Primary Care Physicians in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS): a Qualitative Investigation of Participants' Experiences, Self-Reported Practice Changes, and Suggestions for Program Administrators

Scoping Review: Anesthesiologist Involvement in Alternative Payment Models, Value Measurement, and Nonclinical Capabilities for Success in the United States of America

The US healthcare sector is undergoing significant payment reforms, leading to the emergence of Alternative Payment Models (APMs) aimed at improving clinical outcomes and patient experiences while reducing costs. This scoping review provides an overview of the involvement of anesthesiologists in APMs as found in published literature. It specifically aims to categorize and understand the breadth and depth of their participation, revolving around 3 main axes or "Aims": (1) shaping APMs through design and implementation, (2) gauging the value and quality of care provided by anesthesiologists within these models, and (3) enhancing nonclinical abilities of anesthesiologists for promoting more value in care. To map out the existing literature, a comprehensive search of relevant electronic databases was conducted, yielding a total of 2173 articles, of which 24 met the inclusion criteria, comprising 21 prospective or retrospective cohort studies, 2 surveys, and 1 case-control cohort study. Eleven publications (45%) discussed value-based, bundled, or episode-based payments, whereas the rest discussed non-payment-based models, such as Enhanced Recovery After Surgery (7 articles, 29%), Perioperative Surgical Home (4 articles, 17%), or other models (3 articles, 13%).The review identified key themes related to each aim. The most prominent themes for aim 1 included protocol standardization (16 articles, 67%), design and implementation leadership (8 articles, 33%), multidisciplinary collaboration (7 articles, 29%), and role expansion (5 articles, 21%). For aim 2, the common themes were Process-Based & Patient-Centric Metrics (1 article, 4%), Shared Accountability (3 articles, 13%), and Time-Driven Activity-Based Costing (TDABC) (3 articles, 13%). Furthermore, we identified a wide range of quality metrics, spanning 8 domains that were used in these studies to evaluate anesthesiologists' performance. For aim 3, the main extracted themes included Education on Healthcare Transformation and Policies (3 articles, 13%), Exploring Collaborative Leadership Skills (5 articles, 21%), and Embracing Advanced Analytics and Data Transparency (4 articles, 17%).Findings revealed the pivotal role of anesthesiologists in the design, implementation, and refinement of these emerging delivery and payment models. Our results highlight that while payment models are shifting toward value, patient-centered metrics have yet to be widely accepted for use in measuring quality and affecting payment for anesthesiologists. Gaps remain in understanding how anesthesiologists assess their direct impact and strategies for enhancing the sustainability of anesthesia practices. This review underscores the need for future research contributing to the successful adaptation of clinical practices in this new era of healthcare delivery.

Neurosurgical Performance in the First 2 Years of Merit-Based Incentive Payment System: A Descriptive Analysis and Predictors of Receiving Bonus Payments

BACKGROUND

The merit-based incentive payment system (MIPS) program was implemented to tie Medicare reimbursements to value-based care measures. Neurosurgical performance in MIPS has not yet been described.

OBJECTIVE

To characterize neurosurgical performance in the first 2 years of MIPS.

METHODS

Publicly available data regarding MIPS performance for neurosurgeons in 2017 and 2018 were queried. Descriptive statistics about physician characteristics, MIPS performance, and ensuing payment adjustments were performed, and predictors of bonus payments were identified.

RESULTS

There were 2811 physicians included in 2017 and 3147 in 2018. Median total MIPS scores (99.1 vs 90.4, P < .001) and quality scores (97.9 vs 88.5, P < .001) were higher in 2018 than in 2017. More neurosurgeons (2758, 87.6%) received bonus payments in 2018 than in 2017 (2013, 71.6%). Of the 2232 neurosurgeons with scores in both years, 1347 (60.4%) improved their score. Reporting through an alternative payment model (odds ratio [OR]: 32.3, 95% CI: 16.0-65.4; P < .001) and any practice size larger than 10 (ORs ranging from 2.37 to 10.2, all P < .001) were associated with receiving bonus payments. Increasing years in practice (OR: 0.99; 95% CI: 0.982-0.998, P = .011) and having 25% to 49% (OR: 0.72; 95% CI: 0.53-0.97; P = .029) or ≥50% (OR: 0.48; 95% CI: 0.28-0.82; P = .007) of a physician's patients eligible for Medicaid were associated with lower rates of bonus payments.

