The zone of latent solutions and its relevance to understanding ape cultures

The origin of great ape gestural forms

Two views claim to account for the origins of great ape gestural forms. On the Leipzig view, gestural forms are ontogenetically ritualised from action sequences between pairs of individuals. On the St Andrews view, gestures are the product of natural selection for shared gestural forms. The Leipzig view predicts within- and between-group differences between gestural forms that arise as a product of learning in ontogeny. The St Andrews view predicts universal gestural forms comprehensible within and between species that arise because gestural forms were a target of natural selection. We reject both accounts and propose an alternative "recruitment view" of the origins of great ape gestures. According to the recruitment view, great ape gestures recruit features of their existing behavioural repertoire for communicative purposes. Their gestures inherit their communicative functions from visual (and sometimes tactile) presentations of familiar and easily recognisable action schemas and states and parts of the body. To the extent that great ape species possess similar bodies, this predicts mutual comprehensibility within and between species - but without supposing that gestural forms were themselves targets of natural selection. Additionally, we locate great ape gestural communication within a pragmatic framework that is continuous with human communication, and make testable predications for adjudicating between the three alternative views. We propose that the recruitment view best explains existing data, and does so within a mechanistic framework that emphasises continuity between human and non-human great ape communication.

Hominin cognition: The null hypothesis

The target article explores material culture datasets from three African forager groups. After demonstrating that these modern, contemporary human populations would leave scant evidence of symbolic behaviour or material complexity, it cautioned against using material culture as a barometer for human cognition in the deep past. Twenty-one commentaries broadly support or expand these conclusions. A minority offer targeted demurrals, highlighting (1) the soundness of reasoning from absence; and questioning (2) the "cognitively modern" null; (3) the role of hunter-gatherer ethnography; and (4) the pertinence of the inferential issues identified in the target article. In synthesising these discussions, this reply addresses all four points of demurral in turn, and concludes that there is much to be gained from shifting our null assumptions and reconsidering the probabilistic inferential links between past material culture and cognition.

What we know and don't know about great ape cultural communication in the wild

Following the first descriptions of culture in primates, widespread agreement has developed that the term can be applied to nonhumans as group-specific, socially learned behaviors. While behaviors such as those involving extractive tool use have been researched intensively, we propose that behaviors that are more subtle, less likely to be ecologically constrained, and more likely to be socially shaped, such as cultural forms of communication, provide compelling evidence of culture in nonhuman primates. Additionally, cultural forms of communication can provide novel insights into animal cognition such as the capacity for conformity, conventionalized meanings, arbitrariness in signal forms, and even symbolism. In this paper we focus on evidence from studies conducted on wild great apes. First, we provide a thorough review of what exactly we do know, and by extension don't know, about great ape cultural communication. We argue that detailed research on both vocal and gestural communication in wild great apes shows a more nuanced and variable repertoire than once assumed, with increasing support for group-specific variation. Second, we discuss the relevance of great ape cultural communication and its potential for illustrating evolutionary continuity for human-like cultural attributes, namely cumulative culture and symbolism. In sum, a concerted effort to examine cultural forms of communication in great apes could reveal novel evidence for cultural capacities that have thus far been heavily debated in the literature and can simultaneously contribute to an improved understanding of the complex minds of our closest living relatives.

Group-level signatures in bonobo sociality

Humans show remarkable differences in social behaviour between families, groups, communities and cultures, whereas such group-level within-species variation in socio-behavioural propensities is typically overlooked in other species. Studies on intraspecific variation in animal social structures are needed to inform an evolutionary account of human sociality. Here, we study multiple independent bonobo populations (n = 6) in zoological settings to investigate if and how bonobos (n = 70) show group-specific signatures in sociality. By applying tailored Bayesian statistical methods, we find that beyond individual and dyadic variation, the groups substantially differ from each other in core dimensions of great ape sociality: social proximity, grooming and play. Moreover, the groups' network structures are distinct regarding cohesiveness and clustering, with some groups forming cohesive wholes, while others showcasing high levels of sub-grouping. Overall, while there is consistent evidence of differences in sociality between the groups, the patterns of cohesiveness and clustering are not consistent across the networks. This suggests that rather than groups having different levels of sociality, different patterns of sociality exist in each group. These findings warrant caution with characterising bonobos' behavioural phenotype at the species level, and identify an essential source of variation that needs to be integrated in phylogenetic analyses.

A sequence bottleneck for animal intelligence and language?

We discuss recent findings suggesting that non-human animals lack memory for stimulus sequences, and therefore do not represent the order of stimuli faithfully. These observations have far-reaching consequences for animal cognition, neuroscience, and studies of the evolution of language and culture. This is because, if non-human animals do not remember or process information about order faithfully, then it is unlikely that non-human animals perform mental simulations, construct mental world models, have episodic memory, or transmit culture faithfully. If this suggested sequence bottleneck proves to be a prevalent characteristic of animal memory systems, as suggested by recent work, it would require a re-examination of some influential concepts and ideas.

