Memory illusions and consciousness: Examining the phenomenology of true and false memories

Proneness to false memory generation predicts pseudoscientific belief endorsement

Among cognitive factors that can influence the endorsement of pseudoscientific beliefs, our study focuses on proneness to false memory generation. In this preregistered study, we presented 170 fluent English speakers residing in the USA with a misinformation task aimed at generating false memories. In this task, they first completed an event encoding stage, in which two events were narrated through sequentially presented pictures. One day later, they read a series of sentences relating the same events but which included several inaccurate descriptions aimed at producing a misinformation effect. Finally, we measured the influence of the misinformation manipulation over false memory generation. After completing the misinformation task, participants responded to a questionnaire measuring pseudoscientific beliefs. Our results showed a positive correlation between pseudoscience endorsement and false memory rates, which indicates that the latter might be a key factor influencing susceptibility to pseudoscience. To our knowledge, this is the first study showing a link between the tendency to believe in pseudoscience and variability regarding proneness to develop false memories. Practical implications for the design of new interventions to effectively reduce pseudoscientific beliefs and their negative impact on our society are discussed.

When Imagination Feels Like Reality: A Case Study of False Memories and Maladaptive Daydreaming in Visual Impairment

Background

When a person experiences maladaptive daydreaming (MD), they spend a prolonged period daydreaming with a strong sense of presence. The symptoms of MD are often excessive, interfere with functioning, and are linked to distress and comorbid mental disorders. In this paper, apparent false memory is described in the context of a woman with MD and visual impairment due to a progressive eye condition. Her vivid daydreams seemed indistinguishable from actual memories. Case Report. A 35-year-old woman with a lifelong MD reported three incidents of fabricating detailed false memories of events that her family confirmed never occurred: obtaining a new job, miscarrying twins, and hospitalization for COVID-19. She experienced anxiety and shame when the stories were disproven. The assessment confirmed MD, PTSD, OCD, and other disorders. Her verbal memory was below average, especially for longer narratives. Her misattributions of daydreams as real-life memories may relate to reliance on vivid mental images over deteriorating vision and source monitoring deficits.

Conclusion

This first reported case of confabulations in an individual with MD and visual disability suggests daydreams could potentially be mistaken for actual events in some MD cases. While sensitive, more research is needed on the prevalence of false memories among individuals with MD. The default mode network, prefrontal cortex, and their connectivity may be implicated in generating vivid daydreams and misattributing them to actual episodic events. Understanding the relationship between sensory impairments, dissociation, and susceptibility to memory distortions could inform interventions to improve reality testing for some MD patients.

Journeying to the past: time travel and mental time travel, how far apart?

Spatial models dominated memory research throughout much of the twentieth century, but in recent decades, the concept of memory as a form of mental time travel (MTT) to the past has gained prominence. Initially introduced as a metaphor, the MTT perspective shifted the focus from internal memory processes to the subjective conscious experience of remembering. Despite its significant impact on empirical and theoretical memory research, there has been limited discussion regarding the meaning and adequacy of the MTT metaphor in accounting for memory. While in previous work I have addressed the general limitations of the MTT metaphor in explaining memory, the objective of this article is more focused and modest: to gain a better understanding of what constitutes MTT to the past. To achieve this objective, a detailed analysis of the characteristics of MTT to the past is presented through a comparison with time travel (TT) to the past. Although acknowledging that TT does not refer to an existing physical phenomenon, it is an older concept extensively discussed in the philosophical literature and provides commonly accepted grounds, particularly within orthodox theories of time, that can offer insights into the nature of MTT. Six specific characteristics serve as points of comparison: (1) a destination distinct from the present, (2) the distinction between subjective time and objective time, (3) the subjective experience of the time traveler, (4) their differentiation from the past self, (5) the existence of the past, and (6) its unchangeability. Through this research, a detailed exploration of the phenomenal and metaphysical aspects of MTT to the past is undertaken, shedding light on the distinct features that mental time travel to the past acquires when it occurs within the realm of the mind rather than as a physical phenomenon. By examining these characteristics, a deeper understanding of the nature of mental time travel is achieved, offering insights into how it operates in relation to memory and the past.

