hypotheses such as the global workspace theory remain live options which we should consider. I close by considering a non-functionalist answer to the Hard Question: perhaps it is not a difference in the use to which the representation is put, but a difference in the nature of the representation itself. When it comes to the sense of agency, the Hard Question remains, but there are alternatives open to us.
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Affiliation(s)
- Glenn Carruthers
- ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and Its Disorders, Macquarie University Sydney, NSW, Australia
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Cellular registration without behavioral recall of olfactory sensory input under general anesthesia. Anesthesiology 2014; 120:890-905. [PMID: 24694846 DOI: 10.1097/aln.0000000000000137] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
BACKGROUND Previous studies suggest that sensory information is "received" but not "perceived" under general anesthesia. Whether and to what extent the brain continues to process sensory inputs in a drug-induced unconscious state remain unclear. METHODS One hundred seven rats were randomly assigned to 12 different anesthesia and odor exposure paradigms. The immunoreactivities of the immediate early gene products c-Fos and Egr1 as neural activity markers were combined with behavioral tests to assess the integrity and relationship of cellular and behavioral responsiveness to olfactory stimuli under a surgical plane of ketamine-xylazine general anesthesia. RESULTS The olfactory sensory processing centers could distinguish the presence or absence of experimental odorants even when animals were fully anesthetized. In the anesthetized state, the c-Fos immunoreactivity in the higher olfactory cortices revealed a difference between novel and familiar odorants similar to that seen in the awake state, suggesting that the anesthetized brain functions beyond simply receiving external stimulation. Reexposing animals to odorants previously experienced only under anesthesia resulted in c-Fos immunoreactivity, which was similar to that elicited by familiar odorants, indicating that previous registration had occurred in the anesthetized brain. Despite the "cellular memory," however, odor discrimination and forced-choice odor-recognition tests showed absence of behavioral recall of the registered sensations, except for a longer latency in odor recognition tests. CONCLUSIONS Histologically distinguishable registration of sensory processing continues to occur at the cellular level under ketamine-xylazine general anesthesia despite the absence of behavioral recognition, consistent with the notion that general anesthesia causes disintegration of information processing without completely blocking cellular communications.
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Mehta N, Mashour GA. General and specific consciousness: a first-order representationalist approach. Front Psychol 2013; 4:407. [PMID: 23882231 PMCID: PMC3712269 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00407] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/12/2013] [Accepted: 06/17/2013] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
It is widely acknowledged that a complete theory of consciousness should explain general consciousness (what makes a state conscious at all) and specific consciousness (what gives a conscious state its particular phenomenal quality). We defend first-order representationalism, which argues that consciousness consists of sensory representations directly available to the subject for action selection, belief formation, planning, etc. We provide a neuroscientific framework for this primarily philosophical theory, according to which neural correlates of general consciousness include prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, and non-specific thalamic nuclei, while neural correlates of specific consciousness include sensory cortex and specific thalamic nuclei. We suggest that recent data support first-order representationalism over biological theory, higher-order representationalism, recurrent processing theory, information integration theory, and global workspace theory.
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Affiliation(s)
- Neil Mehta
- Whitney Humanities Center, Yale University New Haven, CT, USA
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De Sousa A. Towards an integrative theory of consciousness: part 2 (an anthology of various other models). Mens Sana Monogr 2013; 11:151-209. [PMID: 23678242 PMCID: PMC3653220 DOI: 10.4103/0973-1229.109341] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/06/2012] [Revised: 12/13/2012] [Accepted: 12/13/2012] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Abstract
The study of consciousness has today moved beyond neurobiology and cognitive models. In the past few years, there has been a surge of research into various newer areas. The present article looks at the non-neurobiological and non-cognitive theories regarding this complex phenomenon, especially ones that self-psychology, self-theory, artificial intelligence, quantum physics, visual cognitive science and philosophy have to offer. Self-psychology has proposed the need to understand the self and its development, and the ramifications of the self for morality and empathy, which will help us understand consciousness better. There have been inroads made from the fields of computer science, machine technology and artificial intelligence, including robotics, into understanding the consciousness of these machines and their implications for human consciousness. These areas are explored. Visual cortex and emotional theories along with their implications are discussed. The phylogeny and evolution of the phenomenon of consciousness is also highlighted, with theories on the emergence of consciousness in fetal and neonatal life. Quantum physics and its insights into the mind, along with the implications of consciousness and physics and their interface are debated. The role of neurophilosophy to understand human consciousness, the functions of such a concept, embodiment, the dark side of consciousness, future research needs and limitations of a scientific theory of consciousness complete the review. The importance and salient features of each theory are discussed along with certain pitfalls, if present. A need for the integration of various theories to understand consciousness from a holistic perspective is stressed.
