Generalised free energy and active inference

Deconstructing Deep Active Inference: A Contrarian Information Gatherer

Active inference is a theory of perception, learning, and decision making that can be applied to neuroscience, robotics, psychology, and machine learning. Recently, intensive research has been taking place to scale up this framework using Monte Carlo tree search and deep learning. The goal of this activity is to solve more complicated tasks using deep active inference. First, we review the existing literature and then progressively build a deep active inference agent as follows: we (1) implement a variational autoencoder (VAE), (2) implement a deep hidden Markov model (HMM), and (3) implement a deep critical hidden Markov model (CHMM). For the CHMM, we implemented two versions, one minimizing expected free energy, CHMM[EFE] and one maximizing rewards, CHMM[reward]. Then we experimented with three different action selection strategies: the ε-greedy algorithm as well as softmax and best action selection. According to our experiments, the models able to solve the dSprites environment are the ones that maximize rewards. On further inspection, we found that the CHMM minimizing expected free energy almost always picks the same action, which makes it unable to solve the dSprites environment. In contrast, the CHMM maximizing reward keeps on selecting all the actions, enabling it to successfully solve the task. The only difference between those two CHMMs is the epistemic value, which aims to make the outputs of the transition and encoder networks as close as possible. Thus, the CHMM minimizing expected free energy repeatedly picks a single action and becomes an expert at predicting the future when selecting this action. This effectively makes the KL divergence between the output of the transition and encoder networks small. Additionally, when selecting the action down the average reward is zero, while for all the other actions, the expected reward will be negative. Therefore, if the CHMM has to stick to a single action to keep the KL divergence small, then the action down is the most rewarding. We also show in simulation that the epistemic value used in deep active inference can behave degenerately and in certain circumstances effectively lose, rather than gain, information. As the agent minimizing EFE is not able to explore its environment, the appropriate formulation of the epistemic value in deep active inference remains an open question.

Interacting with autistic virtual characters: intrapersonal synchrony of nonverbal behavior affects participants' perception

Temporal coordination of communicative behavior is not only located between but also within interaction partners (e.g., gaze and gestures). This intrapersonal synchrony (IaPS) is assumed to constitute interpersonal alignment. Studies show systematic variations in IaPS in individuals with autism, which may affect the degree of interpersonal temporal coordination. In the current study, we reversed the approach and mapped the measured nonverbal behavior of interactants with and without ASD from a previous study onto virtual characters to study the effects of the differential IaPS on observers (N = 68), both with and without ASD (crossed design). During a communication task with both characters, who indicated targets with gaze and delayed pointing gestures, we measured response times, gaze behavior, and post hoc impression formation. Results show that character behavior indicative of ASD resulted in overall enlarged decoding times in observers and this effect was even pronounced in observers with ASD. A classification of observer's gaze types indicated differentiated decoding strategies. Whereas non-autistic observers presented with a rather consistent eyes-focused strategy associated with efficient and fast responses, observers with ASD presented with highly variable decoding strategies. In contrast to communication efficiency, impression formation was not influenced by IaPS. The results underline the importance of timing differences in both production and perception processes during multimodal nonverbal communication in interactants with and without ASD. In essence, the current findings locate the manifestation of reduced reciprocity in autism not merely in the person, but in the interactional dynamics of dyads.

Meeting the multidimensional self: fostering selfhood at the interface of Creative Arts Therapies and neuroscience

Intriguing explorations at the intersection of the fields of neuroscience and psychology are driven by the quest to understand the neural underpinnings of "the self" and their psychotherapeutic implications. These translational efforts pertain to the unique Creative Arts Therapies (CATs) and the attributes and value of the self-related processes they offer. The self is considered as a multi-layered complex construct, comprising bodily and mental constituents, subjective-objective perspectives, spatial and temporal dimensions. Neuroscience research, mostly functional brain imaging, has proposed cogent models of the constitution, development and experience of the self, elucidating how the multiple dimensions of the self are supported by integrated hierarchical brain processes. The psychotherapeutic use of the art-forms, generating aesthetic experiences and creative processes, touch upon and connect the various layers of self-experience, nurturing the sense of self. The present conceptual analysis will describe and interweave the neural mechanisms and neural network configuration suggested to lie at the core of the ongoing self-experience, its deviations in psychopathology, and implications regarding the psychotherapeutic use of the arts. The well-established, parsimonious and neurobiologically plausible predictive processing account of brain-function will be discussed with regard to selfhood and consciousness. The epistemic affordance of the experiential CATs will further be portrayed, enabling and facilitating the creation of updated self-models of the body in the world. The neuropsychological impact of the relational therapeutic encounter will be delineated, acknowledging the intersubjective brain synchronization through communicative verbal and non-verbal means and aesthetic experiences. The recognition and assimilation of neuroscientific, phenomenological and clinical perspectives concerning the nested dimensionality of the self, ground the relational therapeutic process and the neuroplastic modulations that CATs have to offer on the premise of fostering, shaping and integrating selfhood.

Children with developmental coordination disorder display atypical interhemispheric connectivity during conscious and subconscious rhythmic auditory-motor synchronization

Children with developmental coordination disorder (DCD) display difficulties in perception-action coupling when engaging in tasks requiring predictive timing. We investigated the influence of awareness on auditory-motor adjustments to small and large rhythmic perturbations in the auditory sequence to examine whether children synchronize their movements automatically or through planning and whether those adjustments occur consciously or subconsciously. Electroencephalography (EEG) was used to assess functional connectivity patterns underlying different adjustment strategies. Thirty-two children aged 7-11 participated, including children with DCD and their typically developing (TD) peers with and without musical training. All children automatically adjusted their motor responses to small rhythmic perturbations by employing the anticipatory mode, even when those changes were consciously undetectable. Planned adjustments occurred only when children consciously detected large fluctuations (Δ 20%), which required a shift from predictive to reactive strategies. Compared to TD peers, children with DCD showed reduced interhemispheric connectivity during planned adjustments and displayed similar neural patterns regardless of task constraints. Notably, they benefited from rhythmic entrainment despite having increased variability and lower perceptual acuity. Musical training was associated with enhanced auditory-perceptual timing, reduced variability, and increased interhemispheric coherence. These insights are important for the therapeutic application of auditory/rhythm-based interventions in children with DCD.

