The mismeasure of ape social cognition

Sign Language Studies with Chimpanzees in Sanctuary

Adult chimpanzees Tatu and Loulis lived at the Fauna Foundation sanctuary. They had acquired signs of American Sign Language (ASL) while young and continued to use them as adults. Caregivers with proficiency in ASL maintained daily sign language records during interactions and passive observation. Sign checklists were records of daily vocabulary use. Sign logs were records of signed interactions with caregivers and other chimpanzees. This study reports sign use from eight years of these records. Tatu and Loulis used a majority of their base vocabularies consistently over the study period. They used signs that they had acquired decades earlier and new signs. Their utterances served a variety of communicative functions, including responses, conversational devices, requests, and descriptions. They signed to caregivers, other chimpanzees, including those who did not use signs, and to themselves privately. This indicates the importance of a stimulating and interactive environment to understand the scope of ape communication and, in particular, their use of sign language.

Is inferential reasoning a distinctly human cognitive feature? Testing reasoning in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)

Logical inference is often assumed a human-unique ability, although many species of apes and monkeys have shown some facility within a two-cup task in which one cup is baited, the primate is shown the cup which is empty (an exclusion cue), and subsequently chooses the other baited cup. In published reports, New World monkey species show a limited ability to choose successfully, often with half or more of the subjects tested not showing the ability with auditory cues or with exclusion cues. In this study, five cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) were tested in a two-cup task with visual or auditory cues which revealed the presence or absence of bait, and in a second study, were tested with a four-cup array using a variety of walls to define the baiting space and a variety of visual cues including inclusion and exclusion. Tamarins demonstrated the ability to use either visual or auditory exclusion cues to find rewards in the two-cup study, although the visual cue required some exposure before accuracy was expressed. Experiment 2 revealed that two of three tamarins' first guesses to find rewards matched best a logic model. When they made errors, they typically chose cups adjacent to the cued location or made choices that seemed generated from avoiding empty cups. These results suggest that tamarins can deduce the location of food using reasoning, although the ability is only applied robustly to first guesses, while second guesses are motivated by approach/avoidance and proximity to cued locations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Empirical challenges from the comparative and developmental literature to the Shared Intentionality Theory - a review of alternative data on recursive mind reading, prosociality, imitation and cumulative culture

Humans have an irresistible inclination to coordinate actions with others, leading to species-unique forms of cooperation. According to the highly influential Shared Intentionality Theory (SITh), human cooperation is made possible by shared intentionality (SI), typically defined as a suite of socio-cognitive and motivational traits for sharing psychological states with others, thereby enabling individuals to engage in joint action in the mutually aware pursuit of shared goals. SITh theorises that SI evolved as late as 400,000 years ago, when our ancestors (in particular, Homo heidelbergensis) turned to a kind of food procurement that obligatorily required joint coordinated action. SI is, thus, hypothesized to be absent in other extant species, including our closest genetic relatives, the nonhuman great apes ("apes"). According to SITh, ape psychology is exclusively driven by individualistic motivations, as opposed to human psychology which is uniquely driven by altruistic motivations. The evolutionary scenario proposed by SITh builds on a series of findings from socio-cognitive research with apes and human children, and on the assumption that abilities expressed early in human development are human universals, unlikely to have been shaped by socio-cultural influences. Drawing on the primatological and developmental literature, we provide a systematic - albeit selective - review of SITh-inconsistent findings concerning psychological and behavioural traits theorised to be constitutive of SI. The findings we review pertain to all three thematic clusters typically addressed in SITh: (i) recursive mind reading; (ii) prosociality; (iii) imitation and cumulative culture. We conclude that such alternative data undermine two core SITh claims: the late evolutionary emergence of SI and the radical divide between ape and human psychology. We also discuss several conceptual and methodological limitations that currently hamper reliable comparative research on SI, in particular those engendered by Western-centric biases in the social sciences, where an overreliance on Western samples has promoted the formulation of Western-centric conceptualisations, operationalisations and methodologies.

Observational approaches to chimpanzee behavior in an African sanctuary: Implications for research, welfare, and capacity-building

Research in African ape sanctuaries has emerged as an important context for our understanding of comparative cognition and behavior. While much of this work has focused on experimental studies of cognition, these animals semi-free-range in forest habitats and therefore can also provide important information about the behavior of primates in socioecologically-relevant naturalistic contexts. In this "New Approaches" article, we describe a project where we implemented a synthetic program of observational data collection at Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary in Uganda, directly modeled after long-term data collection protocols at the Kibale Chimpanzee Project in Uganda, a wild chimpanzee field site. The foundation for this project was a strong partnership between sanctuary staff, field site staff, and external researchers. We describe how we developed a data-collection protocol through discussion and collaboration among these groups, and trained sanctuary caregivers to collect novel observational data using these protocols. We use these data as a case study to examine: (1) how behavioral observations in sanctuaries can inform primate welfare and care practices, such as by understanding aggression within the group; (2) how matched observational protocols across sites can inform our understanding of primate behavior across different contexts, including sex differences in social relationships; and (3) how more robust collaborations between foreign researchers and local partners can support capacity-building in primate range countries, along with mentoring and training students more broadly.

Early communicative gestures in human and chimpanzee 1-year-olds observed across diverse socioecological settings

We investigated the communicative gestures used by chimpanzee and human infants. In contrast to previous studies, we compared the species at the same age (12-14 months) and used multiple groups living in diverse socioecological settings for both species. We recorded gestures produced by infants and those produce by others and directed toward infants. We classified the gestures into the following types: human-usual, chimpanzee-usual, and species-common; and searched for within species and between species differences. We found no significant differences between groups or species in overall rates of infant-produced or infant-received gestures, suggesting that all of these infants produced and received gestures at similar levels. We did find significant differences, however, when we considered the three types of gesture. Chimpanzee infants produced significantly higher rates of chimpanzee-usual gestures, and human infants produced significantly higher rates of human-usual gestures, but there was no significant species difference in the species-common gestures. Reports of species differences in gesturing in young infants, therefore, could be influenced by investigators' choice of gesture type. Interestingly, we found that 1-year-old infants produced the gesture of "hold mutual gaze" and that the chimpanzee infants had a significantly higher rate than the human infants. We did not find strong evidence that the specific types of gestural environment experienced by young infants influenced the types of gestures that infants produce. We suggest that at this point in development (before human infants use lots of speech), nonverbal communicative gestures may be equally important for human and chimpanzee infants.