Human culture is uniquely open-ended rather than uniquely cumulative

Theories of how humans came to be so ecologically dominant increasingly centre on the adaptive abilities of human culture and its capacity for cumulative change and high-fidelity transmission. Here we revisit this hypothesis by comparing human culture with animal cultures and cases of epigenetic inheritance and parental effects. We first conclude that cumulative change and high transmission fidelity are not unique to human culture as previously thought, and so they are unlikely to explain its adaptive qualities. We then evaluate the evidence for seven alternative explanations: the inheritance of acquired characters, the pathways of inheritance, the non-random generation of variation, the scope of heritable variation, effects on organismal fitness, effects on genetic fitness and effects on evolutionary dynamics. From these, we identify the open-ended scope of human cultural variation as a key, but generally neglected, phenomenon. We end by articulating a hypothesis for the cognitive basis of this open-endedness.

Evolved Open-Endedness in Cultural Evolution: A New Dimension in Open-Ended Evolution Research

The goal of Artificial Life research, as articulated by Chris Langton, is "to contribute to theoretical biology by locating life-as-we-know-it within the larger picture of life-as-it-could-be." The study and pursuit of open-ended evolution in artificial evolutionary systems exemplify this goal. However, open-ended evolution research is hampered by two fundamental issues: the struggle to replicate open-endedness in an artificial evolutionary system and our assumption that we only have one system (genetic evolution) from which to draw inspiration. We argue not only that cultural evolution should be seen as another real-world example of an open-ended evolutionary system but that the unique qualities seen in cultural evolution provide us with a new perspective from which we can assess the fundamental properties of, and ask new questions about, open-ended evolutionary systems, especially with regard to evolved open-endedness and transitions from bounded to unbounded evolution. Here we provide an overview of culture as an evolutionary system, highlight the interesting case of human cultural evolution as an open-ended evolutionary system, and contextualize cultural evolution by developing a new framework of (evolved) open-ended evolution. We go on to provide a set of new questions that can be asked once we consider cultural evolution within the framework of open-ended evolution and introduce new insights that we may be able to gain about evolved open-endedness as a result of asking these questions.

In search of animal normativity: a framework for studying social norms in non-human animals

Social norms - rules governing which behaviours are deemed appropriate or inappropriate within a given community - are typically taken to be uniquely human. Recently, this position has been challenged by a number of philosophers, cognitive scientists, and ethologists, who have suggested that social norms may also be found in certain non-human animal communities. Such claims have elicited considerable scepticism from norm cognition researchers, who doubt that any non-human animals possess the psychological capacities necessary for normative cognition. However, there is little agreement among these researchers about what these psychological prerequisites are. This makes empirical study of animal social norms difficult, since it is not clear what we are looking for and thus what should count as behavioural evidence for the presence (or absence) of social norms in animals. To break this impasse, we offer an approach that moves beyond contested psychological criteria for social norms. This approach is inspired by the animal culture research program, which has made a similar shift away from heavily psychological definitions of 'culture' to become organised around a cluster of more empirically tractable concepts of culture. Here, we propose an analogous set of constructs built around the core notion of a normative regularity, which we define as a socially maintained pattern of behavioural conformity within a community. We suggest methods for studying potential normative regularities in wild and captive primates. We also discuss the broader scientific and philosophical implications of this research program with respect to questions of human uniqueness, animal welfare and conservation.

Chimpanzees use social information to acquire a skill they fail to innovate

Cumulative cultural evolution has been claimed to be a uniquely human phenomenon pivotal to the biological success of our species. One plausible condition for cumulative cultural evolution to emerge is individuals' ability to use social learning to acquire know-how that they cannot easily innovate by themselves. It has been suggested that chimpanzees may be capable of such know-how social learning, but this assertion remains largely untested. Here we show that chimpanzees use social learning to acquire a skill that they failed to independently innovate. By teaching chimpanzees how to solve a sequential task (one chimpanzee in each of the two tested groups, n = 66) and using network-based diffusion analysis, we found that 14 naive chimpanzees learned to operate a puzzle box that they failed to operate during the preceding three months of exposure to all necessary materials. In conjunction, we present evidence for the hypothesis that social learning in chimpanzees is necessary and sufficient to acquire a new, complex skill after the initial innovation.