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Lee G. Commentary on Dan Lloyd: “Neural correlates of Temporality”. Conscious Cogn 2012; 21:707-10; author reply 711-2. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.06.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/14/2011] [Accepted: 06/15/2011] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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Persuh M, Genzer B, Melara RD. Iconic memory requires attention. Front Hum Neurosci 2012; 6:126. [PMID: 22586389 PMCID: PMC3345872 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00126] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/01/2012] [Accepted: 04/19/2012] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
Two experiments investigated whether attention plays a role in iconic memory, employing either a change detection paradigm (Experiment 1) or a partial-report paradigm (Experiment 2). In each experiment, attention was taxed during initial display presentation, focusing the manipulation on consolidation of information into iconic memory, prior to transfer into working memory. Observers were able to maintain high levels of performance (accuracy of change detection or categorization) even when concurrently performing an easy visual search task (low load). However, when the concurrent search was made difficult (high load), observers' performance dropped to almost chance levels, while search accuracy held at single-task levels. The effects of attentional load remained the same across paradigms. The results suggest that, without attention, participants consolidate in iconic memory only gross representations of the visual scene, information too impoverished for successful detection of perceptual change or categorization of features.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marjan Persuh
- Program in Cognitive Neuroscience, City College, City University of New York NY, USA
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Schechter E. The switch model of split-brain consciousness. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2012. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2011.579417] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/28/2022]
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De Brigard F. The role of attention in conscious recollection. Front Psychol 2012; 3:29. [PMID: 22363305 PMCID: PMC3276975 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00029] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/22/2011] [Accepted: 01/24/2012] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Abstract
Most research on the relationship between attention and consciousness has been limited to perception. However, perceptions are not the only kinds of mental contents of which we can be conscious. An important set of conscious states that has not received proper treatment within this discussion is that of memories. This paper reviews compelling evidence indicating that attention may be necessary, but probably not sufficient, for conscious recollection. However, it is argued that unlike the case of conscious perception, the kind of attention required during recollection is internal, as opposed to external, attention. As such, the surveyed empirical evidence is interpreted as suggesting that internal attention is necessary, but probably not sufficient, for conscious recollection. The paper begins by justifying the need for clear distinctions among different kinds of attention, and then emphasizes the difference between internal and external attention. Next, evidence from behavioral, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies suggesting that internal attention is required for the successful retrieval of memorial contents is reviewed. In turn, it is argued that internal attention during recollection is what makes us conscious of the contents of retrieved memories; further evidence in support of this claim is also provided. Finally, it is suggested that internal attention is probably not sufficient for conscious recollection. Open questions and possible avenues for future research are also mentioned.
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Kouider S, de Gardelle V, Sackur J, Dupoux E. How rich is consciousness? The partial awareness hypothesis. Trends Cogn Sci 2010; 14:301-7. [PMID: 20605514 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.04.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 222] [Impact Index Per Article: 15.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/19/2010] [Revised: 04/12/2010] [Accepted: 04/21/2010] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
Current theories of consciousness posit a dissociation between 'phenomenal' consciousness (rich) and 'access' consciousness (limited). Here, we argue that the empirical evidence for phenomenal consciousness without access is equivocal, resulting either from a confusion between phenomenal and unconscious contents, or from an impression of phenomenally rich experiences arising from illusory contents. We propose a refined account of access that relies on a hierarchy of representational levels and on the notion of partial awareness, whereby lower and higher levels are accessed independently. Reframing of the issue of dissociable forms of consciousness into dissociable levels of access provides a more parsimonious account of the existing evidence. In addition, the rich phenomenology illusion can be studied and described in terms of testable cognitive mechanisms.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sid Kouider
- Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives & Psycholinguistique, Ecole Normale Supérieure-CNRS, 29 rue d'Ulm, 75005, Paris, France.
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Bókkon I, Vimal RLP. Implications on visual apperception: energy, duration, structure and synchronization. Biosystems 2010; 101:1-9. [PMID: 20433895 DOI: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2010.04.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/22/2010] [Revised: 04/21/2010] [Accepted: 04/22/2010] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
Although primary visual cortex (V1 or striate) activity per se is not sufficient for visual apperception (normal conscious visual experiences and conscious functions such as detection, discrimination, and recognition), the same is also true for extrastriate visual areas (such as V2, V3, V4/V8/VO, V5/M5/MST, IT, and GF). In the lack of V1 area, visual signals can still reach several extrastriate parts but appear incapable of generating normal conscious visual experiences. It is scarcely emphasized in the scientific literature that conscious perceptions and representations must have also essential energetic conditions. These energetic conditions are achieved by spatiotemporal networks of dynamic mitochondrial distributions inside neurons. However, the highest density of neurons in neocortex (number of neurons per degree of visual angle) devoted to representing the visual field is found in retinotopic V1. It means that the highest mitochondrial (energetic) activity can be achieved in mitochondrial cytochrome oxidase-rich V1 areas. Thus, V1 bear the highest energy allocation for visual representation. In addition, the conscious perceptions also demand structural conditions, presence of adequate duration of information representation, and synchronized neural processes and/or 'interactive hierarchical structuralism.' For visual apperception, various visual areas are involved depending on context such as stimulus characteristics such as color, form/shape, motion, and other features. Here, we focus primarily on V1 where specific mitochondrial-rich retinotopic structures are found; we will concisely discuss V2 where smaller riches of these structures are found. We also point out that residual brain states are not fully reflected in active neural patterns after visual perception. Namely, after visual perception, subliminal residual states are not being reflected in passive neural recording techniques, but require active stimulation to be revealed.