Domestic pigs (Sus scrofa) engage in non-random post-conflict affiliation with third parties: cognitive and functional implications

In social mammals, conflict resolution involves the reunion of former opponents (aggressor and victim) after an aggressive event (reconciliation) or post-conflict triadic contacts with a third party, started by either opponent (solicited-TSC) or spontaneously offered by the third party (unsolicited-TUC). These post-conflict strategies can serve different functions, including consolation (specifically when TUCs reduce the victim's anxiety). We investigated the possible presence and modulating factors of such strategies on semi-free ranging pigs (Sus scrofa; N = 104), housed at the ethical farm Parva Domus (Cavagnolo, Italy). Kinship was known. Reconciliation was present and mainly occurred between weakly related pigs to possibly improve tolerant cohabitation. Triadic contacts (all present except aggressor TSCs) mostly occurred between close kin. TSCs enacted by victims reduced neither their post-conflict anxiety behaviors nor further attacks by the previous aggressor, possibly because TSCs remained largely unreciprocated. TUCs towards aggressors did not reduce aggressor post-conflict anxiety but limited aggression redirection towards third parties. TUCs towards the victim reduced the victim but not the third-party's anxiety. However, TUCs may also provide inclusive fitness benefits to third parties by benefiting close kin. In sum, pigs engaged in non-random solicited/unsolicited triadic contacts, which suggests that pigs might possess socio-emotional regulation abilities to change their own or others' experience and elements of social appraisal, necessary to detect the emotional arousal of relevant others and (in case of TUCs) take the agency to restore homeostasis.

Social engagement revealed by gaze following in third-party observers of simulated social conflict

Humans and non-human primates can allocate visual attention to areas of high interest in their visual field based on the behaviors of their social partners. Allocation of attention is particularly important for third-party observers of social interactions. By following the gaze of interacting individuals, the observer can obtain information about the mental states, emotions, and intentions of others. We presented three adult monkeys (Macaca mulatta) with videos of simulated social interactions and quantified their eye movements to determine which observed behaviors were most conducive to gaze following. Social interactions were simulated by juxtaposing two videos depicting a threatening and an appeasing individual facing each other, with the timing of the facial and bodily displays adjusted to mimic an exchange of social signals. Socially meaningful facial displays combined with full body movements significantly enhanced the probability of gaze following and joint attention. Despite the synthetic nature of these interactions, the facial and bodily displays of the submissive individual elicited significantly more joint-attention than gaze-following saccades, suggesting a preferential allocation of attention to the recipients of threatening displays. Temporal alignment of gaze following and joint attention to the frames of each video showed numerous clusters of significant increases in the frequency of these saccades. These clusters suggest that some videos contained signals that can induce a quasi-automatic redirection of the observer's attention. However, these saccades occurred only on a fraction of the viewings, and we have documented large inter-individual variations. All viewers produced sequences of joint attention saccades (check-backs) shifting their attention between the two monkeys as though monitoring the simulated emitting-receiving cycle of social signals. These sequences reflect the viewer's interest in monitoring the ongoing exchange of agonistic and affiliative displays. It appears that in macaque monkeys, the scanpaths of third-party observers of simulated social interactions are informed by social-cognitive processes suggestive of mentalizing.

Are ape gestures like words? Outstanding issues in detecting similarities and differences between human language and ape gesture

Opinion piece: ape gestures are made intentionally, inviting parallels with human language; but how similar are their gestures to words? Here we ask this in three ways, considering: flexibility and ambiguity, first- and second-order intentionality, and usage in interactive exchanges. Many gestures are used to achieve several, often very distinct, goals. Such apparent ambiguity in meaning is potentially disruptive for communication, but-as with human language-situational and interpersonal context may largely resolve the intended meaning. Our evidence for first-order intentional use of gesture is abundant, but how might we establish a case for the second-order intentional use critical to language? Finally, words are rarely used in tidy signal-response sequences but are exchanged in back-and-forth interaction. Do gestures share this property? In this paper, we examine these questions and set out ways in which they can be resolved, incorporating data from wild chimpanzees. This article is part of the theme issue 'Cognition, communication and social bonds in primates'.

Coordinating social action: a primer for the cross-species investigation of communicative repair

Human joint action is inherently cooperative, manifested in the collaborative efforts of participants to minimize communicative trouble through interactive repair. Although interactive repair requires sophisticated cognitive abilities, it can be dissected into basic building blocks shared with non-human animal species. A review of the primate literature shows that interactionally contingent signal sequences are at least common among species of non-human great apes, suggesting a gradual evolution of repair. To pioneer a cross-species assessment of repair this paper aims at (i) identifying necessary precursors of human interactive repair; (ii) proposing a coding framework for its comparative study in humans and non-human species; and (iii) using this framework to analyse examples of interactions of humans (adults/children) and non-human great apes. We hope this paper will serve as a primer for cross-species comparisons of communicative breakdowns and how they are repaired. This article is part of the theme issue 'Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination'.

Interaction and ostension: the myth of 4th-order intentionality

Research in comparative cognition on allegedly uniquely human capacities considers the identification of these human capacities in other species as one of their main points of inquiry. Capacities are applied in their theoretical descriptions to promising empirical data. The conclusion then often is that even though, on a behavioural level, the human and nonhuman cases appear related, on a cognitive level there is no relation whatsoever because the underlying cognitive states diverge in quality. This result seems dissatisfying for two reasons: (1) there is ample empirical evidence that suggests the presence of the capacities in other species, and (2) the claim that the underlying states diverge often hinges on the reference to the theoretical definitions of these capacities only. This opinion piece focuses on the capacity of ostensive intentional communication to demonstrate that the original theoretical analyses often are not befitting a comparative endeavour and should therefore not be used as pivotal reference within comparative research. An outlook will be provided on more promising approaches to identifying ostensive communication, namely an interactive approach that will allow for ostension to not be perceived as a one-turn signalling behaviour, but as interactive, with the possibility of being established in a trial-and-error manner. This article is part of the theme issue 'Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination'.

