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Zahedi A, Lynn SJ, Sommer W. Cognitive simulation along with neural adaptation explain effects of suggestions: a novel theoretical framework. Front Psychol 2024; 15:1388347. [PMID: 38966744 PMCID: PMC11223671 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1388347] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/19/2024] [Accepted: 04/30/2024] [Indexed: 07/06/2024] Open
Abstract
Hypnosis is an effective intervention with proven efficacy that is employed in clinical settings and for investigating various cognitive processes. Despite their practical success, no consensus exists regarding the mechanisms underlying well-established hypnotic phenomena. Here, we suggest a new framework called the Simulation-Adaptation Theory of Hypnosis (SATH). SATH expands the predictive coding framework by focusing on (a) redundancy elimination in generative models using intrinsically generated prediction errors, (b) adaptation due to amplified or prolonged neural activity, and (c) using internally generated predictions as a venue for learning new associations. The core of our treatise is that simulating proprioceptive, interoceptive, and exteroceptive signals, along with the top-down attenuation of the precision of sensory prediction errors due to neural adaptation, can explain objective and subjective hypnotic phenomena. Based on these postulations, we offer mechanistic explanations for critical categories of direct verbal suggestions, including (1) direct-ideomotor, (2) challenge-ideomotor, (3) perceptual, and (4) cognitive suggestions. Notably, we argue that besides explaining objective responses, SATH accounts for the subjective effects of suggestions, i.e., the change in the sense of agency and reality. Finally, we discuss individual differences in hypnotizability and how SATH accommodates them. We believe that SATH is exhaustive and parsimonious in its scope, can explain a wide range of hypnotic phenomena without contradiction, and provides a host of testable predictions for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anoushiravan Zahedi
- Department of Psychology, University of Münster, Münster, Germany
- Department of Psychology, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany
- Neuroscience Research Center, Charité-Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Berlin, Germany
| | - Steven Jay Lynn
- Department of Psychology, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY, United States
| | - Werner Sommer
- Department of Psychology, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany
- Department of Psychology, Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua, China
- Department of Physics and Life Science Imaging Center, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon, Hong Kong SAR, China
- Faculty of Education, National University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
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Parvizi-Wayne D, Sandved-Smith L, Pitliya RJ, Limanowski J, Tufft MRA, Friston KJ. Forgetting ourselves in flow: an active inference account of flow states and how we experience ourselves within them. Front Psychol 2024; 15:1354719. [PMID: 38887627 PMCID: PMC11182004 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1354719] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/12/2023] [Accepted: 04/26/2024] [Indexed: 06/20/2024] Open
Abstract
Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over (i) the expected sensory consequences of action and (ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flow-inducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher-order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing.
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Affiliation(s)
- Darius Parvizi-Wayne
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Lars Sandved-Smith
- Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia
| | - Riddhi J. Pitliya
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
- VERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA, United States
| | - Jakub Limanowski
- Institute of Psychology, University of Greifswald, Greifswald, Germany
| | - Miles R. A. Tufft
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Karl J. Friston
- VERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA, United States
- Queen Square Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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Raber J, Pittman-Polletta BR, Rastmanesh R. Editorial: Novel applications of Bayesian and other models in translational neuroscience. Front Neurosci 2024; 18:1373633. [PMID: 38741789 PMCID: PMC11089901 DOI: 10.3389/fnins.2024.1373633] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/20/2024] [Accepted: 04/15/2024] [Indexed: 05/16/2024] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Jacob Raber
- Department of Behavioral Neuroscience, Neurology, and Radiation Medicine, Division of Neuroscience, Oregon National Primate Research Center, Oregon Health and Science University, Portland, OR, United States
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Pezzulo G, Parr T, Friston K. Active inference as a theory of sentient behavior. Biol Psychol 2024; 186:108741. [PMID: 38182015 DOI: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2023.108741] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/18/2023] [Revised: 12/05/2023] [Accepted: 12/29/2023] [Indexed: 01/07/2024]
Abstract
This review paper offers an overview of the history and future of active inference-a unifying perspective on action and perception. Active inference is based upon the idea that sentient behavior depends upon our brains' implicit use of internal models to predict, infer, and direct action. Our focus is upon the conceptual roots and development of this theory of (basic) sentience and does not follow a rigid chronological narrative. We trace the evolution from Helmholtzian ideas on unconscious inference, through to a contemporary understanding of action and perception. In doing so, we touch upon related perspectives, the neural underpinnings of active inference, and the opportunities for future development. Key steps in this development include the formulation of predictive coding models and related theories of neuronal message passing, the use of sequential models for planning and policy optimization, and the importance of hierarchical (temporally) deep internal (i.e., generative or world) models. Active inference has been used to account for aspects of anatomy and neurophysiology, to offer theories of psychopathology in terms of aberrant precision control, and to unify extant psychological theories. We anticipate further development in all these areas and note the exciting early work applying active inference beyond neuroscience. This suggests a future not just in biology, but in robotics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Giovanni Pezzulo
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy.
| | - Thomas Parr
- Nuffield Department of Clinical Neurosciences, University of Oxford, UK
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Queen Square Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK; VERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA 90016, USA
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Miller M, White B, Scrivner C. Surfing uncertainty with screams: predictive processing, error dynamics and horror films. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2024; 379:20220425. [PMID: 38104602 PMCID: PMC10725765 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2022.0425] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/27/2023] [Accepted: 10/08/2023] [Indexed: 12/19/2023] Open
Abstract
Despite tremendous efforts in psychology, neuroscience and media and cultural studies, it is still something of a mystery why humans are attracted to fictional content that is horrifying, disgusting or otherwise aversive. While the psychological benefits of horror films, stories, video games, etc. has recently been demonstrated empirically, current theories emphasizing the negative and positive consequences of this engagement often contradict one another. Here, we suggest the predictive processing framework may provide a unifying account of horror content engagement that provides clear and testable hypotheses, and explains why a 'sweet spot' of fear and fun exists in horror entertainment. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mark Miller
- Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5R 0A3
| | - Ben White
- School of Media, Arts and Humanities, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9RH, UK
| | - Coltan Scrivner
- Recreational Fear Lab, Aarhus University, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark
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Van de Cruys S, Frascaroli J, Friston K. Order and change in art: towards an active inference account of aesthetic experience. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2024; 379:20220411. [PMID: 38104600 PMCID: PMC10725768 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2022.0411] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/29/2023] [Accepted: 10/31/2023] [Indexed: 12/19/2023] Open
Abstract
How to account for the power that art holds over us? Why do artworks touch us deeply, consoling, transforming or invigorating us in the process? In this paper, we argue that an answer to this question might emerge from a fecund framework in cognitive science known as predictive processing (a.k.a. active inference). We unpack how this approach connects sense-making and aesthetic experiences through the idea of an 'epistemic arc', consisting of three parts (curiosity, epistemic action and aha experiences), which we cast as aspects of active inference. We then show how epistemic arcs are built and sustained by artworks to provide us with those satisfying experiences that we tend to call 'aesthetic'. Next, we defuse two key objections to this approach; namely, that it places undue emphasis on the cognitive component of our aesthetic encounters-at the expense of affective aspects-and on closure and uncertainty minimization (order)-at the expense of openness and lingering uncertainty (change). We show that the approach offers crucial resources to account for the open-ended, free and playful behaviour inherent in aesthetic experiences. The upshot is a promising but deflationary approach, both philosophically informed and psychologically sound, that opens new empirical avenues for understanding our aesthetic encounters. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Karl Friston
- The Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, UK
- VERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, 900016, CA, USA
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Corcoran AW, Perrykkad K, Feuerriegel D, Robinson JE. Body as First Teacher: The Role of Rhythmic Visceral Dynamics in Early Cognitive Development. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2023:17456916231185343. [PMID: 37694720 DOI: 10.1177/17456916231185343] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 09/12/2023]
Abstract
Embodied cognition-the idea that mental states and processes should be understood in relation to one's bodily constitution and interactions with the world-remains a controversial topic within cognitive science. Recently, however, increasing interest in predictive processing theories among proponents and critics of embodiment alike has raised hopes of a reconciliation. This article sets out to appraise the unificatory potential of predictive processing, focusing in particular on embodied formulations of active inference. Our analysis suggests that most active-inference accounts invoke weak, potentially trivial conceptions of embodiment; those making stronger claims do so independently of the theoretical commitments of the active-inference framework. We argue that a more compelling version of embodied active inference can be motivated by adopting a diachronic perspective on the way rhythmic physiological activity shapes neural development in utero. According to this visceral afferent training hypothesis, early-emerging physiological processes are essential not only for supporting the biophysical development of neural structures but also for configuring the cognitive architecture those structures entail. Focusing in particular on the cardiovascular system, we propose three candidate mechanisms through which visceral afferent training might operate: (a) activity-dependent neuronal development, (b) periodic signal modeling, and (c) oscillatory network coordination.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrew W Corcoran
- Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University
- Cognition and Philosophy Laboratory, School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University
| | - Kelsey Perrykkad
- Cognition and Philosophy Laboratory, School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University
| | | | - Jonathan E Robinson
- Cognition and Philosophy Laboratory, School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University
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Bruineberg J. Adversarial inference: predictive minds in the attention economy. Neurosci Conscious 2023; 2023:niad019. [PMID: 37635900 PMCID: PMC10457025 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/28/2023] [Revised: 07/18/2023] [Accepted: 07/31/2023] [Indexed: 08/29/2023] Open
Abstract