Bumblebees socially learn behaviour too complex to innovate alone

Culture refers to behaviours that are socially learned and persist within a population over time. Increasing evidence suggests that animal culture can, like human culture, be cumulative: characterized by sequential innovations that build on previous ones1. However, human cumulative culture involves behaviours so complex that they lie beyond the capacity of any individual to independently discover during their lifetime1-3. To our knowledge, no study has so far demonstrated this phenomenon in an invertebrate. Here we show that bumblebees can learn from trained demonstrator bees to open a novel two-step puzzle box to obtain food rewards, even though they fail to do so independently. Experimenters were unable to train demonstrator bees to perform the unrewarded first step without providing a temporary reward linked to this action, which was removed during later stages of training. However, a third of naive observer bees learned to open the two-step box from these demonstrators, without ever being rewarded after the first step. This suggests that social learning might permit the acquisition of behaviours too complex to 're-innovate' through individual learning. Furthermore, naive bees failed to open the box despite extended exposure for up to 24 days. This finding challenges a common opinion in the field: that the capacity to socially learn behaviours that cannot be innovated through individual trial and error is unique to humans.

Cultural evolution: A review of theoretical challenges

The rapid growth of cultural evolutionary science, its expansion into numerous fields, its use of diverse methods, and several conceptual problems have outpaced corollary developments in theory and philosophy of science. This has led to concern, exemplified in results from a recent survey conducted with members of the Cultural Evolution Society, that the field lacks 'knowledge synthesis', is poorly supported by 'theory', has an ambiguous relation to biological evolution and uses key terms (e.g. 'culture', 'social learning', 'cumulative culture') in ways that hamper operationalization in models, experiments and field studies. Although numerous review papers in the field represent and categorize its empirical findings, the field's theoretical challenges receive less critical attention even though challenges of a theoretical or conceptual nature underlie most of the problems identified by Cultural Evolution Society members. Guided by the heterogeneous 'grand challenges' emergent in this survey, this paper restates those challenges and adopts an organizational style requisite to discussion of them. The paper's goal is to contribute to increasing conceptual clarity and theoretical discernment around the most pressing challenges facing the field of cultural evolutionary science. It will be of most interest to cultural evolutionary scientists, theoreticians, philosophers of science and interdisciplinary researchers.

The evolution of hierarchically structured communication

Human language sentences are standardly understood as exhibiting considerable hierarchical structure: they can and typically do contain parts that in turn contain parts, etc. In other words, sentences are thought to generally exhibit significant nested part-whole structure. As far as we can tell, this is not a feature of the gestural or vocal communication systems of our great ape relatives. So, one of the many challenges we face in providing a theory of human language evolution is to explain the evolution of hierarchically structured communication in our line. This article takes up that challenge. More specifically, I first present and motivate an account of hierarchical structure in language that departs significantly from the orthodox conception of such structure in linguistics and evolutionary discussions that draw on linguistic theory. On the account I propose, linguistic structure, including hierarchical structure, is treated as a special case of structured action. This account is rooted in the cognitive neuroscience of action, as opposed to (formal) linguistic theory. Among other things, such an account enables us to see how selection for enhanced capacities of act organization and act control in actors, and for act interpretation in observers, might have constructed the brain machinery necessary for the elaborate forms of hierarchically structured communication that we humans engage in. I flesh out this line of thought, emphasizing in particular the role of hominin technique and technology, and the social learning thereof, as evolutionary drivers of this brain machinery.

Generative cultural learning in children and adults: the role of compositionality and generativity in cultural evolution

Are human cultures distinctively cumulative because they are uniquely compositional? We addressed this question using a summative learning paradigm where participants saw different models build different tower elements, consisting of discrete actions and objects: stacking cubes (tower base) and linking squares (tower apex). These elements could be combined to form a tower that was optimal in terms of height and structural soundness. In addition to measuring copying fidelity, we explored whether children and adults (i) extended the knowledge demonstrated to additional tower elements and (ii) productively combined them. Results showed that children and adults copied observed demonstrations and applied them to novel exemplars. However, only adults in the imitation condition combined the two newly derived base and apex, relative to adults in a control group. Nonetheless, there were remarkable similarities between children's and adults' performance across measures. Composite measures capturing errors and overall generativity in children's and adults' performance produced few population by condition interactions. Results suggest that early in development, humans possess a suite of cognitive skills-compositionality and generativity-that transforms phylogenetically widespread social learning competencies into something that may be unique to our species, cultural learning; allowing human cultures to evolve towards greater complexity.

Cultural evolution in the science of culture and cultural evolution

My critical review [1] elicited a welcome diversity of perspectives across the 12 commentaries now published [2-13]. In total 28 co-authors were inspired to contribute. In addition to engaging with the critical perspectives of my review, several of the commentaries take the debates and discussions into insightful and potentially important supplementary domains that I highlight in what follows. I have extracted a number of major themes in which I detected overlaps in the foci of different commentaries, and I use these to organise my replies. I hope that our shared efforts will constitute some degree of 'cultural evolution' in our science, as suggested in the title of this reply to commentaries.