CONCLUSION

Neurosurgeons performed well in MIPS in 2017 and 2018, although the program may be biased against surgeons who practice in small groups or take care of socially disadvantaged patients.

Show Me the Money, I'll Show You My Complications: Impacts of Incentivized Incident Self-Reporting Among Surgeons

INTRODUCTION

Trial and error have the propensity to generate knowledge. Near misses and adverse event reporting can improve patient care. Professional ridicule or litigation risks after an incident may lead to decreased reporting by physicians; however, the lack of incident reporting can negatively affect patient safety and halt scientific advancements. This study compares reporting patterns after distribution of financial incentives to surgeons for self-reporting quality incidents.

METHODS

Retrospective review of an internal incident reporting system, RL6, from September 2018 to September 2019 was performed. Incident reporting patterns after incentive distributions across professional classifications and surgical specialties were evaluated. Engagement surveys on incident reporting were completed by physicians. The primary outcomes were changes in reporting patterns and perceptions after distribution of incentives.

RESULTS

Two hundred and eighteen surgical patients were identified in the incidents reported. Financial incentives significantly increased incidents reported (35 to 183) by physicians (37.1% to 67.8%; P < 0.001) and physician assistants (2.9% to 18.6%; P < 0.001). Acute care surgery displayed the largest increase in incidents reported among surgical specialties (5.7% to 20.2%; P = 0.040). Surgeons exhibited an increase in reporting (60.0% to 94.5%; P < 0.001) compared with witnesses after incentivization (2.9% to 1.6%).

CONCLUSIONS

Financial incentives were associated with increased incident reporting. After the establishment of incentives, physicians were more likely to report their incidents, which may dispel professional embarrassment and display incident ownership. Institutions must encourage reporting while supporting providers. Future quality-improvement studies targeting reporting should incorporate incentives aimed to engage and empower health-care providers.

OUP accepted manuscript

OBJECTIVES

To assess whether previously observed differences in interoperable exchange by physician practice size persisted in 2019 and identify the role of 3 factors shaping interoperable exchange among physicians in practices of varying sizes: Federal incentive programs designed to encourage health IT use, value-based care, and selection of electronic health record (EHR) developer.

MATERIALS

Cross-sectional analysis of a 2019 survey of physicians. We used multivariable Poisson models to estimate the relative risk of interoperable exchange based on the size of the practice accounting for other characteristics and the mediating role of 3 factors.

RESULTS

Seventeen percent of solo practice physicians integrated outside data relative to 51% of large practice physicians. This difference remained substantial in initial multivariable models including physician characteristics. When included in models, Federal incentive programs partially mediated the relationship between practice size and interoperable exchange status. In final models including EHR developer, developer was strongly associated with both exchange and integration while practice size was no longer an independent predictor. These trends persisted when comparing practices with 4 or fewer physicians to those with 5 or more.

DISCUSSION

Public and private initiatives that increase the benefits of interoperable exchange may encourage small practices to pursue it. Technical and policy changes that reduce the costs and complexity of supporting exchange could make it easier for small developers to advance their capabilities to support small practices.

CONCLUSION

Addressing the gap between small and large practices will take a 2-pronged approach that targets both small EHR developers and small practices.

How Did Orthopaedic Surgeons Perform in the 2018 Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System?

BACKGROUND

The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is the latest value-based payment program implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. As performance-based bonuses and penalties continue to rise in magnitude, it is essential to evaluate this program's ability to achieve its core objectives of quality improvement, cost reduction, and competition around clinically meaningful outcomes.

QUESTIONS/PURPOSES

We asked the following: (1) How do orthopaedic surgeons differ on the MIPS compared with surgeons in other specialties, both in terms of the MIPS scores and bonuses that derive from them? (2) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving penalties based on the MIPS? (3) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving a perfect score of 100 based on the MIPS?

