Beyond the responsibility gap. Discussion note on responsibility and liability in the use of brain-computer interfaces

Asking questions that matter – Question prompt lists as tools for improving the consent process for neurotechnology clinical trials

Implantable neurotechnology devices such as Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs) and Deep Brain Stimulators (DBS) are an increasing part of treating or exploring potential treatments for neurological and psychiatric disorders. While only a few devices are approved, many promising prospects for future devices are under investigation. The decision to participate in a clinical trial can be challenging, given a variety of risks to be taken into consideration. During the consent process, prospective participants might lack the language to consider those risks, feel unprepared, or simply not know what questions to ask. One tool to help empower participants to play a more active role during the consent process is a Question Prompt List (QPL). QPLs are communication tools that can prompt participants and patients to articulate potential concerns. They offer a structured list of disease, treatment, or research intervention-specific questions that research participants can use as support for question asking. While QPLs have been studied as tools for improving the consent process during cancer treatment, in this paper, we suggest they would be helpful in neurotechnology research, and offer an example of a QPL as a template for an informed consent tool in neurotechnology device trials.

Control and Ownership of Neuroprosthetic Speech

Implantable brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are being developed to restore speech capacity for those who are unable to speak. Patients with locked-in syndrome or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis could be able to use covert speech – vividly imagining saying something without actual vocalisation – to trigger neural controlled systems capable of synthesising speech. User control has been identified as particularly pressing for this type of BCI. The incorporation of machine learning and statistical language models into the decoding process introduces a contribution to (or ‘shaping of’) the output that is beyond the user’s control. Whilst this type of ‘shared control’ of BCI action is not unique to speech BCIs, the automated shaping of what a user ‘says’ has a particularly acute ethical dimension, which may differ from parallel concerns surrounding automation in movement BCIs. This paper provides an analysis of the control afforded to the user of a speech BCI of the sort under development, as well as the relationships between accuracy, control, and the user’s ownership of the speech produced. Through comparing speech BCIs with BCIs for movement, we argue that, whilst goal selection is the more significant locus of control for the user of a movement BCI, control over process will be more significant for the user of the speech BCI. The design of the speech BCI may therefore have to trade off some possible efficiency gains afforded by automation in order to preserve sufficient guidance control necessary for users to express themselves in ways they prefer. We consider the implications for the speech BCI user’s responsibility for produced outputs and their ownership of token outputs. We argue that these are distinct assessments. Ownership of synthetic speech concerns whether the content of the output sufficiently represents the user, rather than their morally relevant, causal role in producing that output.

Mapping the Dimensions of Agency

Neural devices have the capacity to enable users to regain abilities lost due to disease or injury - for instance, a deep brain stimulator (DBS) that allows a person with Parkinson's disease to regain the ability to fluently perform movements or a Brain Computer Interface (BCI) that enables a person with spinal cord injury to control a robotic arm. While users recognize and appreciate the technologies' capacity to maintain or restore their capabilities, the neuroethics literature is replete with examples of concerns expressed about agentive capacities: A perceived lack of control over the movement of a robotic arm might result in an altered sense of feeling responsible for that movement. Clinicians or researchers being able to record and access detailed information of a person's brain might raise privacy concerns. A disconnect between previous, current, and future understandings of the self might result in a sense of alienation. The ability to receive and interpret sensory feedback might change whether someone trusts the implanted device or themselves. Inquiries into the nature of these concerns and how to mitigate them has produced scholarship that often emphasizes one issue - responsibility, privacy, authenticity, or trust - selectively. However, we believe that examining these ethical dimensions separately fails to capture a key aspect of the experience of living with a neural device. In exploring their interrelations, we argue that their mutual significance for neuroethical research can be adequately captured if they are described under a unified heading of agency. On these grounds, we propose an "Agency Map" which brings together the diverse neuroethical dimensions and their interrelations into a comprehensive framework. With this, we offer a theoretically-grounded approach to understanding how these various dimensions are interwoven in an individual's experience of agency.