'Snakes and ladders' in paleoanthropology: From cognitive surprise to skillfulness a million years ago

A paradigmatic account may suffice to explain behavioral evolution in early Homo. We propose a parsimonious account that (1) could explain a particular, frequently-encountered, archeological outcome of behavior in early Homo - namely, the fashioning of a Paleolithic stone 'handaxe' - from a biological theoretic perspective informed by the free energy principle (FEP); and that (2) regards instances of the outcome as postdictive or retrodictive, circumstantial corroboration. Our proposal considers humankind evolving as a self-organizing biological ecosystem at a geological time-scale. We offer a narrative treatment of this self-organization in terms of the FEP. Specifically, we indicate how 'cognitive surprises' could underwrite an evolving propensity in early Homo to express sporadic unorthodox or anomalous behavior. This co-evolutionary propensity has left us a legacy of Paleolithic artifacts that is reminiscent of a 'snakes and ladders' board game of appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of particular archeological traces of Paleolithic behavior. When detected in the Early and Middle Pleistocene record, anthropologists and archeologists often imagine evidence of unusual or novel behavior in terms of early humankind ascending the rungs of a figurative phylogenetic 'ladder' - as if these corresponded to progressive evolution of cognitive abilities that enabled incremental achievements of increasingly innovative technical prowess, culminating in the cognitive ascendancy of Homo sapiens. The conjecture overlooks a plausible likelihood that behavior by an individual who was atypical among her conspecifics could have been disregarded in a community of Hominina (for definition see Appendix 1) that failed to recognize, imagine, or articulate potential advantages of adopting hitherto unorthodox behavior. Such failure, as well as diverse fortuitous demographic accidents, would cause exceptional personal behavior to be ignored and hence unremembered. It could disappear by a pitfall, down a 'snake', as it were, in the figurative evolutionary board game; thereby causing a discontinuity in the evolution of human behavior that presents like an evolutionary puzzle. The puzzle discomforts some paleoanthropologists trained in the natural and life sciences. They often dismiss it, explaining it away with such self-justifying conjectures as that, maybe, separate paleospecies of Homo differentially possessed different cognitive abilities, which, supposedly, could account for the presence or absence in the Pleistocene archeological record of traces of this or that behavioral outcome or skill. We argue that an alternative perspective - that inherits from the FEP and an individual's 'active inference' about its surroundings and of its own responses - affords a prosaic, deflationary, and parsimonious way to account for appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of particular behavioral outcomes and skills of early humankind.

The Universal Optimism of the Self-Evidencing Mind

Karl Friston's free-energy principle casts agents as self-evidencing through active inference. This implies that decision-making, planning and information-seeking are, in a generic sense, 'wishful'. We take an interdisciplinary perspective on this perplexing aspect of the free-energy principle and unpack the epistemological implications of wishful thinking under the free-energy principle. We use this epistemic framing to discuss the emergence of biases for self-evidencing agents. In particular, we argue that this elucidates an optimism bias as a foundational tenet of self-evidencing. We allude to a historical precursor to some of these themes, interestingly found in Machiavelli's oeuvre, to contextualise the universal optimism of the free-energy principle.

The empirical status of predictive coding and active inference

Research on predictive processing models has focused largely on two specific algorithmic theories: Predictive Coding for perception and Active Inference for decision-making. While these interconnected theories possess broad explanatory potential, they have only recently begun to receive direct empirical evaluation. Here, we review recent studies of Predictive Coding and Active Inference with a focus on evaluating the degree to which they are empirically supported. For Predictive Coding, we find that existing empirical evidence offers modest support. However, some positive results can also be explained by alternative feedforward (e.g., feature detection-based) models. For Active Inference, most empirical studies have focused on fitting these models to behavior as a means of identifying and explaining individual or group differences. While Active Inference models tend to explain behavioral data reasonably well, there has not been a focus on testing empirical validity of active inference theory per se, which would require formal comparison to other models (e.g., non-Bayesian or model-free reinforcement learning models). This review suggests that, while promising, a number of specific research directions are still necessary to evaluate the empirical adequacy and explanatory power of these algorithms.

Order and change in art: towards an active inference account of aesthetic experience

How to account for the power that art holds over us? Why do artworks touch us deeply, consoling, transforming or invigorating us in the process? In this paper, we argue that an answer to this question might emerge from a fecund framework in cognitive science known as predictive processing (a.k.a. active inference). We unpack how this approach connects sense-making and aesthetic experiences through the idea of an 'epistemic arc', consisting of three parts (curiosity, epistemic action and aha experiences), which we cast as aspects of active inference. We then show how epistemic arcs are built and sustained by artworks to provide us with those satisfying experiences that we tend to call 'aesthetic'. Next, we defuse two key objections to this approach; namely, that it places undue emphasis on the cognitive component of our aesthetic encounters-at the expense of affective aspects-and on closure and uncertainty minimization (order)-at the expense of openness and lingering uncertainty (change). We show that the approach offers crucial resources to account for the open-ended, free and playful behaviour inherent in aesthetic experiences. The upshot is a promising but deflationary approach, both philosophically informed and psychologically sound, that opens new empirical avenues for understanding our aesthetic encounters. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.

Federated inference and belief sharing

This paper concerns the distributed intelligence or federated inference that emerges under belief-sharing among agents who share a common world-and world model. Imagine, for example, several animals keeping a lookout for predators. Their collective surveillance rests upon being able to communicate their beliefs-about what they see-among themselves. But, how is this possible? Here, we show how all the necessary components arise from minimising free energy. We use numerical studies to simulate the generation, acquisition and emergence of language in synthetic agents. Specifically, we consider inference, learning and selection as minimising the variational free energy of posterior (i.e., Bayesian) beliefs about the states, parameters and structure of generative models, respectively. The common theme-that attends these optimisation processes-is the selection of actions that minimise expected free energy, leading to active inference, learning and model selection (a.k.a., structure learning). We first illustrate the role of communication in resolving uncertainty about the latent states of a partially observed world, on which agents have complementary perspectives. We then consider the acquisition of the requisite language-entailed by a likelihood mapping from an agent's beliefs to their overt expression (e.g., speech)-showing that language can be transmitted across generations by active learning. Finally, we show that language is an emergent property of free energy minimisation, when agents operate within the same econiche. We conclude with a discussion of various perspectives on these phenomena; ranging from cultural niche construction, through federated learning, to the emergence of complexity in ensembles of self-organising systems.