METHODS

Scores from the 2018 MIPS reporting period were linked to physician demographic and practice-based information using the Medicare Part B Provider Utilization and Payment File, the National Plan and Provider Enumeration System Data (NPPES), and National Physician Compare Database. For all orthopaedic surgeons identified within the Physician Compare Database, there were 15,210 MIPS scores identified, representing a 72% (15,210 of 21,124) participation rate in the 2018 MIPS. Those participating in the MIPS receive a final score (0 to 100, with 100 being a perfect score) based on a weighted calculation of performance metrics across four domains: quality, promoting interoperability, improvement activities, and costs. In 2018, orthopaedic surgeons had an overall mean ± SD score of 87 ± 21. From these scores, payment adjustments are determined in the following manner: scores less than 15 received a maximum penalty adjustment of -5% ("penalty"), scores equal to 15 did not receive an adjustment ("neutral"), scores between 15 and 70 received a positive adjustment ("positive"), and scores above 70 (maximum 100) received both a positive adjustment and an additional exceptional performance adjustment with a maximum adjustment of +5% ("bonus"). Adjustments among orthopaedic surgeons were compared across various demographic and practice characteristics. Both the mean MIPS score and the resulting payment adjustments were compared with a group of surgeons in other subspecialties. Finally, multivariable logistic regression models were generated to identify which variables were associated with increased odds of receiving a penalty as well as a perfect score of 100.

RESULTS

Compared with surgeons in other specialties, orthopaedic surgeons' mean MIPS score was 4.8 (95% CI 4.3 to 5.2; p < 0.001) points lower. From this difference, a lower proportion of orthopaedic surgeons received bonuses (-5.0% [95% CI -5.6 to -4.3]; p < 0.001), and a greater proportion received penalties (+0.5% [95% CI 0.2 to 0.8]; p < 0.001) and positive adjustments (+4.6% [95% CI 6.1 to 10.7]; p < 0.001) compared with surgeons in other specialties. After controlling for potentially confounding variables such as gender, years in practice, and practice setting, small (1 to 49 members) group size (adjusted odds ratio 22.2 [95% CI 8.17 to 60.3]; p < 0.001) and higher Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) scores (aOR 2.32 [95% CI 1.35 to 4.01]; p = 0.002) were associated with increased odds of a penalty. Also, after controlling for potential confounding, we found that reporting through an alternative payment model (aOR 28.7 [95% CI 24.0 to 34.3]; p < 0.001) was associated with increased odds of a perfect score, whereas small practice size (1 to 49 members) (aOR 0.35 [95% CI 0.31 to 0.39]; p < 0.001), a high patient volume (greater than 500 Medicare patients) (aOR 0.82 [95% CI 0.70 to 0.95]; p = 0.01), and higher HCC score (aOR 0.79 [95% Cl 0.66 to 0.93]; p = 0.006) were associated with decreased odds of a perfect MIPS score.

CONCLUSION

Collectively, orthopaedic surgeons performed well in the second year of the MIPS, with 87% earning bonus payments. Among participating orthopaedic surgeons, individual reporting affiliation, small practice size, and more medically complex patient populations were associated with higher odds of receiving penalties and lower odds of earning a perfect score. Based on these findings, we recommend that individuals and orthopaedic surgeons in small group practices strive to forge partnerships with larger hospital practices with adequate ancillary staff to support quality reporting initiatives. Such partnerships may help relieve surgeons of growing administrative obligations and allow for maintained focus on direct patient care activities. Policymakers should aim to produce a shortened panel of performance measures to ensure more standardized comparison and less time and energy diverted from established clinical workflows. The current MIPS scoring methodology should also be amended with a complexity modifier to ensure fair evaluation of surgeons practicing in the safety net setting, or those treating patients with a high comorbidity burden.

LEVEL OF EVIDENCE

Level III, therapeutic study.

