Effect of group selection on the evolution of altruistic behavior

Environmentally Driven Migration in a Social Network Game

Cooperative behaviors are common in humans, and they are the fundamental basis of our society. Theoretical and experimental studies have modeled environments where the behaviors of humans, or agents, have been restricted to analyze their social behavior. However, it is important that such studies can be generalized to a less restrictive environment in order to understand human society. Social network games (SNGs) provide a powerful tool for the quantitative study of human behavior using a less restrictive environment than in previous studies. We focused on multilevel selection, one of the theoretical frameworks used to study the evolution of cooperation. The evolution of cooperation by multilevel selection requires that the continual assortment between cooperators and noncooperators is generated; thus, humans may have acquired mechanisms that ensure assortment (e.g., migration between groups). This study aims to investigate this mechanism in a less restrictive environment. For this purpose, we researched the effect of migration based on data analysis in an SNG where the players could behave more freely than was possible in the environments used in the previous studies. We showed that players maintained assortment between cooperators and defectors in this SNG, where it appears that environmentally driven migration generated the assortment.

Computer simulations of cellular group selection reveal mechanism for sustaining cooperation

We present a computer simulation of group selection that is inspired by proto-cell division. Two types of replicating molecules, cooperators and defectors, reside inside membrane bound compartments. Cooperators pay a cost for other replicators in the cell to receive a benefit. Defectors pay no cost and distribute no benefits. The total population size fluctuates as a consequence of births and deaths of individual replicators. Replication requires activated substrates that are generated at a constant rate. Our model includes mutation between cooperators and defectors and selection on two levels: within proto-cells and between proto-cells. We find surprising similarities and differences between models with and without cell death. In both cases, a necessary requirement for group selection to favor some level of cooperation is the continuous formation of a minimum fraction of pure cooperator groups. Subsequently these groups become undermined by defectors, because of mutation and selection within cells. Cell division mechanisms which generate pure cooperator groups more efficiently are stronger promoters of cooperation. For example, division of a proto-cell into many daughter cells is more powerful in enhancing cooperation than division into two daughter cells. Our model differs from previous studies of group selection in that we explore a variety of different features and relax several restrictive assumptions that would be needed for analytic calculations.

Ecological conditions favoring budding in colonial organisms under environmental disturbance

Dispersal is a topic of great interest in ecology. Many organisms adopt one of two distinct dispersal tactics at reproduction: the production of small offspring that can disperse over long distances (such as seeds and spawned eggs), or budding. The latter is observed in some colonial organisms, such as clonal plants, corals and ants, in which (super)organisms split their body into components of relatively large size that disperse to a short distance. Contrary to the common dispersal viewpoint, short-dispersal colonial organisms often flourish even in environments with frequent disturbances. In this paper, we investigate the conditions that favor budding over long-distance dispersal of small offspring, focusing on the life history of the colony growth and the colony division ratio. These conditions are the relatively high mortality of very small colonies, logistic growth, the ability of dispersers to peacefully seek and settle unoccupied spaces, and small spatial scale of environmental disturbance. If these conditions hold, budding is advantageous even when environmental disturbance is frequent. These results suggest that the demography or life history of the colony underlies the behaviors of the colonial organisms.

Collective chasing behavior between cooperators and defectors in the spatial prisoner's dilemma

Cooperation is one of the essential factors for all biological organisms in major evolutionary transitions. Recent studies have investigated the effect of migration for the evolution of cooperation. However, little is known about whether and how an individuals' cooperativeness coevolves with mobility. One possibility is that mobility enhances cooperation by enabling cooperators to escape from defectors and form clusters; the other possibility is that mobility inhibits cooperation by helping the defectors to catch and exploit the groups of cooperators. In this study we investigate the coevolutionary dynamics by using the prisoner's dilemma game model on a lattice structure. The computer simulations demonstrate that natural selection maintains cooperation in the form of evolutionary chasing between the cooperators and defectors. First, cooperative groups grow and collectively move in the same direction. Then, mutant defectors emerge and invade the cooperative groups, after which the defectors exploit the cooperators. Then other cooperative groups emerge due to mutation and the cycle is repeated. Here, it is worth noting that, as a result of natural selection, the mobility evolves towards directional migration, but not to random or completely fixed migration. Furthermore, with directional migration, the rate of global population extinction is lower when compared with other cases without the evolution of mobility (i.e., when mobility is preset to random or fixed). These findings illustrate the coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation and mobility through the directional chasing between cooperators and defectors.

Positive effects of multiple gene control on the spread of altruism by group selection

The origin of altruistic behavior has long been a challenge for students of evolutionary biology. The populations with altruistic individuals do better than those without altruists; however, the altruists within a population do worse than the non-altruists and their prevalence in the population decreases due to individual selection. Under certain conditions, the strength of group selection, i.e., the selection driven by competition between populations, can surpass the strength of individual selection; however, such conditions seem to be relatively strict and probably do not hold in many natural systems where the altruistic behavior was observed. It was suggested recently that chances for altruistic behavior to spread highly increase when it is controlled not by a single gene but by multiple independent genes substitutable in their effects on the phenotype of the individual. Here we confirm the original verbal model by numerical modeling of the spread of altruistic/selfish alleles in a metapopulation consisting of partly isolated groups of organisms (demes) interconnected by migration. We have shown that altruistic behavior coded by multiple substitutable genes can stably coexist with selfish behavior, even under relatively high mutation and migration rates, i.e., under such conditions where altruistic behavior coded by a single gene is quickly outcompeted in a metapopulation.

Evolutionary games in deme structured, finite populations

We describe a fairly general model for the evolutionary dynamics in a sub-divided (or deme structured) population with migration and mutation. The number and size of demes are finite and fixed. The fitness of each individual is determined by pairwise interactions with other members of the same deme. The dynamics within demes can be modeled according to a broad range of evolutionary processes. With a probability proportional to fitness, individuals migrate to another deme. Mutations occur randomly. In the limit of few migrations and even rarer mutations we derive a simple analytic condition for selection to favor one strategic type over another. In particular, we show that the Pareto efficient type is favored when competition within demes is sufficiently weak. We then apply the general results to the prisoner's dilemma game and discuss selected dynamics and the conditions for cooperation to prevail.

Evolutionary, Biological Origins of Morality: Implications for Research with Human Embryonic Stem Cells

Medical research with human embryonic stem cells, despite its enormous potential to reduce human suffering, is banned in many countries and heavily restricted in others. "Moral reasons" are invoked to justify bans and restrictions on this promising research. Rather surprisingly, while those moral reasons have been extensively discussed and hotly debated in several papers, not a single article on the moral aspects of that research has attempted to answer this fundamental question: What is morality? Considering that a scientifically objective definition of morality is essential to determine whether those moral reasons are justified or groundless, this article focuses on the evolutionary origins of morality and its biological basis. Morality arose as a selectively advantageous product of evolution and preceded all religions and philosophies by millions of years. For the 99% of humankind's evolution, morality was axiomatically aimed at reducing the sufferings of the social members, because pains and afflictions, as expressions of diseases and impairments, tended to hasten the extinction of the small ancestral groups, which characteristically consisted of a few tens of members. Had the therapeutic use of human embryos been available in remote times, our ancestors would have deemed it unquestionably immoral to save amorphous and microscopic agglomerates of insensitive cells representing neither parental nor social investment, at the expense of the lives of the suffering members of their little communities. Unless we venture the untenable thesis that the unlikelihood of extinction of our immense societies entitles us to overturn the meaning of morality, we cannot but conclude that bans and restrictions on research with human embryonic stem cells are patently immoral.