Biased cultural transmission of a social custom in chimpanzees

Cultural transmission studies in animals have predominantly focused on identifying between-group variation in tool-use techniques, while immaterial cultures remain understudied despite their potential for highlighting similarities between human and animal culture. Here, using long-term data from two chimpanzee communities, we tested whether one of chimpanzees' most enigmatic social customs-the grooming handclasp-is culturally transmitted by investigating the influence of well-documented human transmission biases on their variational preferences. After identifying differences in style preferences between the communities, we show that older and dominant individuals exert more influence over their partners' handclasp styles. Mothers were equally likely to influence their offspring's preferences as nonkin, indicating that styles are transmitted both vertically and obliquely. Last, individuals gradually converged on the group style, suggesting that conformity guides chimpanzees' handclasp preferences. Our findings show that chimpanzees' social lives are influenced by cultural transmission biases that hitherto were thought to be uniquely human.

The method of exclusion (still) cannot identify specific mechanisms of cultural inheritance

The method of exclusion identifies patterns of distributions of behaviours and/or artefact forms among different groups, where these patterns are deemed unlikely to arise from purely genetic and/or ecological factors. The presence of such patterns is often used to establish whether a species is cultural or not-i.e. whether a species uses social learning or not. Researchers using or describing this method have often pointed out that the method cannot pinpoint which specific type(s) of social learning resulted in the observed patterns. However, the literature continues to contain such inferences. In a new attempt to warn against these logically unwarranted conclusions, we illustrate this error using a novel approach. We use an individual-based model, focused on wild ape cultural patterns-as these patterns are the best-known cases of animal culture and as they also contain the most frequent usage of the unwarranted inference for specific social learning mechanisms. We built a model that contained agents unable to copy specifics of behavioural or artefact forms beyond their individual reach (which we define as "copying"). We did so, as some of the previous inference claims related to social learning mechanisms revolve around copying defined in this way. The results of our model however show that non-copying social learning can already reproduce the defining-even iconic-features of observed ape cultural patterns detected by the method of exclusion. This shows, using a novel model approach, that copying processes are not necessary to produce the cultural patterns that are sometimes still used in an attempt to identify copying processes. Additionally, our model could fully control for both environmental and genetic factors (impossible in real life) and thus offers a new validity check for the method of exclusion as related to general cultural claims-a check that the method passed. Our model also led to new and additional findings, which we likewise discuss.

Blind alleys and fruitful pathways in the comparative study of cultural cognition

A mere few decades ago, culture was thought a unique human attribute. Evidence to the contrary accumulated through the latter part of the twentieth century and has exploded in the present one, demonstrating the transmission of traditions through social learning across all principal vertebrate taxa and even invertebrates, notably insects. The scope of human culture is nevertheless highly distinctive. What makes our cultural capacities and their cognitive underpinnings so different? In this article I argue that in behavioural scientists' endeavours to answer this question, fruitful research pathways and their ensuing discoveries have come to exist alongside popular, yet in the light of current empirical evidence, highly questionable scenarios and even scientific blind alleys. I particularly re-evaluate theories that rely on the centrality of a supposed uniquely human capacity for imitative copying in explaining the distinctive capacity for massive cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) in our species. The most extreme versions of this perspective suffer logical incoherence and severe limits on scientific testability. By contrast the field has generated a range of rigorous observational and experimental methodologies that have revealed both long-term cultural fidelity and limited forms of CCE in non-human species. Attention now turns to directly investigating the scope, limits and underlying cognition of non-human versus human CCE, with a broader approach to factors additional to cultural transmission, notably the role of invention, innovation and evolved motivational biases underlying the scope of CCE in the species studied.

The experimental evolution of human culture: flexibility, fidelity and environmental instability

The past 2 Myr have seen both unprecedented environmental instability and the evolution of the human capacity for complex culture. This, along with the observation that cultural evolution occurs faster than genetic evolution, has led to the suggestion that culture is an adaptation to an unstable environment. We test this hypothesis by examining the ability of human social learning to respond to environmental changes. We do this by inserting human participants (n = 4800) into evolutionary simulations with a changing environment while varying the social information available to individuals across five conditions. We find that human social learning shows some signs of adaptation to environmental instability, including critical social learning, the adoption of up-and-coming traits and, unexpectedly, contrariness. However, these are insufficient to avoid significant fitness declines when the environment changes, and many individuals are highly conformist, which exacerbates the fitness effects of environmental change. We conclude that human social learning reflects a compromise between the competing needs for flexibility to accommodate environmental change and fidelity to accurately transmit valuable cultural information.