Brain-Machine Interfaces as Commodities: Exchanging Mind for Matter

Brain-machine interfaces (BMIs), which enable a two-way flow of signals, information, and directions between human neurons and computerized machines, offer spectacular opportunities for therapeutic and consumer applications, but they also present unique dangers to the safety, privacy, psychological health, and spiritual well-being of their users. The sale of these devices as commodities for profit exacerbates such issues and may subject the user to an unequal exchange with corporations. Catholic healthcare professionals and bioethicists should be especially concerned about the implications for the essential dignity of the persons using the new BMIs.

Summary

The commercial sale of brain-machine interfaces (BMIs) generates and exacerbates problems for end-users' safety, psychological health, and spiritual well-being.

Wired Emotions: Ethical Issues of Affective Brain-Computer Interfaces

Ethical issues concerning brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) have already received a considerable amount of attention. However, one particular form of BCI has not received the attention that it deserves: Affective BCIs that allow for the detection and stimulation of affective states. This paper brings the ethical issues of affective BCIs in sharper focus. The paper briefly reviews recent applications of affective BCIs and considers ethical issues that arise from these applications. Ethical issues that affective BCIs share with other neurotechnologies are presented and ethical concerns that are specific to affective BCIs are identified and discussed.

Brain–Computer Interfaces: Lessons to Be Learned from the Ethics of Algorithms

Brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) are driven essentially by algorithms; however, the ethical role of such algorithms has so far been neglected in the ethical assessment of BCIs. The goal of this article is therefore twofold: First, it aims to offer insights into whether (and how) the problems related to the ethics of BCIs (e.g., responsibility) can be better grasped with the help of already existing work on the ethics of algorithms. As a second goal, the article explores what kinds of solutions are available in that body of scholarship, and how these solutions relate to some of the ethical questions around BCIs. In short, the article asks what lessons can be learned about the ethics of BCIs from looking at the ethics of algorithms. To achieve these goals, the article proceeds as follows. First, a brief introduction into the algorithmic background of BCIs is given. Second, the debate about epistemic concerns and the ethics of algorithms is sketched. Finally, this debate is transferred to the ethics of BCIs.

Biomimetic rehabilitation engineering: the importance of somatosensory feedback for brain-machine interfaces

OBJECTIVE

Brain-machine interfaces (BMIs) re-establish communication channels between the nervous system and an external device. The use of BMI technology has generated significant developments in rehabilitative medicine, promising new ways to restore lost sensory-motor functions. However and despite high-caliber basic research, only a few prototypes have successfully left the laboratory and are currently home-deployed.

APPROACH

The failure of this laboratory-to-user transfer likely relates to the absence of BMI solutions for providing naturalistic feedback about the consequences of the BMI's actions. To overcome this limitation, nowadays cutting-edge BMI advances are guided by the principle of biomimicry; i.e. the artificial reproduction of normal neural mechanisms.

MAIN RESULTS

Here, we focus on the importance of somatosensory feedback in BMIs devoted to reproducing movements with the goal of serving as a reference framework for future research on innovative rehabilitation procedures. First, we address the correspondence between users' needs and BMI solutions. Then, we describe the main features of invasive and non-invasive BMIs, including their degree of biomimicry and respective advantages and drawbacks. Furthermore, we explore the prevalent approaches for providing quasi-natural sensory feedback in BMI settings. Finally, we cover special situations that can promote biomimicry and we present the future directions in basic research and clinical applications.

SIGNIFICANCE

The continued incorporation of biomimetic features into the design of BMIs will surely serve to further ameliorate the realism of BMIs, as well as tremendously improve their actuation, acceptance, and use.

What will this do to me and my brain? Ethical issues in brain-to-brain interfacing

Recent brain-to-brain interfacing studies provide proof of principle for the feasibility of various forms of direct information transfer between two brains, and may lead to the development of new approaches involving memory, emotions, or senses. What makes brain-to-brain interfaces unique is the transfer of information representing specific messages directly from one brain to another, without involving any activity of the peripheral nervous system or senses. The article discusses ethical issues that arise in neural interfacing. The focus is on the implications that brain-to-brain interfaces may have on the individual at the recipient side.