What is it about our current digital technologies that seemingly makes it difficult for users to attend to what matters to them? According to the dominant narrative in the literature on the "attention economy," a user's lack of attention is due to the large amounts of information available in their everyday environments. I will argue that information-abundance fails to account for some of the central manifestations of distraction, such as sudden urges to check a particular information-source in the absence of perceptual information. I will use active inference, and in particular models of action selection based on the minimization of expected free energy, to develop an alternative answer to the question about what makes it difficult to attend. Besides obvious adversarial forms of inference, in which algorithms build up models of users in order to keep them scrolling, I will show that active inference provides the tools to identify a number of problematic structural features of current digital technologies: they contain limitless sources of novelty, they can be navigated by very simple and effortless motor movements, and they offer their action possibilities everywhere and anytime independent of place or context. Moreover, recent models of motivated control show an intricate interplay between motivation and control that can explain sudden transitions in motivational state and the consequent alteration of the salience of actions. I conclude, therefore, that the challenges users encounter when engaging with digital technologies are less about information overload or inviting content, but more about the continuous availability of easily available possibilities for action.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jelle Bruineberg
- Center for Subjectivity Research, Department of Communication, University of Copenhagen, Karen Blixens Plads 8, Copenhagen 2300, Denmark
- Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Balaclava Rd, Macquarie Park, New South Wales 2109, Australia
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Milburn GJ, Shrapnel S, Evans PW. Physical Grounds for Causal Perspectivalism. ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2023; 25:1190. [PMID: 37628219 PMCID: PMC10453189 DOI: 10.3390/e25081190] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/12/2023] [Revised: 07/27/2023] [Accepted: 07/28/2023] [Indexed: 08/27/2023]
Abstract
We ground the asymmetry of causal relations in the internal physical states of a special kind of open and irreversible physical system, a causal agent. A causal agent is an autonomous physical system, maintained in a steady state, far from thermal equilibrium, with special subsystems: sensors, actuators, and learning machines. Using feedback, the learning machine, driven purely by thermodynamic constraints, changes its internal states to learn probabilistic functional relations inherent in correlations between sensor and actuator records. We argue that these functional relations just are causal relations learned by the agent, and so such causal relations are simply relations between the internal physical states of a causal agent. We show that learning is driven by a thermodynamic principle: the error rate is minimised when the dissipated power is minimised. While the internal states of a causal agent are necessarily stochastic, the learned causal relations are shared by all machines with the same hardware embedded in the same environment. We argue that this dependence of causal relations on such 'hardware' is a novel demonstration of causal perspectivalism.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gerard J. Milburn
- Centre for Engineered Quantum Systems, School of Mathematics and Physics, The University of Queensland, St. Lucia, QLD 4072, Australia;
| | - Sally Shrapnel
- Centre for Engineered Quantum Systems, School of Mathematics and Physics, The University of Queensland, St. Lucia, QLD 4072, Australia;
| | - Peter W. Evans
- School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, The University of Queensland, St. Lucia, QLD 4072, Australia;
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Carl M. Models of the Translation Process and the Free Energy Principle. ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2023; 25:928. [PMID: 37372272 DOI: 10.3390/e25060928] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/07/2023] [Revised: 05/26/2023] [Accepted: 05/28/2023] [Indexed: 06/29/2023]
Abstract
Translation process research (TPR) has generated a large number of models that aim at explaining human translation processes. In this paper, I suggest an extension of the monitor model to incorporate aspects of relevance theory (RT) and to adopt the free energy principle (FEP) as a generative model to elucidate translational behaviour. The FEP-and its corollary, active inference-provide a general, mathematical framework to explain how organisms resist entropic erosion so as to remain within their phenotypic bounds. It posits that organisms reduce the gap between their expectations and observations by minimising a quantity called free energy. I map these concepts on the translation process and exemplify them with behavioural data. The analysis is based on the notion of translation units (TUs) which exhibit observable traces of the translator's epistemic and pragmatic engagement with their translation environment, (i.e., the text) that can be measured in terms of translation effort and effects. Sequences of TUs cluster into translation states (steady state, orientation, and hesitation). Drawing on active inference, sequences of translation states combine into translation policies that reduce expected free energy. I show how the notion of free energy is compatible with the concept of relevance, as developed in RT, and how essential concepts of the monitor model and RT can be formalised as deep temporal generative models that can be interpreted under a representationalist view, but also support a non-representationalist account.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael Carl
- Department of Modern and Classical Language Studies, Kent State University, Kent, OH 44240, USA
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11
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Prescott TJ, Wilson SP. Understanding brain functional architecture through robotics. Sci Robot 2023; 8:eadg6014. [PMID: 37256968 DOI: 10.1126/scirobotics.adg6014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/09/2023] [Accepted: 05/05/2023] [Indexed: 06/02/2023]
Abstract
Robotics is increasingly seen as a useful test bed for computational models of the brain functional architecture underlying animal behavior. We provide an overview of past and current work, focusing on probabilistic and dynamical models, including approaches premised on the free energy principle, situating this endeavor in relation to evidence that the brain constitutes a layered control system. We argue that future neurorobotic models should integrate multiple neurobiological constraints and be hybrid in nature.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tony J Prescott
- Department of Computer Science, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
| | - Stuart P Wilson
- Department of Computer Science, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
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Floegel M, Kasper J, Perrier P, Kell CA. How the conception of control influences our understanding of actions. Nat Rev Neurosci 2023; 24:313-329. [PMID: 36997716 DOI: 10.1038/s41583-023-00691-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 02/28/2023] [Indexed: 04/01/2023]
Abstract
Wilful movement requires neural control. Commonly, neural computations are thought to generate motor commands that bring the musculoskeletal system - that is, the plant - from its current physical state into a desired physical state. The current state can be estimated from past motor commands and from sensory information. Modelling movement on the basis of this concept of plant control strives to explain behaviour by identifying the computational principles for control signals that can reproduce the observed features of movements. From an alternative perspective, movements emerge in a dynamically coupled agent-environment system from the pursuit of subjective perceptual goals. Modelling movement on the basis of this concept of perceptual control aims to identify the controlled percepts and their coupling rules that can give rise to the observed characteristics of behaviour. In this Perspective, we discuss a broad spectrum of approaches to modelling human motor control and their notions of control signals, internal models, handling of sensory feedback delays and learning. We focus on the influence that the plant control and the perceptual control perspective may have on decisions when modelling empirical data, which may in turn shape our understanding of actions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mareike Floegel
- Department of Neurology and Brain Imaging Center, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany
| | - Johannes Kasper
- Department of Neurology and Brain Imaging Center, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany
| | - Pascal Perrier
- Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, Grenoble INP, GIPSA-lab, Grenoble, France
| | - Christian A Kell
- Department of Neurology and Brain Imaging Center, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany.
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McParlin Z, Cerritelli F, Manzotti A, Friston KJ, Esteves JE. Therapeutic touch and therapeutic alliance in pediatric care and neonatology: An active inference framework. Front Pediatr 2023; 11:961075. [PMID: 36923275 PMCID: PMC10009260 DOI: 10.3389/fped.2023.961075] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/03/2022] [Accepted: 02/07/2023] [Indexed: 03/03/2023] Open
Abstract
Therapeutic affective touch has been recognized as essential for survival, nurturing supportive interpersonal interactions, accelerating recovery-including reducing hospitalisations, and promoting overall health and building robust therapeutic alliances. Through the lens of active inference, we present an integrative model, combining therapeutic touch and communication, to achieve biobehavioural synchrony. This model speaks to how the brain develops a generative model required for recovery, developing successful therapeutic alliances, and regulating allostasis within paediatric manual therapy. We apply active inference to explain the neurophysiological and behavioural mechanisms that underwrite the development and maintenance of synchronous relationships through touch. This paper foregrounds the crucial role of therapeutic touch in developing a solid therapeutic alliance, the clinical effectiveness of paediatric care, and triadic synchrony between health care practitioner, caregiver, and infant in a variety of clinical situations. We start by providing a brief overview of the significance and clinical role of touch in the development of social interactions in infants; facilitating a positive therapeutic alliance and restoring homeostasis through touch to allow a more efficient process of allostatic regulation. Moreover, we explain the role of CT tactile afferents in achieving positive clinical outcomes and updating prior beliefs. We then discuss how touch is implemented in treatment sessions to promote cooperative interactions in the clinic and facilitate theory of mind. This underwrites biobehavioural synchrony, epistemic trust, empathy, and the resolution of uncertainty. The ensuing framework is underpinned by a critical application of the active inference framework to the fields of pediatrics and neonatology.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zoe McParlin
- Foundation COME Collaboration, Clinical-Based Human Research Department, Pescara, Italy
| | - Francesco Cerritelli
- Division of Neonatology, “V. Buzzi” Children's Hospital, ASST-FBF-Sacco, Milan, Italy
| | - Andrea Manzotti
- Foundation COME Collaboration, Clinical-Based Human Research Department, Pescara, Italy
- Division of Neonatology, “V. Buzzi” Children's Hospital, ASST-FBF-Sacco, Milan, Italy
- Research Department, SOMA, Istituto Osteopatia Milano, Milan, Italy
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, Queen Square, London, United Kingdom
| | - Jorge E Esteves
- Foundation COME Collaboration, Clinical-Based Human Research Department, Pescara, Italy
- Malta ICOM Educational, Malta, Finland
- Research Department, University College of Osteopathy, Research Department, London, United Kingdom
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Kersten L. A Model Solution: On the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and Embodied Cognition. Minds Mach (Dordr) 2022. [DOI: 10.1007/s11023-022-09617-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
AbstractPredictive processing (PP) and embodied cognition (EC) have emerged as two influential approaches within cognitive science in recent years. Not only have PP and EC been heralded as “revolutions” and “paradigm shifts” but they have motivated a number of new and interesting areas of research. This has prompted some to wonder how compatible the two views might be. This paper looks to weigh in on the issue of PP-EC compatibility. After outlining two recent proposals, I argue that further clarity can be achieved on the issue by considering a model of scientific progress. Specifically, I suggest that Larry Laudan’s “problem solving model” can provide important insights into a number of outstanding challenges that face existing accounts of PP-EC compatibility. I conclude by outlining additional implications of the problem solving model for PP and EC more generally.