The production of false recognition and the associated state of consciousness following encoding in a naturalistic context in aging

Using virtual reality, we implemented a naturalistic variant of the DRM paradigm in young and older adults to evaluate false recall and false recognition. We distinguished false recognition related to the highest semantic association (the critical lures), semantic similarity (i.e. items that belong to the same semantic category), and perceptual similarity (i.e. items that are similar, but not identical in terms of shape or color). The data revealed that younger adults recalled and recognized more correct elements than older adults did while the older adults intruded more critical items than younger adults. Both age groups produced false recognition related to the critical items, followed by perceptually and then semantically related items. False recognitions were highly recollective as they were mainly associated with a sense of remembering, even more so in older adults than in young adults. The decline of executive functions and working memory predicted age-related increases in false memories.

Induction of false beliefs and false memories in laboratory studies-A systematic review

Psychological interventions often use guided discovery and other techniques for diagnostic exploration and intervention planning. This way, memories may arise in the person, which may be true or false. False memories of earlier events can be harmful and result in real suffering, similar to actual traumatic memories. Based on cognitive psychological and psycho-traumatological findings, there is pronounced dissent in the academic disciplines regarding the conceptualization, relevance and research of false memories. This review contributes to the basic question of how often false beliefs and false memories may be induced within the frame of different interactional techniques. A systematic review has been conducted of 59 articles from (quasi-)experimental studies and two qualitative sources from 30 data bases. Three main methods of memory induction provide the basis for reporting: imagination inflation, false feedback, and memory implantation. Due to the conceptual and methodological diversity of the studies, the results appear to be heterogeneous. Free and guided imagery, as well as suggestive statements, could induce false beliefs or false memories in, on average, 20%-50% of the participants who underwent experimental manipulation concerning false past events. A false belief induction may occur after dream interpretation or hypnosis in more than 50% of participants. Personalized suggestion is more effective in inducing memory than the general plausibility of the suggested events. Further research questions are which therapeutic actions seem appropriate in cases of harmful false memories. This depends not only on whether there are veridical elements in the false memory but also on the quality and meaning of the memory for the person's life and ability to cope with burdens.

When do pictures reduce false memory?

An important discovery in false-memory research is Israel and Schacter's (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 4, 577-581, 1997) finding that presenting pictures at study relative to words alone reduces false memory in the DRM paradigm, a result that has been replicated many times. The standard interpretation is that memory for visual processing of the pictures can be used to reject the critical distractors, which were not explicitly present at study. Beginning from the empirical observation that the pictures used by Israel and Schacter are not consistently labelled with the DRM word they are supposed to represent, we present a series of four studies designed to determine if it is the presentation of pictures or the mismatch between the pictures and the words that reduces false memory. The results across the four experiments demonstrate that picture presentation at study is neither necessary nor sufficient to reduce false memory in the DRM and the categorical associate paradigms. However, we discuss other studies in which picture processing clearly is responsible for reduction of false alarms and note that these studies use study materials and memory tests that are different from the DRM and categorical associate paradigms in that critical lures are externally provided rather than generated. We speculate that the effectiveness of memory for visual processing for reducing false memory may depend on the source of the false memory, but this remains for future research.

Memory for the usual: the influence of schemas on memory for non-schematic information in younger and older adults

Schemas are abstract mental representations that influence perceptual and memory processes. Schemas can aide memory for information that is related or congruent with a given schema (i.e., schematic information), yet it is unclear how schemas affect memory for information that does not directly relate to the schema (i.e., non-schematic information). Using a novel scene paradigm, the current series of studies investigated how schemas affect memory for schematic and non-schematic information, as well as how directed encoding influences remembering of both types of information in younger and older adults. Results showed poorer accurate recognition of non-schematic information relative to schematic information, influenced largely by a bias in identifying non-schematic items as "new". While directed encoding was able to increase remembering of non-schematic information and decrease bias across both age groups, the present set of studies highlights the pervasive influence of a schema on memory for non-schematic information.