Path integrals, particular kinds, and strange things

This paper describes a path integral formulation of the free energy principle. The ensuing account expresses the paths or trajectories that a particle takes as it evolves over time. The main results are a method or principle of least action that can be used to emulate the behaviour of particles in open exchange with their external milieu. Particles are defined by a particular partition, in which internal states are individuated from external states by active and sensory blanket states. The variational principle at hand allows one to interpret internal dynamics-of certain kinds of particles-as inferring external states that are hidden behind blanket states. We consider different kinds of particles, and to what extent they can be imbued with an elementary form of inference or sentience. Specifically, we consider the distinction between dissipative and conservative particles, inert and active particles and, finally, ordinary and strange particles. Strange particles can be described as inferring their own actions, endowing them with apparent autonomy or agency. In short-of the kinds of particles afforded by a particular partition-strange kinds may be apt for describing sentient behaviour.

Incremental Learning of Goal-Directed Actions in a Dynamic Environment by a Robot Using Active Inference

This study investigated how a physical robot can adapt goal-directed actions in dynamically changing environments, in real-time, using an active inference-based approach with incremental learning from human tutoring examples. Using our active inference-based model, while good generalization can be achieved with appropriate parameters, when faced with sudden, large changes in the environment, a human may have to intervene to correct actions of the robot in order to reach the goal, as a caregiver might guide the hands of a child performing an unfamiliar task. In order for the robot to learn from the human tutor, we propose a new scheme to accomplish incremental learning from these proprioceptive-exteroceptive experiences combined with mental rehearsal of past experiences. Our experimental results demonstrate that using only a few tutoring examples, the robot using our model was able to significantly improve its performance on new tasks without catastrophic forgetting of previously learned tasks.

Testing predictive coding theories of autism spectrum disorder using models of active inference

Several competing neuro-computational theories of autism have emerged from predictive coding models of the brain. To disentangle their subtly different predictions about the nature of atypicalities in autistic perception, we performed computational modelling of two sensorimotor tasks: the predictive use of manual gripping forces during object lifting and anticipatory eye movements during a naturalistic interception task. In contrast to some accounts, we found no evidence of chronic atypicalities in the use of priors or weighting of sensory information during object lifting. Differences in prior beliefs, rates of belief updating, and the precision weighting of prediction errors were, however, observed for anticipatory eye movements. Most notably, we observed autism-related difficulties in flexibly adapting learning rates in response to environmental change (i.e., volatility). These findings suggest that atypical encoding of precision and context-sensitive adjustments provide a better explanation of autistic perception than generic attenuation of priors or persistently high precision prediction errors. Our results did not, however, support previous suggestions that autistic people perceive their environment to be persistently volatile.

Planning to Learn: A Novel Algorithm for Active Learning during Model-Based Planning

Active Inference is a recently developed framework for modeling decision processes under uncertainty. Over the last several years, empirical and theoretical work has begun to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of this approach and how it might be extended and improved. One recent extension is the "sophisticated inference" (SI) algorithm, which improves performance on multi-step planning problems through a recursive decision tree search. However, little work to date has been done to compare SI to other established planning algorithms in reinforcement learning (RL). In addition, SI was developed with a focus on inference as opposed to learning. The present paper therefore has two aims. First, we compare performance of SI to Bayesian RL schemes designed to solve similar problems. Second, we present and compare an extension of SI - sophisticated learning (SL) - that more fully incorporates active learning during planning. SL maintains beliefs about how model parameters would change under the future observations expected under each policy. This allows a form of counterfactual retrospective inference in which the agent considers what could be learned from current or past observations given different future observations. To accomplish these aims, we make use of a novel, biologically inspired environment that requires an optimal balance between goal-seeking and active learning, and which was designed to highlight the problem structure for which SL offers a unique solution. This setup requires an agent to continually search an open environment for available (but changing) resources in the presence of competing affordances for information gain. Our simulations demonstrate that SL outperforms all other algorithms in this context - most notably, Bayes-adaptive RL and upper confidence bound (UCB) algorithms, which aim to solve multi-step planning problems using similar principles (i.e., directed exploration and counterfactual reasoning about belief updates given different possible actions/observations). These results provide added support for the utility of Active Inference in solving this class of biologically-relevant problems and offer added tools for testing hypotheses about human cognition.

Automating Model Comparison in Factor Graphs

Bayesian state and parameter estimation are automated effectively in a variety of probabilistic programming languages. The process of model comparison on the other hand, which still requires error-prone and time-consuming manual derivations, is often overlooked despite its importance. This paper efficiently automates Bayesian model averaging, selection, and combination by message passing on a Forney-style factor graph with a custom mixture node. Parameter and state inference, and model comparison can then be executed simultaneously using message passing with scale factors. This approach shortens the model design cycle and allows for the straightforward extension to hierarchical and temporal model priors to accommodate for modeling complicated time-varying processes.

Pattern breaking: a complex systems approach to psychedelic medicine

Recent research has demonstrated the potential of psychedelic therapy for mental health care. However, the psychological experience underlying its therapeutic effects remains poorly understood. This paper proposes a framework that suggests psychedelics act as destabilizers, both psychologically and neurophysiologically. Drawing on the 'entropic brain' hypothesis and the 'RElaxed Beliefs Under pSychedelics' model, this paper focuses on the richness of psychological experience. Through a complex systems theory perspective, we suggest that psychedelics destabilize fixed points or attractors, breaking reinforced patterns of thinking and behaving. Our approach explains how psychedelic-induced increases in brain entropy destabilize neurophysiological set points and lead to new conceptualizations of psychedelic psychotherapy. These insights have important implications for risk mitigation and treatment optimization in psychedelic medicine, both during the peak psychedelic experience and during the subacute period of potential recovery.

On Bayesian mechanics: a physics of and by beliefs

The aim of this paper is to introduce a field of study that has emerged over the last decade, called Bayesian mechanics. Bayesian mechanics is a probabilistic mechanics, comprising tools that enable us to model systems endowed with a particular partition (i.e. into particles), where the internal states (or the trajectories of internal states) of a particular system encode the parameters of beliefs about external states (or their trajectories). These tools allow us to write down mechanical theories for systems that look as if they are estimating posterior probability distributions over the causes of their sensory states. This provides a formal language for modelling the constraints, forces, potentials and other quantities determining the dynamics of such systems, especially as they entail dynamics on a space of beliefs (i.e. on a statistical manifold). Here, we will review the state of the art in the literature on the free energy principle, distinguishing between three ways in which Bayesian mechanics has been applied to particular systems (i.e. path-tracking, mode-tracking and mode-matching). We go on to examine a duality between the free energy principle and the constrained maximum entropy principle, both of which lie at the heart of Bayesian mechanics, and discuss its implications.