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Ilan Y. The constrained disorder principle defines living organisms and provides a method for correcting disturbed biological systems. Comput Struct Biotechnol J 2022; 20:6087-6096. [DOI: 10.1016/j.csbj.2022.11.015] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/29/2022] [Revised: 10/26/2022] [Accepted: 11/06/2022] [Indexed: 11/11/2022] Open
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Free-energy pragmatics: Markov blankets don't prescribe objective ontology, and that's okay. Behav Brain Sci 2022; 45:e198. [PMID: 36172768 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x22000322] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
Abstract
We target the ontological and epistemological ramifications of the proposed distinction between Friston and Pearl blankets. We emphasize the need for empirical testing next to computational modeling. A peculiar aspect of the free energy principle (FEP) is its purported support of radically opposed ontologies of the mind. In our view, the objective ontological aspiration itself should be rejected for a pragmatic instrumentalist view.
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Vasil J. A New Look at Young Children's Referential Informativeness. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2022; 18:624-648. [PMID: 36170548 DOI: 10.1177/17456916221112072] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
In this article, I review experimental evidence for the dependence of 2- to 5-year-olds' linguistic referential informativeness on cues to common ground (CG) and propose a process model. Cues to CG provide evidence for CG, that is, for the shared knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes of interlocutors. The presence of cues to CG (e.g., unimpeded listener line of regard or prior mention) is shown to be associated with less informative reference (e.g., pronouns). In contrast, the absence of cues to CG (e.g., impeded listener line of regard or new mention) is shown to be associated with more informative reference (e.g., nouns). Informativeness is sensitive to linguistic before nonlinguistic cues to CG (i.e., 2.0 vs. 2.5 years old, respectively). Reference is cast as a process of active inference, a formulation of Bayesian belief-guided control in biological systems. Child speakers are hierarchical generative models that, characteristically, expect sensory evidence for the evolved, prior Bayesian belief that interlocutor mental states are aligned (i.e., that CG exists). Referential control emerges as an embodied tool to gather evidence for this prior belief. Bottom-up cues to CG elicited by action drive updates to beliefs about CG. In turn, beliefs about CG guide efficient referential control.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jared Vasil
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University
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McGovern HT, De Foe A, Biddell H, Leptourgos P, Corlett P, Bandara K, Hutchinson BT. Learned uncertainty: The free energy principle in anxiety. Front Psychol 2022; 13:943785. [PMID: 36248528 PMCID: PMC9559819 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.943785] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/14/2022] [Accepted: 07/21/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Generalized anxiety disorder is among the world’s most prevalent psychiatric disorders and often manifests as persistent and difficult to control apprehension. Despite its prevalence, there is no integrative, formal model of how anxiety and anxiety disorders arise. Here, we offer a perspective derived from the free energy principle; one that shares similarities with established constructs such as learned helplessness. Our account is simple: anxiety can be formalized as learned uncertainty. A biological system, having had persistent uncertainty in its past, will expect uncertainty in its future, irrespective of whether uncertainty truly persists. Despite our account’s intuitive simplicity—which can be illustrated with the mere flip of a coin—it is grounded within the free energy principle and hence situates the formation of anxiety within a broader explanatory framework of biological self-organization and self-evidencing. We conclude that, through conceptualizing anxiety within a framework of working generative models, our perspective might afford novel approaches in the clinical treatment of anxiety and its key symptoms.
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Affiliation(s)
- H. T. McGovern
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
| | - Alexander De Foe
- School of Educational Psychology and Counselling, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
| | - Hannah Biddell
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
| | - Pantelis Leptourgos
- Department of Psychiatry, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT, United States
| | - Philip Corlett
- Department of Psychiatry, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT, United States
| | - Kavindu Bandara
- School of Psychological Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
| | - Brendan T. Hutchinson
- Research School of Psychology, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia
- *Correspondence: Brendan T. Hutchinson,
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19
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McParlin Z, Cerritelli F, Rossettini G, Friston KJ, Esteves JE. Therapeutic Alliance as Active Inference: The Role of Therapeutic Touch and Biobehavioural Synchrony in Musculoskeletal Care. Front Behav Neurosci 2022; 16:897247. [PMID: 35846789 PMCID: PMC9280207 DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2022.897247] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2022] [Accepted: 05/24/2022] [Indexed: 12/05/2022] Open
Abstract
Touch is recognised as crucial for survival, fostering cooperative communication, accelerating recovery, reducing hospital stays, and promoting overall wellness and the therapeutic alliance. In this hypothesis and theory paper, we present an entwined model that combines touch for alignment and active inference to explain how the brain develops "priors" necessary for the health care provider to engage with the patient effectively. We appeal to active inference to explain the empirically integrative neurophysiological and behavioural mechanisms that underwrite synchronous relationships through touch. Specifically, we offer a formal framework for understanding - and explaining - the role of therapeutic touch and hands-on care in developing a therapeutic alliance and synchrony between health care providers and their patients in musculoskeletal care. We first review the crucial importance of therapeutic touch and its clinical role in facilitating the formation of a solid therapeutic alliance and in regulating allostasis. We then consider how touch is used clinically - to promote cooperative communication, demonstrate empathy, overcome uncertainty, and infer the mental states of others - through the lens of active inference. We conclude that touch plays a crucial role in achieving successful clinical outcomes and adapting previous priors to create intertwined beliefs. The ensuing framework may help healthcare providers in the field of musculoskeletal care to use hands-on care to strengthen the therapeutic alliance, minimise prediction errors (a.k.a., free energy), and thereby promote recovery from physical and psychological impairments.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zoe McParlin
- Clinical-Based Human Research Department, Foundation COME Collaboration, Pescara, Italy
| | - Francesco Cerritelli
- Clinical-Based Human Research Department, Foundation COME Collaboration, Pescara, Italy
| | | | - Karl J. Friston
- Institute of Neurology, Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, London, United Kingdom
| | - Jorge E. Esteves
- Clinical-Based Human Research Department, Foundation COME Collaboration, Pescara, Italy
- Malta ICOM Educational, Gzira, Malta
- University College of Osteopathy, London, United Kingdom
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20
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Kiverstein J, Kirchhoff MD, Froese T. The Problem of Meaning: The Free Energy Principle and Artificial Agency. Front Neurorobot 2022; 16:844773. [PMID: 35812784 PMCID: PMC9260223 DOI: 10.3389/fnbot.2022.844773] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/28/2021] [Accepted: 05/17/2022] [Indexed: 12/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Biological agents can act in ways that express a sensitivity to context-dependent relevance. So far it has proven difficult to engineer this capacity for context-dependent sensitivity to relevance in artificial agents. We give this problem the label the “problem of meaning”. The problem of meaning could be circumvented if artificial intelligence researchers were to design agents based on the assumption of the continuity of life and mind. In this paper, we focus on the proposal made by enactive cognitive scientists to design artificial agents that possess sensorimotor autonomy—stable, self-sustaining patterns of sensorimotor interaction that can ground values, norms and goals necessary for encountering a meaningful environment. More specifically, we consider whether the Free Energy Principle (FEP) can provide formal tools for modeling sensorimotor autonomy. There is currently no consensus on how to understand the relationship between enactive cognitive science and the FEP. However, a number of recent papers have argued that the two frameworks are fundamentally incompatible. Some argue that biological systems exhibit historical path-dependent learning that is absent from systems that minimize free energy. Others have argued that a free energy minimizing system would fail to satisfy a key condition for sensorimotor agency referred to as “interactional asymmetry”. These critics question the claim we defend in this paper that the FEP can be used to formally model autonomy and adaptivity. We will argue it is too soon to conclude that the two frameworks are incompatible. There are undeniable conceptual differences between the two frameworks but in our view each has something important and necessary to offer. The FEP needs enactive cognitive science for the solution it provides to the problem of meaning. Enactive cognitive science needs the FEP to formally model the properties it argues to be constitutive of agency. Our conclusion will be that active inference models based on the FEP provides a way by which scientists can think about how to address the problems of engineering autonomy and adaptivity in artificial agents in formal terms. In the end engaging more closely with this formalism and its further developments will benefit those working within the enactive framework.
