Why Do Exceptionally Dangerous Gain-of-Function Experiments in Influenza?

Biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of biosafety in the biomedical sciences. While it is often assumed that biosafety is a purely technical matter that has little to do with philosophy or the humanities, biosafety raises important ethical issues that have not been adequately examined in the scientific or bioethics literature. This article reviews some pivotal events in the history of biosafety and biosecurity and explores three different biosafety topics that generate significant ethical concerns, i.e., risk assessment, risk management, and risk distribution. The article also discusses the role of democratic governance in the oversight of biosafety and offers some suggestions for incorporating bioethics into biosafety practice, education, and policy.

Gain-of-function research and model organisms in biology

So-called 'gain-of-function' (GOF) research is virological research that results in a virus substantially more virulent or transmissible than its wild antecedent. GOF research has been subject to ethical analysis in the past, but the methods of GOF research have to date been underexamined by philosophers in these analyses. Here, we examine the typical animal used in influenza GOF experiments, the ferret, and show how despite its longstanding use, it does not easily satisfy the desirable criteria for an animal model We then discuss the limitations of the ferret model, and how those epistemic limitations bear on ethical and policy questions around the risks and benefits of GOF research. We conclude with a reflection on how philosophy of science can contribute to ethical and policy debates around the risks, benefits and relative priority of life sciences research.

Global Catastrophic Risk and the Drivers of Scientist Attitudes Towards Policy

An anthropogenic global catastrophic risk is a human-induced risk that threatens sustained and wide-scale loss of life and damage to civilisation across the globe. In order to understand how new research on governance mechanisms for emerging technologies might assuage such risks, it is important to ask how perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes towards the governance of global catastrophic risk within the research community shape the conduct of potentially risky research. The aim of this study is to deepen our understanding of emerging technology research culture as it relates to global catastrophic risks, and to shed new light on how new research governance mechanisms might be developed. We analyse in-depth interviews with leading AI and biotech researchers both from universities and the private sector. We develop new insights in terms of four salient themes. First, 'engineering mindset', which highlights the premium placed by many interviewees on pursuing interesting research about the physical world for its own sake. Second, 'self-government', which looks at how self-regulation of technological development currently occurs. Third, 'pure incentives', focussing on how career and other incentives shapes research. Fourth, 'norms and persuasion', which examines the role of moral considerations in guiding the research choices of scientists. We end by considering the implications of these findings for future research on governance of anthropogenic global catastrophic risk.

Why do some coronaviruses become pandemic threats when others do not?

Despite multiple spillover events and short chains of transmission on at least 4 continents, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) has never triggered a pandemic. By contrast, its relative, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has, despite apparently little, if any, previous circulation in humans. Resolving the unsolved mystery of the failure of MERS-CoV to trigger a pandemic could help inform how we understand the pandemic potential of pathogens, and probing it underscores a need for a more holistic understanding of the ways in which viral genetic changes scale up to population-level transmission.

Animal Models for Influenza Research: Strengths and Weaknesses

Influenza remains one of the most significant public health threats due to its ability to cause high morbidity and mortality worldwide. Although understanding of influenza viruses has greatly increased in recent years, shortcomings remain. Additionally, the continuous mutation of influenza viruses through genetic reassortment and selection of variants that escape host immune responses can render current influenza vaccines ineffective at controlling seasonal epidemics and potential pandemics. Thus, there is a knowledge gap in the understanding of influenza viruses and a corresponding need to develop novel universal vaccines and therapeutic treatments. Investigation of viral pathogenesis, transmission mechanisms, and efficacy of influenza vaccine candidates requires animal models that can recapitulate the disease. Furthermore, the choice of animal model for each research question is crucial in order for researchers to acquire a better knowledge of influenza viruses. Herein, we reviewed the advantages and limitations of each animal model-including mice, ferrets, guinea pigs, swine, felines, canines, and non-human primates-for elucidating influenza viral pathogenesis and transmission and for evaluating therapeutic agents and vaccine efficacy.

Current status and future prospect of management of biosafety laboratories for emerging infectious diseases

In recent years, there have been several outbreaks of infectious diseases around the world, including severe acute respiratory syndrome, Ebola virus disease, Middle East respiratory syndrome, and corona virus disease 2019. Experience suggests that the detection and research of emergent infectious diseases play a crucial role in the process of responding to the epidemic, which also brings great challenges to biosafety laboratories. In the face of unknown biological risk factors, the non-standard biosafety protection measures have a serious impact on the life safety of laboratory staff and the research of infectious diseases, which stresses the necessity of safety protection in biosafety laboratories. This article will briefly review the current status and future prospect of management of biosafety laboratories both in China and other countries in terms of safety protection measures during new sudden infectious disease incidents.

