Debunking a myth: plant consciousness

Induced resistance to herbivory and the intelligent plant

Plant induced responses to environmental stressors are increasingly studied in a behavioral ecology context. This is particularly true for plant induced responses to herbivory that mediate direct and indirect defenses, and tolerance. These seemingly adaptive alterations of plant defense phenotypes in the context of other environmental conditions have led to the discussion of such responses as intelligent behavior. Here we consider the concept of plant intelligence and some of its predictions for chemical information transfer in plant interaction with other organisms. Within this framework, the flow, perception, integration, and storage of environmental information are considered tunable dials that allow plants to respond adaptively to attacking herbivores while integrating past experiences and environmental cues that are predictive of future conditions. The predictive value of environmental information and the costs of acting on false information are important drivers of the evolution of plant responses to herbivory. We identify integrative priming of defense responses as a mechanism that allows plants to mitigate potential costs associated with acting on false information. The priming mechanisms provide short- and long-term memory that facilitates the integration of environmental cues without imposing significant costs. Finally, we discuss the ecological and evolutionary prediction of the plant intelligence hypothesis.

Vegetal memory through the lens of transcriptomic changes - recent progress and future practical prospects for exploiting plant transcriptional memory

Plant memory plays an important role in the efficient and rapid acclimation to a swiftly changing environment. In addition, since plant memory can be inherited, it is also of adaptive and evolutionary importance. The ability of a plant to store, retain, retrieve and delete information on acquired experience is based on cellular, biochemical and molecular networks in the plants. This review offers an up-to-date overview on the formation, types, checkpoints of plant memory based on our current knowledge and focusing on its transcriptional aspects, the transcriptional memory. Roles of long and small non-coding RNAs are summarized in the regulation, formation and the cooperation between the different layers of the plant memory, i.e. in the establishment of epigenetic changes associated with memory formation in plants. The RNA interference mechanisms at the RNA and DNA level and the interplays between them are also presented. Furthermore, this review gives an insight of how exploitation of plant transcriptional memory may provide new opportunities for elaborating promising cost-efficient, and effective strategies to cope with the ever-changing environmental perturbations, caused by climate change. The potentials of plant memory-based methods, such as crop priming, cross acclimatization, memory modification by miRNAs and associative use of plant memory, in the future's agriculture are also discussed.

The "plant neurobiology" revolution

The 21st-century "plant neurobiology" movement is an amalgam of scholars interested in how "neural processes", broadly defined, lead to changes in plant behavior. Integral to the movement (now called plant behavioral biology) is a triad of historically marginalized subdisciplines, namely plant ethology, whole plant electrophysiology and plant comparative psychology, that set plant neurobiology apart from the mainstream. A central tenet held by these "triad disciplines" is that plants are exquisitely sensitive to environmental perturbations and that destructive experimental manipulations rapidly and profoundly affect plant function. Since destructive measurements have been the norm in plant physiology, much of our "textbook knowledge" concerning plant physiology is unrelated to normal plant function. As such, scientists in the triad disciplines favor a more natural and holistic approach toward understanding plant function. By examining the history, philosophy, sociology and psychology of the triad disciplines, this paper refutes in eight ways the criticism that plant neurobiology presents nothing new, and that the topics of plant neurobiology fall squarely under the purview of mainstream plant physiology. It is argued that although the triad disciplines and mainstream plant physiology share the common goal of understanding plant function, they are distinct in having their own intellectual histories and epistemologies.

How (not) to Talk to a Plant: An Application of Automata Theory to Plant Communication

Plants are capable of a range of complex interactions with the environment. Over the last decade, some authors have used this as evidence to argue that plants are cognitive agents. While there is no consensus on this view, it is certainly interesting to approach the debate from a comparative perspective, trying to understand whether different lineages of plants show different degrees of responsiveness to environmental cues, and how their responses compare with those of animals or humans. In this paper, I suggest that a potentially fruitful approach to these comparative studies is provided by automata theory. Accordingly, I shall present a possible application of this theory to plant communication. Two tentative results will emerge. First, that different lineages may exhibit different levels of complexity in response to similar stimuli. Second, that current evidence does not allow to infer great cognitive sophistication in plants.