Every product needs a process: unpacking joint commitment as a process across species

Joint commitment, the feeling of mutual obligation binding participants in a joint action, is typically conceptualized as arising by the expression and acceptance of a promise. This account limits the possibilities of investigating fledgling forms of joint commitment in actors linguistically less well-endowed than adult humans. The feeling of mutual obligation is one aspect of joint commitment (the product), which emerges from a process of signal exchange. It is gradual rather than binary; feelings of mutual obligation can vary in strength according to how explicit commitments are perceived to be. Joint commitment processes are more complex than simple promising, in at least three ways. They are affected by prior joint actions, which create precedents and conventions that can be embodied in material arrangements of institutions. Joint commitment processes also arise as solutions to generic coordination problems related to opening up, maintaining and closing down joint actions. Finally, during joint actions, additional, specific commitments are made piecemeal. These stack up over time and persist, making it difficult for participants to disengage from joint actions. These complexifications open up new perspectives for assessing joint commitment across species. This article is part of the theme issue 'Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination'.

A comparison of personality traits of gifted word learner and typical border collies

While personality and cognition are distinct domains, some personality traits may affect the capacity for problem-solving. It was suggested that there is a positive association between the Playfulness trait and problem-solving performance in humans. Studies on giftedness (extremely good capacity in the case of a specific skill), typically aimed to reveal the genetic, experiential, and mental origins of such extreme inter-individual variation. We exploited recent findings on giftedness in a specific cognitive skill, object label learning, in dogs to explore the potential association between this exceptional skill and personality traits. We administered the Dog Personality Questionnaire to 21 gifted dog owners and compared the personality traits of their dogs to those of matched samples of 43 Hungarian and 101 Austrian typical dogs, i.e., dogs lacking this exceptional capacity. Since most Gifted Word Learner dogs are Border collies, we restricted our analysis to dogs of this breed. We hypothesized that the Gifted Word Learner dogs may show higher levels of Playfulness. As expected, we found that the gifted Border collies were rated as more playful than both the Hungarian and Austrian typical ones. Our results suggest that an extremely high level of Playfulness is associated with giftedness in a specific cognitive trait in dogs: the capacity to learn object verbal labels, thus opening new possibilities for comparative research on the relationship between giftedness and personality.

Joint Attention in Human and Chimpanzee Infants in Varied Socio-Ecological Contexts

Joint attention (JA) is an early manifestation of social cognition, commonly described as interactions in which an infant looks or gestures to an adult female to share attention about an object, within a positive emotional atmosphere. We label this description the JA phenotype. We argue that characterizing JA in this way reflects unexamined assumptions which are, in part, due to past developmental researchers' primary focus on western, middle-class infants and families. We describe a range of cultural variations in caregiving practices, socialization goals, and parenting ethnotheories as an essential initial step in viewing joint attention within inclusive and contextualized perspectives. We begin the process of conducting a decolonized study of JA by considering the core construct of joint attention (i.e., triadic connectedness) and adopting culturally inclusive definitions (labeled joint engagement [JE]). Our JE definitions allow for attention and engagement to be expressed in visual and tactile modalities (e.g., for infants experiencing distal or proximal caregiving), with various social partners (e.g., peers, older siblings, mothers), with a range of shared topics (e.g., representing diverse socialization goals, and socio-ecologies with and without toys), and with a range of emotional tone (e.g., for infants living in cultures valuing calmness and low arousal, and those valuing exuberance). Our definition of JE includes initiations from either partner (to include priorities for adult-led or child-led interactions). Our next foundational step is making an ecological commitment to naturalistic observations (Dahl, 2017, Child Dev Perspect, 11(2), 79-84): We measure JE while infants interact within their own physical and social ecologies. This commitment allows us to describe JE as it occurs in everyday contexts, without constraints imposed by researchers. Next, we sample multiple groups of infants drawn from diverse socio-ecological settings. Moreover, we include diverse samples of chimpanzee infants to compare with diverse samples of human infants, to investigate the extent to which JE is unique to humans, and to document diversity both within and between species. We sampled human infants living in three diverse settings. U.K. infants (n = 8) were from western, middle-class families living near universities in the south of England. Nso infants (n = 12) were from communities of subsistence farmers in Cameroon, Africa. Aka infants (n = 10) were from foraging communities in the tropical rain forests of Central African Republic, Africa. We coded behavioral details of JE from videotaped observations (taken between 2004 and 2010). JE occurred in the majority of coded intervals (Mdn = 68%), supporting a conclusion that JE is normative for human infants. The JA phenotype, in contrast, was infrequent, and significantly more common in the U.K. (Mdn = 10%) than the other groups (Mdn < 3%). We found significant within-species diversity in JE phenotypes (i.e., configurations of predominant forms of JE characteristics). We conclude that triadic connectedness is very common in human infants, but there is significant contextualization of behavioral forms of JE. We also studied chimpanzee infants living in diverse socio-ecologies. The PRI/Zoo chimpanzee infants (n = 7) were from captive, stable groups of mixed ages and sexes, and included 4 infants from the Chester Zoo, U.K. and 3 from the Primate Research Institute, Kyoto University, Japan. The Gombe chimpanzee infants (n = 12) were living in a dynamically changing, wild community in the Gombe National Park, Tanzania, Africa. Additionally, we include two Home chimpanzee infants who were reared from birth by a female scientist, in the combined U.S., middle-class contexts of home and university cognition laboratory. JE was coded from videotaped observations (taken between 1993 and 2006). JE occurred during the majority of coded intervals (Mdn = 64%), consistent with the position that JE is normative for chimpanzee infants. The JA phenotype, in contrast, was rare, but more commonly observed in the two Home chimpanzee infants (in 8% and 2% of intervals) than in other chimpanzee groups (Mdns = 0%). We found within-species diversity in the configurations comprising the JE phenotypes. We conclude that triadic connectedness is very common in chimpanzee infants, but behavioral forms of joint engagement are contextualized. We compared JE across species, and found no species-uniqueness in behavioral forms, JE characteristics, or JE phenotypes. Both human and chimpanzee infants develop contextualized social cognition. Within-species diversity is embraced when triadic connectedness is described with culturally inclusive definitions. In contrast, restricting definitions to the JA phenotype privileges a behavioral form most valued in western, middle-class socio-ecologies, irrespective of whether the interactions involve human or chimpanzee infants. Our study presents a model for how to decolonize an important topic in developmental psychology. Decolonization is accomplished by defining the phenomenon inclusively, embracing diversity in sampling, challenging claims of human-uniqueness, and having an ecological commitment to observe infant social cognition as it occurs within everyday socio-ecological contexts. It is essential that evolutionary and developmental theories of social cognition are re-built on more inclusive and decolonized empirical foundations.