Inferring cultural reproduction from lithic data: A critical review

The cultural reproduction of lithic technology, long an implicit assumption of archaeological theories, has garnered increasing attention over the past decades. Major debates ranging from the origins of the human culture capacity to the interpretation of spatiotemporal patterning now make explicit reference to social learning mechanisms and cultural evolutionary dynamics. This burgeoning literature has produced important insights and methodological innovations. However, this rapid growth has sometimes led to confusion and controversy due to an under-examination of underlying theoretical and methodological assumptions. The time is thus ripe for a critical assessment of progress in the study of the cultural reproduction of lithic technology. Here we review recent work addressing the evolutionary origins of human culture and the meaning of artifact variation at both intrasite and intersite levels. We propose that further progress will require a more extended and context-specific evolutionary approach to address the complexity of real-world cultural reproduction.

Early knapping techniques do not necessitate cultural transmission

Early stone tool production, or knapping, techniques are claimed to be the earliest evidence for cultural transmission in the human lineage. Previous experimental studies have trained human participants to knap in conditions involving opportunities for cultural transmission. Subsequent knapping was then interpreted as evidence for a necessity of the provided cultural transmission opportunities for these techniques. However, a valid necessity claim requires showing that individual learning alone cannot lead to early knapping techniques. Here, we tested human participants (N = 28) in cultural isolation for the individual learning of early knapping techniques by providing them with relevant raw materials and a puzzle task as motivation. Twenty-five participants were technique naïve according to posttest questionnaires, yet they individually learned early knapping techniques, therewith producing and using core and flake tools. Early knapping techniques thus do not necessitate cultural transmission of know-how and could likewise have been individually derived among premodern hominins.

Landscaping the Behavioural Ecology of Primate Stone Tool Use

Ecology is fundamental in the development, transmission, and perpetuity of primate technology. Previous studies on tool site selection have addressed the relevance of targeted resources and raw materials for tools, but few have considered the broader foraging landscape. In this landscape-scale study of the ecological contexts of wild chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes verus) tool use, we investigated the conditions required for nut-cracking to occur and persist in discrete locations at the long-term field site of Bossou, Guinea. We examined this at three levels: selection, frequency of use, and inactivity. We collected data on plant foods, nut trees, and raw materials using transect and quadrat methods, and conducted forest-wide surveys to map the location of nests and watercourses. We analysed data at the quadrat level (n = 82) using generalised linear models and descriptive statistics. We found that, further to the presence of a nut tree and availability of raw materials, abundance of food-providing trees as well as proximity to nest sites were significant predictors of nut-cracking occurrence. This suggests that the spatial distribution of nut-cracking sites is mediated by the broader behavioural landscape and is influenced by non-extractive foraging of perennial resources and non-foraging activities. Additionally, the number of functional tools was greater at sites with higher nut-cracking frequency, and was negatively correlated with site inactivity. Our research indicates that the technological landscape of Bossou chimpanzees shares affinities with the ‘favoured places’ model of hominin site formation, providing a comparative framework for reconstructing landscape-scale patterns of ancient human behaviour. A French translation of this abstract is provided in theelectronic supplementary information: EMS 2.

Experimental investigation of orangutans' lithic percussive and sharp stone tool behaviours

Early stone tools, and in particular sharp stone tools, arguably represent one of the most important technological milestones in human evolution. The production and use of sharp stone tools significantly widened the ecological niche of our ancestors, allowing them to exploit novel food resources. However, despite their importance, it is still unclear how these early lithic technologies emerged and which behaviours served as stepping-stones for the development of systematic lithic production in our lineage. One approach to answer this question is to collect comparative data on the stone tool making and using abilities of our closest living relatives, the great apes, to reconstruct the potential stone-related behaviours of early hominins. To this end, we tested both the individual and the social learning abilities of five orangutans to make and use stone tools. Although the orangutans did not make sharp stone tools initially, three individuals spontaneously engaged in lithic percussion, and sharp stone pieces were produced under later experimental conditions. Furthermore, when provided with a human-made sharp stone, one orangutan spontaneously used it as a cutting tool. Contrary to previous experiments, social demonstrations did not considerably improve the stone tool making and using abilities of orangutans. Our study is the first to systematically investigate the stone tool making and using abilities of untrained, unenculturated orangutans showing that two proposed pre-requisites for the emergence of early lithic technologies-lithic percussion and the recognition of sharp-edged stones as cutting tools-are present in this species. We discuss the implications that ours and previous great ape stone tool experiments have for understanding the initial stages of lithic technologies in our lineage.

From Beethoven to Beyoncé: Do Changing Aesthetic Cultures Amount to "Cumulative Cultural Evolution?"