Emergency clinician participation and performance in the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System

BACKGROUND

The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is the largest national pay-for-performance program and the first to afford emergency clinicians unique financial incentives for quality measurement and improvement. With little known regarding its impact on emergency clinicians, we sought to describe participation in the MIPS and examine differences in performance scores and payment adjustments based on reporting affiliation and reporting strategy.

METHODS

We performed a cross-sectional analysis using the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2018 Quality Payment Program (QPP) Experience Report data set. We categorized emergency clinicians by their reporting affiliation (individual, group, MIPS alternative payment model [APM]), MIPS performance scores, and Medicare Part B payment adjustments. We calculated performance scores for common quality measures contributing to the quality category score if reported through qualified clinical data registries (QCDRs) or claims-based reporting strategies.

RESULTS

In 2018, a total of 59,828 emergency clinicians participated in the MIPS-1,246 (2.1%) reported as individuals, 43,404 (72.5%) reported as groups, and 15,178 (25.4%) reported within MIPS APMs. Clinicians reporting as individuals earned lower overall MIPS scores (median [interquartile range {IQR}] = 30.8 [15.0-48.2] points) than those reporting within groups (median [IQR] = 88.4 [49.3-100.0]) and MIPS APMs (median [IQR] = 100.0 [100.0-100.0]; p < 0.001) and more frequently incurred penalties with a negative payment adjustment. Emergency clinicians had higher measure scores if reporting QCDR or QPP non-emergency medicine specialty set measures.

CONCLUSIONS

Emergency clinician participation in national value-based programs is common, with one in four participating through MIPS APMs. Those employing specific strategies such as QCDR and group reporting received the highest MIPS scores and payment adjustments, emphasizing the role that reporting strategy and affiliation play in the quality of care.

Measuring and Improving Quality of Colonoscopy for Colorectal Cancer Screening

Colorectal cancer (CRC) is largely preventable, yet it remains a major public health issue as it is the third most common and deadly malignancy in the United States. While there are many ways to screen for CRC, colonoscopy remains the gold standard as it is the only test that is both cancer-detecting and cancer-preventing through removal of precancerous polyps. Through identifying and removing neoplastic lesions, colonoscopy reduces CRC incidence by 31%-91% and CRC mortality by 65%-88%. However, colonoscopy is not an infallible test-there is a chance for missed lesions during the exam and there is substantial variation in outcomes among endoscopists. To enhance the quality of colonoscopic exams, and ultimately to improve CRC outcomes, quality indicators have been developed for measuring endoscopists' performance. In this review, we describe the colonoscopic quality indicators and benchmarks recommended by the American Society for Gastrointestinal Endoscopy/American College of Gastroenterology Task Force on Quality in Endoscopy for screening colonoscopies in average-risk individuals. Measuring and monitoring endoscopists' performance on these measures are critical first steps in striving toward conducting high quality exams. We also review the evidence for interventions that aim to improve critical measures including adenoma detection rate, withdrawal time, cecal intubation, and bowel preparation quality. Finally, we provide a preview of the forthcoming Advancing Care for Appropriate Colon Health Merit-Based Incentive Payment System Value Pathway by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and its potential impact on clinical practice.

The Merit-based Incentive Payment System: Pearson's Chi-Square and Categorical Dependent Variable Models Analyzed for Domains-Effective Clinical Care and Efficiency/Cost Reduction