Intentional gestural communication amongst red-capped mangabeys (Cercocebus torquatus)

Apes, human’s closest living relatives, are renowned for their intentional and highly flexible use of gestural communication. In stark contrast, evidence for flexible and intentional gestural communication in monkeys is scarce. Here, we investigated the intentionality and flexibility of spontaneous gesture use in red-capped mangabeys (Cercocebus torquatus). We applied established methods used in ape gesture research to analyse whether the body acts produced by a total of 17 individuals living in three different groups in captivity qualified as intentionally produced gesture instances. Results showed that signallers showed all hallmarks of intentionality during the production of 20 out of a total of 21 different types of body acts. These were only produced in the presence of other individuals, and the monkeys showed audience checking, sensitivity to the attentional states of recipients, adjustment of signal modality, and response waiting relative to their production. Moreover, in case of communication failure, the monkeys showed goal persistence, and regarding the production contexts they showed some signs of means–ends dissociation. Therefore, these monkeys are capable of flexible and intentional gestural communication and use this to communicate with conspecifics. Our results corroborate recent findings showing that intentional gestural communication was already present in the monkey lineage of catarrhine primates. We discuss our results in light of the comparative approach towards human language evolution and highlight our finding that these monkeys also showed flexible and intentional use of four ‘free’ manual gesture types.

Are conspecific social videos rewarding to chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)? A test of the social motivation theory

Many claim that social stimuli are rewarding to primates, but few, if any, studies have explicitly demonstrated their reward value. Here, we examined whether chimpanzees would produce overt responses for the opportunity to view conspecific social, compared to dynamic (video: Experiment 1) and static (picture: Experiment 2) control content. We also explored the relationships between variation in social reward and social behavior and cognition. We provided captive chimpanzees with access to a touchscreen during four, one-hour sessions (two 'conspecific social' and two 'control'). The sessions consisted of ten, 15-second videos (or pictures in Experiment 2) of either chimpanzees engaging in a variety of behaviors (social condition) or vehicles, humans, or other animals engaged in some activity (control condition). For each chimpanzee, we recorded the number of responses to the touchscreen and the frequency of watching the stimuli. Independent t-tests revealed no sex or rearing differences in touching and watching the social or control videos (p>0.05). Repeated measures ANOVAs showed chimpanzees touched and watched the screen significantly more often during the social compared to control video sessions. Furthermore, although chimpanzees did not touch the screen more often during social than control picture sessions in Experiment 2, they did watch the screen more often. Additionally, chimpanzees that previously performed better on a task of social cognition and engaged in more affiliative behavior watched a higher percentage of social videos during the touchscreen task. These results are consistent with the social motivation theory, and indicate social stimuli are intrinsically rewarding, as chimpanzees made more overt responses for the opportunity to view conspecific social, compared to control, content.

The hidden side of animal cognition research: Scientists' attitudes toward bias, replicability and scientific practice

Animal cognition research aims to understand animal minds by using a diverse range of methods across an equally diverse range of species. Throughout its history, the field has sought to mitigate various biases that occur when studying animal minds, from experimenter effects to anthropomorphism. Recently, there has also been a focus on how common scientific practices might affect the reliability and validity of published research. Usually, these issues are discussed in the literature by a small group of scholars with a specific interest in the topics. This study aimed to survey a wider range of animal cognition researchers to ask about their attitudes towards classic and contemporary issues facing the field. Two-hundred and ten active animal cognition researchers completed our survey, and provided answers on questions relating to bias, replicability, statistics, publication, and belief in animal cognition. Collectively, researchers were wary of bias in the research field, but less so in their own work. Over 70% of researchers endorsed Morgan’s canon as a useful principle but many caveated this in their free-text responses. Researchers self-reported that most of their studies had been published, however they often reported that studies went unpublished because they had negative or inconclusive results, or results that questioned “preferred” theories. Researchers rarely reported having performed questionable research practices themselves—however they thought that other researchers sometimes (52.7% of responses) or often (27.9% of responses) perform them. Researchers near unanimously agreed that replication studies are important but too infrequently performed in animal cognition research, 73.0% of respondents suggested areas of animal cognition research could experience a ‘replication crisis’ if replication studies were performed. Consistently, participants’ free-text responses provided a nuanced picture of the challenges animal cognition research faces, which are available as part of an open dataset. However, many researchers appeared concerned with how to interpret negative results, publication bias, theoretical bias and reliability in areas of animal cognition research. Collectively, these data provide a candid overview of barriers to progress in animal cognition and can inform debates on how individual researchers, as well as organizations and journals, can facilitate robust scientific research in animal cognition.

Connecting primate gesture to the evolutionary roots of language: A systematic review

Comparative psychology provides important contributions to our understanding of the origins of human language. The presence of common features in human and nonhuman primate communication can be used to suggest the evolutionary trajectories of potential precursors to language. However, to do so effectively, our findings must be comparable across diverse species. This systematic review describes the current landscape of data available from studies of gestural communication in human and nonhuman primates that make an explicit connection to language evolution. We found a similar number of studies on human and nonhuman primates, but that very few studies included data from more than one species. As a result, evolutionary inferences remain restricted to comparison across studies. We identify areas of focus, bias, and apparent gaps within the field. Different domains have been studied in human and nonhuman primates, with relatively few nonhuman primate studies of ontogeny and relatively few human studies of gesture form. Diversity in focus, methods, and socio-ecological context fill important gaps and provide nuanced understanding, but only where the source of any difference between studies is transparent. Many studies provide some definition for their use of gesture; but definitions of gesture, and in particular, criteria for intentional use, are absent in the majority of human studies. We find systematic differences between human and nonhuman primate studies in the research scope, incorporation of other modalities, research setting, and study design. We highlight eight particular areas in a call to action through which we can strengthen our ability to investigate gestural communication's contribution within the evolutionary roots of human language.