Decoding reward-curiosity conflict in decision-making from irrational behaviors

Humans and animals are not always rational. They not only rationally exploit rewards but also explore an environment owing to their curiosity. However, the mechanism of such curiosity-driven irrational behavior is largely unknown. Here, we developed a decision-making model for a two-choice task based on the free energy principle, which is a theory integrating recognition and action selection. The model describes irrational behaviors depending on the curiosity level. We also proposed a machine learning method to decode temporal curiosity from behavioral data. By applying it to rat behavioral data, we found that the rat had negative curiosity, reflecting conservative selection sticking to more certain options and that the level of curiosity was upregulated by the expected future information obtained from an uncertain environment. Our decoding approach can be a fundamental tool for identifying the neural basis for reward-curiosity conflicts. Furthermore, it could be effective in diagnosing mental disorders.

Computational cross-species views of the hippocampal formation

The discovery of place cells and head direction cells in the hippocampal formation of freely foraging rodents has led to an emphasis of its role in encoding allocentric spatial relationships. In contrast, studies in head-fixed primates have additionally found representations of spatial views. We review recent experiments in freely moving monkeys that expand upon these findings and show that postural variables such as eye/head movements strongly influence neural activity in the hippocampal formation, suggesting that the function of the hippocampus depends on where the animal looks. We interpret these results in the light of recent studies in humans performing challenging navigation tasks which suggest that depending on the context, eye/head movements serve one of two roles-gathering information about the structure of the environment (active sensing) or externalizing the contents of internal beliefs/deliberation (embodied cognition). These findings prompt future experimental investigations into the information carried by signals flowing between the hippocampal formation and the brain regions controlling postural variables, and constitute a basis for updating computational theories of the hippocampal system to accommodate the influence of eye/head movements.

From fear of falling to choking under pressure: A predictive processing perspective of disrupted motor control under anxiety

Under the Predictive Processing Framework, perception is guided by internal models that map the probabilistic relationship between sensory states and their causes. Predictive processing has contributed to a new understanding of both emotional states and motor control but is yet to be fully applied to their interaction during the breakdown of motor movements under heightened anxiety or threat. We bring together literature on anxiety and motor control to propose that predictive processing provides a unifying principle for understanding motor breakdowns as a disruption to the neuromodulatory control mechanisms that regulate the interactions of top-down predictions and bottom-up sensory signals. We illustrate this account using examples from disrupted balance and gait in populations who are anxious/fearful of falling, as well as 'choking' in elite sport. This approach can explain both rigid and inflexible movement strategies, as well as highly variable and imprecise action and conscious movement processing, and may also unite the apparently opposing self-focus and distraction approaches to choking. We generate predictions to guide future work and propose practical recommendations.

To copy or not to copy? That is the question! From chimpanzees to the foundation of human technological culture

A prerequisite for copying innovative behaviour faithfully is the capacity of observers' brains, regarded as 'hierarchically mechanistic minds', to overcome cognitive 'surprisal' (see 2.), by maximising the evidence for their internal models, through active inference. Unlike modern humans, chimpanzees and other great apes show considerable limitations in their ability, or 'Zone of Bounded Surprisal', to overcome cognitive surprisal induced by innovative or unorthodox behaviour that rarely, therefore, is copied precisely or accurately. Most can copy adequately what is within their phenotypically habitual behavioural repertoire, in which technology plays scant part. Widespread intra- and intergenerational social transmission of complex technological innovations is not a hall-mark of great-ape taxa. 3 Ma, precursors of the genus Homo made stone artefacts, and stone-flaking likely was habitual before 2 Ma. After that time, early Homo erectus has left traces of technological innovations, though faithful copying of these and their intra- and intergenerational social transmission were rare before 1 Ma. This likely owed to a cerebral infrastructure of interconnected neuronal systems more limited than ours. Brains were smaller in size than ours, and cerebral neuronal systems ceased to develop when early Homo erectus attained full adult maturity by the mid-teen years, whereas its development continues until our mid-twenties nowadays. Pleistocene Homo underwent remarkable evolutionary adaptation of neurobiological propensities, and cerebral aspects are discussed that, it is proposed here, plausibly, were fundamental for faithful copying, which underpinned social transmission of technologies, cumulative learning, and culture. Here, observers' responses to an innovation are more important for ensuring its transmission than is an innovator's production of it, because, by themselves, the minimal cognitive prerequisites that are needed for encoding and assimilating innovations are insufficient for practical outcomes to accumulate and spread intra- and intergenerationally.

A Bayesian computational model to investigate expert anticipation of a seemingly unpredictable ball bounce

During dynamic and time-constrained sporting tasks performers rely on both online perceptual information and prior contextual knowledge to make effective anticipatory judgments. It has been suggested that performers may integrate these sources of information in an approximately Bayesian fashion, by weighting available information sources according to their expected precision. In the present work, we extended Bayesian brain approaches to anticipation by using formal computational models to estimate how performers weighted different information sources when anticipating the bounce direction of a rugby ball. Both recreational (novice) and professional (expert) rugby players (n = 58) were asked to predict the bounce height of an oncoming rugby ball in a temporal occlusion paradigm. A computational model, based on a partially observable Markov decision process, was fitted to observed responses to estimate participants' weighting of online sensory cues and prior beliefs about ball bounce height. The results showed that experts were more sensitive to online sensory information, but that neither experts nor novices relied heavily on prior beliefs about ball trajectories in this task. Experts, but not novices, were observed to down-weight priors in their anticipatory decisions as later and more precise visual cues emerged, as predicted by Bayesian and active inference accounts of perception.

Bridging the gap between believing and memory functions

Believing has recently been recognized as a fundamental brain function linking a person’s experience with his or her attitude, actions and predictions. In general, believing results from the integration of ambient information with emotions and can be reinforced or modulated in a probabilistic fashion by new experiences. Although these processes occur in the subliminal realm, humans can become aware of what they believe and express it verbally. We explain how believing is interwoven with memory functions in a multifaceted fashion. Linking the typically rapid and adequate reactions of a subject to what he/she believes is enabled by working memory. Perceptions are stored in episodic memory as beneficial or aversive events, while the corresponding verbal descriptions of what somebody believes are stored in semantic memory. After recall from memory of what someone believes, personally relevant information can be communicated to other people. Thus, memory is essential for maintaining what people believe.