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Affiliation(s)
- Julian Kiverstein
- Academic Medical Center, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- *Correspondence: Julian Kiverstein
| | - Michael D. Kirchhoff
- Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities, School of Liberal Arts, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia
| | - Tom Froese
- Embodied Cognitive Science Unit, Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate University, Okinawa, Japan
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21
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An Enactive-Ecological Model to Guide Patient-Centered Osteopathic Care. Healthcare (Basel) 2022; 10:healthcare10061092. [PMID: 35742142 PMCID: PMC9223169 DOI: 10.3390/healthcare10061092] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/03/2022] [Revised: 05/31/2022] [Accepted: 06/10/2022] [Indexed: 12/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Osteopaths commonly face complexity and clinical uncertainty in their daily professional practice as primary contact practitioners. In order to effectively deal with complex clinical presentations, osteopaths need to possess well-developed clinical reasoning to understand the individual patient’s lived experience of pain and other symptoms and how their problem impacts their personhood and ability to engage with their world. We have recently proposed (En)active inference as an integrative framework for osteopathic care. The enactivist and active inference frameworks underpin our integrative hypothesis. Here, we present a clinically based interpretation of our integrative hypothesis by considering the ecological niche in which osteopathic care occurs. Active inference enables patients and practitioners to disambiguate each other’s mental states. The patients’ mental states are unobservable and must be inferred based on perceptual cues such as posture, body language, gaze direction and response to touch and hands-on care. A robust therapeutic alliance centred on cooperative communication and shared narratives and the appropriate and effective use of touch and hands-on care enable patients to contextualize their lived experiences. Touch and hands-on care enhance the therapeutic alliance, mental state alignment, and biobehavioural synchrony between patient and practitioner. Therefore, the osteopath–patient dyad provides mental state alignment and opportunities for ecological niche construction. Arguably, this can produce therapeutic experiences which reduce the prominence given to high-level prediction errors—and consequently, the top-down attentional focus on bottom-up sensory prediction errors, thus minimizing free energy. This commentary paper primarily aims to enable osteopaths to critically consider the value of this proposed framework in appreciating the complexities of delivering person-centred care.
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22
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Constant A, Clark A, Kirchhoff M, Friston KJ. Extended active inference: Constructing predictive cognition beyond skulls. MIND & LANGUAGE 2022; 37:373-394. [PMID: 35875359 PMCID: PMC9292365 DOI: 10.1111/mila.12330] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/10/2019] [Revised: 10/07/2019] [Accepted: 11/19/2019] [Indexed: 05/17/2023]
Abstract
Cognitive niche construction is the process whereby organisms create and maintain cause-effect models of their niche as guides for fitness influencing behavior. Extended mind theory claims that cognitive processes extend beyond the brain to include predictable states of the world. Active inference and predictive processing in cognitive science assume that organisms embody predictive (i.e., generative) models of the world optimized by standard cognitive functions (e.g., perception, action, learning). This paper presents an active inference formulation that views cognitive niche construction as a cognitive function aimed at optimizing organisms' generative models. We call that process of optimization extended active inference.
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Affiliation(s)
- Axel Constant
- Charles Perkins CentreThe University of SydneySydneyNew South WalesAustralia
- Culture, Mind, and Brain ProgramMcGill UniversityMontrealQuebecCanada
- Wellcome Centre for Human NeuroimagingUniversity College LondonLondonUK
| | - Andy Clark
- Department of PhilosophyThe University of SussexBrightonUK
- Department of InformaticsThe University of SussexBrightonUK
- Department of PhilosophyMacquarie UniversitySydneyNew South WalesAustralia
| | - Michael Kirchhoff
- Department of PhilosophyUniversity of WollongongWollongongNew South WalesAustralia
| | - Karl J. Friston
- Culture, Mind, and Brain ProgramMcGill UniversityMontrealQuebecCanada
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23
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An informal reconstruction of the free-energy framework, examining the conceptual problems that arise. Neuropsychologia 2022; 173:108281. [PMID: 35662551 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2022.108281] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/22/2021] [Revised: 05/19/2022] [Accepted: 05/26/2022] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Recent decades have seen increasing attention given to the free-energy framework. This proposes that many of the phenomena we associate with life, intelligence and adaptation can be explained in terms of a single, mathematical precept: the free-energy principle. This is claimed to apply to the adaptive behavior of primitive organisms as much as it does to the physiological structures of human brains. The proposal is potentially of interest to theorists from multiple disciplines. But as presentations often make intensive use of mathematical notation, it can be hard to understand, even for experts. The present article presents an informal reconstruction, using schematic illustrations. Mathematical notation is largely avoided, while detail and precision are retained as far as possible. The specifically conceptual problems that come to notice in the reconstruction are highlighted and discussed.
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24
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Cellular sentience as the primary source of biological order and evolution. Biosystems 2022; 218:104694. [PMID: 35595194 DOI: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2022.104694] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/05/2022] [Revised: 05/09/2022] [Accepted: 05/09/2022] [Indexed: 12/17/2022]
Abstract
All life is cellular, starting some 4 billion years ago with the emergence of the first cells. In order to survive their early evolution in the face of an extremely challenging environment, the very first cells invented cellular sentience and cognition, allowing them to make relevant decisions to survive through creative adaptations in a continuously running evolutionary narrative. We propose that the success of cellular life has crucially depended on a biological version of Maxwell's demons which permits the extraction of relevant sensory information and energy from the cellular environment, allowing cells to sustain anti-entropic actions. These sensor-effector actions allowed for the creative construction of biological order in the form of diverse organic macromolecules, including crucial polymers such as DNA, RNA, and cytoskeleton. Ordered biopolymers store analogue (structures as templates) and digital (nucleotide sequences of DNA and RNA) information that functioned as a form memory to support the development of organisms and their evolution. Crucially, all cells are formed by the division of previous cells, and their plasma membranes are physically and informationally continuous across evolution since the beginning of cellular life. It is argued that life is supported through life-specific principles which support cellular sentience, distinguishing life from non-life. Biological order, together with cellular cognition and sentience, allow the creative evolution of all living organisms as the authentic authors of evolutionary novelty.
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25
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Lomas JD, Lin A, Dikker S, Forster D, Lupetti ML, Huisman G, Habekost J, Beardow C, Pandey P, Ahmad N, Miyapuram K, Mullen T, Cooper P, van der Maden W, Cross ES. Resonance as a Design Strategy for AI and Social Robots. Front Neurorobot 2022; 16:850489. [PMID: 35574227 PMCID: PMC9097027 DOI: 10.3389/fnbot.2022.850489] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/07/2022] [Accepted: 03/23/2022] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Resonance, a powerful and pervasive phenomenon, appears to play a major role in human interactions. This article investigates the relationship between the physical mechanism of resonance and the human experience of resonance, and considers possibilities for enhancing the experience of resonance within human-robot interactions. We first introduce resonance as a widespread cultural and scientific metaphor. Then, we review the nature of "sympathetic resonance" as a physical mechanism. Following this introduction, the remainder of the article is organized in two parts. In part one, we review the role of resonance (including synchronization and rhythmic entrainment) in human cognition and social interactions. Then, in part two, we review resonance-related phenomena in robotics and artificial intelligence (AI). These two reviews serve as ground for the introduction of a design strategy and combinatorial design space for shaping resonant interactions with robots and AI. We conclude by posing hypotheses and research questions for future empirical studies and discuss a range of ethical and aesthetic issues associated with resonance in human-robot interactions.