Is Conceptual Diversity an Advantage for Scientific Inquiry? A Case Study on the Concept of 'Gesture' in Comparative Psychology

Growing scientific fields often involve multidisciplinary investigations in which the same concepts may have different meanings. Here, we examine the case of 'gesture' in comparative research to depict how conceptual diversity hidden by the label 'gesture' can lead to consistently divergent interpretations in humans and nonhuman primates. We show that definitions of 'gesture' drastically differ regarding the forms of a gesture and the cognitive processes inferred from it, and that these differences emerge from implicit assumptions which have pervasive consequences on the interpretations claimed by researchers. We then demonstrate that implicit assumptions about scientific concepts can be made explicit using a finite set of operational criteria. We argue that developing theoretical definitions systematically associated with operational conceptual boundaries would allow to tackle both the challenges of maintaining high internal coherence within studies and of improving comparability and replicability of scientific results. We thus offer an easy-to-implement conceptual tool that should help ground valid comparisons between studies and serve scientific inquiry.

Replications, Comparisons, Sampling and the Problem of Representativeness in Animal Cognition Research

Animal cognition research often involves small and idiosyncratic samples. This can constrain the generalizability and replicability of a study's results and prevent meaningful comparisons between samples. However, there is little consensus about what makes a strong replication or comparison in animal research. We apply a resampling definition of replication to answer these questions in Part 1 of this article, and, in Part 2, we focus on the problem of representativeness in animal research. Through a case study and a simulation study, we highlight how and when representativeness may be an issue in animal behavior and cognition research and show how the representativeness problems can be viewed through the lenses of, i) replicability, ii) generalizability and external validity, iii) pseudoreplication and, iv) theory testing. Next, we discuss when and how researchers can improve their ability to learn from small sample research through, i) increasing heterogeneity in experimental design, ii) increasing homogeneity in experimental design, and, iii) statistically modeling variation. Finally, we describe how the strongest solutions will vary depending on the goals and resources of individual research programs and discuss some barriers towards implementing them.

Identifying animal complex cognition requires natural complexity

The search for human cognitive uniqueness often relied on low ecological tests with subjects experiencing unnatural ontogeny. Recently, neuroscience demonstrated the significance of a rich environment on the development of brain structures and cognitive abilities. This stresses the importance to consider the prior knowledge that subjects bring in any experiment. Second, recent developments in multivariate statistics control precisely for a number of factors and their interactions. Making controls in natural observations equivalent and sometimes superior to captive experimental studies without the drawbacks of the latter methods. Thus, we can now investigate complex cognition by accounting for many different factors, as required when solving tasks in nature. Combining both progresses allows us to move toward an “experience-specific cognition”, recognizing that cognition varies extensively in nature as individuals adapt to the precise challenges they experience in life. Such cognitive specialization makes cross-species comparisons more complex, while potentially identifying human cognitive uniqueness.

The performance of domestic dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) on two versions of the object choice task

Object choice task (OCT) studies are widely used to assess the phylogenetic and ontogenetic distribution of the understanding of communicative cues, with this understanding serving as a proxy for the discernment of communicative intentions. Recent reviews have found systematic procedural and methodological differences in studies which compare performances across species on the OCT. One such difference concerns the spatial configuration of the test set-up, specifically the distances between the two containers (inter-object distance) and the subject-experimenter distance. Here, we tested dogs on two versions of the task: a central version in which the containers were in the subjects' direct line of vision, and a peripheral version in which the position of the containers was distal to the subject. Half of the subjects were tested with a barrier in the testing environment (as nonhuman primates are tested) and the other half without. We found that dogs tested with a barrier performed significantly better in the central version and were more likely to fail to make a choice in the peripheral version. Dogs tested without a barrier showed comparable performance on the two versions. We thus failed to find support for the distraction hypothesis in dogs. We discuss potential explanations for this, highlighting how methodological differences in the presentation of the OCT can influence outcomes in studies using this paradigm.

The Pan social brain: An evolutionary history of neurochemical receptor genes and their potential impact on sociocognitive differences

Humans have unique cognitive capacities that, compared with apes, are not only simply expressed as a higher level of general intelligence, but also as a quantitative difference in sociocognitive skills. Humans' closest living relatives, bonobos (Pan paniscus), and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), show key between-species differences in social cognition despite their close phylogenetic relatedness, with bonobos arguably showing greater similarities to humans. To better understand the evolution of these traits, we investigate the neurochemical mechanisms underlying sociocognitive skills by focusing on variation in genes encoding proteins with well-documented roles in mammalian social cognition: the receptors for vasopressin (AVPR1A), oxytocin (OXTR), serotonin (HTR1A), and dopamine (DRD2). Although these genes have been well studied in humans, little is known about variation in these genes that may underlie differences in social behavior and cognition in apes. We comparatively analyzed sequence data for 33 bonobos and 57 chimpanzees, together with orthologous sequence data for other apes. In all four genes, we describe genetic variants that alter the amino acid sequence of the respective receptors, raising the possibility that ligand binding or signal transduction may be impacted. Overall, bonobos show 57% more fixed substitutions than chimpanzees compared with the ancestral Pan lineage. Chimpanzees, show 31% more polymorphic coding variation, in line with their larger historical effective population size estimates and current wider distribution. An extensive literature review comparing allelic changes in Pan with known human behavioral variants revealed evidence of homologous evolution in bonobos and humans (OXTR rs4686301(T) and rs237897(A)), while humans and chimpanzees shared OXTR rs2228485(A), DRD2 rs6277(A), and DRD2 rs11214613(A) to the exclusion of bonobos. Our results offer the first in-depth comparison of neurochemical receptor gene variation in Pan and put forward new variants for future behavior-genotype association studies in apes, which can increase our understanding of the evolution of social cognition in modern humans.