Background: Following the 2015 repeal of the Sustainable Growth Rate formula, the US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' formula under which physicians were reimbursed, two payment systems were put in place to incentivize physicians, one of which was the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). MIPS emphasizes high-quality care that is accessible, affordable, and supports a healthier population. Objectives: This research aims to measure characteristics of MIPS relevant to National Quality Strategy (NQS) domains, quality measure types, and clinical specialties; categorize MIPS with NQS domains and quality measure types by MIPS specialty types; and quantify the relationship between MIPS specialties, measure types, and two NQS domains, Effective Clinical Care (ECC) and Efficiency/Cost Reduction (E/CR), for years 2017 through 2020. Methodology: The Pearson's chi-square test examined distributions of the analyzed categorical variables. The Categorical Dependent Variable Method examined the association between the dependent and independent variables. Results: The Pearson's chi-square test showed statistically significant distributions between ECC and E/CR when analyzed with the types of quality measures. There were more process measures (93.81% vs 89.64% [P=.000]) in 2018 versus 2017. This changed minutely with significantly less process measures (93.75% vs 93.81% [P=.000]) in 2019 versus 2018. Finally, measure types changed minutely but significantly with less process measures (93.81% vs 93.75% [P=.000]) in 2020 versus 2019. The regression model showed that ECC was significantly associated with outcome measures through all analyzed years of this research. Conclusion: The above findings show scope for including additional outcome measures, given its importance in MIPS. There is potential to increase the percentage allocation for reporting more outcome measures in quality. This re-allotment infers reporting more outcome measures aligning with priority outcome measures (PROMs). Re-allocating the incentive formula to report more outcome measures aligned with PROMs shows potential to increase reporting of more outcome measures under MIPS.

Physician Practice Leaders' Perceptions of Medicare's Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS)

BACKGROUND

Medicare's Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is a major value-based purchasing program. Little is known about how physician practice leaders view the program and its benefits and challenges.

OBJECTIVE

To understand practice leaders' perceptions of MIPS.

DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS

Interviews were conducted from December 12, 2019, to June 23, 2020, with leaders of 30 physician practices of various sizes and specialties across the USA. Practices were randomly selected using the Medical Group Management Association's membership database. Practices included small primary care and general surgery practices (1-9 physicians); medium primary care and general surgery practices (10-25 physicians); and large multispecialty practices (50 or more physicians). Participants were asked about their perceptions of MIPS measures; the program's effect on patient care; administrative burden; and rationale for participation.

MAIN MEASURES

Major themes related to practice participation in MIPS.

KEY RESULTS

Interviews were conducted with 30 practices representing all US census regions. Six major themes emerged: (1) MIPS is understood as a continuation of previous value-based payment programs and a precursor to future programs; (2) measures are more relevant to primary care practices than other specialties; (3) leaders are conflicted on whether the program improves patient care; (4) MIPS creates a substantial administrative burden, exacerbated by annual programmatic changes; (5) incentives are small relative to the effort needed to participate; and (6) external support for participation can be helpful. Many participants indicated that their practice only participated in MIPS to avoid financial penalties; some reported that physicians cared for fewer patients due to the program's administrative burden.

CONCLUSIONS

Practice leaders reported several challenges related to MIPS, including irrelevant measures, administrative burden, frequent programmatic changes, and small incentives. They held mixed views on whether the program improves patient care. These findings may be useful to policymakers hoping to improve MIPS.

Changes in patient experiences and assessment of gaming among large clinician practices in precursors of the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System

Question

Do clinician practices game pay-for-performance programs by selectively reporting measures on which they already perform well, and does mandating public reporting on patient experience measures improve care?

Findings

In this cross-sectional analysis of patient experience data from Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) surveys, practices were more likely to voluntarily include CAHPS measures in a Medicare pay-for-performance program when they previously scored higher on these measures. However, mandatory public reporting of CAHPS measures was not associated with improved patient experiences with care.

Meaning

These findings support calls to end voluntary measure selection in public reporting and pay-for-performance programs, including Medicare’s Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, but also suggest that requiring practices to report on patient experiences may not produce gains.

Importance

Medicare’s Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), a public reporting and pay-for-performance program, adjusts clinician payments based on publicly reported measures that are chosen primarily by clinicians or their practices. However, measure selection raises concerns that practices could earn bonuses or avoid penalties by selecting measures on which they already perform well, rather than by improving care—a form of gaming. This has prompted calls for mandatory reporting on a smaller set of measures including patient experiences.

Objective

To examine (1) practices’ selection of Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) patient experience measures for quality scoring under the pay-for-performance program and (2) the association between mandated public reporting on CAHPS measures and performance on those measures within precursor programs of the MIPS.

