Getting a tool gives wings: overestimation of tool-related benefits in a motor imagery task and a decision task

Impact of Intrinsic Cognitive Skills and Metacognitive Beliefs on Tool Use Performance

Cognitive tools (e.g., calculators) provide all users with the same potential. Yet when people use such cognitive tools, interindividual variations are observed. Previous findings have indicated that 2 main factors could explain these variations: intrinsic cognitive skills (i.e., the “non–tool use” cognitive skills associated with the task targeted) and metacognitive beliefs about one's performance with tool use. In this study we sought to reproduce these findings and to investigate in more detail the nature of the relationships (i.e., linear vs. exponential) between tool use performance and intrinsic cognitive skills. In Experiment 1, 200 participants completed 2 cognitive tasks (calculation and geography) in 2 conditions (non–tool use vs. tool use). In Experiment 2, 70 participants performed a geography task in 2 conditions (non–tool use vs. tool use) and estimated their performance in each condition before completing the task. Results indicated that intrinsic cognitive skills and, to a lesser extent, metacognitive beliefs improved tool use performance: The higher the intrinsic cognitive skills and the higher participants estimated their tool use performance, the higher this tool use performance was. The nature of the relationship between tool use performance and intrinsic cognitive skills appeared to be linear rather than exponential. These findings extend previous research showing a strong impact of intrinsic cognitive skills on the performance associated with the use of cognitive tools or external aids.

The Toolman effect: Preexisting non-tool-use experience improves subsequent tool-use performance

This study explores whether performing a cognitive task without using a tool (i.e., preexisting non-tool-use experience) impacts subsequent tool-use performance. Sixty participants moved an avatar within a maze in four directions (up, down, left, right). The keys were remapped 90° anticlockwise (e.g., the right key → upward). Therefore, the participants had to learn the mental-rotation-based perceptual-motor transformation to complete the path as quickly as possible and with as few errors as possible. In Tool trials, a cognitive tool (i.e., an arrow symbol) helped the participants to find the correct key. In No Tool trials, they completed the task without the cognitive tool. The tool was introduced either early or late in the task. At the end of the task, all participants completed the task without the tool. Results indicated that preexisting non-tool-use experience improved subsequent tool-use efficiency (i.e., completion times). In addition, the early introduction of the tool induced an effectiveness bias (i.e., accuracy) that persisted even after the removal of the tool. By contrast, its late introduction favored the emergence of an efficiency bias that persisted even after the introduction of the tool. These findings provide new insights into the role of users' intrinsic cognitive skills in tool use.

Getting a tool gives wings even in schizophrenia: underestimation of tool-related effort in a motor imagery task

Humans frequently use tools to reduce action-related efforts. Interestingly, several studies have demonstrated that individuals had tool-related biases in terms of perceived effort reduction during motor imagery tasks, despite the lack of evidence of real benefits. Reduced effort allocation has been repeatedly found in schizophrenia, but it remains unknown how schizophrenia patients perceive tool-related benefits regarding effort. Twenty-four schizophrenia patients and twenty-four nonclinical participants were instructed to move the same quantities of objects with their hands or with a tool in both real and imagined situations. Imagined and real movement durations were recorded. Similarly to nonclinical participants, patients overestimated tool-related benefits and underestimated tool-related effort in terms of time when they mentally simulated a task requiring the use of a tool. No association between movement durations and psychotic symptoms was found. Our results open new perspectives on the issue of effort in schizophrenia.

Learning versus reasoning to use tools in children

Tool behavior might be based on two strategies associated with specific cognitive mechanisms: cued-learning and technical-reasoning strategies. We aimed to explore whether these strategies coexist in young children and whether they are manifest differently through development. We presented 216 3- to 9-year-olds with a vertical maze task consisting in moving a ball from the top to the bottom of a maze. Two tool-use/mechanical actions were possible: rotating action and sliding action. Three conditions were tested, each focused on a different strategy. In the Opaque-Cue condition (cued-learning strategy), children could not see the mechanical action of each tool. Nevertheless, a cue was provided according to the tool needed to solve the problem. In the Transparent-No Cue condition (technical-reasoning strategy), no cue was presented. However, children could see the mechanical actions associated with each tool. In the Transparent-Cue condition (cued-learning and/or technical-reasoning strategies) children saw both the mechanical actions and the cues. Results indicated that the Opaque-Cue and Transparent-Cue conditions were easier than the Transparent-No-Cue condition in all children. These findings stress that children can use either cued learning or technical reasoning to use tools, according to the available information. The behavioral pattern observed in the Transparent-Cue condition suggests that children might be inclined to use technical reasoning even when the task can be solved through cued learning.