The Referential Problem Space revisited: An ecological hypothesis of the evolutionary and developmental origins of pointing

Pointing by great apes poses a significant challenge to contemporary theories about the evolutionary and developmental foundations of cognitive development, because pointing has long been viewed by theoreticians as an evolved, human-unique developmental stepping-stone to linguistic reference. Although reports of pointing by great apes have existed in the scientific literature for over a century, only in recent decades has it become clear that ape pointing is definitely an intentionally communicative signal, by the same criteria we adjudge human pointing to be intentionally communicative. Theoretical responses to this changed empirical landscape have generally taken the approach of asserting, without any direct evidence (indeed, in the absence of any possibility of direct evidence), that pointing by humans is psychologically distinct from and more cognitively complex than the pointing of apes. It is commonplace in the contemporary literature to appeal to imaginary, species-unique causal factors to account for human pointing, rendering a large body of contemporary theoretical work untestable with scientific methods: scientific arguments require the public availability of core theoretical entities. In this paper, I will analyze the circumstances of pointing by apes and humans and develop an alternative theoretical model of pointing that does not rely upon non-physical constructs. According to the view espoused, here, pointing develops as a solution to a particular kind of developmental problem, characterized by (a) a developing capacity for tool use, (b) barriers to direct action, and (c) a history of caregiver responsiveness. Pointing by both apes and humans is explicable without invoking imaginary, mental causes. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Psychology > Comparative Psychology.

Chimpanzees Predict the Hedonic Outcome of Novel Taste Combinations: The Evolutionary Origins of Affective Forecasting

Affective forecasting–predicting the emotional outcome of never-before experienced situations–is pervasive in our lives. When facing novel situations, we can quickly integrate bits and pieces of prior experiences to envisage possible scenarios and their outcomes, and what these might feel like. Such affective glimpses of the future often steer the decisions we make. By enabling principled decision-making in novel situations, affective forecasting confers the important adaptive advantage of eluding the potentially costly consequences of tackling such situations by trial-and-error. Affective forecasting has been hypothesized as uniquely human, yet, in a recent study we found suggestive evidence of this ability in an orangutan. To test non-verbal subjects, we capitalized on culinary examples of affective forecasting and devised a behavioral test that required the subjects to make predictions about novel juice mixes produced from familiar ingredients. In the present study, we administered the same task to two chimpanzees and found that their performance was comparable to that of the previously tested orangutan and 10 humans, who served as a comparison group. To improve the comparability of human and animal performance, in the present study we also introduced a new approach to assessing if the subjects’ performance was indicative of affective forecasting, which relies exclusively on behavioral data. The results of the study open for the possibility that affective forecasting has evolved in the common ancestor of the great apes, providing Hominids with the adaptive advantage of e.g., quickly evaluating heterogeneous food patches using hedonic prediction.

Object sorting into a two-dimensional array in humans and chimpanzees

Object-sorting tasks have been used as a means of assessing the cognitive development of humans. In order to investigate cognitive development from a comparative perspective, an object-sorting task was conducted in a longitudinal face-to-face situation involving three juvenile/adolescent chimpanzees (7-9 years old) and 17 children (2-5 years old). The subjects were requested to place nine blocks of different categories (distinguished by three colors and three shapes) into the cells of a box arrayed in a three-by-three pattern. Chimpanzees showed complete or partial categorical sorting in 24-43% of pre-cued trials. The youngest children had difficulty in completing a trial by placing all nine blocks into the box. Humans older than 2 years succeeded in making a one-to-one correspondence by placing a block in each cell, while the end-state pattern remained random. The children gradually increased their rate of categorical sorting, where objects of one category were placed in the same row/column; this tendency peaked at 4 years of age. Above this age, the humans spontaneously shifted their sorting strategy to make a completely even configuration (resulting in a Latin square), which may be more cognitively demanding than categorical sorting. While chimpanzees and older children used both color and shape cues for categorical sorting, younger humans preferred to use shape cues. The results of the present study show fundamental similarities between humans and chimpanzees at the basic level of categorical sorting, which indicates that some autonomous rules are applied during object manipulation.

Old and New Approaches to Animal Cognition: There Is Not "One Cognition"

Using the comparative approach, researchers draw inferences about the evolution of cognition. Psychologists have postulated several hypotheses to explain why certain species are cognitively more flexible than others, and these hypotheses assume that certain cognitive skills are linked together to create a generally "smart" species. However, empirical findings suggest that several animal species are highly specialized, showing exceptional skills in single cognitive domains while performing poorly in others. Although some cognitive skills may indeed overlap, we cannot a priori assume that they do across species. We argue that the term "cognition" has often been used by applying an anthropocentric viewpoint rather than a biocentric one. As a result, researchers tend to overrate cognitive skills that are human-like and assume that certain skills cluster together in other animals as they do in our own species. In this paper, we emphasize that specific physical and social environments create selection pressures that lead to the evolution of certain cognitive adaptations. Skills such as following the pointing gesture, tool-use, perspective-taking, or the ability to cooperate evolve independently from each other as a concrete result of specific selection pressures, and thus have appeared in distantly related species. Thus, there is not "one cognition". Our argument is founded upon traditional Darwinian thinking, which-although always at the forefront of biology-has sometimes been neglected in animal cognition research. In accordance with the biocentric approach, we advocate a broader empirical perspective as we are convinced that to better understand animal minds, comparative researchers should focus much more on questions and experiments that are ecologically valid. We should investigate nonhuman cognition for its own sake, not only in comparison to the human model.

Joint attention skills in wild Arabian babblers ( Turdoides squamiceps): a consequence of cooperative breeding?

Human cooperation strongly relies on the ability of interlocutors to coordinate each other's attentional state: joint attention. One predominant hypothesis postulates that this hallmark of the unique cognitive system of humans evolved due to the combination of an ape-like cognitive system and the prosocial motives that facilitate cooperative breeding. Here, we tested this hypothesis by investigating communicative interactions of a cooperatively breeding bird species, the Arabian babbler ( Turdoides squamiceps). The behaviour of 12 wild social groups was observed focusing on two distinct communicative behaviours: object presentation and babbler walk. The results showed that both behaviours fulfilled the criteria for first-order intentional communication and involved co-orientation of recipients' attention. In turn, recipients responded with cooperative and communicative acts that resulted in coordinated joint travel between interlocutors. These findings provide the first evidence that another animal species shows several key criteria traditionally used to infer joint attention in prelinguistic human infants. Furthermore, they emphasize the influence of cooperative breeding on sophisticated socio-cognitive performances, while questioning the necessity of an ape-like cognitive system underlying joint attentional behaviour.