Interpersonal attunement in social interactions: from collective psychophysiology to inter-personalized psychiatry and beyond

In this article, we analyse social interactions, drawing on diverse points of views, ranging from dialectics, second-person neuroscience and enactivism to dynamical systems, active inference and machine learning. To this end, we define interpersonal attunement as a set of multi-scale processes of building up and materializing social expectations-put simply, anticipating and interacting with others and ourselves. While cultivating and negotiating common ground, via communication and culture-building activities, are indispensable for the survival of the individual, the relevant multi-scale mechanisms have been largely considered in isolation. Here, collective psychophysiology, we argue, can lend itself to the fine-tuned analysis of social interactions, without neglecting the individual. On the other hand, an interpersonal mismatch of expectations can lead to a breakdown of communication and social isolation known to negatively affect mental health. In this regard, we review psychopathology in terms of interpersonal misattunement, conceptualizing psychiatric disorders as disorders of social interaction, to describe how individual mental health is inextricably linked to social interaction. By doing so, we foresee avenues for an inter-personalized psychiatry, which moves from a static spectrum of disorders to a dynamic relational space, focusing on how the multi-faceted processes of social interaction can help to promote mental health. This article is part of the theme issue 'Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences'.

A neural active inference model of perceptual-motor learning

The active inference framework (AIF) is a promising new computational framework grounded in contemporary neuroscience that can produce human-like behavior through reward-based learning. In this study, we test the ability for the AIF to capture the role of anticipation in the visual guidance of action in humans through the systematic investigation of a visual-motor task that has been well-explored-that of intercepting a target moving over a ground plane. Previous research demonstrated that humans performing this task resorted to anticipatory changes in speed intended to compensate for semi-predictable changes in target speed later in the approach. To capture this behavior, our proposed "neural" AIF agent uses artificial neural networks to select actions on the basis of a very short term prediction of the information about the task environment that these actions would reveal along with a long-term estimate of the resulting cumulative expected free energy. Systematic variation revealed that anticipatory behavior emerged only when required by limitations on the agent's movement capabilities, and only when the agent was able to estimate accumulated free energy over sufficiently long durations into the future. In addition, we present a novel formulation of the prior mapping function that maps a multi-dimensional world-state to a uni-dimensional distribution of free-energy/reward. Together, these results demonstrate the use of AIF as a plausible model of anticipatory visually guided behavior in humans.

Task-evoked pupillary responses track precision-weighted prediction errors and learning rate during interceptive visuomotor actions

In this study, we examined the relationship between physiological encoding of surprise and the learning of anticipatory eye movements. Active inference portrays perception and action as interconnected inference processes, driven by the imperative to minimise the surprise of sensory observations. To examine this characterisation of oculomotor learning during a hand-eye coordination task, we tested whether anticipatory eye movements were updated in accordance with Bayesian principles and whether trial-by-trial learning rates tracked pupil dilation as a marker of 'surprise'. Forty-four participants completed an interception task in immersive virtual reality that required them to hit bouncing balls that had either expected or unexpected bounce profiles. We recorded anticipatory eye movements known to index participants' beliefs about likely ball bounce trajectories. By fitting a hierarchical Bayesian inference model to the trial-wise trajectories of these predictive eye movements, we were able to estimate each individual's expectations about bounce trajectories, rates of belief updating, and precision-weighted prediction errors. We found that the task-evoked pupil response tracked prediction errors and learning rates but not beliefs about ball bounciness or environmental volatility. These findings are partially consistent with active inference accounts and shed light on how encoding of surprise may shape the control of action.

In vitro neurons learn and exhibit sentience when embodied in a simulated game-world

Integrating neurons into digital systems may enable performance infeasible with silicon alone. Here, we develop DishBrain, a system that harnesses the inherent adaptive computation of neurons in a structured environment. In vitro neural networks from human or rodent origins are integrated with in silico computing via a high-density multielectrode array. Through electrophysiological stimulation and recording, cultures are embedded in a simulated game-world, mimicking the arcade game "Pong." Applying implications from the theory of active inference via the free energy principle, we find apparent learning within five minutes of real-time gameplay not observed in control conditions. Further experiments demonstrate the importance of closed-loop structured feedback in eliciting learning over time. Cultures display the ability to self-organize activity in a goal-directed manner in response to sparse sensory information about the consequences of their actions, which we term synthetic biological intelligence. Future applications may provide further insights into the cellular correlates of intelligence.

Rethinking statistical learning as a continuous dynamic stochastic process, from the motor systems perspective

The brain integrates streams of sensory input and builds accurate predictions, while arriving at stable percepts under disparate time scales. This stochastic process bears different unfolding dynamics for different people, yet statistical learning (SL) currently averages out, as noise, individual fluctuations in data streams registered from the brain as the person learns. We here adopt a new analytical approach that instead of averaging out fluctuations in continuous electroencephalographic (EEG)-based data streams, takes these gross data as the important signals. Our new approach reassesses how individuals dynamically learn predictive information in stable and unstable environments. We find neural correlates for two types of learners in a visuomotor task: narrow-variance learners, who retain explicit knowledge of the regularity embedded in the stimuli. They seem to use an error-correction strategy steadily present in both stable and unstable environments. This strategy can be captured by current optimization-based computational frameworks. In contrast, broad-variance learners emerge only in the unstable environment. Local analyses of the moment-by-moment fluctuations, naïve to the overall outcome, reveal an initial period of memoryless learning, well characterized by a continuous gamma process starting out exponentially distributed whereby all future events are equally probable, with high signal (mean) to noise (variance) ratio. The empirically derived continuous Gamma process smoothly converges to predictive Gaussian signatures comparable to those observed for the error-corrective mode that is captured by current optimization-driven computational models. We coin this initially seemingly purposeless stage exploratory. Globally, we examine a posteriori the fluctuations in distributions' shapes over the empirically estimated stochastic signatures. We then confirm that the exploratory mode of those learners, free of expectation, random and memoryless, but with high signal, precedes the acquisition of the error-correction mode boasting smooth transition from exponential to symmetric distributions' shapes. This early naïve phase of the learning process has been overlooked by current models driven by expected, predictive information and error-based learning. Our work demonstrates that (statistical) learning is a highly dynamic and stochastic process, unfolding at different time scales, and evolving distinct learning strategies on demand.