The importance of the body-specificity in the evaluation of visuospatial working memory

This work is rooted in the embodied cognition paradigm applied to the evaluation of visuospatial memory span. We aimed to test whether manuospatial incompatibility affects the evaluation of visuospatial working memory. Older and younger participants were tested under two different spatial field conditions, namely manuospatial incompatibility and manuospatial compatibility, using the standard Corsi Block Tapping Task. The results show that a manuospatial compatibility condition helped both younger and older participants to increase their visuospatial working memory span compared to the traditional manuospatial incompatibility condition. By analyzing the data, our results showed an increase of visuospatial memory span in manuospatial compatibility condition (i.e., the experimenter using his left hand and the participant his right hand) compared to manuospatial incompatibility condition for younger and older adults. We recommend that the interaction between body and cognition would be taken into account in clinical evaluation methods.

Extraversion level predicts perceived benefits from social resources and tool use

Social baseline theory states that there are differences in how humans integrate social resources into their economy of action when they face environmental demands. However, although several authors suggested that extraversion may be an indicator of the social baseline, no study has demonstrated it. The present study aims to test this hypothesis and, in particular, examines whether extraversion is a specific indicator of the social baseline. In two experiments, participants were asked to move rolls either alone (with their hands), or with the help of a social resource (Experiment 1), or a tool (Experiment 2). Results showed that extraversion predicted the choice to use both types of resource. Specifically, the more participants were extraverted, the more they tended to consider the use of the social resource or the tool as beneficial. We argue that these results indicate that extraversion is not specifically an indicator of the social baseline, but rather an indicator of how individuals integrate technical and social resources into their economy of action. In addition, this study encourages future research endeavors to define what constitutes a resource and how it could fit into the Social Baseline Theory.

Validation of a Perception of Objectification in the Workplace Short Scale (POWS)

An increasing number of studies focus on the phenomenon of objectification in the workplace. This phenomenon reflects a process of subjection of the employee, where he is considered as an object, a mean (utilitarian) or reduced to one of his attributes. Previous studies have shown that objectification can have consequences on the workplace health or performance. Field studies are based on objectification measures based on tools whose psychometric qualities are unclear. Based on a previous workplace objectification measurement scale, we conducted a study with the aim of devising a new parsimonious scale. We present three studies which aim to validate this new scale. In the first study, an EFA and a CFA were performed in order to construct a scale and verify its structure validity. We obtained a 10-item scale reporting two factors labeled “Instrumental value” and “Powerfulness.” The psychometric qualities of this scale were satisfactory, i.e., showed good internal reliability and good structural validity. In a second study, we tested the convergent and divergent validity of the scale. We observe that POWS is adequately correlated with dehumanization indicators. Finally, in a third study, we found that only powerfulness was associated with negative consequences for occupational health. This suggests that objectification is a process of social perception that contributes either to the devaluation of social agents in the workplace or to normal functioning at work.

The effects of tool comparisons when estimating the likelihood of task success

People often use tools for tasks, and sometimes there is uncertainty about whether a given task can be completed with a given tool. This project explored whether, when, and how people’s optimism about successfully completing a task with a given tool is affected by the contextual salience of a better or worse tool. In six studies, participants were faced with novel tasks. For each task, they were assigned a tool but also exposed to a comparison tool that was better or worse in utility (or sometimes similar in utility). In some studies, the tool comparisons were essentially social comparisons, because the tool was assigned to another person. In other studies, the tool comparisons were merely counterfactual rather than social. The studies revealed contrast effects on optimism, and the effect worked in both directions. That is, worse comparison tools boosted optimism and better tools depressed optimism. The contrast effects were observed regardless of the general type of comparison (e.g., social, counterfactual). The comparisons also influenced discrete decisions about which task to attempt (for a prize), which is an important finding for ruling out superficial scaling explanations for the contrast effects. It appears that people fail to exclude irrelevant tool-comparison information from consideration when assessing their likelihood of success on a task, resulting in biased optimism and decisions.

Too much or too little? Exploring effort perception in schizophrenia within the framework of motivational intensity theory

Introduction: To explain motivational difficulties in schizophrenia (SZ), attention has focused on the reward system and effort-based decision-making deficits. However, according to motivational intensity theory (MIT), effort is not directly determined by reward but by task difficulty. Moreover, no studies have examined the effort perception in the SZ. Therefore, this cross-sectional study compared effort perception in SZ group with healthy controls. Method: Task difficulty was manipulated by increasing the distance covered (from 8 to 48 metres). Walking speed, perceptions of difficulty and effort were assessed for all difficulty levels. Clinical and bodyweight variables were recorded. Results: As postulated by MIT, perceived effort and difficulty increased with task difficulty in both groups. Perceived effort and difficulty were higher in the SZ group. Perceptions of effort were positively correlated with BMI in SZ, but not with clinical variables. Importantly, although SZ patients perceived the task as more effortful, walking speed was similar between groups. Conclusions: Taken together, these results suggested that individuals with SZ perceived more strongly the effort and the difficulty of the task but could mobilise more effort to complete it. This observation may explain in part the decrease in engaging in physical demanding activities in daily life in SZ.