Design, Setting, and Participants

This cross-sectional study included 2 analyses. The first analysis examined the association between the baseline CAHPS scores of large practices (≥100 clinicians) and practices’ selection of these measures for quality scoring under a pay-for-performance program up to 2 years later. The second analysis examined changes in patient experiences associated with a requirement that large practices publicly report CAHPS measures starting in 2014. A difference-in-differences analysis of 2012 to 2017 fee-for-service Medicare CAHPS data was conducted to compare changes in patient experiences between large practices (111-150 clinicians) that became subject to this reporting mandate and smaller unaffected practices (50-89 clinicians). Analyses were conducted between October 1, 2020, and July 30, 2021.

Main Outcomes and Measures

The primary outcomes of the 2 analyses were (1) the association of baseline CAHPS scores of large practices with those practices’ selection of those measures for quality scoring under a pay-for-performance program; and (2) changes in patient experiences associated with a requirement that large practices publicly report CAHPS measures starting in 2014.

Results

Among 301 large practices that publicly reported patient experience measures, the mean (IQR) age of patients at baseline was 71.6 (70.4-73.2 ) years, and 55.8% of patients were women (IQR, 54.3%-57.7%). Large practices in the top vs bottom quintile of patient experience scores at baseline were more likely to voluntarily include these scores in the pay-for-performance program 2 years later (96.3% vs 67.9%), a difference of 28.4 percentage points (95% CI, 9.4-47.5 percentage points; P = .004). After 2 to 3 years of the reporting mandate, patient experiences did not differentially improve in affected vs unaffected practices (difference-in-differences estimate: −0.03 practice-level standard deviations of the composite score; 95% CI, −0.64 to 0.58; P = .92).

Conclusions and Relevance

In this cross-sectional study of US physician practices that participated in precursors of the MIPS, large practices were found to select measures on which they were already performing well for a pay-for-performance program, consistent with gaming. However, mandating public reporting was not associated with improved patient experiences. These findings support recommendations to end optional measures in the MIPS but also suggest that public reporting on mandated measures may not improve care.

Anesthesia provider performance in the first two years of merit-based incentive payment system: Shifts in reporting and predictors of receiving bonus payments

STUDY OBJECTIVE

The Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) program was intended to align CMS quality and incentive programs. To date, no reports have described anesthesia clinician performance in the first two years of the program.

DESIGN

Observational retrospective cohort study.

SETTING

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services public datasets for their Quality Payment Program.

PATIENTS

Anesthesia clinicians who participated in MIPS for 2017 and 2018 performance years.

INTERVENTIONS

Descriptive statistics compared anesthesia clinician characteristics, practice setting, and MIPS performance between the two years to determine associations with MIPS-based payment adjustments.

MEASUREMENTS

Logistic regression identified independent predictors of bonus payments for exceptional performance.

MAIN RESULTS

Compared with participants in 2017 (n = 25,604), participants in 2018 (n = 54,381) had a higher proportion of reporting through groups and alternative payment models (APMs) than as individuals (p < 0.001). The proportion of clinicians earning performance bonuses increased from 2017 to 2018 except for those MIPS participants reporting as individuals. Median total MIPS scores were higher in 2018 than 2017 (84.6 vs. 82.4, p < 0.001), although median total scores fell for participants reporting as individuals (40.9 vs 75.5, p < 0.001). Among clinicians with scores in both years (n = 20,490), 10,559 (51.3%) improved their total score between 2017 and 2018, and 347 (1.7%) changed reporting from individual to APM. Reporting as an individual compared with group reporting (OR: 0.75; 95% CI: 0.71 to 0.80; p < 0.001) was associated with lower rates of bonus payments, as was having a greater proportion of patients dual-eligible for Medicaid and Medicare. Reporting through an APM (OR: 149.6; 95% CI: 110 to 203.4; p < 0.001) and increasing practice group size were associated with higher likelihood of bonus payments.

CONCLUSIONS

Anesthesia clinician MIPS participation and performance were strong during 2017 and 2018 performance years. Providers who reported through groups or APMs have a higher likelihood of receiving bonus payments.