Cell consciousness: a dissenting opinion : The cellular basis of consciousness theory lacks empirical evidence for its claims that all cells have consciousness

The proponents of CBC claim that all living organisms down to prokaryotes have consciousness. However, their arguments lack empirical evidence or are refuted by established facts.

Mother trees, altruistic fungi, and the perils of plant personification

There are growing doubts about the true role of the common mycorrhizal networks (CMN or wood wide web) connecting the roots of trees in forests. We question the claims of a substantial carbon transfer from 'mother trees' to their offspring and nearby seedlings through the CMN. Recent reviews show that evidence for the 'mother tree concept' is inconclusive or absent. The origin of this concept seems to stem from a desire to humanize plant life but can lead to misunderstandings and false interpretations and may eventually harm rather than help the commendable cause of preserving forests. Two recent books serve as examples: The Hidden Life of Trees and Finding the Mother Tree.

Alleviative effects of Faradarmani Consciousness Field on Triticum aestivum L. under salinity stress

Background: The Faradarmani Consciousness Field was founded by Mohammad Ali Taheri. It is a novel field and is described similarly to the field of gravity, or the electromagnetic field. This field is neither matter nor energy, and therefore does not possess a quantity. Even though there is no direct scientific evidence for the Consciousness Field, it is possible to investigate its effects on objects through controlled experiments. The aim of the present work was to study the alleviative effects of the Faradarmani Consciousness Field on common wheat Triticum aestivum L. var Star under salt stress. Methods: Plants were grown under 0 mM NaCl (control) and 150 mM NaCl with or without the influence of Faradarmani Consciousness Field for 3 weeks. Chlorophyll, hydrogen peroxide (H ₂O ₂), malondialdehyde (MDA) content and activity of antioxidant enzymes such as superoxide dismutase (SOD),polyphenol oxidase (PPO), and peroxidase (POX) were measured in all groups of plants. Results: In the salt-treated plants under the influence of the Faradarmani Consciousness Field, the contents of total chlorophyll, as well as a and b chlorophyll forms, were elevated compared with the salt-treated plants without Faradarmani CF (34.8%, 17.8%, and 169% respectively). Additionally, Faradarmani increased H ₂O ₂ (57%) and the activity of SOD and PPO by 220% and 168%, respectively, under salinity compared with the salt-treated plants without Faradarmani CF. MDA content and activity of peroxidase were decreased by 12.5% and 34%, respectively. Conclusion: These results suggest the Faradarmani Consciousness Field as a qualitative intervention strategy to withstand salt stress in plants, by increasing the contents of chlorophyll, antioxidant enzyme activities, and decreasing MDA content under salinity.

Deep inside the epigenetic memories of stressed plants

Recent evidence sheds light on the peculiar type of plant intelligence. Plants have developed complex molecular networks that allow them to remember, choose, and make decisions depending on the stress stimulus, although they lack a nervous system. Being sessile, plants can exploit these networks to optimize their resources cost-effectively and maximize their fitness in response to multiple environmental stresses. Even more interesting is the capability to transmit this experience to the next generation(s) through epigenetic modifications that add to the classical genetic inheritance. In this opinion article, we present concepts and perspectives regarding the capabilities of plants to sense, perceive, remember, re-elaborate, respond, and to some extent transmit to their progeny information to adapt more efficiently to climate change.