Decision-making flexibility in New Caledonian crows, young children and adult humans in a multi-dimensional tool-use task

The ability to make profitable decisions in natural foraging contexts may be influenced by an additional requirement of tool-use, due to increased levels of relational complexity and additional work-effort imposed by tool-use, compared with simply choosing between an immediate and delayed food item. We examined the flexibility for making the most profitable decisions in a multi-dimensional tool-use task, involving different apparatuses, tools and rewards of varying quality, in 3-5-year-old children, adult humans and tool-making New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides). We also compared our results to previous studies on habitually tool-making orangutans (Pongo abelii) and non-tool-making Goffin's cockatoos (Cacatua goffiniana). Adult humans, cockatoos and crows, but not children and orangutans, did not select a tool when it was not necessary, which was the more profitable choice in this situation. Adult humans, orangutans and cockatoos, but not crows and children, were able to refrain from selecting non-functional tools. By contrast, the birds, but not the primates tested, struggled to attend to multiple variables-where two apparatuses, two tools and two reward qualities were presented simultaneously-without extended experience. These findings indicate: (1) in a similar manner to humans and orangutans, New Caledonian crows and Goffin's cockatoos can flexibly make profitable decisions in some decision-making tool-use tasks, though the birds may struggle when tasks become more complex; (2) children and orangutans may have a bias to use tools in situations where adults and other tool-making species do not.

Communicative roots of complex sociality and cognition

Mammals living in more complex social groups typically have large brains for their body size and many researchers have proposed that the primary driver of the increase in brain size through primate and hominin evolution was the selection pressures associated with sociality. Many mammals, and especially primates, use flexible signals that show a high degree of voluntary control and these signals may play an important role in forming and maintaining social relationships between group members. However, the specific role that cognitive skills play in this complex communication, and how in turn this relates to sociality, is still unclear. The hypothesis for the communicative roots of complex sociality and cognition posits that cognitive demands behind the communication needed to form and maintain bonded social relationships in complex social settings drives the link between brain size and sociality. We review the evidence in support of this hypothesis and why key features of cognitively complex communication such as intentionality and referentiality should be more effective in forming and maintaining bonded relationships as compared with less cognitively complex communication. Exploring the link between cognition, communication and sociality provides insights into how increasing flexibility in communication can facilitate the emergence of social systems characterised by bonded social relationships, such as those found in non-human primates and humans. To move the field forward and carry out both within- and among-species comparisons, we advocate the use of social network analysis, which provides a novel way to describe and compare social structure. Using this approach can lead to a new, systematic way of examining social and communicative complexity across species, something that is lacking in current comparative studies of social structure.

Testing dogs in ape-like conditions: the effect of a barrier on dogs' performance on the object-choice task

Recent reviews have found marked procedural and methodological differences in the testing of different taxonomic groups on the object-choice task. One such difference is the imposition of a barrier in the testing environment of nonhuman primates in the form of a cage, necessitated to ensure the experimenter's safety. Here, we conducted two studies with domestic dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) in which we compared the performance of dogs tested from within a child's playpen and dogs tested without this barrier present. In Study 1, in a within-subjects design, we found no effect of the barrier on dogs' ability to use a pointing cue, but there was an increase in instances in which dogs failed to choose a cup. In Study 2, in a between-subjects design, dogs tested with a barrier failed to perform above chance, and were also more likely to fail to make a choice. When dogs tested without a barrier made an incorrect response, these were more likely to be incorrect choices than no choice errors. We discuss the implications of these differences in behavioural responses in function of the presence of a barrier and the necessity of ensuring matched conditions when comparing across species.

What animals do not do or fail to find: A novel observational approach for studying cognition in the wild

To understand how our brain evolved and what it is for, we are in urgent need of knowledge about the cognitive skills of a large variety of animal species and individuals, and their relationships to rapidly disappearing social and ecological conditions. But how do we obtain this knowledge? Studying cognition in the wild is a challenge. Field researchers (and their study subjects) face many factors that can easily interfere with their variables of interest. Although field studies of cognition present unique challenges, they are still invaluable for understanding the evolutionary drivers of cognition. In this review, I discuss the advantages and urgency of field-based studies on animal cognition and introduce a novel observational approach for field research that is guided by three questions: (a) what do animals fail to find?, (b) what do they not do?, and (c) what do they only do when certain conditions are met? My goal is to provide guidance to future field researchers examining primate cognition.

Delayed gratification in New Caledonian crows and young children: influence of reward type and visibility

Self-control underlies cognitive abilities such as decision making and future planning. Delay of gratification is a measure of self-control and involves obtaining a more valuable outcome in the future by tolerating a delay or investing a greater effort in the present. Contextual issues, such as reward visibility and type, may influence delayed gratification performance, although there has been limited comparative investigation between humans and other animals, particularly non-primate species. Here, we adapted an automated 'rotating tray' paradigm used previously with capuchin monkeys to test for delay of gratification ability that requires little pre-test training, where the subject must forgo an immediate, less preferred reward for a delayed, more preferred one. We tested New Caledonian crows and 3-5-year-old human children. We manipulated reward types to differ in quality or quantity (Experiments 1 and 2) as well as visibility (Experiment 2). In Experiments 1 and 2, both species performed better when the rewards varied in quality as opposed to quantity, though performed above chance in both conditions. In Experiment 1, both crows and children were able to delay gratification when both rewards were visible. In Experiment 2, 5-year-old children outperformed 3- and 4-year olds, though overall children still performed well, while the crows struggled when reward visibility was manipulated, a result which may relate to difficulties in tracking the experimenters' hands during baiting. We discuss these findings in relation to the role of contextual issues on self-control when making species comparisons and investigating the mechanisms of self-control.

Developmental perspectives on primate gesture: 100 years in the making

This paper is an introduction to the special issue entitled Evolving the study of gesture: evaluating and unifying theories of gesture acquisition in great apes. The gestures of great apes have been recorded in scientific literature for over 100 years, but the ways in which apes acquire their gestures remains a highly debated topic. Through this historical framework, we summarize and contextualize contemporary research on the development of ape gesture. We describe the papers presented in this special issue, grouping them into three themes: assessing theories, methodological innovation, and new empirical approaches. Each of the papers is a significant contribution to the literature on ape gesture, but the collection of work together represents a unique collaboration across labs, theories, and studied species. By considering the papers side-by-side, we hope that readers will see the authors as engaging in a true dialogue, one which will help the field of primate gesture research make significant advances in the years to come.