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Affiliation(s)
- I Bókkon
- Semmelweis University, Budapest, Hungary.
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De Brigard F, Prinz J. Attention and consciousness. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2009; 1:51-59. [PMID: 26272838 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.27] [Citation(s) in RCA: 40] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
For the past three decades there has been a substantial amount of scientific evidence supporting the view that attention is necessary and sufficient for perceptual representations to become conscious (i.e., for there to be something that it is like to experience a representational perceptual state). This view, however, has been recently questioned on the basis of some alleged counterevidence. In this paper we survey some of the most important recent findings. In doing so, we have two primary goals. The first is descriptive: we provide a literature review for those seeking an understanding of the present debate. The second is editorial: we suggest that the evidence alleging dissociations between consciousness and attention is not decisive. Thus, this is an opinionated overview of the debate. By presenting our assessment, we hope to bring out both sides in the debate and to underscore that the issues here remain matters of intense controversy and ongoing investigation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
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Affiliation(s)
- Felipe De Brigard
- Department of Philosophy, CB # 3125, Caldwell Hall, UNC/ Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125, USA
| | - Jesse Prinz
- Department of Philosophy, City University of New York, Graduate Center 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10016, USA
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Dresp-Langley B, Durup J. A plastic temporal brain code for conscious state generation. Neural Plast 2009; 2009:482696. [PMID: 19644552 PMCID: PMC2715825 DOI: 10.1155/2009/482696] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/10/2008] [Revised: 02/18/2009] [Accepted: 05/24/2009] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Consciousness is known to be limited in processing capacity and often described in terms of a unique processing stream across a single dimension: time. In this paper, we discuss a purely temporal pattern code, functionally decoupled from spatial signals, for conscious state generation in the brain. Arguments in favour of such a code include Dehaene et al.'s long-distance reverberation postulate, Ramachandran's remapping hypothesis, evidence for a temporal coherence index and coincidence detectors, and Grossberg's Adaptive Resonance Theory. A time-bin resonance model is developed, where temporal signatures of conscious states are generated on the basis of signal reverberation across large distances in highly plastic neural circuits. The temporal signatures are delivered by neural activity patterns which, beyond a certain statistical threshold, activate, maintain, and terminate a conscious brain state like a bar code would activate, maintain, or inactivate the electronic locks of a safe. Such temporal resonance would reflect a higher level of neural processing, independent from sensorial or perceptual brain mechanisms.
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Affiliation(s)
- Birgitta Dresp-Langley
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS - UMR 5508), Université Montpellier 2, CC048 34095 Montpellier Cedex 5, France
| | - Jean Durup
- 16 rue Romain Rolland, 34200 Sète, France
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Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behav Brain Sci 2008; 30:481-99; discussion 499-548. [PMID: 18366828 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x07002786] [Citation(s) in RCA: 326] [Impact Index Per Article: 20.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases--when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority--and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is "Yes," then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is "Yes"? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.
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Abstract
AbstractIn this response to 32 commentators, I start by clarifying the overflow argument. I explain why the distinction between generic and specific phenomenology is important and why we are justified in acknowledging specific phenomenology in the overflow experiments. Other issues discussed are the relations among report, cognitive access, and attention; panpsychic disaster; the mesh between psychology and neuroscience; and whether consciousness exists.
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Gallace A, Spence C. The cognitive and neural correlates of “tactile consciousness”: A multisensory perspective. Conscious Cogn 2008; 17:370-407. [PMID: 17398116 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2007.01.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 82] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/04/2006] [Revised: 12/23/2006] [Accepted: 01/06/2007] [Indexed: 12/31/2022]
Abstract
People's awareness of tactile stimuli has been investigated in far less detail than their awareness of stimuli in other sensory modalities. In an attempt to fill this gap, we provide an overview of studies that are pertinent to the topic of tactile consciousness. We discuss the results of research that has investigated phenomena such as "change blindness", phantom limb sensations, and numerosity judgments in tactile perception, together with the results obtained from the study of patients affected by deficits that can adversely affect tactile perception such as neglect, extinction, and numbsense. The similarities as well as some of the important differences that have emerged when visual and tactile conscious information processing have been compared using similar experimental procedures are highlighted. We suggest that conscious information processing in the tactile modality cannot be separated completely from the more general processing of spatial information in the brain. Finally, the importance of considering tactile consciousness within the larger framework of multisensory information processing is also discussed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alberto Gallace
- Crossmodal Research Laboratory, Department of Experimental Psychology, Oxford University, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3UD, UK.