Neuroanatomy of the Will

Questions regarding the nature and source of consciousness and individual agency to make decisions have enormous practical implications that include human health and wellbeing, social policy, and economics. Ethical issues involving the ability for patients to make conscious, informed choices, such as in cases of dementia or coma, abound, and the health implications of individual choice on public wellbeing are becoming increasingly important as population densities increase. Furthermore, the use of animals for drug testing presents moral dilemmas related to our concepts of consciousness, pain, and consent. While philosophers have long debated aspects of consciousness, the means to scientifically address specific questions regarding regional and cellular functions of the brain are constantly emerging, as are new theories of physical laws and particle interactions which allow for the formation of new hypotheses of the source of consciousness. These emerging capabilities and hypotheses are increasingly able to be subjected to methodological scrutiny by the scientific community. To facilitate open discussion and advances in investigations regarding the nature of consciousness, this Topical Collection is intended to provide a peer-reviewed space to discuss or propose falsifiable hypotheses of consciousness in a full range of systems, using methods across disciplines of biology, physics, computer science, and philosophy of science that can inform such a discussion, while emphasizing the role that our conception of consciousness has on human health, society, and policy.

Do plants pay attention? A possible phenomenological-empirical approach

Attention is the important ability of flexibly controlling limited cognitive resources. It ensures that organisms engage with the activities and stimuli that are relevant to their survival. Despite the cognitive capabilities of plants and their complex behavioural repertoire, the study of attention in plants has been largely neglected. In this article, we advance the hypothesis that plants are endowed with the ability of attaining attentive states. We depart from a transdisciplinary basis of philosophy, psychology, physics and plant ecophysiology to propose a framework that seeks to explain how plant attention might operate and how it could be studied empirically. In particular, the phenomenological approach seems particularly important to explain plant attention theoretically, and plant electrophysiology seems particularly suited to study it empirically. We propose the use of electrophysiological techniques as a viable way for studying it, and we revisit previous work to support our hypothesis. We conclude this essay with some remarks on future directions for the study of plant attention and its implications to botany.

What Is It Like to Be a Bass? Red Herrings, Fish Pain and the Study of Animal Sentience

Debates around fishes' ability to feel pain concern sentience: do reactions to tissue damage indicate evaluative consciousness (conscious affect), or mere nociception? Thanks to Braithwaite's discovery of trout nociceptors, and concerns that current practices could compromise welfare in countless fish, this issue's importance is beyond dispute. However, nociceptors are merely necessary, not sufficient, for true pain, and many measures held to indicate sentience have the same problem. The question of whether fish feel pain - or indeed anything at all - therefore stimulates sometimes polarized debate. Here, we try to bridge the divide. After reviewing key consciousness concepts, we identify "red herring" measures that should not be used to infer sentience because also present in non-sentient organisms, notably those lacking nervous systems, like plants and protozoa (P); spines disconnected from brains (S); decerebrate mammals and birds (D); and humans in unaware states (U). These "S.P.U.D. subjects" can show approach/withdrawal; react with apparent emotion; change their reactivity with food deprivation or analgesia; discriminate between stimuli; display Pavlovian learning, including some forms of trace conditioning; and even learn simple instrumental responses. Consequently, none of these responses are good indicators of sentience. Potentially more valid are aspects of working memory, operant conditioning, the self-report of state, and forms of higher order cognition. We suggest new experiments on humans to test these hypotheses, as well as modifications to tests for "mental time travel" and self-awareness (e.g., mirror self-recognition) that could allow these to now probe sentience (since currently they reflect perceptual rather than evaluative, affective aspects of consciousness). Because "bullet-proof" neurological and behavioral indicators of sentience are thus still lacking, agnosticism about fish sentience remains widespread. To end, we address how to balance such doubts with welfare protection, discussing concerns raised by key skeptics in this debate. Overall, we celebrate the rigorous evidential standards required by those unconvinced that fish are sentient; laud the compassion and ethical rigor shown by those advocating for welfare protections; and seek to show how precautionary principles still support protecting fish from physical harm.