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Affiliation(s)
- James Derek Lomas
- Department of Human Centered Design, Faculty of Industrial Design Engineering, Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands
| | - Albert Lin
- Center for Human Frontiers, Qualcomm Institute, University of California, San Diego, San Diego, CA, United States
| | - Suzanne Dikker
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, United States
- Department of Clinical Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Deborah Forster
- Center for Human Frontiers, Qualcomm Institute, University of California, San Diego, San Diego, CA, United States
| | - Maria Luce Lupetti
- Department of Human Centered Design, Faculty of Industrial Design Engineering, Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands
| | - Gijs Huisman
- Department of Human Centered Design, Faculty of Industrial Design Engineering, Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands
| | - Julika Habekost
- The Design Lab, California Institute of Information and Communication Technologies, University of California, San Diego, San Diego, CA, United States
| | - Caiseal Beardow
- Department of Human Centered Design, Faculty of Industrial Design Engineering, Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands
| | - Pankaj Pandey
- Centre for Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Gandhinagar, India
| | - Nashra Ahmad
- Centre for Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Gandhinagar, India
| | - Krishna Miyapuram
- Centre for Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Gandhinagar, India
| | - Tim Mullen
- Intheon Labs, San Diego, CA, United States
| | - Patrick Cooper
- Department of Physics, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA, United States
| | - Willem van der Maden
- Department of Human Centered Design, Faculty of Industrial Design Engineering, Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands
| | - Emily S. Cross
- Social Robotics, Institute of Neuroscience and Psychology, School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom
- SOBA Lab, School of Psychology, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia
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26
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Tison R. The fanciest sort of intentionality: Active inference, mindshaping and linguistic content. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2062315] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Remi Tison
- Department of Philosophy, UQAM, Montreal, Québec, Canada
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27
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Ecological Mechanistic Research and Modelling. ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/10407413.2022.2050912] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
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28
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Esteves JE, Cerritelli F, Kim J, Friston KJ. Osteopathic Care as (En)active Inference: A Theoretical Framework for Developing an Integrative Hypothesis in Osteopathy. Front Psychol 2022; 13:812926. [PMID: 35250743 PMCID: PMC8894811 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.812926] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/10/2021] [Accepted: 01/11/2022] [Indexed: 12/11/2022] Open
Abstract
Osteopathy is a person-centred healthcare discipline that emphasizes the body’s structure-function interrelationship—and its self-regulatory mechanisms—to inform a whole-person approach to health and wellbeing. This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework for developing an integrative hypothesis in osteopathy, which is based on the enactivist and active inference accounts. We propose that osteopathic care can be reconceptualised under (En)active inference as a unifying framework. Active inference suggests that action-perception cycles operate to minimize uncertainty and optimize an individual’s internal model of the lived world and, crucially, the consequences of their behaviour. We argue that (En)active inference offers an integrative framework for osteopathy, which can evince the mechanisms underlying dyadic and triadic (e.g., in paediatric care) exchanges and osteopathic care outcomes. We propose that this theoretical framework can underpin osteopathic care across the lifespan, from preterm infants to the elderly and those with persistent pain and other physical symptoms. In situations of chronicity, as an ecological niche, the patient-practitioner dyad provides the osteopath and the patient with a set of affordances, i.e., possibilities for action provided by the environment, that through shared intentionally, can promote adaptations and restoration of productive agency. Through a dyadic therapeutic relationship, as they engage with their ecological niche’s affordances—a structured set of affordances shared by agents—osteopath and patient actively construct a shared sense-making narrative and realise a shared generative model of their relation to the niche. In general, touch plays a critical role in developing a robust therapeutic alliance, mental state alignment, and biobehavioural synchrony between patient and practitioner. However, its role is particularly crucial in the fields of neonatology and paediatrics, where it becomes central in regulating allostasis and restoring homeostasis. We argue that from an active inference standpoint, the dyadic shared ecological niche underwrites a robust therapeutic alliance, which is crucial to the effectiveness of osteopathic care. Considerations and implications of this model—to clinical practice and research, both within- and outside osteopathy—are critically discussed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jorge E. Esteves
- Clinical-Based Human Research Department, Foundation COME Collaboration, Pescara, Italy
- Malta ICOM Educational, Gżira, Malta
- Research Department, University College of Osteopathy, London, United Kingdom
- *Correspondence: Jorge E. Esteves,
| | - Francesco Cerritelli
- Clinical-Based Human Research Department, Foundation COME Collaboration, Pescara, Italy
| | - Joohan Kim
- Department of Communication, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea
| | - Karl J. Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, London, United Kingdom
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29
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McParlin Z, Cerritelli F, Friston KJ, Esteves JE. Therapeutic Alliance as Active Inference: The Role of Therapeutic Touch and Synchrony. Front Psychol 2022; 13:783694. [PMID: 35250723 PMCID: PMC8892201 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.783694] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/26/2021] [Accepted: 01/19/2022] [Indexed: 12/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Recognizing and aligning individuals' unique adaptive beliefs or "priors" through cooperative communication is critical to establishing a therapeutic relationship and alliance. Using active inference, we present an empirical integrative account of the biobehavioral mechanisms that underwrite therapeutic relationships. A significant mode of establishing cooperative alliances-and potential synchrony relationships-is through ostensive cues generated by repetitive coupling during dynamic touch. Established models speak to the unique role of affectionate touch in developing communication, interpersonal interactions, and a wide variety of therapeutic benefits for patients of all ages; both neurophysiologically and behaviorally. The purpose of this article is to argue for the importance of therapeutic touch in establishing a therapeutic alliance and, ultimately, synchrony between practitioner and patient. We briefly overview the importance and role of therapeutic alliance in prosocial and clinical interactions. We then discuss how cooperative communication and mental state alignment-in intentional communication-are accomplished using active inference. We argue that alignment through active inference facilitates synchrony and communication. The ensuing account is extended to include the role of (C-) tactile afferents in realizing the beneficial effect of therapeutic synchrony. We conclude by proposing a method for synchronizing the effects of touch using the concept of active inference.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zoe McParlin
- Foundation COME Collaboration, Clinical-Based Human Research Department, Pescara, Italy
| | - Francesco Cerritelli
- Foundation COME Collaboration, Clinical-Based Human Research Department, Pescara, Italy
| | - Karl J. Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, London, United Kingdom
| | - Jorge E. Esteves
- Foundation COME Collaboration, Clinical-Based Human Research Department, Pescara, Italy
- Malta ICOM Educational Ltd., Gzira, Malta
- Research Department, University College of Osteopathy, London, United Kingdom
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30
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Colditz IG. Competence to thrive: resilience as an indicator of positive health and positive welfare in animals. ANIMAL PRODUCTION SCIENCE 2022. [DOI: 10.1071/an22061] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
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31
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Aarts E, Akkerman A, Altgassen M, Bartels R, Beckers D, Bevelander K, Bijleveld E, Blaney Davidson E, Boleij A, Bralten J, Cillessen T, Claassen J, Cools R, Cornelissen I, Dresler M, Eijsvogels T, Faber M, Fernández G, Figner B, Fritsche M, Füllbrunn S, Gayet S, van Gelder MMHJ, van Gerven M, Geurts S, Greven CU, Groefsema M, Haak K, Hagoort P, Hartman Y, van der Heijden B, Hermans E, Heuvelmans V, Hintz F, den Hollander J, Hulsman AM, Idesis S, Jaeger M, Janse E, Janzing J, Kessels RPC, Karremans JC, de Kleijn W, Klein M, Klumpers F, Kohn N, Korzilius H, Krahmer B, de Lange F, van Leeuwen J, Liu H, Luijten M, Manders P, Manevska K, Marques JP, Matthews J, McQueen JM, Medendorp P, Melis R, Meyer A, Oosterman J, Overbeek L, Peelen M, Popma J, Postma G, Roelofs K, van Rossenberg YGT, Schaap G, Scheepers P, Selen L, Starren M, Swinkels DW, Tendolkar I, Thijssen D, Timmerman H, Tutunji R, Tuladhar A, Veling H, Verhagen M, Verkroost J, Vink J, Vriezekolk V, Vrijsen J, Vyrastekova J, van der Wal S, Willems R, Willemsen A. Protocol of the Healthy Brain Study: An accessible resource for understanding the human brain and how it dynamically and individually operates in its bio-social context. PLoS One 2021; 16:e0260952. [PMID: 34965252 PMCID: PMC8716054 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0260952] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/12/2021] [Accepted: 11/20/2021] [Indexed: 12/29/2022] Open
Abstract
The endeavor to understand the human brain has seen more progress in the last few decades than in the previous two millennia. Still, our understanding of how the human brain relates to behavior in the real world and how this link is modulated by biological, social, and environmental factors is limited. To address this, we designed the Healthy Brain Study (HBS), an interdisciplinary, longitudinal, cohort study based on multidimensional, dynamic assessments in both the laboratory and the real world. Here, we describe the rationale and design of the currently ongoing HBS. The HBS is examining a population-based sample of 1,000 healthy participants (age 30–39) who are thoroughly studied across an entire year. Data are collected through cognitive, affective, behavioral, and physiological testing, neuroimaging, bio-sampling, questionnaires, ecological momentary assessment, and real-world assessments using wearable devices. These data will become an accessible resource for the scientific community enabling the next step in understanding the human brain and how it dynamically and individually operates in its bio-social context. An access procedure to the collected data and bio-samples is in place and published on https://www.healthybrainstudy.nl/en/data-and-methods/access. Trail registration:https://www.trialregister.nl/trial/7955.