Inflation-Adjusted Medicare Reimbursement for Revision Hip Arthroplasty: Study Showing Significant Decrease from 2002 to 2019

BACKGROUND

Investigations into reimbursement trends for primary and revision arthroplasty procedures have demonstrated a steady decline over the past several years. Revision total hip arthroplasty (rTHA) due to infection (rTHA-I) has been associated with higher resource utilization and complexity, but long-term inflation-adjusted data have yet to be compared between rTHA-I and rTHA due to aseptic complications (rTHA-A). The present study was performed to analyze temporal reimbursement trends regarding rTHA-I procedures compared with those for rTHA-A procedures.

METHODS

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Physician Fee Schedule Look-Up Tool was used to extract Medicare reimbursements associated with 1-stage and 2-stage rTHA-I as well as 1-stage rTHA-A procedures from 2002 to 2019. Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes for rTHA were grouped according to the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons coding reference guide. Monetary values were adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; reported as 2019 U.S. dollars) and used to calculate the cumulative and average annual percent changes in reimbursement.

RESULTS

Following inflation adjustment, the physician fee reimbursement for rTHA-A decreased by a mean [and standard deviation] of 27.26% ± 3.57% (from $2,209.11 in 2002 to $1,603.20 in 2019) for femoral component revision, 27.41% ± 3.57% (from $2,130.55 to $1,542.91) for acetabular component revision, and 27.50% ± 2.56% (from $2,775.53 to $2,007.61) for both-component revision. Similarly, for a 2-stage rTHA-I, the mean reimbursement declined by 18.74% ± 3.87% (from $2,063.36 in 2002 to $1,673.36 in 2019) and 24.45% ± 3.69% (from $2,328.79 to $1,755.45) for the explantation and reimplantation stages, respectively. The total decline in physician fee reimbursement for rTHA-I ($1,020.64 ± $233.72) was significantly greater than that for rTHA-A ($580.72 ± $107.22; p < 0.00001).

CONCLUSIONS

Our study demonstrated a consistent devaluation of both rTHA-I and rTHA-A procedures from 2002 to 2019, with a larger deficit seen for rTHA-I. A continuation of this trend could create substantial disincentives for physicians to perform such procedures and limit access to care at the population level.

LEVEL OF EVIDENCE

Economic and Decision Analysis Level IV. See Instructions for Authors for a complete description of levels of evidence.

Place Matters: Closing the Gap on Rural Primary Care Quality Improvement Capacity-the Healthy Hearts Northwest Study

CONTEXT

To compare rural independent and health system primary care practices with urban practices to external practice facilitation support in terms of recruitment, readiness, engagement, retention, and change in quality improvement (QI) capacity and quality metric performance.

METHODS

The setting consisted of 135 small or medium-sized primary care practices participating in the Healthy Hearts Northwest quality improvement initiative. The practices were stratified by geography, rural or urban, and by ownership (independent [physician-owned] or system-owned [health/hospital system]). The quality improvement capacity assessment (QICA) survey tool was used to measure QI at baseline and after 12 months of practice facilitation. Changes in 3 clinical quality measures (CQMs)-appropriate aspirin use, blood pressure (BP) control, and tobacco use screening and cessation-were measured at baseline in 2015 and follow-up in 2017.

RESULTS

Rural practices were more likely to enroll in the study, with 1 out of 3.5 rural recruited practices enrolled, compared with 1 out of 7 urban practices enrolled. Rural independent practices had the lowest QI capacity at baseline, making the largest gain in establishing a regular QI process involving cross-functional teams. Rural independent practices made the greatest improvement in meeting the BP control CQM, from 55.5% to 66.1% (P ≤ .001) and the smoking cessation metric, from 72.3% to 86.7% (P ≤ .001).

CONCLUSIONS

Investing practice facilitation and sustained QI strategies in rural independent practices, where the need is high and resources are low, will yield benefits that outweigh centrally prescribed models.