The benefit (and cost) of drawing as an encoding strategy

Drawing, as an encoding strategy for to-be-remembered words, has previously been shown to provide robust memory benefits. In the current study, we investigated the effect of drawing on false memory endorsements during a recognition test. We found that while drawing led to higher hit rates relative to writing (Experiment 1) and creating visual mental imagery (Experiment 2), it also led to higher false alarm (FA) rates to critical lures in a variant of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. When compared with an encoding strategy requiring listing of object features (Experiment 3), drawing led to a lower FA rate. We suggest that drawing enhances memory by promoting recollection of rich visual contextual information during retrieval, and this leads to the unintended side effect of increasing FA rates to related information.

Who is susceptible in three false memory tasks?

Decades of research show that people are susceptible to developing false memories. But if they do so in one task, are they likely to do so in a different one? The answer: "No". In the current research, a large number of participants took part in three well-established false memory paradigms (a misinformation task, the Deese-Roediger-McDermott [DRM] list learning paradigm, and an imagination inflation exercise) as well as completed several individual difference measures. Results indicate that many correlations between false memory variables in all three inter-paradigm comparisons are null, though some small, positive, significant correlations emerged. Moreover, very few individual difference variables significantly correlated with false memories, and any significant correlations were rather small. It seems likely, therefore, that there is no false memory "trait". In other words, no one type of person seems especially prone, or especially resilient, to the ubiquity of memory distortion.

Fuzzy-Trace Theory, False Memory, and the Law

Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) provides well-researched scientific principles that explain worrisome forms of false memory in the law. False memories are of great legal concern because memory reports are frequently the evidence that determines guilt/innocence and are sometimes the only evidence that crimes have been committed. FTT’s principles reveal errors in commonsense theories that jurors use to judge the credibility of witnesses’ memory reports. This science versus commonsense disconnect is salient in cases involving child witnesses, eyewitness identifications, and confessions. The consequences of this disconnect for justice could be ameliorated by a simple change in federal rules of evidence.

Overcoming familiarity illusions in a single case with persistent déjà vu

While occasional déjà vu is benign in the general population, rare neuropsychological cases with persistent déjà vu have been described in the literature. We report the case of MN, a 25-year-old woman, who suffered a cerebral haemorrhage in the right thalamo-callosal region and experienced recurrent déjà vu episodes. Through clinical interviews and memory tasks related to déjà vu, we assumed that source memory errors and an inappropriate feeling of familiarity (measured by the number of false recognitions) were critically involved in MN's déjà vu. Based on this, we developed the first neuropsychological intervention dedicated to déjà vu. The rationale was to train MN to detect elements that could produce an inappropriate feeling of familiarity and to promote metacognitive awareness about déjà vu. This intervention was effective at reducing the frequency of déjà vu episodes in MN's daily life, as well as the number of false recognitions in memory tasks. In addition to its clinical contribution, this single-case study contributes to the limited literature on patients whose déjà vu is not related to epileptic abnormalities and medial temporal brain damage, and provide supportive evidence of the role of an erroneous feeling of familiarity and of metacognitive processes in déjà vu.

The role of decision criterion in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false recognition memory: False memory falls and rises as a function of restriction on criterion setting

How much of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory is attributable to decision criterion is so far a controversial issue. Previous studies typically used explicit warnings against accepting the critical lure to investigate this issue. The assumption is that if the false memory results from using a liberally biased criterion, it should be greatly reduced or eliminated by an explicit warning against accepting the critical lure. Results showed that warning was generally ineffective. We asked the question of whether subjects can substantially reduce false recognition without being warned when the test forces them to make a distinction between true and false memories. Using a two-alternative forced choice in which criterion plays a relatively smaller role, we showed that subjects could indeed greatly reduce the rate of false recognition. However, when the forced-choice restriction was removed from the two-item choice test, the rate of false recognition rebounded to that of the hit for studied list words, indicating the role of criterion in false recognition.

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory

Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, 'autonoetic' character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms, and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken towards an event simulation. On this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in 'future-oriented mental time travel' neither do justice to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons for why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events.