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Affiliation(s)
- Healthy Brain Study consortium
- Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
- Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
- Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Esther Aarts
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Agnes Akkerman
- Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | | | - Ronald Bartels
- Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Debby Beckers
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | | | - Erik Bijleveld
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | | | | | - Janita Bralten
- Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Toon Cillessen
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Jurgen Claassen
- Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Roshan Cools
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | | | - Martin Dresler
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | | | - Myrthe Faber
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Guillén Fernández
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
- * E-mail:
| | - Bernd Figner
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Matthias Fritsche
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Sascha Füllbrunn
- Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Surya Gayet
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | | | - Marcel van Gerven
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Sabine Geurts
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Corina U. Greven
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Martine Groefsema
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Koen Haak
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Peter Hagoort
- Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Yvonne Hartman
- Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | | | - Erno Hermans
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | | | - Florian Hintz
- Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | | | - Anneloes M. Hulsman
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Sebastian Idesis
- Center for Brain and Cognition, University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain
| | - Martin Jaeger
- Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Esther Janse
- Centre for Language Studies, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Joost Janzing
- Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Roy P. C. Kessels
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Johan C. Karremans
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Willemien de Kleijn
- School of Psychology and Artificial Intelligence, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Marieke Klein
- Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Floris Klumpers
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Nils Kohn
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Hubert Korzilius
- Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Bas Krahmer
- Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Floris de Lange
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Judith van Leeuwen
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Huaiyu Liu
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Maartje Luijten
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Peggy Manders
- Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Katerina Manevska
- Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - José P. Marques
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Jon Matthews
- Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - James M. McQueen
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Pieter Medendorp
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - René Melis
- Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Antje Meyer
- Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Joukje Oosterman
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Lucy Overbeek
- Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Marius Peelen
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Jean Popma
- Interdisciplinary Hub for Security, Privacy and Data Governance, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Geert Postma
- Institute for Molecules and Materials, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Karin Roelofs
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | | | - Gabi Schaap
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Paul Scheepers
- Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Luc Selen
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Marianne Starren
- Centre for Language Studies, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | | | - Indira Tendolkar
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Dick Thijssen
- Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Hans Timmerman
- University Medical Center Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
| | - Rayyan Tutunji
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Anil Tuladhar
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Harm Veling
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Maaike Verhagen
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | | | - Jacqueline Vink
- Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | | | - Janna Vrijsen
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Jana Vyrastekova
- Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | | | - Roel Willems
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
- Centre for Language Studies, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
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Goekoop R, de Kleijn R. Permutation Entropy as a Universal Disorder Criterion: How Disorders at Different Scale Levels Are Manifestations of the Same Underlying Principle. ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2021; 23:1701. [PMID: 34946007 PMCID: PMC8700347 DOI: 10.3390/e23121701] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/04/2021] [Revised: 12/10/2021] [Accepted: 12/13/2021] [Indexed: 12/12/2022]
Abstract
What do bacteria, cells, organs, people, and social communities have in common? At first sight, perhaps not much. They involve totally different agents and scale levels of observation. On second thought, however, perhaps they share everything. A growing body of literature suggests that living systems at different scale levels of observation follow the same architectural principles and process information in similar ways. Moreover, such systems appear to respond in similar ways to rising levels of stress, especially when stress levels approach near-lethal levels. To explain such communalities, we argue that all organisms (including humans) can be modeled as hierarchical Bayesian controls systems that are governed by the same biophysical principles. Such systems show generic changes when taxed beyond their ability to correct for environmental disturbances. Without exception, stressed organisms show rising levels of 'disorder' (randomness, unpredictability) in internal message passing and overt behavior. We argue that such changes can be explained by a collapse of allostatic (high-level integrative) control, which normally synchronizes activity of the various components of a living system to produce order. The selective overload and cascading failure of highly connected (hub) nodes flattens hierarchical control, producing maladaptive behavior. Thus, we present a theory according to which organic concepts such as stress, a loss of control, disorder, disease, and death can be operationalized in biophysical terms that apply to all scale levels of organization. Given the presumed universality of this mechanism, 'losing control' appears to involve the same process anywhere, whether involving bacteria succumbing to an antibiotic agent, people suffering from physical or mental disorders, or social systems slipping into warfare. On a practical note, measures of disorder may serve as early warning signs of system failure even when catastrophic failure is still some distance away.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rutger Goekoop
- Parnassia Group, PsyQ Parnassia Academy, Department of Anxiety Disorders, Early Detection and Intervention Team (EDIT), Lijnbaan 4, 2512 VA Den Haag, The Netherlands
| | - Roy de Kleijn
- Cognitive Psychology Unit, Institute of Psychology & Leiden Institute for Brain and Cognition, Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK Leiden, The Netherlands;
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How particular is the physics of the free energy principle? Phys Life Rev 2021; 40:24-50. [PMID: 34895862 PMCID: PMC8902446 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2021.11.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/30/2021] [Accepted: 11/01/2021] [Indexed: 12/15/2022]
Abstract
The free energy principle (FEP) states that any dynamical system can be interpreted as performing Bayesian inference upon its surrounding environment. Although, in theory, the FEP applies to a wide variety of systems, there has been almost no direct exploration or demonstration of the principle in concrete systems. In this work, we examine in depth the assumptions required to derive the FEP in the simplest possible set of systems – weakly-coupled non-equilibrium linear stochastic systems. Specifically, we explore (i) how general the requirements imposed on the statistical structure of a system are and (ii) how informative the FEP is about the behaviour of such systems. We discover that two requirements of the FEP – the Markov blanket condition (i.e. a statistical boundary precluding direct coupling between internal and external states) and stringent restrictions on its solenoidal flows (i.e. tendencies driving a system out of equilibrium) – are only valid for a very narrow space of parameters. Suitable systems require an absence of perception-action asymmetries that is highly unusual for living systems interacting with an environment. More importantly, we observe that a mathematically central step in the argument, connecting the behaviour of a system to variational inference, relies on an implicit equivalence between the dynamics of the average states of a system with the average of the dynamics of those states. This equivalence does not hold in general even for linear stochastic systems, since it requires an effective decoupling from the system's history of interactions. These observations are critical for evaluating the generality and applicability of the FEP and indicate the existence of significant problems of the theory in its current form. These issues make the FEP, as it stands, not straightforwardly applicable to the simple linear systems studied here and suggest that more development is needed before the theory could be applied to the kind of complex systems that describe living and cognitive processes. We review the free energy principle (FEP) in a family of analytically tractable non-equilibrium linear systems. We study how general and how informative the FEP is in this class of systems. We find that crucial assumptions of the FEP restrict its applicability to a very narrow space of the studied linear systems. Secondly, a core step relies on an equivalence between the dynamics of the average and the average of the dynamics. As a result, the FEP does not result in a good description of the (history-dependent) behaviour of a system.
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Parr T, Pezzulo G. Understanding, Explanation, and Active Inference. Front Syst Neurosci 2021; 15:772641. [PMID: 34803619 PMCID: PMC8602880 DOI: 10.3389/fnsys.2021.772641] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/08/2021] [Accepted: 10/15/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
While machine learning techniques have been transformative in solving a range of problems, an important challenge is to understand why they arrive at the decisions they output. Some have argued that this necessitates augmenting machine intelligence with understanding such that, when queried, a machine is able to explain its behaviour (i.e., explainable AI). In this article, we address the issue of machine understanding from the perspective of active inference. This paradigm enables decision making based upon a model of how data are generated. The generative model contains those variables required to explain sensory data, and its inversion may be seen as an attempt to explain the causes of these data. Here we are interested in explanations of one's own actions. This implies a deep generative model that includes a model of the world, used to infer policies, and a higher-level model that attempts to predict which policies will be selected based upon a space of hypothetical (i.e., counterfactual) explanations-and which can subsequently be used to provide (retrospective) explanations about the policies pursued. We illustrate the construct validity of this notion of understanding in relation to human understanding by highlighting the similarities in computational architecture and the consequences of its dysfunction.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Queen Square Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Giovanni Pezzulo
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy
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Tison R, Poirier P. Communication as Socially Extended Active Inference: An Ecological Approach to Communicative Behavior. ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1080/10407413.2021.1965480] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/31/2023]
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Tison R, Poirier P. Active Inference and Cooperative Communication: An Ecological Alternative to the Alignment View. Front Psychol 2021; 12:708780. [PMID: 34456822 PMCID: PMC8397515 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.708780] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/12/2021] [Accepted: 07/19/2021] [Indexed: 02/03/2023] Open
Abstract
We present and contrast two accounts of cooperative communication, both based on Active Inference, a framework that unifies biological and cognitive processes. The mental alignment account, defended in Vasil et al., takes the function of cooperative communication to be the alignment of the interlocutor's mental states, and cooperative communicative behavior to be driven by an evolutionarily selected adaptive prior belief favoring the selection of action policies that promote such an alignment. We argue that the mental alignment account should be rejected because it neglects the action-oriented nature of cooperative communication, which skews its view of the dynamics of communicative interaction. We introduce our own conception of cooperative communication, inspired by a more radical ecological interpretation of the active inference framework. Cooperative communication, on our ecological conception, serves to guide and constrain the dynamics of the cooperative interaction via the construction and restructuring of shared fields of affordances, in order to reach the local goals of the joint actions in which episodes of cooperative communication are embedded. We argue that our ecological conception provides a better theoretical standpoint to account for the action-oriented nature of cooperative communication in the active inference framework.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rémi Tison
- Department of Philosophy, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM), Montreal, QC, Canada
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From many to (n)one: Meditation and the plasticity of the predictive mind. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2021; 128:199-217. [PMID: 34139248 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.06.021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 34] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/23/2021] [Revised: 06/07/2021] [Accepted: 06/09/2021] [Indexed: 12/21/2022]
Abstract
How profoundly can humans change their own minds? In this paper we offer a unifying account of deconstructive meditation under the predictive processing view. We start from simple axioms. First, the brain makes predictions based on past experience, both phylogenetic and ontogenetic. Second, deconstructive meditation brings one closer to the here and now by disengaging anticipatory processes. We propose that practicing meditation therefore gradually reduces counterfactual temporally deep cognition, until all conceptual processing falls away, unveiling a state of pure awareness. Our account also places three main styles of meditation (focused attention, open monitoring, and non-dual) on a single continuum, where each technique relinquishes increasingly engrained habits of prediction, including the predicted self. This deconstruction can also permit certain insights by making the above processes available to introspection. Our framework is consistent with the state of empirical and (neuro)phenomenological evidence and illuminates the top-down plasticity of the predictive mind. Experimental rigor, neurophenomenology, and no-report paradigms are needed to further understanding of how meditation affects predictive processing and the self.
