Adaptive dynamics of altruistic cooperation in a metapopulation: evolutionary emergence of cooperators and defectors or evolutionary suicide?

The conditional defector strategies can violate the most crucial supporting mechanisms of cooperation

Cooperation is essential for all domains of life. Yet, ironically, it is intrinsically vulnerable to exploitation by cheats. Hence, an explanatory necessity spurs many evolutionary biologists to search for mechanisms that could support cooperation. In general, cooperation can emerge and be maintained when cooperators are sufficiently interacting with themselves. This communication provides a kind of assortment and reciprocity. The most crucial and common mechanisms to achieve that task are kin selection, spatial structure, and enforcement (punishment). Here, we used agent-based simulation models to investigate these pivotal mechanisms against conditional defector strategies. We concluded that the latter could easily violate the former and take over the population. This surprising outcome may urge us to rethink the evolution of cooperation, as it illustrates that maintaining cooperation may be more difficult than previously thought. Moreover, empirical applications may support these theoretical findings, such as invading the cooperator population of pathogens by genetically engineered conditional defectors, which could be a potential therapy for many incurable diseases.

Tumor microenvironment as a metapopulation model: the effects of angiogenesis, emigration and treatment modalities

Tumors consist of heterogeneous cell subpopulations that may develop differing phenotypes, such as increased cell growth, metastatic potential and treatment sensitivity or resistance. To study the dynamics of cancer development at a single-cell level, we model the tumor microenvironment as a metapopulation, in which habitat patches correspond to possible sites for cell subpopulations. Cancer cells may emigrate into dispersal pool (e.g. circulation system) and spread to new sites (i.e. metastatic disease). In the patches, cells divide and new variants may arise, possibly leading into an invasion provided the aberration promotes the cell growth. To study such adaptive landscape of cancer ecosystem, we consider various evolutionary strategies (phenotypes), such as emigration and angiogenesis, which are important determinants during early stages of tumor development. We use the metapopulation fitness of new variants to investigate how these strategies evolve through natural selection and disease progression. We further study various treatment effects and investigate how different therapy regimens affect the evolution of the cell populations. These aspects are relevant, for example, when examining the dynamic process of a benign tumor becoming cancerous, and what is the best treatment strategy during the early stages of cancer development. It is shown that positive angiogenesis promotes cancer cell growth in the absence of anti-angiogenic treatment, and that the anti-angiogenic treatment reduces the need of cytotoxic treatment when used in a combination. Interestingly, the model predicts that treatment resistance might become a favorable quality to cancer cells when the anti-angiogenic treatment is intensive enough. Thus, the optimal treatment dosage should remain below a patient-specific level to avoid treatment resistance.

Joint evolution of dispersal propensity and site selection in structured metapopulation models

We propose a novel mathematical model for a metapopulation in which dispersal occurs on two levels: juvenile dispersal from the natal site is mandatory but it may take place either locally within the natal patch or globally between patches. Within each patch, individuals live in sites. Each site can be inhabited by at most one individual at a time and it may be of high or low quality. A disperser immigrates into a high-quality site whenever it obtains one, but it immigrates into a low-quality site only with a certain probability that depends on the time within the dispersal season. The vector of these low-quality-site-acceptance probabilities is the site-selection strategy of an individual. We derive a proxy for the invasion fitness in this model and study the joint evolution of long-distance-dispersal propensity and site-selection strategy. We focus on the way different ecological changes affect the evolutionary dynamics and study the interplay between global patch-to-patch dispersal and local site-selection. We show that ecological changes affect site-selection mainly via the severeness of competition for sites, which often leads to effects that may appear counterintuitive. Moreover, the metapopulation structure may result in extremely complex site-selection strategies and even in evolutionary cycles. The propensity for long-distance dispersal is mainly determined by the metapopulation-level ecological factors. It is, however, also strongly affected by the winter-survival of the site-holders within patches, which results in surprising non-monotonous effects in the evolution of site-selection due to interplay with long-distance dispersal. Altogether, our results give new additional support to the recent general conclusion that evolution of site-selection is often dominated by the indirect factors that take place via density-dependence, which means that evolutionary responses can rarely be predicted by intuition.