Technition: When Tools Come Out of the Closet

People are ambivalently enthusiastic and anxious about how far technology can go. Therefore, understanding the neurocognitive bases of the human technical mind should be a major topic of the cognitive sciences. Surprisingly, however, scientists are not interested in this topic or address it only marginally in other mainstream domains (e.g., motor control, action observation, social cognition). In fact, this lack of interest may hinder our understanding of the necessary neurocognitive skills underlying our appetence for transforming our physical environment. Here, we develop the thesis that our technical mind originates in perhaps uniquely human neurocognitive skills, namely, technical-reasoning skills involving the area PF within the left inferior parietal lobe. This thesis creates an epistemological rupture with the state of the art that justifies the emergence of a new field in the cognitive sciences (i.e., technition) dedicated to the intelligence hidden behind tools and other forms of technologies, including constructions.

The elephant in the room: What matters cognitively in cumulative technological culture

Cumulative technological culture (CTC) refers to the increase in the efficiency and complexity of tools and techniques in human populations over generations. A fascinating question is to understand the cognitive origins of this phenomenon. Because CTC is definitely a social phenomenon, most accounts have suggested a series of cognitive mechanisms oriented toward the social dimension (e.g., teaching, imitation, theory of mind, and metacognition), thereby minimizing the technical dimension and the potential influence of non-social, cognitive skills. What if we have failed to see the elephant in the room? What if social cognitive mechanisms were only catalyzing factors and not the sufficient and necessary conditions for the emergence of CTC? In this article, we offer an alternative, unified cognitive approach to this phenomenon by assuming that CTC originates in non-social cognitive skills, namely technical-reasoning skills which enable humans to develop the technical potential necessary to constantly acquire and improve technical information. This leads us to discuss how theory of mind and metacognition, in concert with technical reasoning, can help boost CTC. The cognitive approach developed here opens up promising new avenues for reinterpreting classical issues (e.g., innovation, emulation vs. imitation, social vs. asocial learning, cooperation, teaching, and overimitation) in a field that has so far been largely dominated by other disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, anthropology, archeology, economics, and philosophy.

From the Age of 5 Humans Decide Economically, Whereas Crows Exhibit Individual Preferences

Human societies greatly depend on tools, which spare us considerable time and effort. Humans might have evolved a bias to employ tools, using them even when they are unnecessary. This study aimed to investigate whether adult humans and a distantly related habitually tool-using vertebrate species, the New Caledonian crow (Corvus moneduloides), use tools depending on their necessity. In addition, children aged 3 to 5 years were examined to investigate the developmental pattern. The task involved choosing between using a body part (i.e. crows: beak; humans: hand) or a tool for retrieving a reward from a box. All subjects were tested in two conditions. In the Body+/Tool- condition, using the body was more efficient than using the tool, and conversely in the Body-/Tool+ condition. Our results suggest that the capacity to employ tools economically develops late in humans. Crows, however, failed to choose economically. At the individual level, some subjects exhibited striking individual preferences for either using a tool or their beak throughout the task. Whether such biases depend on individual experience or whether they are genetically determined remains to be investigated. Our findings provide new insights about tool use and its cognitive implementation in two outstanding tool-using taxa.

Embodied cognition of aging

Embodiment is revolutionizing the way we consider cognition by incorporating the influence of our body and of the current context within cognitive processing. A growing number of studies which support this view of cognition in young adults stands in stark contrast with the lack of evidence in favor of this view in the field of normal aging and neurocognitive disorders. Nonetheless, the validation of embodiment assumptions on the whole spectrum of cognition is a mandatory step in order for embodied cognition theories to become theories of human cognition. More pragmatically, aging populations represent a perfect target to test embodied cognition theories due to concomitant changes in sensory, motor and cognitive functioning that occur in aging, since these theories predict direct interactions between them. Finally, the new perspectives on cognition provided by these theories might also open new research avenues and new clinical applications in the field of aging. The present article aims at showing the value and interest to explore embodiment in normal and abnormal aging as well as introducing some potential theoretical and clinical applications.

To do it or to let an automatic tool do it? The priority of control over effort

The aim of the present study is to provide experimental data relevant to the issue of what leads humans to use automatic tools. Two answers can be offered. The first is that humans strive to minimize physical and/or cognitive effort (principle of least effort). The second is that humans tend to keep their perceived control over the environment (principle of more control). These two factors certainly play a role, but the question raised here is to what do people give priority in situations wherein both manual and automatic actions take the same time - minimizing effort or keeping perceived control? To answer that question, we built four experiments in which participants were confronted with a recurring choice between performing a task manually (physical effort) or in a semi-automatic way (cognitive effort) versus using an automatic tool that completes the task for them (no effort). In this latter condition, participants were required to follow the progression of the automatic tool step by step. Our results showed that participants favored the manual or semi-automatic condition over the automatic condition. However, when they were offered the opportunity to perform recreational tasks in parallel, the shift toward manual condition disappeared. The findings give support to the idea that people give priority to keeping control over minimizing effort.