Culture can be defined as "group typical behaviour patterns shared by members of a community that rely on socially learned and transmitted information" (Laland and Hoppitt, 2003, p. 151). Once thought to be a distinguishing characteristic of humans relative to other animals (Dean et al., 2014) it is now generally accepted to exist more widely, with especially abundant evidence in non-human primates, cetaceans, and birds (Rendell and Whitehead, 2001; Aplin, 2019; Whiten, 2021). More recently, cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) has taken on this distinguishing role (Henrich, 2015; Laland, 2018). CCE, it is argued, allows humans, uniquely, to ratchet up the complexity or efficiency of cultural traits over time. This "ratchet effect" (Tomasello, 1994) gives the capacity to accumulate beneficial modifications over time beyond the capacities of a single individual (Sasaki and Biro, 2017). Mesoudi and Thornton (2018) define a core set of criteria for identifying CCE in humans and non-human animals that places emphasis on some performance measure of traits increasing over time. They suggest this emphasis is also pertinent to cultural products in the aesthetic domain, but is this the case? Music, art and dance evolve over time (Savage, 2019), but can we say they gain beneficial modifications that increase their aesthetic value? Here we bring together perspectives from philosophy, musicology and biology to build a conceptual analysis of this question. We summarise current thinking on cumulative culture and aesthetics across fields to determine how aesthetic culture fits into the concept of CCE. We argue that this concept is problematic to reconcile with dominant views of aesthetics in philosophical analysis and struggles to characterise aesthetic cultures that evolve over time. We suggest that a tension arises from fundamental differences between cultural evolution in aesthetic and technological domains. Furthermore, this tension contributes to current debates between reconstructive and preservative theories of cultural evolution.

Young children spontaneously invent three different types of associative tool use behaviour

Associative Tool Use (ATU) describes the use of two or more tools in combination, with the literature further differentiating between Tool set use, Tool composite use, Sequential tool use and Secondary tool use. Research investigating the cognitive processes underlying ATU has shown that some primate and bird species spontaneously invent Tool set and Sequential tool use. Yet studies with humans are sparse. Whether children are also able to spontaneously invent ATU behaviours and at what age this ability emerges is poorly understood. We addressed this gap in the literature with two experiments involving preschoolers (E1, N = 66, 3 years 6 months to 4 years 9 months; E2, N = 119, 3 years 0 months to 6 years 10 months) who were administered novel tasks measuring Tool set, Metatool and Sequential tool use. Participants needed to solve the tasks individually, without the opportunity for social learning (except for enhancement effects). Children from 3 years of age spontaneously invented all of the types of investigated ATU behaviours. Success rates were low, suggesting that individual invention of ATU in novel tasks is still challenging for preschoolers. We discuss how future studies can use and expand our tasks to deepen our understanding of tool use and problem-solving in humans and non-human animals.

Field experiments find no evidence that chimpanzee nut cracking can be independently innovated

Cumulative culture has been claimed a hallmark of human evolution. Yet, the uniqueness of human culture is heavily debated. The zone of latent solutions hypothesis states that only humans have cultural forms that require form-copying social learning and are culture-dependent. Non-human ape cultural behaviours are considered 'latent solutions', which can be independently (re-)innovated. Others claim that chimpanzees, like humans, have cumulative culture. Here, we use field experiments at Seringbara (Nimba Mountains, Guinea) to test whether chimpanzee nut cracking can be individually (re-)innovated. We provided: (1) palm nuts and stones, (2) palm fruit bunch, (3) cracked palm nuts and (4) Coula nuts and stones. Chimpanzee parties visited (n = 35) and explored (n = 11) the experiments but no nut cracking occurred. In these experiments, chimpanzees did not individually (re-)innovate nut cracking under ecologically valid conditions. Our null results are consistent with the hypothesis that chimpanzee nut cracking is a product of social learning.

Animal culture: But of which kind?

Is animal culture a real entity or is it rather just in the eye of the beholder? The concept of culture began to be increasingly used in the context of animal behaviour research around the 1960s. Despite its success, it is not clear that it represents what philosophers have traditionally thought to be a natural kind. In this article I will show, however, how conceiving of animal culture in this fashion has played a role in the "culture wars", and what lessons we can draw from this. First, an analysis of the epistemological landscape of author keywords related to the concept of animal cultures is presented, thus vindicating the centrality of the concept in describing a broad range of findings. A minimal definition that encompasses the multiple strands of research incorporating the notion of culture is proposed. I then systematically enumerate the ways in which culture thus conceived cannot be considered a natural kind in the study of animal behaviour. This is accomplished by reviewing the efforts and possibilities of anchoring the elusive idea in specific mechanisms, homologies, selection pressures, homeostatic property clusters, or alternatively, its reduction or elimination. Finally, a plausible interpretation of the scientific status of the animal culture concept is suggested that is compatible with both its well established use in animal behaviour research and its inferential limitations. Culture plays the role of a well-established epistemic kind, a node that connects different areas of research on common themes.

Orangutans have larger gestural repertoires in captivity than in the wild-A case of weak innovation?