The evolution of site-selection strategy during dispersal

We propose a mathematical model that enables the evolutionary analysis of site-selection process of dispersing individuals that encounter sites of high or low quality. Since each site can be inhabited by at most one individual, all dispersers are not able to obtain a high-quality site. We study the evolutionary dynamics of the low-quality-site acceptance as a function of the time during the dispersal season using adaptive dynamics. We show that environmental changes affect the evolutionary dynamics in two ways: directly and indirectly via density-dependent factors. Direct evolutionary effects usually follow intuition, whereas indirect effects are often counter-intuitive and hence difficult to predict without mechanistic modeling. Therefore, the mechanistic derivation of the fitness function, with careful attention on density- and frequency dependence, is essential for predicting the consequences of environmental changes to site selection. For example, increasing fecundity in high-quality sites makes them more tempting for dispersers and hence the direct effect of this ecological change delays the acceptance of low-quality sites. However, increasing fecundity in high-quality sites also increases the population size, which makes the competition for sites more severe and thus, as an indirect effect, forces evolution to favor less picky individuals. Our results indicate that the indirect effects often dominate the intuitive effects, which emphasizes the need for mechanistic models of the immigration process.

Defectors Can Create Conditions That Rescue Cooperation

Cooperation based on the production of costly common goods is observed throughout nature. This is puzzling, as cooperation is vulnerable to exploitation by defectors which enjoy a fitness advantage by consuming the common good without contributing fairly. Depletion of the common good can lead to population collapse and the destruction of cooperation. However, population collapse implies small population size, which, in a structured population, is known to favor cooperation. This happens because small population size increases variability in cooperator frequency across different locations. Since individuals in cooperator-dominated locations (which are most likely cooperators) will grow more than those in defector-dominated locations (which are most likely defectors), cooperators can outgrow defectors globally despite defectors outgrowing cooperators in each location. This raises the possibility that defectors can lead to conditions that sometimes rescue cooperation from defector-induced destruction. We demonstrate multiple mechanisms through which this can occur, using an individual-based approach to model stochastic birth, death, migration, and mutation events. First, during defector-induced population collapse, defectors occasionally go extinct before cooperators by chance, which allows cooperators to grow. Second, empty locations, either preexisting or created by defector-induced population extinction, can favor cooperation because they allow cooperator but not defector migrants to grow. These factors lead to the counterintuitive result that the initial presence of defectors sometimes allows better survival of cooperation compared to when defectors are initially absent. Finally, we find that resource limitation, inducible by defectors, can select for mutations adaptive to resource limitation. When these mutations are initially present at low levels or continuously generated at a moderate rate, they can favor cooperation by further reducing local population size. We predict that in a structured population, small population sizes precipitated by defectors provide a "built-in" mechanism for the persistence of cooperation.

Cheating is evolutionarily assimilated with cooperation in the continuous snowdrift game

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We fully analyze continuous snowdrift games with quadratic payoff functions in diversified populations.

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It is well known that classical snowdrift games maintain the coexistence of cooperators and cheaters.

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We clarify that the continuous snowdrift games often lead to assimilation of cooperators and cheaters.

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Allowing the gradual evolution of cooperative behavior can facilitate social inequity aversion in joint ventures.

It is well known that in contrast to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the snowdrift game can lead to a stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. Recent theoretical evidence on the snowdrift game suggests that gradual evolution for individuals choosing to contribute in continuous degrees can result in the social diversification to a 100% contribution and 0% contribution through so-called evolutionary branching. Until now, however, game-theoretical studies have shed little light on the evolutionary dynamics and consequences of the loss of diversity in strategy. Here, we analyze continuous snowdrift games with quadratic payoff functions in dimorphic populations. Subsequently, conditions are clarified under which gradual evolution can lead a population consisting of those with 100% contribution and those with 0% contribution to merge into one species with an intermediate contribution level. The key finding is that the continuous snowdrift game is more likely to lead to assimilation of different cooperation levels rather than maintenance of diversity. Importantly, this implies that allowing the gradual evolution of cooperative behavior can facilitate social inequity aversion in joint ventures that otherwise could cause conflicts that are based on commonly accepted notions of fairness.

Relationship between aggregation of rewards and the possibility of polymorphism in continuous snowdrift games

The existence of intra-population variations in cooperation level has often been reported by some empirical studies. Evolutionary conditions of polymorphism in cooperation have been investigated by using a framework of the continuous snowdrift game. However, our insights from this framework have been limited because of an assumption that the cooperative reward is a function of total amount of investments within an interacting group. In many cases, payoffs may actually depend on the interactions between the effects of such investments, such as members share the sum of beneficial effects that are individually produced from their own investments. Alternatively, payoffs may depend multiplicatively on investment, such as when investments are complementary. In the present paper, we investigated the influence of such difference on the evolution of cooperation with respect to three aspects of the aggregating process of individuals' contributions for reward, i.e. (i) additive or multiplicative, (ii) aggregation of either investments or effects, and (iii) promotion of advantage or suppression of disadvantage. We analytically show that the possibilities of the emergence of polymorphism are different depending on the type of aggregation process classified from these three aspects. Polymorphism of cooperation level never emerges unless the aggregation process is the aggregation of investment or the multiplicative aggregation of effect with suppression of disadvantage. Our results show the necessary condition for the emergence of polymorphic cooperation levels that are observed in various taxonomic groups.