The effects of increasing semantic-associate list length on the Deese-Roediger-McDermott false recognition memory: Dual false-memory process in retrieval from sub- and supraspan lists

In this study, the number of semantic associates in Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists was varied from 4 to 14 in a modified Sternberg paradigm. The false alarm (FA) and correct rejection (CR) reaction time (RT)/memory-set size (MSS) functions of critical lures showed a cross-over interaction at approximately MSS 7, suggesting a reversal of the relative dominance between these two responses to the critical lure at this point and also indicating the location of the boundary between the sub- and supraspan MSS. For the subspan lists, FA to critical lures was slower than CR, suggesting a slow, strategic mechanism driving the false memory. Conversely, for the supraspan lists, critical lure FA was faster than its CR, suggesting a spontaneous mechanism driving the false memory. Results of two experiments showed that an automatic, fast, and a slow, controlled process could be error-prone or error-corrective, depending on the length of the DRM memory list. Thus there is a dual retrieval process in false memory as in true memory. The findings can be explained by both the activation/monitoring and the fuzzy-trace theories.

Get the gist? The effects of processing depth on false recognition in short-term and long-term memory

Gist-based processing has been proposed to account for robust false memories in the converging-associates task. The deep-encoding processes known to enhance verbatim memory also strengthen gist memory and increase distortions of long-term memory (LTM). Recent research has demonstrated that compelling false memory illusions are relatively delay-invariant, also occurring under canonical short-term memory (STM) conditions. To investigate the contributions of gist to false memory at short and long delays, processing depth was manipulated as participants encoded lists of four semantically related words and were probed immediately, following a filled 3- to 4-s retention interval, or approximately 20 min later, in a surprise recognition test. In two experiments, the encoding manipulation dissociated STM and LTM on the frequency, but not the phenomenology, of false memory. Deep encoding at STM increases false recognition rates at LTM, but confidence ratings and remember/know judgments are similar across delays and do not differ as a function of processing depth. These results suggest that some shared and some unique processes underlie false memory illusions at short and long delays.

The consciousness state space (CSS)-a unifying model for consciousness and self

Every experience, those we are aware of and those we are not, is embedded in a subjective timeline, is tinged with emotion, and inevitably evokes a certain sense of self. Here, we present a phenomenological model for consciousness and selfhood which relates time, awareness, and emotion within one framework. The consciousness state space (CSS) model is a theoretical one. It relies on a broad range of literature, hence has high explanatory and integrative strength, and helps in visualizing the relationship between different aspects of experience. Briefly, it is suggested that all phenomenological states fall into two categories of consciousness, core and extended (CC and EC, respectively). CC supports minimal selfhood that is short of temporal extension, its scope being the here and now. EC supports narrative selfhood, which involves personal identity and continuity across time, as well as memory, imagination and conceptual thought. The CSS is a phenomenological space, created by three dimensions: time, awareness and emotion. Each of the three dimensions is shown to have a dual phenomenological composition, falling within CC and EC. The neural spaces supporting each of these dimensions, as well as CC and EC, are laid out based on the neuroscientific literature. The CSS dynamics include two simultaneous trajectories, one in CC and one in EC, typically antagonistic in normal experiences. However, this characteristic behavior is altered in states in which a person experiences an altered sense of self. Two examples are laid out, flow and meditation. The CSS model creates a broad theoretical framework with explanatory and unificatory power. It constructs a detailed map of the consciousness and selfhood phenomenology, which offers constraints for the science of consciousness. We conclude by outlining several testable predictions raised by the CSS model.

The role of phantom recollection in false recall

Although high levels of phantom recollection (illusory vivid experience of the prior "presentation" of unpresented items) have been found for false recognition, little is known about phantom recollection in recall. We examined this issue with Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists using two paradigms: repeated recall and conjoint recall. High levels of phantom recollection were observed with both standard behavioral measures and the parameters of fuzzy-trace theory's dual-recall model. In addition, phantom recollection and the true recollection that accompanies presented items appear to involve different retrieval processes, because they were dissociated by manipulations such as number of recall tests and list strength.