Direct Approach or Detour: A Comparative Model of Inhibition and Neural Ensemble Size in Behavior Selection

Organisms must cope with different risk/reward landscapes in their ecological niche. Hence, species have evolved behavior and cognitive processes to optimally balance approach and avoidance. Navigation through space, including taking detours, appears also to be an essential element of consciousness. Such processes allow organisms to negotiate predation risk and natural geometry that obstruct foraging. One aspect of this is the ability to inhibit a direct approach toward a reward. Using an adaptation of the well-known detour paradigm in comparative psychology, but in a virtual world, we simulate how different neural configurations of inhibitive processes can yield behavior that approximates characteristics of different species. Results from simulations may help elucidate how evolutionary adaptation can shape inhibitive processing in particular and behavioral selection in general. More specifically, results indicate that both the level of inhibition that an organism can exert and the size of neural populations dedicated to inhibition contribute to successful detour navigation. According to our results, both factors help to facilitate detour behavior, but the latter (i.e., larger neural populations) appears to specifically reduce behavioral variation.

Our sisters the plants? notes from phylogenetics and botany on plant kinship blindness

Before the upheaval brought about by phylogenetic classification, classical taxonomy separated living beings into two distinct kingdoms, animals and plants. Rooted in 'naturalist' cosmology, Western science has built its theoretical apparatus on this dichotomy mostly based on ancient Aristotelian ideas. Nowadays, despite the adoption of the Darwinian paradigm that unifies living organisms as a kinship, the concept of the "scale of beings" continues to structure our analysis and understanding of living species. Our aim is to combine developments in phylogeny, recent advances in biology, and renewed interest in plant agency to craft an interdisciplinary stance on the living realm. The lines at the origin of plant or animal have a common evolutionary history dating back to about 3.9 Ga, separating only 1.6 Ga ago. From a phylogenetic perspective of living species history, plants and animals belong to sister groups. With recent data related to the field of Plant Neurobiology, our aim is to discuss some socio-cultural obstacles, mainly in Western naturalist epistemology, that have prevented the integration of living organisms as relatives, while suggesting a few avenues inspired by practices principally from other ontologies that could help overcome these obstacles and build bridges between different ways of connecting to life.

Plants make smart decisions in complex environments

This review proposes that plants make smart decision and encourages scientists to formulate and test hypotheses about plant's decisions as an option to investigate complex phenomena that are hardly explained through the predominant mechanistic approach. Three physiological processes (seed germination and seedling emergence, abortion of reproductive structures, and regulation of photosynthesis) are discussed to illustrate the plant's ability to make decisions from three different perspectives. It is proposed that plant scientists could access a rich pool of information by formulating and testing hypothesis on plant's decisions, even when it is not possible elucidating the full mechanism underpinning the decision. Decisions with a strategic component are discussed for seed germination and seedling emergence, in which the plant depends on limited information for making early decisions that will influence its survival and potential growth. Decisions consistent with an analysis of benefit/cost are illustrated with observations from abortion of reproductive structures. Decisions that search the optimization of complex processes are exemplified with the regulation of photosynthesis. For each type of decision, some draft experiments are suggested as exercise on how this framework could be applied. It is proposed that scientists could make experiments with plant's decisions adapting methods that were developed for other disciplines.

Multiple Routes to Animal Consciousness: Constrained Multiple Realizability Rather Than Modest Identity Theory

The multiple realizability thesis (MRT) is an important philosophical and psychological concept. It says any mental state can be constructed by multiple realizability (MR), meaning in many distinct ways from different physical parts. The goal of our study is to find if the MRT applies to the mental state of consciousness among animals. Many things have been written about MRT but the ones most applicable to animal consciousness are by Shapiro in a 2004 book called The Mind Incarnate and by Polger and Shapiro in their 2016 work, The Multiple Realization Book. Standard, classical MRT has been around since 1967 and it says that a mental state can have very many different physical realizations, in a nearly unlimited manner. To the contrary, Shapiro's book reasoned that physical, physiological, and historical constraints force mental traits to evolve in just a few, limited directions, which is seen as convergent evolution of the associated neural traits in different animal lineages. This is his mental constraint thesis (MCT). We examined the evolution of consciousness in animals and found that it arose independently in just three animal clades-vertebrates, arthropods, and cephalopod mollusks-all of which share many consciousness-associated traits: elaborate sensory organs and brains, high capacity for memory, directed mobility, etc. These three constrained, convergently evolved routes to consciousness fit Shapiro's original MCT. More recently, Polger and Shapiro's book presented much the same thesis but changed its name from MCT to a "modest identity thesis." Furthermore, they argued against almost all the classically offered instances of MR in animal evolution, especially against the evidence of neural plasticity and the differently expanded cerebrums of mammals and birds. In contrast, we argue that some of these classical examples of MR are indeed valid and that Shapiro's original MCT correction of MRT is the better account of the evolution of consciousness in animal clades. And we still agree that constraints and convergence refute the standard, nearly unconstrained, MRT.