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Abstract
By sharing their world, humans and other animals sustain each other. Their world gets determined over time as generations of animals act in it. Current approaches to psychological science, by contrast, start from the assumption that the world is already determined before an animal's activity. These approaches seem more concerned with uncertainty about the world than with the practical indeterminacies of the world humans and nonhuman animals experience. As human activity is making life increasingly hard for other animals, this preoccupation becomes difficult to accept. This article introduces an ecological approach to psychology to develop a view that centralizes the indeterminacies of a shared world. Specifically, it develops an open-ended notion of "affordances," the possibilities for action offered by the environment. Affordances are processes in which (a) the material world invites individual animals to participate, while (b) participation concurrently continues the material world in a particular way. From this point of view, species codetermine the world together. Several empirical and methodological implications of this view on affordances are explored. The article ends with an explanation of how an ecological perspective brings responsibility for the shared world to the heart of psychological science.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ludger van Dijk
- Centre for Philosophical Psychology, Department of Philosophy, University of Antwerp
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Examining the Continuity between Life and Mind: Is There a Continuity between Autopoietic Intentionality and Representationality? PHILOSOPHIES 2021. [DOI: 10.3390/philosophies6010018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/19/2022]
Abstract
A weak version of the life-mind continuity thesis entails that every living system also has a basic mind (with a non-representational form of intentionality). The strong version entails that the same concepts that are sufficient to explain basic minds (with non-representational states) are also central to understanding non-basic minds (with representational states). We argue that recent work on the free energy principle supports the following claims with respect to the life-mind continuity thesis: (i) there is a strong continuity between life and mind; (ii) all living systems can be described as if they had representational states; (iii) the ’as-if representationality’ entailed by the free energy principle is central to understanding both basic forms of intentionality and intentionality in non-basic minds. In addition to this, we argue that the free energy principle also renders realism about computation and representation compatible with a strong life-mind continuity thesis (although the free energy principle does not entail computational and representational realism). In particular, we show how representationality proper can be grounded in ’as-if representationality’.
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Venter E. Toward an Embodied, Embedded Predictive Processing Account. Front Psychol 2021; 12:543076. [PMID: 33584461 PMCID: PMC7879985 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.543076] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/24/2020] [Accepted: 01/12/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
In this paper, I argue for an embodied, embedded approach to predictive processing and thus align the framework with situated cognition. The recent popularity of theories conceiving of the brain as a predictive organ has given rise to two broad camps in the literature that I call free energy enactivism and cognitivist predictive processing. The two approaches vary in scope and methodology. The scope of cognitivist predictive processing is narrow and restricts cognition to brain processes and structures; it does not consider the body-beyond-brain and the environment as constituents of cognitive processes. Free energy enactivism, on the other hand, includes all self-organizing systems that minimize free energy (including non-living systems) and thus does not offer any unique explanations for more complex cognitive phenomena that are unique to human cognition. Furthermore, because of its strong commitment to the mind-life continuity thesis, it does not provide an explanation of what distinguishes more sophisticated cognitive systems from simple systems. The account that I develop in this paper rejects both of these radical extremes. Instead, I propose a compromise that highlights the necessary components of predictive processing by making use of a mechanistic methodology of explanation. The starting point of the argument in this paper is that despite the interchangeable use of the terms, prediction error minimization and the free energy principle are not identical. But this distinction does not need to disrupt the status quo of the literature if we consider an alternative approach: Embodied, Embedded Predictive Processing (EEPP). EEPP accommodates the free energy principle, as argued for by free energy enactivism, but it also allows for mental representations in its explanation of cognition. Furthermore, EEPP explains how prediction error minimization is realized but, unlike cognitivist PP, it allocates a constitutive role to the body in cognition. Despite highlighting concerns regarding cognitivist PP, I do not wish to discredit the role of the neural domain or representations as free energy enactivism does. Neural structures and processes undeniably contribute to the minimization of prediction error but the role of the body is equally important. On my account, prediction error minimization and free energy minimization are deeply dependent on the body of an agent, such that the body-beyond-brain plays a constitutive role in cognitive processing. I suggest that the body plays three constitutive roles in prediction error minimization: The body regulates cognitive activity, ensuring that cognition and action are intricately linked. The body acts as distributor in the sense that it carries some of the cognitive load by fulfilling the function of minimizing prediction error. Finally, the body serves to constrain the information that is processed by an agent. In fulfilling these three roles, the agent and environment enter into a bidirectional relation through influencing and modeling the structure of the other. This connects EEPP to the free energy principle because the whole embodied agent minimizes free energy in virtue of being a model of its econiche. This grants the body a constitutive role as part of the collection of mechanisms that minimize prediction error and free energy. The body can only fulfill its role when embedded in an environment, of which it is a model. In this sense, EEPP offers the most promising alternative to cognitivist predictive processing and free energy enactivism.
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Affiliation(s)
- Elmarie Venter
- Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
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41
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Constant A, Clark A, Friston KJ. Representation Wars: Enacting an Armistice Through Active Inference. Front Psychol 2021; 11:598733. [PMID: 33488462 PMCID: PMC7817850 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.598733] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/02/2020] [Accepted: 12/08/2020] [Indexed: 12/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Over the last 30 years, representationalist and dynamicist positions in the philosophy of cognitive science have argued over whether neurocognitive processes should be viewed as representational or not. Major scientific and technological developments over the years have furnished both parties with ever more sophisticated conceptual weaponry. In recent years, an enactive generalization of predictive processing – known as active inference – has been proposed as a unifying theory of brain functions. Since then, active inference has fueled both representationalist and dynamicist campaigns. However, we believe that when diving into the formal details of active inference, one should be able to find a solution to the war; if not a peace treaty, surely an armistice of a sort. Based on an analysis of these formal details, this paper shows how both representationalist and dynamicist sensibilities can peacefully coexist within the new territory of active inference.
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Affiliation(s)
- Axel Constant
- Charles Perkins Centre, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Andy Clark
- Department of Philosophy, The University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom.,Department of Informatics, The University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom.,Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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Abstract
Climate change, biodiversity loss, and other major social and environmental problems pose severe risks. Progress has been inadequate and scientists, global policy experts, and the general public increasingly conclude that transformational change is needed across all sectors of society in order to improve and maintain social and ecological wellbeing. At least two paths to transformation are conceivable: (1) reform of and innovation within existing societal systems (e.g., economic, legal, and governance systems); and (2) the de novo development of and migration to new and improved societal systems. This paper is the final in a three-part series of concept papers that together outline a novel science-driven research and development program aimed at the second path. It summarizes literature to build a narrative on the topic of de novo design of societal systems. The purpose is to raise issues, suggest design possibilities, and highlight directions and questions that could be explored in the context of this or any R&D program aimed at new system design. This paper does not present original research, but rather provides a synthesis of selected ideas from the literature. Following other papers in the series, a society is viewed as a superorganism and its societal systems as a cognitive architecture. Accordingly, a central goal of design is to improve the collective cognitive capacity of a society, rendering it more capable of achieving and sustainably maintaining vitality. Topics of attention, communication, self-identity, power, and influence are discussed in relation to societal cognition and system design. A prototypical societal system is described, and some design considerations are highlighted.
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van Dijk L, Rietveld E. Situated anticipation. SYNTHESE 2021; 198:349-371. [PMID: 33583961 PMCID: PMC7822785 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-02013-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/09/2018] [Accepted: 09/21/2018] [Indexed: 05/21/2023]
Abstract
In cognitive science, long-term anticipation, such as when planning to do something next year, is typically seen as a form of 'higher' cognition, requiring a different account than the more basic activities that can be understood in terms of responsiveness to 'affordances,' i.e. to possibilities for action. Starting from architects that anticipate the possibility to make an architectural installation over the course of many months, in this paper we develop a process-based account of affordances that includes long-term anticipation within its scope. We present a framework in which situations and their affordances unfold, and can be thought of as continuing a history of practices into a current situational activity. In this activity affordances invite skilled participants to act further. Via these invitations one situation develops into the other; an unfolding process that sets up the conditions for its own continuation. Central to our process account of affordances is the idea that engaged individuals can be responsive to the direction of the process to which their actions contribute. Anticipation, at any temporal scale, is then part and parcel of keeping attuned to the movement of the unfolding situations to which an individual contributes. We concretize our account by returning to the example of anticipation observed in architectural practice. This account of anticipation opens the door to considering a wide array of human activities traditionally characterized as 'higher' cognition in terms of engaging with affordances.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ludger van Dijk
- Department of Philosophy, Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, Prinsstraat 13, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium
- Department of Psychiatry and Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, Amsterdam University Medical Center, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Erik Rietveld
- Department of Psychiatry and Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, Amsterdam University Medical Center, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
- Department of Philosophy/ILLC, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
- Department of Philosophy, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands
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44
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Beni MD. An Algorithmic Metaphysics of Self-Patterns. Front Psychol 2020; 11:607917. [PMID: 33362668 PMCID: PMC7758732 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.607917] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/18/2020] [Accepted: 11/13/2020] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
The paper draws on an algorithmic criterion to demonstrate that the self (as initially described in Shaun Gallagher’s a pattern theory of self) is a composite, scattered, and patterned object. It also addresses the question of extendedness of the self-pattern. Based on the criteria drawn from algorithmic complexity, I argue that although the self-pattern possesses a genuinely extended aspect (and in this sense, the self-pattern is minimally extended) the self-pattern and its environment do not constitute a genuine composite object.