Neural Mechanisms and Psychology of Psychedelic Ego Dissolution

Neuroimaging studies of psychedelics have advanced our understanding of hierarchical brain organization and the mechanisms underlying their subjective and therapeutic effects. The primary mechanism of action of classic psychedelics is binding to serotonergic 5-HT2A receptors. Agonist activity at these receptors leads to neuromodulatory changes in synaptic efficacy that can have a profound effect on hierarchical message-passing in the brain. Here, we review the cognitive and neuroimaging evidence for the effects of psychedelics: in particular, their influence on selfhood and subject-object boundaries-known as ego dissolution-surmised to underwrite their subjective and therapeutic effects. Agonism of 5-HT2A receptors, located at the apex of the cortical hierarchy, may have a particularly powerful effect on sentience and consciousness. These effects can endure well after the pharmacological half-life, suggesting that psychedelics may have effects on neural plasticity that may play a role in their therapeutic efficacy. Psychologically, this may be accompanied by a disarming of ego resistance that increases the repertoire of perceptual hypotheses and affords alternate pathways for thought and behavior, including those that undergird selfhood. We consider the interaction between serotonergic neuromodulation and sentience through the lens of hierarchical predictive coding, which speaks to the value of psychedelics in understanding how we make sense of the world and specific predictions about effective connectivity in cortical hierarchies that can be tested using functional neuroimaging. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: Classic psychedelics bind to serotonergic 5-HT2A receptors. Their agonist activity at these receptors leads to neuromodulatory changes in synaptic efficacy, resulting in a profound effect on information processing in the brain. Here, we synthesize an abundance of brain imaging research with pharmacological and psychological interpretations informed by the framework of predictive coding. Moreover, predictive coding is suggested to offer more sophisticated interpretations of neuroimaging findings by bridging the role between the 5-HT2A receptors and large-scale brain networks.

The Emperor Is Naked: Replies to commentaries on the target article

The 35 commentaries cover a wide range of topics and take many different stances on the issues explored by the target article. We have organised our response to the commentaries around three central questions: Are Friston blankets just Pearl blankets? What ontological and metaphysical commitments are implied by the use of Friston blankets? What kind of explanatory work are Friston blankets capable of? We conclude our reply with a short critical reflection on the indiscriminate use of both Markov blankets and the free energy principle.

A Bayesian model for chronic pain

The perceiving mind constructs our coherent and embodied experience of the world from noisy, ambiguous and multi-modal sensory information. In this paper, we adopt the perspective that the experience of pain may similarly be the result of a probabilistic, inferential process. Prior beliefs about pain, learned from past experiences, are combined with incoming sensory information in a Bayesian manner to give rise to pain perception. Chronic pain emerges when prior beliefs and likelihoods are biased towards inferring pain from a wide range of sensory data that would otherwise be perceived as harmless. We present a computational model of interoceptive inference and pain experience. It is based on a Bayesian graphical network which comprises a hidden layer, representing the inferred pain state; and an observable layer, representing current sensory information. Within the hidden layer, pain states are inferred from a combination of priors p(pain), transition probabilities between hidden states p(paint+1∣paint) and likelihoods of certain observations p(sensation∣pain). Using variational inference and free-energy minimization, the model is able to learn from observations over time. By systematically manipulating parameter settings, we demonstrate that the model is capable of reproducing key features of both healthy- and chronic pain experience. Drawing on mathematical concepts, we finally simulate treatment resistant chronic pain and discuss mathematically informed treatment options.

How Stress Can Change Our Deepest Preferences: Stress Habituation Explained Using the Free Energy Principle

People who habituate to stress show a repetition-induced response attenuation—neuroendocrine, cardiovascular, neuroenergetic, and emotional—when exposed to a threatening environment. But the exact dynamics underlying stress habituation remain obscure. The free energy principle offers a unifying account of self-organising systems such as the human brain. In this paper, we elaborate on how stress habituation can be explained and modelled using the free energy principle. We introduce habituation priors that encode the agent’s tendency for stress habituation and incorporate them in the agent’s decision-making process. Using differently shaped goal priors—that encode the agent’s goal preferences—we illustrate, in two examples, the optimising (and thus habituating) behaviour of agents. We show that habituation minimises free energy by reducing the precision (inverse variance) of goal preferences. Reducing the precision of goal priors means that the agent accepts adverse (previously unconscionable) states (e.g., lower social status and poverty). Acceptance or tolerance of adverse outcomes may explain why habituation causes people to exhibit an attenuation of the stress response. Given that stress habituation occurs in brain regions where goal priors are encoded, i.e., in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and that these priors are encoded as sufficient statistics of probability distributions, our approach seems plausible from an anatomical-functional and neuro-statistical point of view. The ensuing formal and generalisable account—based on the free energy principle—further motivate our novel treatment of stress habituation. Our analysis suggests that stress habituation has far-reaching consequences, protecting against the harmful effects of toxic stress, but on the other hand making the acceptability of precarious living conditions and the development of the obese type 2 diabetes mellitus phenotype more likely.

Theories of consciousness

Recent years have seen a blossoming of theories about the biological and physical basis of consciousness. Good theories guide empirical research, allowing us to interpret data, develop new experimental techniques and expand our capacity to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, it is only when couched in terms of a theory that empirical discoveries can ultimately deliver a satisfying understanding of a phenomenon. However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries.

An Active Inference Account of Skilled Anticipation in Sport: Using Computational Models to Formalise Theory and Generate New Hypotheses

Optimal performance in time-constrained and dynamically changing environments depends on making reliable predictions about future outcomes. In sporting tasks, performers have been found to employ multiple information sources to maximise the accuracy of their predictions, but questions remain about how different information sources are weighted and integrated to guide anticipation. In this paper, we outline how predictive processing approaches, and active inference in particular, provide a unifying account of perception and action that explains many of the prominent findings in the sports anticipation literature. Active inference proposes that perception and action are underpinned by the organism’s need to remain within certain stable states. To this end, decision making approximates Bayesian inference and actions are used to minimise future prediction errors during brain–body–environment interactions. Using a series of Bayesian neurocomputational models based on a partially observable Markov process, we demonstrate that key findings from the literature can be recreated from the first principles of active inference. In doing so, we formulate a number of novel and empirically falsifiable hypotheses about human anticipation capabilities that could guide future investigations in the field.