Evolution of density-dependent cooperation

Cooperation is surprisingly common in life despite of its vulnerability to selfish cheating, i.e. defecting. Defectors do not contribute to common resources but take the advantage of cooperators' investments. Therefore, the emergence and maintenance of cooperation have been considered irrational phenomena. In this study, we focus on plastic, quantitative cooperation behaviour, especially on its evolution. We assume that individuals are capable to sense the population density in their neighbourhood and adjust their real-valued investments on public goods based on that information. The ecological setting is described with stochastic demographic events, e.g. birth and death, occurring at individual level. Individuals form small populations, which further constitute a structured metapopulation. For evolutionary investigations, we apply the adaptive dynamics framework. The cost of cooperative investment is incorporated into the model in two ways, by decreasing the birth rate or by increasing the death rate. In the first case, density-dependent cooperation evolves to be a decreasing function of population size as expected. In the latter case, however, the density-dependent cooperative investment can have a qualitatively different form as it may evolve to be highest in intermediate-sized populations. Indeed, we emphasize that some details in modelling may have a significant impact on the results obtained.

Evolutionary dynamics of nitrogen fixation in the legume-rhizobia symbiosis

The stabilization of host–symbiont mutualism against the emergence of parasitic individuals is pivotal to the evolution of cooperation. One of the most famous symbioses occurs between legumes and their colonizing rhizobia, in which rhizobia extract nutrients (or benefits) from legume plants while supplying them with nitrogen resources produced by nitrogen fixation (or costs). Natural environments, however, are widely populated by ineffective rhizobia that extract benefits without paying costs and thus proliferate more efficiently than nitrogen-fixing cooperators. How and why this mutualism becomes stabilized and evolutionarily persists has been extensively discussed. To better understand the evolutionary dynamics of this symbiosis system, we construct a simple model based on the continuous snowdrift game with multiple interacting players. We investigate the model using adaptive dynamics and numerical simulations. We find that symbiotic evolution depends on the cost–benefit balance, and that cheaters widely emerge when the cost and benefit are similar in strength. In this scenario, the persistence of the symbiotic system is compatible with the presence of cheaters. This result suggests that the symbiotic relationship is robust to the emergence of cheaters, and may explain the prevalence of cheating rhizobia in nature. In addition, various stabilizing mechanisms, such as partner fidelity feedback, partner choice, and host sanction, can reinforce the symbiotic relationship by affecting the fitness of symbionts in various ways. This result suggests that the symbiotic relationship is cooperatively stabilized by various mechanisms. In addition, mixed nodule populations are thought to encourage cheater emergence, but our model predicts that, in certain situations, cheaters can disappear from such populations. These findings provide a theoretical basis of the evolutionary dynamics of legume–rhizobia symbioses, which is extendable to other single-host, multiple-colonizer systems.

Self-extinction through optimizing selection

Evolutionary suicide is a process in which selection drives a viable population to extinction. So far, such selection-driven self-extinction has been demonstrated in models with frequency-dependent selection. This is not surprising, since frequency-dependent selection can disconnect individual-level and population-level interests through environmental feedback. Hence it can lead to situations akin to the tragedy of the commons, with adaptations that serve the selfish interests of individuals ultimately ruining a population. For frequency-dependent selection to play such a role, it must not be optimizing. Together, all published studies of evolutionary suicide have created the impression that evolutionary suicide is not possible with optimizing selection. Here we disprove this misconception by presenting and analyzing an example in which optimizing selection causes self-extinction. We then take this line of argument one step further by showing, in a further example, that selection-driven self-extinction can occur even under frequency-independent selection.

Evolution of complex density-dependent dispersal strategies

The question of how dispersal behavior is adaptive and how it responds to changes in selection pressure is more relevant than ever, as anthropogenic habitat alteration and climate change accelerate around the world. In metapopulation models where local populations are large, and thus local population size is measured in densities, density-dependent dispersal is expected to evolve to a single-threshold strategy, in which individuals stay in patches with local population density smaller than a threshold value and move immediately away from patches with local population density larger than the threshold. Fragmentation tends to convert continuous populations into metapopulations and also to decrease local population sizes. Therefore we analyze a metapopulation model, where each patch can support only a relatively small local population and thus experience demographic stochasticity. We investigated the evolution of density-dependent dispersal, emigration and immigration, in two scenarios: adult and natal dispersal. We show that density-dependent emigration can also evolve to a nonmonotone, "triple-threshold" strategy. This interesting phenomenon results from an interplay between the direct and indirect benefits of dispersal and the costs of dispersal. We also found that, compared to juveniles, dispersing adults may benefit more from density-dependent vs. density-independent dispersal strategies.