Effects of stereotypes and suggestion on memory

In this study, the interactive effect of stereotype and suggestion on accuracy of memory was examined by presenting 645 participants (native Israelis and immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia) with three versions of a story about a worker who is waiting in a manager's office for a meeting. All versions were identical except for the worker's name, which implied a Russian or an Ethiopian immigrant or a person of no ethnic origin. Each participant was presented with one version of the story. After an hour delay, the participants' memories were tested via two questionnaires that differed in terms of level of suggestion. Data analyses show that (a) when a suggestion matched the participant's stereotypical perception, the suggestion was incorporated into memory but (b) when the suggestion contradicted the stereotype, it did not influence memory. The conclusion was that recall is influenced by stereotypes but can be enhanced by compatible suggestions.

Is the content of confabulation positive? An experimental study

There has been little experimental work investigating the emotional content of confabulation, despite clinical descriptions of self-serving and affectively positive biases. False memories were elicited in 10 amnesic confabulating patients, 10 healthy controls and four amnesic control patients without confabulation. Memory protocols of the interviews with these groups were presented to naïve raters who were asked to rate the emotional valence of the listed confabulations. The false memories of the confabulating patients were found to distort previous experiences in ways significantly more pleasant and self-enhancing than those of controls. It was also found paradoxically that the more depressed the patients' mood the more positive the content of their confabulations. These findings suggest that the content of confabulation is mostly positive. The results have implications for the role of emotion and motivation in confabulation, as well as for the clinical management of confabulating patients.

Can false memories be corrected by feedback in the DRM paradigm?

Normal processes of comprehension frequently yield false memories as an unwanted by-product. The simple paradigm now known as the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm takes advantage of this fact and has been used to reliably produce false memory for laboratory study. Among the findings from past research is the difficulty of preventing false memories in this paradigm. The purpose of the present experiments was to examine the effectiveness of feedback in correcting false memories. Two experiments were conducted, in which participants recalled DRM lists and either received feedback on their performance or did not. A subsequent recall test was administered to assess the effect of feedback. The results showed promising effects of feedback: Feedback enhanced both error correction and the propagation of correct recall. The data replicated other data of studies that have shown substantial error perseveration following feedback. These data also provide new information on the occurrence of errors following feedback. The results are discussed in terms of the activation-monitoring theory of false memory.

False recollections and the congruence of suggested information

In two experiments, congruence of postevent information was manipulated in order to explore its role in the misinformation effect. Congruence of a detail was empirically defined as its compatibility (or match) with a concrete event. Based on this idea it was predicted that a congruent suggested detail would be more easily accepted than an incongruent one. In Experiments 1 and 2 two factors(congruence and truth value ) were manipulated within-subjects, and a two-alternative forced-choice recognition test was used followed by phenomenological judgements. Furthermore, in the second experiment participants were asked to describe four critical items (two seen and two suggested details)to explore differences and similarities between real and unreal memories. Both experiments clearly showed that the congruence of false information caused a robust misinformation effect, so that congruent information was much more accepted than false incongruent information. Furthermore, congruence increased the descriptive and phenomenological similarities between perceived and suggested memories, thus contributing to the misleading effect.

Developmental differences in false-event rejection: Effects of memorability-based warnings

The present study investigated the development of the memorability-based strategy, a metacognitive process through which individuals reject the occurrence of false events if they do not remember the events and they expect them to be highly memorable. Previous research found that only older children spontaneously use this strategy. In the present study, we examined whether providing children with relevant information about expected event-memorability and inferences derived from it induced strategy use. Children aged 5, 7, and 9 (n = 144) were asked about true and false (high- and low-memorability) autobiographical events. Participants were either interviewed according to the standard "lost-in-the-mall" procedure, or were additionally provided with warnings. Warnings were either congruent or incongruent with assessments and decision processes involved in the strategy use. Results showed that receiving memorability-congruent warnings increased false-event rejection rates in 7- and 9-year-olds, but not in 5-year-olds. However, only older children were more likely to reject high-memorability compared with low-memorability false events. Developmental trajectories and factors affecting reliance on the memorability-based strategy are discussed.