Branching Time Active Inference: The theory and its generality

Over the last 10 to 15 years, active inference has helped to explain various brain mechanisms from habit formation to dopaminergic discharge and even modelling curiosity. However, the current implementations suffer from an exponential (space and time) complexity class when computing the prior over all the possible policies up to the time-horizon. Fountas et al. (2020) used Monte Carlo tree search to address this problem, leading to impressive results in two different tasks. In this paper, we present an alternative framework that aims to unify tree search and active inference by casting planning as a structure learning problem. Two tree search algorithms are then presented. The first propagates the expected free energy forward in time (i.e., towards the leaves), while the second propagates it backward (i.e., towards the root). Then, we demonstrate that forward and backward propagations are related to active inference and sophisticated inference, respectively, thereby clarifying the differences between those two planning strategies.

Active Inference and Epistemic Value in Graphical Models

The Free Energy Principle (FEP) postulates that biological agents perceive and interact with their environment in order to minimize a Variational Free Energy (VFE) with respect to a generative model of their environment. The inference of a policy (future control sequence) according to the FEP is known as Active Inference (AIF). The AIF literature describes multiple VFE objectives for policy planning that lead to epistemic (information-seeking) behavior. However, most objectives have limited modeling flexibility. This paper approaches epistemic behavior from a constrained Bethe Free Energy (CBFE) perspective. Crucially, variational optimization of the CBFE can be expressed in terms of message passing on free-form generative models. The key intuition behind the CBFE is that we impose a point-mass constraint on predicted outcomes, which explicitly encodes the assumption that the agent will make observations in the future. We interpret the CBFE objective in terms of its constituent behavioral drives. We then illustrate resulting behavior of the CBFE by planning and interacting with a simulated T-maze environment. Simulations for the T-maze task illustrate how the CBFE agent exhibits an epistemic drive, and actively plans ahead to account for the impact of predicted outcomes. Compared to an EFE agent, the CBFE agent incurs expected reward in significantly more environmental scenarios. We conclude that CBFE optimization by message passing suggests a general mechanism for epistemic-aware AIF in free-form generative models.

Epistemic Communities under Active Inference

The spread of ideas is a fundamental concern of today's news ecology. Understanding the dynamics of the spread of information and its co-option by interested parties is of critical importance. Research on this topic has shown that individuals tend to cluster in echo-chambers and are driven by confirmation bias. In this paper, we leverage the active inference framework to provide an in silico model of confirmation bias and its effect on echo-chamber formation. We build a model based on active inference, where agents tend to sample information in order to justify their own view of reality, which eventually leads to them to have a high degree of certainty about their own beliefs. We show that, once agents have reached a certain level of certainty about their beliefs, it becomes very difficult to get them to change their views. This system of self-confirming beliefs is upheld and reinforced by the evolving relationship between an agent's beliefs and observations, which over time will continue to provide evidence for their ingrained ideas about the world. The epistemic communities that are consolidated by these shared beliefs, in turn, tend to produce perceptions of reality that reinforce those shared beliefs. We provide an active inference account of this community formation mechanism. We postulate that agents are driven by the epistemic value that they obtain from sampling or observing the behaviours of other agents. Inspired by digital social networks like Twitter, we build a generative model in which agents generate observable social claims or posts (e.g., 'tweets') while reading the socially observable claims of other agents that lend support to one of two mutually exclusive abstract topics. Agents can choose which other agent they pay attention to at each timestep, and crucially who they attend to and what they choose to read influences their beliefs about the world. Agents also assess their local network's perspective, influencing which kinds of posts they expect to see other agents making. The model was built and simulated using the freely available Python package pymdp. The proposed active inference model can reproduce the formation of echo-chambers over social networks, and gives us insight into the cognitive processes that lead to this phenomenon.

Goal-Directed Planning and Goal Understanding by Extended Active Inference: Evaluation through Simulated and Physical Robot Experiments

We show that goal-directed action planning and generation in a teleological framework can be formulated by extending the active inference framework. The proposed model, which is built on a variational recurrent neural network model, is characterized by three essential features. These are that (1) goals can be specified for both static sensory states, e.g., for goal images to be reached and dynamic processes, e.g., for moving around an object, (2) the model cannot only generate goal-directed action plans, but can also understand goals through sensory observation, and (3) the model generates future action plans for given goals based on the best estimate of the current state, inferred from past sensory observations. The proposed model is evaluated by conducting experiments on a simulated mobile agent as well as on a real humanoid robot performing object manipulation.

Prefrontal contributions to the stability and variability of thought and conscious experience

The human prefrontal cortex is a structurally and functionally heterogenous brain region, including multiple subregions that have been linked to different large-scale brain networks. It contributes to a broad range of mental phenomena, from goal-directed thought and executive functions to mind-wandering and psychedelic experience. Here we review what is known about the functions of different prefrontal subregions and their affiliations with large-scale brain networks to examine how they may differentially contribute to the diversity of mental phenomena associated with prefrontal function. An important dimension that distinguishes across different kinds of conscious experience is the stability or variability of mental states across time. This dimension is a central feature of two recently introduced theoretical frameworks-the dynamic framework of thought (DFT) and the relaxed beliefs under psychedelics (REBUS) model-that treat neurocognitive dynamics as central to understanding and distinguishing between different mental phenomena. Here, we bring these two frameworks together to provide a synthesis of how prefrontal subregions may differentially contribute to the stability and variability of thought and conscious experience. We close by considering future directions for this work.

How Psychedelic-Assisted Treatment Works in the Bayesian Brain

Psychedelics are experiencing a renaissance in clinical research. In recent years, an increasing number of studies on psychedelic-assisted treatment have been conducted. So far, the results are promising, suggesting that this new (or rather, rediscovered) form of therapy has great potential. One particular reason for that appears to be the synergistic combination of the pharmacological and psychotherapeutic interventions in psychedelic-assisted treatment. But how exactly do these two interventions complement each other? This paper provides the first account of the interaction between pharmacological and psychological effects in psychedelic-assisted treatment. Building on the relaxed beliefs under psychedelics (REBUS) hypothesis of Carhart-Harris and Friston and the contextual model of Wampold, it argues that psychedelics amplify the common factors and thereby the remedial effects of psychotherapy. More precisely, psychedelics are assumed to attenuate the precision of high-level predictions, making them more revisable by bottom-up input. Psychotherapy constitutes an important source of such input. At best, it signalizes a safe and supportive environment (cf. setting) and induces remedial expectations (cf. set). During treatment, these signals should become incorporated when high-level predictions are revised: a process that is hypothesized to occur as a matter of course in psychotherapy but to get reinforced and accelerated under psychedelics. Ultimately, these revisions should lead to a relief of symptoms.