High Rates Of Partial Participation In The First Year Of The Merit-Based Incentive Payment System

There has been widespread concern over the design of the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) since its authorization with the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) in 2015. Using detailed performance data from 2017, the first implementation year of MIPS, we found that while 90 percent of participating clinicians reported performance equal to the low performance threshold of 3 out of 100 (a calculated composite score), almost half of clinicians did not participate in at least one of the three categories of the program (quality, advancing care information, and improvement activities). The decision to participate in each category explained 86 percent of the total variance in clinicians’ overall score, while actual performance explained just 14 percent because of the ease of achieving high scores within each category. Still, 74 percent of clinicians that only partially participated in the program received positive payment adjustments. These findings underline concerns that MIPS’ design may have been too flexible to effectively incentivize clinicians to make incremental progress across all targeted aspects of the program. In turn, this is likely to lead to resistance when payment penalties become more severe in 2022 as required by MIPS’ authorizing legislation.

Time and Financial Costs for Physician Practices to Participate in the Medicare Merit-based Incentive Payment System: A Qualitative Study

Importance

The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is a major Medicare value-based purchasing program, influencing payment for more than 1 million clinicians annually. There is a growing concern that MIPS increases administrative burden, and little is known about what it costs physician practices to participate in the program.

Objective

To examine the costs for independent physician practices to participate in MIPS in 2019.

Design Setting and Participants

This qualitative study identified and interviewed leaders of physician practices participating in the US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) MIPS program, including those in MIPS alternative payment models. Time required and financial costs were calculated from responses to in-depth, semistructured interviews conducted from December 12, 2019, to June 23, 2020. Physician practices were categorized by size (small, 1-9 physicians; medium, 10-25; and large, ≥50), specialty (primary care, general surgery, or multispecialty), and US census region. Participants were asked about 2019 costs related to clinician and staff time, information technology, and external vendors. Time was converted to financial costs using the Medical Group Management Association's Provider Compensation and the Management and Staff Compensation databases.

Main Outcomes and Measures

Annual time spent by staff on MIPS-related activities and mean per-physician costs to physician practices in 2019.

Results

Leaders of 30 physician practices (9 [30.0%] small primary care, 6 [20.0%] small general surgery, 4 [13.3%] medium primary care, 4 [13.3%] medium general surgery, and 7 [23.3%] large multispecialty) represented all US census regions, and 14 of the 30 (46.7%) practices participated in a MIPS alternative payment model in 2019. The mean per-physician cost to practices of participating in MIPS was $12 811 (interquartile range [IQR], $2861-$17 715). Physicians, clinical staff, and administrative staff together spent 201.7 (IQR, 50.9-295.2) hours annually per physician on MIPS-related activities. Medical assistants and nursing staff together spent a mean of 99.2 (IQR, 0-163.3) hours per physician each year; frontline physicians spent 53.6 (IQR, 0.6-55.8) hours; executive administrators spent 28.6 (IQR, 3.1-26.7) hours; other clinicians and staff spent a combined 20.3 (IQR, 0-36.8) hours. Physician time accounted for the greatest proportion of overall MIPS-related costs (54%; $6909; IQR, $94-$9905).

Conclusions and Relevance

In this qualitative study, physician practice leaders reported significant time and financial costs of participating in the MIPS program. Attention to reducing the burden of MIPS may be warranted.

Choosing Evolution over Extinction: Integrating Direct Patient Care Services and Value-Based Payment Models into the Community-Based Pharmacy Setting

The American healthcare payment model introduced Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) into a position of power that currently puts into question the state of the pharmacy profession, especially in the community field. Reimbursement plans had been designed to benefit all stakeholders and save patients money but have only been shown to increase costs for these involved parties. There exist unresolved gaps in care as a result of the healthcare structure and underutilized skills of trained pharmacists who do not have the federal means to provide clinical services. Four collaborative payment models have been proposed, offering methods to quell the monetary problems that exist and are predicted to continue with the closure of community pharmacies and sustained influence of PBMs. These models may additionally allow the expansion of pharmacy career paths and improve healthcare benefits for patients. With a reflective perspective on the healthcare structure and knowledge of positive impacts with the inclusion of pharmacists, solutions to payment challenges could present a progressive approach to an outdated system. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic highlights a dependency on pharmacists and community settings. This outlook on pharmacists may persist and an established expansion of services could prove beneficial to all healthcare stakeholders.