Consciousness and cognition in plants

Unlike animal behavior, behavior in plants is traditionally assumed to be completely determined either genetically or environmentally. Under this assumption, plants are usually considered to be noncognitive organisms. This view nonetheless clashes with a growing body of empirical research that shows that many sophisticated cognitive capabilities traditionally assumed to be exclusive to animals are exhibited by plants too. Yet, if plants can be considered cognitive, even in a minimal sense, can they also be considered conscious? Some authors defend that the quest for plant consciousness is worth pursuing, under the premise that sentience can play a role in facilitating plant's sophisticated behavior. The goal of this article is not to provide a positive argument for plant cognition and consciousness, but to invite a constructive, empirically informed debate about it. After reviewing the empirical literature concerning plant cognition, we introduce the reader to the emerging field of plant neurobiology. Research on plant electrical and chemical signaling can help shed light into the biological bases for plant sentience. To conclude, we shall present a series of approaches to scientifically investigate plant consciousness. In sum, we invite the reader to consider the idea that if consciousness boils down to some form of biological adaptation, we should not exclude a priori the possibility that plants have evolved their own phenomenal experience of the world. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Philosophy > Consciousness Neuroscience > Cognition.

What Is Consciousness? Integrated Information vs. Inference

Any successful naturalistic account of consciousness must state what consciousness is, in terms that are compatible with the rest of our naturalistic descriptions of the world. Integrated Information Theory represents a pioneering attempt to do just this. This theory accounts for the core features of consciousness by holding that there is an equivalence between the phenomenal experience associated with a system and its intrinsic causal power. The proposal, however, fails to provide insight into the qualitative character of consciousness and, as a result of its proposed equivalence between consciousness and purely internal dynamics, into the intentional character of conscious perception. In recent years, an alternate group of theories has been proposed that claims consciousness to be equivalent to certain forms of inference. One such theory is the Living Mirror theory, which holds consciousness to be a form of inference performed by all living systems. The proposal of consciousness as inference overcomes the shortcomings of Integrated Information Theory, particularly in the case of conscious perception. A synthesis of these two perspectives can be reached by appreciating that conscious living systems are self-organising in nature. This mode of organization requires them to have a high level of integration. From this perspective, we can understand consciousness as being dependent on a system possessing non-trivial amounts of integrated information while holding that the process of inference performed by the system is the fact of consciousness itself.

Plants have neither synapses nor a nervous system

The alleged existence of so-called synapses or equivalent structures in plants provided the basis for the concept of Plant Neurobiology (Baluska et al., 2005; Brenner et al., 2006). More recently, supporters of this controversial theory have even speculated that the phloem acts as a kind of nerve system serving long distance electrical signaling (Mediano et al., 2021; Baluska and Mancuso, 2021). In this review we have critically examined the literature cited by these authors and arrive at a completely different conclusion. Plants do not have any structures resembling animal synapses (neither chemical nor electrical). While they certainly do have complex cell contacts and signaling mechanisms, none of these structures provides a basis for neuronal-like synaptic transmission. Likewise, the phloem is undoubtedly a conduit for the propagation of electrical signaling, but the characteristics of this process are in no way comparable to the events underlying information processing in neuronal networks. This has obvious implications in regard to far-going speculations into the realms of cognition, sentience and consciousness.