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Giordano J, Engebretson J. Neural and Cognitive Basis of Spiritual Experience: Biopsychosocial and Ethical Implications for Clinical Medicine. Explore (NY) 2006; 2:216-25. [PMID: 16781644 DOI: 10.1016/j.explore.2006.02.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/07/2005] [Accepted: 02/16/2006] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
The role of patient spirituality and spiritual/liminal experience(s; SE) in the clinical setting has generated considerable equivocality within the medical community. Spiritual experience(s), characterized by circumstance, manifestation, and interpretation, reflect patients' explanatory models. We seek to demonstrate the importance of SE to clinical medicine by illustrating biological, cognitive, and psychosocial domains of effect. Specifically, we address where in the brain these events are processed and what types of neural events may be occurring. We posit that existing evidence suggests that SE can induce both intermediate level processing (ILP) to generate attentional awareness (ie, "consciousness of") effects and perhaps nonintermediate level processing to generate nonattentive, subliminal (ie, "state of") consciousness effects. Recognition of neural and cognitive mechanisms is important to clinicians' understanding of the biological basis of noetic, salutogenic, and putative physiologic effects. We posit that neurocognitive mechanisms, fortified by anthropologic and social contexts, led to the incorporation of SE-evoked behaviors into health-based ritual(s) and religious practice(s). Thus, these experiences not only exert biological effects but may provide important means for enhancing patients' locus of control. By recognizing these variables, we advocate clinicians to act within an ethical scope of practice as therapeutic and moral agents to afford patients resources to accommodate their specific desire(s) and/or need(s) for spiritual experiences, in acknowledgement of the underlying mechanisms and potential outcomes that may be health promotional.
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Affiliation(s)
- James Giordano
- Center for Clinical Bioethics, Georgetown University Medical Center, Washington, DC, USA.
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Abstract
In his novel Remembrance of Things Past, Marcel Proust argues that conventional descriptions of the phenomenology of consciousness are incomplete because they focus too much on the highly-salient sensory information that dominates each moment of awareness and ignore the network of associations that lies in the background. In this paper, I explicate Proust's theory of conscious experience and show how it leads him directly to a theory of aesthetic perception. Proust's division of awareness into two components roughly corresponds to William James' division of the stream of thought into a "nucleus" and "fringe." Proust argues that the function of art is to evoke the underlying associative network indirectly in the mind of the observer by using carefully chosen sensory surfaces to control the stream of thought. I propose a possible neural basis for this Proustian/Jamesian phenomenology, and argue that the general principles of Proustian aesthetics can be applied to all forms of art. I conclude that a scientific theory of art should follow in a straightforward manner from a scientific theory of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Russell Epstein
- Department of Psychology and Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Pennsylvania, 3815 Walnut St., Philadelphia, PA 19104-6196, USA.
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Abstract
Functionalists about consciousness identify consciousness with a role; physicalists identify consciousness with an implementer of that role. The global workspace theory of consciousness fits the functionalist perspective, but the physicalist sees consciousness as a biological phenomenon that implements global accessibility.
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Affiliation(s)
- N Block
- Philosophy Department, Main Building, Room 503E, New York University, 100 Washington Square East, New York, NY 10003, USA.
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Abstract
In his commentary, David Galin raises several important issues that deserve to be addressed. In this response, I do three things. First, I briefly discuss the relation between the present work and the metaphoric theories of thought developed by cognitive lin- guists such as Lakoff and Johnson (1998). Second, I address some of the confusions that seem to have arisen about my use of the terms "substantive thought" and "nucleus." Third, I briefly discuss some of the directions that Galin suggests for further research.
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Affiliation(s)
- R Epstein
- Medical Research Council, Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, 15 Chaucer Rd., Cambridge, CB2 2EF, United Kingdom
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Marcel A. On a neurofunctional theory of visual consciousness: commentary on J. Prinz. Conscious Cogn 2000; 9:267-73; discussion 274-8. [PMID: 10924246 DOI: 10.1006/ccog.2000.0444] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- A Marcel
- Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Medical Research Council, 15 Chaucer Road, Cambridge, CB2 2EF, United Kingdom.
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Lormand E. Comments on "A neurofunctional theory of visual consciousness". Conscious Cogn 2000; 9:260-6; discussion 274-8. [PMID: 10924245 DOI: 10.1006/ccog.2000.0443] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- E Lormand
- Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, 2267 Angell Hall, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48109, USA.
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