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Affiliation(s)
- Majid D Beni
- Department of Philosophy, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey
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45
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Seymour B, Mancini F. Hierarchical models of pain: Inference, information-seeking, and adaptive control. Neuroimage 2020; 222:117212. [PMID: 32739554 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2020.117212] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/01/2020] [Revised: 07/21/2020] [Accepted: 07/25/2020] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
Computational models of pain consider how the brain processes nociceptive information and allow mapping neural circuits and networks to cognition and behaviour. To date, they have generally have assumed two largely independent processes: perceptual inference, typically modelled as an approximate Bayesian process, and action control, typically modelled as a reinforcement learning process. However, inference and control are intertwined in complex ways, challenging the clarity of this distinction. Here, we consider how they may comprise a parallel hierarchical architecture that combines inference, information-seeking, and adaptive value-based control. This sheds light on the complex neural architecture of the pain system, and takes us closer to understanding from where pain 'arises' in the brain.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ben Seymour
- Computational and Biological Learning Lab, Department of Engineering, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom; Center for Information and Neural Networks, National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Osaka, Japan.
| | - Flavia Mancini
- Computational and Biological Learning Lab, Department of Engineering, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom.
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Hobson JA, Gott JA, Friston KJ. Minds and Brains, Sleep and Psychiatry. PSYCHIATRIC RESEARCH AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 2020; 3:12-28. [PMID: 35174319 PMCID: PMC8834904 DOI: 10.1176/appi.prcp.20200023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/12/2020] [Accepted: 10/14/2020] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
Objective This article offers a philosophical thesis for psychiatric disorders that rests upon some simple truths about the mind and brain. Specifically, it asks whether the dual aspect monism—that emerges from sleep research and theoretical neurobiology—can be applied to pathophysiology and psychopathology in psychiatry. Methods Our starting point is that the mind and brain are emergent aspects of the same (neuronal) dynamics; namely, the brain–mind. Our endpoint is that synaptic dysconnection syndromes inherit the same dual aspect; namely, aberrant inference or belief updating on the one hand, and a failure of neuromodulatory synaptic gain control on the other. We start with some basic considerations from sleep research that integrate the phenomenology of dreaming with the neurophysiology of sleep. Results We then leverage this treatment by treating the brain as an organ of inference. Our particular focus is on the role of precision (i.e., the representation of uncertainty) in belief updating and the accompanying synaptic mechanisms. Conclusions Finally, we suggest a dual aspect approach—based upon belief updating (i.e., mind processes) and its neurophysiological implementation (i.e., brain processes)—has a wide explanatory compass for psychiatry and various movement disorders. This approach identifies the kind of pathophysiology that underwrites psychopathology—and points to certain psychotherapeutic and psychopharmacological targets, which may stand in mechanistic relation to each other. The ‘mind’ emerges from Bayesian belief updating in the ‘brain’ Psychopathology can be read as aberrant belief updating. Aberrant belief updating follows from any neuromodulatory synaptopathy
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Affiliation(s)
- J. Allan Hobson
- Division of Sleep Medicine Harvard Medical School Boston Massachusetts
| | - Jarrod A. Gott
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour Radboud University Nijmegen
| | - Karl J. Friston
- The Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging University College London London
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Fingelkurts AA, Fingelkurts AA, Kallio-Tamminen T. Selfhood triumvirate: From phenomenology to brain activity and back again. Conscious Cogn 2020; 86:103031. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2020.103031] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/08/2020] [Revised: 08/21/2020] [Accepted: 10/05/2020] [Indexed: 12/21/2022]
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Proksch S, Comstock DC, Médé B, Pabst A, Balasubramaniam R. Motor and Predictive Processes in Auditory Beat and Rhythm Perception. Front Hum Neurosci 2020; 14:578546. [PMID: 33061902 PMCID: PMC7518112 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2020.578546] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2020] [Accepted: 08/18/2020] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
In this article, we review recent advances in research on rhythm and musical beat perception, focusing on the role of predictive processes in auditory motor interactions. We suggest that experimental evidence of the motor system's role in beat perception, including in passive listening, may be explained by the generation and maintenance of internal predictive models, concordant with the Active Inference framework of sensory processing. We highlight two complementary hypotheses for the neural underpinnings of rhythm perception: The Action Simulation for Auditory Prediction hypothesis (Patel and Iversen, 2014) and the Gradual Audiomotor Evolution hypothesis (Merchant and Honing, 2014) and review recent experimental progress supporting each of these hypotheses. While initial formulations of ASAP and GAE explain different aspects of beat-based timing-the involvement of motor structures in the absence of movement, and physical entrainment to an auditory beat respectively-we suggest that work under both hypotheses provide converging evidence toward understanding the predictive role of the motor system in the perception of rhythm, and the specific neural mechanisms involved. We discuss future experimental work necessary to further evaluate the causal neural mechanisms underlying beat and rhythm perception.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shannon Proksch
- Sensorimotor Neuroscience Laboratory, Cognitive & Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA, United States
| | - Daniel C Comstock
- Sensorimotor Neuroscience Laboratory, Cognitive & Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA, United States
| | - Butovens Médé
- Sensorimotor Neuroscience Laboratory, Cognitive & Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA, United States
| | - Alexandria Pabst
- Sensorimotor Neuroscience Laboratory, Cognitive & Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA, United States
| | - Ramesh Balasubramaniam
- Sensorimotor Neuroscience Laboratory, Cognitive & Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA, United States
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Nave K, Deane G, Miller M, Clark A. Wilding the predictive brain. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2020; 11:e1542. [PMID: 32902122 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1542] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/09/2019] [Revised: 03/25/2020] [Accepted: 07/16/2020] [Indexed: 12/31/2022]
Abstract
The Predictive Processing (PP) framework casts the brain as a probabilistic prediction engine that continually generates predictions of the causal structure of the world in order to construct for itself, from the top down, incoming sensory signals. Conceiving of the brain in this way has yielded incredible explanatory power, offering what many believe to be our first glimpse at a unified theory of the mind. In this paper, the picture of the mind brought into view by predictive processing theories is shown to be embodied, deeply affective and nicely poised for cognitive extension. We begin by giving an overview of the main themes of the framework, and situating this approach within embodied cognitive science. We show perception, action, homeostatic regulation and emotion to be underpinned by the very same predictive machinery. We conclude by showing how predictive minds will increasingly be understood as deeply interwoven with, and perhaps extended into, the surrounding social, cultural and technological landscape. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Psychology > Emotion and Motivation Philosophy > Action.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kathryn Nave
- Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
| | - George Deane
- Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
| | - Mark Miller
- Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
| | - Andy Clark
- Department of Philosophy, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
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Kirchhoff MD, Kiverstein J. Attuning to the World: The Diachronic Constitution of the Extended Conscious Mind. Front Psychol 2020; 11:1966. [PMID: 32982832 PMCID: PMC7475699 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01966] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/29/2020] [Accepted: 07/15/2020] [Indexed: 12/16/2022] Open
Abstract
It is a near consensus among materialist philosophers of mind that consciousness must somehow be constituted by internal neural processes, even if we remain unsure quite how this works. Even friends of the extended mind theory have argued that when it comes to the material substrate of conscious experience, the boundary of skin and skull is likely to prove somehow to be privileged. Such arguments have, however, typically conceived of the constitution of consciousness in synchronic terms, making a firm separation between proximate mechanisms and their ultimate causes. We argue that the processes involved in the constitution of some conscious experiences are diachronic, not synchronic. We focus on what we call phenomenal attunement in this paper—the feeling of being at home in a familiar, culturally constructed environment. Such a feeling is missing in cases of culture shock. Phenomenal attunement is a structure of our conscious experience of the world that is ubiquitous and taken for granted. We will argue that it is constituted by cycles of embodied and world-involving engagement whose dynamics are constrained by cultural practices. Thus, it follows that an essential structure of the conscious mind, the absence of which profoundly transforms conscious experience, is extended.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael D Kirchhoff
- Department of Philosophy, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia
| | - Julian Kiverstein
- Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam University Medical Center, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
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