An approach to the plant body: Assessing concrete and abstract aspects

The paper aims at proposing a representation of plants as individuals. The first section selects the population of plants to which this study is addressed. The second section describes the effective architecture of plants as modular systems with fixed and mobile elements, in other words, plants and their extensions. The third section presents how plants integrate the fixed and mobile modules into functional units through three areas of particular relevance to plant growth and development: nutrition, defence and pollination. Based on the tangible elements introduced in the previous sections, the fourth section presents the main issue of the proposal which is not apparent at first glance, namely, the local-global relationship in plants' architecture that determines their individuality as organisms. Finally, in the conclusion, we issue the challenge of developing a collective presentation of plants which satisfies their complementary dimension.

A Traditional Scientific Perspective on the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness

This paper assesses two different theories for explaining consciousness, a phenomenon that is widely considered amenable to scientific investigation despite its puzzling subjective aspects. I focus on Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which says that consciousness is integrated information (as ϕMax) and says even simple systems with interacting parts possess some consciousness. First, I evaluate IIT on its own merits. Second, I compare it to a more traditionally derived theory called Neurobiological Naturalism (NN), which says consciousness is an evolved, emergent feature of complex brains. Comparing these theories is informative because it reveals strengths and weaknesses of each, thereby suggesting better ways to study consciousness in the future. IIT's strengths are the reasonable axioms at its core; its strong logic and mathematical formalism; its creative "experience-first" approach to studying consciousness; the way it avoids the mind-body ("hard") problem; its consistency with evolutionary theory; and its many scientifically testable predictions. The potential weakness of IIT is that it contains stretches of logic-based reasoning that were not checked against hard evidence when the theory was being constructed, whereas scientific arguments require such supporting evidence to keep the reasoning on course. This is less of a concern for the other theory, NN, because it incorporated evidence much earlier in its construction process. NN is a less mature theory than IIT, less formalized and quantitative, and less well tested. However, it has identified its own neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and offers a roadmap through which these NNCs may answer the questions of consciousness using the hypothesize-test-hypothesize-test steps of the scientific method.

Awareness and integrated information theory identify plant meristems as sites of conscious activity

Lacking an anatomical brain/nervous system, it is assumed plants are not conscious. The biological function of consciousness is an input to behaviour; it is adaptive (subject to selection) and based on information. Complex language makes human consciousness unique. Consciousness is equated to awareness. All organisms are aware of their surroundings, modifying their behaviour to improve survival. Awareness requires assessment too. The mechanisms of animal assessment are neural while molecular and electrical in plants. Awareness of plants being also consciousness may resolve controversy. The integrated information theory (IIT), a leading theory of consciousness, is also blind to brains, nerves and synapses. The integrated information theory indicates plant awareness involves information of two kinds: (1) communicative, extrinsic information as a result of the perception of environmental changes and (2) integrated intrinsic information located in the shoot and root meristems and possibly cambium. The combination of information constructs an information nexus in the meristems leading to assessment and behaviour. The interpretation of integrated information in meristems probably involves the complex networks built around [Ca2+]i that also enable plant learning, memory and intelligent activities. A mature plant contains a large number of conjoined, conscious or aware, meristems possibly unique in the living kingdom.

Anesthetics and plants: no pain, no brain, and therefore no consciousness

Plants have a rich variety of interactions with their environment, including adaptive responses mediated by electrical signaling. This has prompted claims that information processing in plants is similar to that in animals and, hence, that plants are conscious, intelligent organisms. In several recent reports, the facts that general anesthetics cause plants to lose their sensory responses and behaviors have been taken as support for such beliefs. These lipophilic substances, however, alter multiple molecular, cellular, and systemic functions in almost every organism. In humans and other animals with complex brains, they eliminate the experience of pain and disrupt consciousness. The question therefore arises: do plants feel pain and have consciousness? In this review, we discuss what can be learned from the effects of anesthetics in plants. For this, we describe the mechanisms and structural prerequisites for pain sensations in animals and show that plants lack the neural anatomy and all behaviors that would indicate pain. By explaining the ubiquitous and diverse effects of anesthetics, we discuss whether these substances provide any empirical or logical evidence for "plant consciousness" and whether it makes sense to study the effects of anesthetics on plants for this purpose. In both cases, the answer is a resounding no.