Situational Understanding in the Human and the Machine

The Air Force research programs envision developing AI technologies that will ensure battlespace dominance, by radical increases in the speed of battlespace understanding and decision-making. In the last half century, advances in AI have been concentrated in the area of machine learning. Recent experimental findings and insights in systems neuroscience, the biophysics of cognition, and other disciplines provide converging results that set the stage for technologies of machine understanding and machine-augmented Situational Understanding. This paper will review some of the key ideas and results in the literature, and outline new suggestions. We define situational understanding and the distinctions between understanding and awareness, consider examples of how understanding-or lack of it-manifest in performance, and review hypotheses concerning the underlying neuronal mechanisms. Suggestions for further R&D are motivated by these hypotheses and are centered on the notions of Active Inference and Virtual Associative Networks.

The Markov blanket trick: On the scope of the free energy principle and active inference

The free energy principle (FEP) has been presented as a unified brain theory, as a general principle for the self-organization of biological systems, and most recently as a principle for a theory of every thing. Additionally, active inference has been proposed as the process theory entailed by FEP that is able to model the full range of biological and cognitive events. In this paper, we challenge these two claims. We argue that FEP is not the general principle it is claimed to be, and that active inference is not the all-encompassing process theory it is purported to be either. The core aspects of our argumentation are that (i) FEP is just a way to generalize Bayesian inference to all domains by the use of a Markov blanket formalism, a generalization we call the Markov blanket trick; and that (ii) active inference presupposes successful perception and action instead of explaining them.

On Epistemics in Expected Free Energy for Linear Gaussian State Space Models

Active Inference (AIF) is a framework that can be used both to describe information processing in naturally intelligent systems, such as the human brain, and to design synthetic intelligent systems (agents). In this paper we show that Expected Free Energy (EFE) minimisation, a core feature of the framework, does not lead to purposeful explorative behaviour in linear Gaussian dynamical systems. We provide a simple proof that, due to the specific construction used for the EFE, the terms responsible for the exploratory (epistemic) drive become constant in the case of linear Gaussian systems. This renders AIF equivalent to KL control. From a theoretical point of view this is an interesting result since it is generally assumed that EFE minimisation will always introduce an exploratory drive in AIF agents. While the full EFE objective does not lead to exploration in linear Gaussian dynamical systems, the principles of its construction can still be used to design objectives that include an epistemic drive. We provide an in-depth analysis of the mechanics behind the epistemic drive of AIF agents and show how to design objectives for linear Gaussian dynamical systems that do include an epistemic drive. Concretely, we show that focusing solely on epistemics and dispensing with goal-directed terms leads to a form of maximum entropy exploration that is heavily dependent on the type of control signals driving the system. Additive controls do not permit such exploration. From a practical point of view this is an important result since linear Gaussian dynamical systems with additive controls are an extensively used model class, encompassing for instance Linear Quadratic Gaussian controllers. On the other hand, linear Gaussian dynamical systems driven by multiplicative controls such as switching transition matrices do permit an exploratory drive.

What it is like to be a bit: an integrated information decomposition account of emergent mental phenomena

A central question in neuroscience concerns the relationship between consciousness and its physical substrate. Here, we argue that a richer characterization of consciousness can be obtained by viewing it as constituted of distinct information-theoretic elements. In other words, we propose a shift from quantification of consciousness-viewed as integrated information-to its decomposition. Through this approach, termed Integrated Information Decomposition (ΦID), we lay out a formal argument that whether the consciousness of a given system is an emergent phenomenon depends on its information-theoretic composition-providing a principled answer to the long-standing dispute on the relationship between consciousness and emergence. Furthermore, we show that two organisms may attain the same amount of integrated information, yet differ in their information-theoretic composition. Building on ΦID's revised understanding of integrated information, termed ΦR, we also introduce the notion of ΦR-ing ratio to quantify how efficiently an entity uses information for conscious processing. A combination of ΦR and ΦR-ing ratio may provide an important way to compare the neural basis of different aspects of consciousness. Decomposition of consciousness enables us to identify qualitatively different 'modes of consciousness', establishing a common space for mapping the phenomenology of different conscious states. We outline both theoretical and empirical avenues to carry out such mapping between phenomenology and information-theoretic modes, starting from a central feature of everyday consciousness: selfhood. Overall, ΦID yields rich new ways to explore the relationship between information, consciousness, and its emergence from neural dynamics.

Sense of agency disturbances in movement disorders: A comprehensive review

Sense of agency refers to the experience that one's self-generated action causes an event in the external environment. Here, we review the behavioural and brain evidence of aberrant experiences of agency in movement disorders, clinical conditions characterized by either a paucity or an excess of movements unrelated to the patient's intention. We show that specific abnormal agency experiences characterize several movement disorders. Those manifestations are typically associated with structural and functional brain abnormalities. However, the evidence is sometimes conflicting, especially when considering results obtained through different agency measures. The present review aims to create order in the existing literature on sense of agency investigations in movement disorders and to provide a coherent overview framed within current neurocognitive models of motor awareness.

Predictive eye movements are adjusted in a Bayes-optimal fashion in response to unexpectedly changing environmental probabilities

This study examined the application of active inference to dynamic visuomotor control. Active inference proposes that actions are dynamically planned according to uncertainty about sensory information, prior expectations, and the environment, with motor adjustments serving to minimise future prediction errors. We investigated whether predictive gaze behaviours are indeed adjusted in this Bayes-optimal fashion during a virtual racquetball task. In this task, participants intercepted bouncing balls with varying levels of elasticity, under conditions of higher or lower environmental volatility. Participants' gaze patterns differed between stable and volatile conditions in a manner consistent with generative models of Bayes-optimal behaviour. Partially observable Markov models also revealed an increased rate of associative learning in response to unpredictable shifts in environmental probabilities, although there was no overall effect of volatility on this parameter. Findings extend active inference frameworks into complex and unconstrained visuomotor tasks and present important implications for a neurocomputational understanding of the visual guidance of action.