Whether nonhuman species can change their communicative repertoire in response to socio-ecological environments has critical implications for communicative innovativeness prior to the emergence of human language, with its unparalleled productivity. Here, we use a comparative sample of wild and zoo-housed orangutans of two species (Pongo abelii, Pongo pygmaeus) to assess the effect of the wild-captive contrast on repertoires of gestures and facial expressions. We find that repertoires on both the individual and population levels are larger in captive than in wild settings, regardless of species, age class, or sampling effort. In the more sociable Sumatran species, dominant use of signals toward single outcomes was also higher in captive settings. We thus conclude that orangutans exposed to more sociable and terrestrial conditions evince behavioral plasticity, in that they produce additional innate or innovated signals that are highly functionally specific. These findings suggest a latent capacity for innovativeness in these apes' communicative repertoires.

Culture without copying or selection

Typical examples of cultural phenomena all exhibit a degree of similarity across time and space at the level of the population. As such, a fundamental question for any science of culture is, what ensures this stability in the first place? Here we focus on the evolutionary and stabilising role of 'convergent transformation', in which one item causes the production of another item whose form tends to deviate from the original in a directed, non-random way. We present a series of stochastic models of cultural evolution investigating its effects. The results show that cultural stability can emerge and be maintained by virtue of convergent transformation alone, in the absence of any form of copying or selection process. We show how high-fidelity copying and convergent transformation need not be opposing forces, and can jointly contribute to cultural stability. We finally analyse how non-random transformation and high-fidelity copying can have different evolutionary signatures at population level, and hence how their distinct effects can be distinguished in empirical records. Collectively, these results supplement existing approaches to cultural evolution based on the Darwinian analogy, while also providing formal support for other frameworks - such as Cultural Attraction Theory - that entail its further loosening.

Social media summary

Culture can be produced and maintained by convergent transformation, without copying or selection involved.

Captive great apes tend to innovate simple tool behaviors quickly

Recent studies have highlighted the important role that individual learning mechanisms and different forms of enhancenment play in the acquisition of novel behaviors by naïve individuals. A considerable subset of these studies has focused on tool innovation by our closest living relatives, the great apes, to better undestand the evolution of technology in our own lineage. To be able to isolate the role that individual learning plays in great ape tool innovation, researchers usually employ what are known as baseline tests. Although these baselines are commonly used in behavioral studies in captivity, the length of these tests in terms of number of trials and duration remains unstandarized across studies. To address this methodological issue, we conducted a literature review of great ape tool innovation studies conducted in zoological institutions and compiled various methodological data including the timing of innovation. Our literature review revealed an early innovation tendency in great apes, which was particularly pronounced when simple forms of tool use were investigated. In the majority of experiments where tool innovation took place, this occurred within the first trial and/or the first hour of testing. We discuss different possible sources of variation in the latency to innovate such as testing setup, species and task. We hope that our literature review helps researchers design more data-informed, resource-efficient experiments on tool innovation in our closest living relatives.

Naïve, unenculturated chimpanzees fail to make and use flaked stone tools

Background: Despite substantial research on early hominin lithic technologies, the learning mechanisms underlying flake manufacture and use are contested. To draw phylogenetic inferences on the potential cognitive processes underlying the acquisition of both of these abilities in early hominins, we investigated if and how one of our closest living relatives, chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes), could learn to make and use flakes. Methods: Across several experimental conditions, we tested eleven task-naïve chimpanzees (unenculturated n=8, unknown status n=3) from two independent populations for their abilities to spontaneously make and subsequently use flakes as well as to use flakes made by a human experimenter. Results: Despite the fact that the chimpanzees seemed to understand the requirements of the task, were sufficiently motivated and had ample opportunities to develop the target behaviours, none of the chimpanzees tested made or used flakes in any of the experimental conditions. Conclusions: These results differ from all previous ape flaking experiments, which found flake manufacture and use in bonobos and one orangutan. However, these earlier studies tested human-enculturated apes and provided test subjects with flake making and using demonstrations. The contrast between these earlier positive findings and our negative findings (despite using a much larger sample size) suggests that enculturation and/or demonstrations may be necessary for chimpanzees to acquire these abilities. The data obtained in this study are consistent with the hypothesis that flake manufacture and use might have evolved in the hominin lineage after the split between Homo and Pan 7 million years ago, a scenario further supported by the initial lack of flaked stone tools in the archaeological record after this split. We discuss possible evolutionary scenarios for flake manufacture and use in both non-hominin and hominin lineages.