Application of a Biologically Contained Reporter System To Study Gain-of-Function H5N1 Influenza A Viruses with Pandemic Potential

Understanding how animal influenza viruses can adapt to spread in humans is critical to prepare for, and prevent, new pandemics. However, working safely with pathogens that have pandemic potential requires tight regulation and the use of high-level physical and biological risk mitigation strategies to stop accidental loss of containment. Here, we used a biological containment system for influenza viruses to study strains with pandemic potential. The system relies on deletion of the essential HA gene from the viral genome and its provision by a genetically modified cell line, to which virus propagation is therefore restricted. We show that this method permits safe handling of these pathogens, including gain-of-function variants, without the risk of generating fully infectious viruses. Furthermore, we demonstrate that this system can be used to assess virus sensitivity to both approved and experimental drugs, as well as the antigenic profile of viruses, important considerations for evaluating prepandemic vaccine and antiviral strategies.

Natural adaptation of an antigenically novel avian influenza A virus (IAV) to be transmitted efficiently in humans has the potential to trigger a devastating pandemic. Understanding viral genetic determinants underlying adaptation is therefore critical for pandemic preparedness, as the knowledge gained enhances surveillance and eradication efforts, prepandemic vaccine design, and efficacy assessment of antivirals. However, this work has risks, as making gain-of-function substitutions in fully infectious IAVs may create a pathogen with pandemic potential. Thus, such experiments must be tightly controlled through physical and biological risk mitigation strategies. Here, we applied a previously described biological containment system for IAVs to a 2009 pandemic H1N1 strain and a highly pathogenic H5N1 strain. The system relies on deletion of the essential viral hemagglutinin (HA) gene, which is instead provided in trans, thereby restricting multicycle virus replication to genetically modified HA-complementing cells. In place of HA, a Renilla luciferase gene is inserted within the viral genome, and a live-cell luciferase substrate allows real-time quantitative monitoring of viral replication kinetics with a high dynamic range. We demonstrate that biologically contained IAV-like particles exhibit wild-type sensitivities to approved antivirals, including oseltamivir, zanamivir, and baloxavir. Furthermore, the inability of these IAV-like particles to genetically acquire the host-encoded HA allowed us to introduce gain-of-function substitutions in the H5 HA gene that promote mammalian transmissibility. Biologically contained “transmissible” H5N1 IAV-like particles exhibited wild-type sensitivities to approved antivirals, to the fusion inhibitor S20, and to neutralization by existing H5 monoclonal and polyclonal sera. This work represents a proof of principle that biologically contained IAV systems can be used to safely conduct selected gain-of-function experiments.

IMPORTANCE Understanding how animal influenza viruses can adapt to spread in humans is critical to prepare for, and prevent, new pandemics. However, working safely with pathogens that have pandemic potential requires tight regulation and the use of high-level physical and biological risk mitigation strategies to stop accidental loss of containment. Here, we used a biological containment system for influenza viruses to study strains with pandemic potential. The system relies on deletion of the essential HA gene from the viral genome and its provision by a genetically modified cell line, to which virus propagation is therefore restricted. We show that this method permits safe handling of these pathogens, including gain-of-function variants, without the risk of generating fully infectious viruses. Furthermore, we demonstrate that this system can be used to assess virus sensitivity to both approved and experimental drugs, as well as the antigenic profile of viruses, important considerations for evaluating prepandemic vaccine and antiviral strategies.

Virus population dynamics examined with experimental model systems

Experimental evolution permits exploring the effect of controlled environmental variables in virus evolution. Several designs in cell culture and in vivo have established basic concepts that can assist in the interpretation of evolutionary events in the field. Important information has come from cytolytic and persistent infections in cell culture that have unveiled the power of virus-cell coevolution in virus and cell diversification. Equally informative are comparisons of the response of viral populations when subjected to different passage régimens. In particular, plaque-to-plaque transfers in cell culture have revealed unusual genotypes and phenotypes that populate minority layers of viral quasispecies. Some of these viruses display properties that contradict features established in virology textbooks. Several hypotheses and principles of population genetics have found experimental confirmation in experimental designs with viruses. The possibilities of using experimental evolution to understand virus behavior are still largely unexploited.

Evolution in the Anthropocene: Informing Governance and Policy

The Anthropocene biosphere constitutes an unprecedented phase in the evolution of life on Earth with one species, humans, exerting extensive control. The increasing intensity of anthropogenic forces in the twenty-first century has widespread implications for attempts to govern both human-dominated ecosystems and the last remaining wild ecosystems. Here, we review how evolutionary biology can inform governance and policies in the Anthropocene, focusing on five governance challenges that span biodiversity, environmental management, food and other biomass production, and human health. The five challenges are: ( a) evolutionary feedbacks, ( b) maintaining resilience, ( c) alleviating constraints, ( d) coevolutionary disruption, and ( e) biotechnology. Strategies for governing these dynamics will themselves have to be coevolutionary, as eco-evolutionary and social dynamics change in response to each other.