Evolution of Speech: Anatomy and Control

Purpose This article critically reviews work on the evolution of speech in the context of motor control. It presents a brief introduction to the field of language evolution, of which the study of the evolution of speech is an integral component, and argues why taking the evolutionary perspective is useful. It then proceeds to review different methods of studying evolutionary questions: comparative research, experimental and observational research, and computer and mathematical modeling. Conclusions On the basis of comparative analysis of related species (specifically, other great apes) and on the basis of theoretical results, this article argues that adaptations for speech must have evolved gradually and that it is likely that speech motor control is one of the key aspects that has undergone observable selection related to speech, because, in this area, all the necessary precursors are present in closely related species. This implies that it must be possible to find empirical evidence for how speech evolved in the area of speech motor control. However, such research is only in its infancy at the present moment.

Travel linearity and speed of human foragers and chimpanzees during their daily search for food in tropical rainforests

To understand the evolutionary roots of human spatial cognition, researchers have compared spatial abilities of humans and one of our closest living relatives, the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes). However, how humans and chimpanzees compare in solving spatial tasks during real-world foraging is unclear to date, as measuring such spatial abilities in natural habitats is challenging. Here we compared spatial movement patterns of the Mbendjele BaYaka people and the Taï chimpanzees during their daily search for food in rainforests. We measured linearity and speed during off-trail travels toward out-of-sight locations as proxies for spatial knowledge. We found similarly high levels of linearity in individuals of Mbendjele foragers and Taï chimpanzees. However, human foragers and chimpanzees clearly differed in their reactions to group size and familiarity with the foraging areas. Mbendjele foragers increased travel linearity with increasing familiarity and group size, without obvious changes in speed. This pattern was reversed in Taï chimpanzees. We suggest that these differences between Mbendjele foragers and Taï chimpanzees reflect their different ranging styles, such as life-time range size and trail use. This result highlights the impact of socio-ecological settings on comparing spatial movement patterns. Our study provides a first step toward comparing long-range spatial movement patterns of two closely-related species in their natural environments.

Gesturing towards the future: cognition, big data, and the future of comparative gesture research

The field of ape gesture research has grown significantly in the past two decades, but progress on the question of gesture development has been limited by methodological and terminological disagreements, small sample sizes, and a lack of fine-grained longitudinal data. The main theories of gesture acquisition are often portrayed as mutually exclusive, but only some theories actually detail learning mechanisms, and differences in the level of analysis may help explain some of the apparent disagreements. Gesture research would benefit greatly from the articulation of more testable hypotheses. We propose two hypotheses that follow from dominant theories of gesture acquisition. We urge scholars to collect new data and leverage existing data in ways that maximize the potential for comparison across datasets and articulation with studies of other communicative modalities. Finally, we advocate for a transition away from using intentionality as a marker of the 'special status' of gesture, and towards using gesture as a window onto the lives and minds of apes.

A gestural repertoire of 1- to 2-year-old human children: in search of the ape gestures

When we compare human gestures to those of other apes, it looks at first like there is nothing much to compare at all. In adult humans, gestures are thought to be a window into the thought processes accompanying language, and sign languages are equal to spoken language with all of its features. Some research firmly emphasises the differences between human gestures and those of other apes; however, the question about whether there are any commonalities is rarely investigated, and has mostly been confined to pointing gestures. The gestural repertoires of nonhuman ape species have been carefully studied and described with regard to their form and function-but similar approaches are much rarer in the study of human gestures. This paper applies the methodology commonly used in the study of nonhuman ape gestures to the gestural communication of human children in their second year of life. We recorded (n = 13) children's gestures in a natural setting with peers and caregivers in Germany and Uganda. Children employed 52 distinct gestures, 46 (89%) of which are present in the chimpanzee repertoire. Like chimpanzees, they used them both singly, and in sequences, and employed individual gestures flexibly towards different goals.

Multimodal communication and language origins: integrating gestures and vocalizations

The presence of divergent and independent research traditions in the gestural and vocal domains of primate communication has resulted in major discrepancies in the definition and operationalization of cognitive concepts. However, in recent years, accumulating evidence from behavioural and neurobiological research has shown that both human and non-human primate communication is inherently multimodal. It is therefore timely to integrate the study of gestural and vocal communication. Herein, we review evidence demonstrating that there is no clear difference between primate gestures and vocalizations in the extent to which they show evidence for the presence of key language properties: intentionality, reference, iconicity and turn-taking. We also find high overlap in the neurobiological mechanisms producing primate gestures and vocalizations, as well as in ontogenetic flexibility. These findings confirm that human language had multimodal origins. Nonetheless, we note that in great apes, gestures seem to fulfil a carrying (i.e. predominantly informative) role in close-range communication, whereas the opposite holds for face-to-face interactions of humans. This suggests an evolutionary shift in the carrying role from the gestural to the vocal stream, and we explore this transition in the carrying modality. Finally, we suggest that future studies should focus on the links between complex communication, sociality and cooperative tendency to strengthen the study of language origins.

Learning curves and teaching when acquiring nut-cracking in humans and chimpanzees

Humans are considered superior to other species in their tool using skills. However, most of our knowledge about animals comes from observations in artificial conditions with individuals removed from their natural environment. We present a first comparison of humans and chimpanzees spontaneously acquiring the same technique as they forage in their natural environment. We compared the acquisition of the Panda nut-cracking technique between Mbendjele foragers from the Republic of Congo and the Taï chimpanzees from Côte d'Ivoire. Both species initially acquire the technique slowly with similar kinds of mistakes, with years of practice required for the apprentice to become expert. Chimpanzees more rapidly acquired the technique when an apprentice, and reached adult efficiency earlier than humans. Adult efficiencies in both species did not differ significantly. Expert-apprentice interactions showed many similar instances of teaching in both species, with more variability in humans due, in part to their more complex technique. While in humans, teaching occurred both vertically and obliquely, only the former existed in chimpanzees. This comparison of the acquisition of a natural technique clarifies how the two species differed in their technical intelligence. Furthermore, our observations support the idea of teaching in both species being more frequent for difficult skills.