Processing of novel food reveals payoff and rank-biased social learning in a wild primate

Social learning—learning from others—is the basis for behavioural traditions. Different social learning strategies (SLS), where individuals biasedly learn behaviours based on their content or who demonstrates them, may increase an individual’s fitness and generate behavioural traditions. While SLS have been mostly studied in isolation, their interaction and the interplay between individual and social learning is less understood. We performed a field-based open diffusion experiment in a wild primate. We provided two groups of vervet monkeys with a novel food, unshelled peanuts, and documented how three different peanut opening techniques spread within the groups. We analysed data using hierarchical Bayesian dynamic learning models that explore the integration of multiple SLS with individual learning. We (1) report evidence of social learning compared to strictly individual learning, (2) show that vervets preferentially socially learn the technique that yields the highest observed payoff and (3) also bias attention toward individuals of higher rank. This shows that behavioural preferences can arise when individuals integrate social information about the efficiency of a behaviour alongside cues related to the rank of a demonstrator. When these preferences converge to the same behaviour in a group, they may result in stable behavioural traditions.

The Method of Local Restriction: in search of potential great ape culture-dependent forms

Humans possess a perhaps unique type of culture among primates called cumulative culture. In this type of culture, behavioural forms cumulate changes over time, which increases their complexity and/or efficiency, eventually making these forms culture-dependent. As changes cumulate, culture-dependent forms become causally opaque, preventing the overall behavioural form from being acquired by individuals on their own; in other words, culture-dependent forms must be copied between individuals and across generations. Despite the importance of cumulative culture for understanding the evolutionary history of our species, how and when cumulative culture evolved is still debated. One of the challenges faced when addressing these questions is how to identify culture-dependent forms that result from cumulative cultural evolution. Here we propose a novel method to identify the most likely cases of culture-dependent forms. The 'Method of Local Restriction' is based on the premise that as culture-dependent forms are repeatedly transmitted via copying, these forms will unavoidably cumulate population-specific changes (due to copying error) and therefore must be expected to become locally restricted over time. When we applied this method to our closest living relatives, the great apes, we found that most known ape behavioural forms are not locally restricted (across domains and species) and thus are unlikely to be acquired via copying. Nevertheless, we found 25 locally restricted forms across species and domains, three of which appear to be locally unique (having been observed in a single population of a single species). Locally unique forms represent the best current candidates for culture-dependent forms in non-human great apes. Besides these rare exceptions, our results show that overall, ape cultures do not rely heavily on copying, as most ape behaviours appear across sites and/or species, rendering them unlikely to be culture-dependent forms resulting from cumulative cultural evolution. Yet, the locally restricted forms (and especially the three locally unique forms) identified by our method should be tested further for their potential reliance on copying social learning mechanisms (and in turn, for their potential culture-dependence). Future studies could use the Method of Local Restriction to investigate the existence of culture-dependent forms in other animal species and in the hominin archaeological record to estimate how widespread copying is in the animal kingdom and to postulate a timeline for the emergence of copying in our lineage.

Leveraging Social Learning to Enhance Captive Animal Care and Welfare

From ants to zebras, animals are influenced by the behavior of others. At the simplest level, social support can reduce neophobia, increasing animals’ exploration of novel spaces, foods, and other environmental stimuli. Animals can also learn new skills more quickly and more readily after observing others perform them. How then can we apply animals’ proclivity to socially learn to enhance their care and welfare in captive settings? Here, I review the ways in which animals (selectively) use social information, and propose tactics for leveraging that to refine the behavioral management of captive animals: to enhance socialization techniques, enrichment strategies, and training outcomes. It is also important to consider, however, that social learning does not always promote the uniform expression of new behaviors. There are differences in animals’ likelihood to seek out or use socially provided information, driven by characteristics such as species, rank, age, and personality. Additionally, social learning can result in inexact transmission or the transmission of undesirable behaviors. Thus, understanding when, how, and why animals use social information is key to developing effective strategies to improve how we care for animals across settings and, ultimately, enhance captive animal welfare.

Clarifying Misconceptions of the Zone of Latent Solutions Hypothesis: A Response to Haidle and Schlaudt: Miriam Noël Haidle and Oliver Schlaudt: Where Does Cumulative Culture Begin? A Plea for a Sociologically Informed Perspective (Biological Theory 15: 161-174, 2020)

The critical examination of current hypotheses is one of the key ways in which scientific fields develop and grow. Therefore, any critique, including Haidle and Schlaudt's article, "Where Does Cumulative Culture Begin? A Plea for a Sociologically Informed Perspective," represents a welcome addition to the literature. However, critiques must also be evaluated. In their article, Haidle and Schlaudt (Biol Theory 15:161-174, 2020. 10.1007/s13752-020-00351-w; henceforth H&S) review some approaches to culture and cumulative culture in both human and nonhuman primates. H&S discuss the "zone of latent solutions" (ZLS) hypothesis as applied to nonhuman primates and stone-toolmaking premodern hominins. Here, we will evaluate whether H&S's critique addresses its target.