Did you witness demonic possession? A response time analysis of the relationship between event plausibility and autobiographical beliefs

This study tested the hypothesis that the search for information pertinent to answering the question "Did event x happen to you?" is preceded by a preliminary plausibility assessment, the outcome of which affects the amount of effort invested in the search. Undergraduate students were asked to assess the plausibility of six events and subsequently to rate their belief that each event had happened to them before the age of 6. Unknown to them, response times (RTs) for answering the belief questions were also recorded. RTs for making belief judgments were more highly correlated with plausibility than with belief, and were significantly associated with plausibility even when belief ratings were controlled. As predicted, RTs were very short when the event was deemed highly implausible and increased sharply if the event was deemed at least somewhat plausible; significant but less pronounced increases in RTs followed as plausibility increased further.

Importing perceived features into false memories

False memories sometimes contain specific details, such as location or colour, about events that never occurred. Based on the source-monitoring framework, we investigated one process by which false memories acquire details: the reactivation and misattribution of feature information from memories of similar perceived events. In Experiments 1A and 1B, when imagined objects were falsely remembered as seen, participants often reported that the objects had appeared in locations where visually or conceptually similar objects, respectively, had actually appeared. Experiment 2 indicated that colour and shape features of seen objects were misattributed to false memories of imagined objects. Experiment 3 showed that perceived details were misattributed to false memories of objects that had not been explicitly imagined. False memories that imported perceived features, compared to those that presumably did not, were subjectively more like memories for perceived events. Thus, perception may be even more pernicious than imagination in contributing to false memories.

Compelling untruths: content borrowing and vivid false memories

False memories are sometimes accompanied by surprisingly vivid experiential detail that makes them difficult to distinguish from actual memories. Such strikingly real false memories may be produced by a process called content borrowing in which details from presented items are errantly borrowed to corroborate the occurrence of the false memory item. In 2 experiments using think-out-loud protocols at both study and test, evidence for content borrowing occurred for more than half of the false remember judgments participants reported. The present study also provides evidence consistent with recollection rejection and distinctiveness playing a role in false-memory editing.

Classic and false memory designs: An electrophysiological comparison

In false memory tasks new items either overlap with the semantic concepts of studied items (LURE) or do not (NEW). ERP differences between OLD and NEW items in false memory tasks have been interpreted as similar to episodic memory effects observed in classic recognition studies. However, NEW items in a false memory task can be rejected on the basis of semantic information alone, a strategy useless in classic tasks. Here a medial frontal (400 to 500 ms) episodic memory effect was revealed in both classic and false memory tasks, whereas a parietal (500 to 700 ms) episodic memory effect was found only in the classic task. In the false memory task a large, parietally focused positivity was evident for NEW items, assumed to reflect a targetlike response to new semantic information. The brain activity underlying false memory effects, therefore, cannot be interpreted as a straightforward example of that arising during a standard recognition task.

Behavioral Measurement of Remembering Phenomenologies: So Simple a Child Can Do It

Two remembering phenomenologies, vivid recollection and vague familiarity, have been extensively studied in adults using introspective self-report tasks, such as remember-know. Because such tasks are beyond the capabilities of young children, there is no database on how these phenomenologies first develop and what factors affect them. In experiments with 5- to 14-year-olds, a child-appropriate behavioral methodology (conjoint recognition) was used to measure these phenomenologies. For both true and false memory, there were marked age increases in vivid recollective experiences, coupled with only slight increases in vague familiarity experiences. Thus, there is a vague-to-vivid developmental shift in the mental states that accompany remembering, a finding that is predicted by fuzzy-trace theory's explanation of recollection and familiarity.

Robust Recollection Rejection in the Memory Conjunction Paradigm

The present research provides compelling evidence for recollection rejection in the memory conjunction paradigm. In Experiment 1, warnings provided at time of test were shown to reduce memory conjunction errors. Moreover, the authors found substantial evidence of recollection rejection and phantom recollection. In Experiment 2, the authors manipulated how often study items were presented. Participants were told that they could earn a cash payoff for being accurate. Recognition of conjunction lures was lower in the multiple presentation condition. However, the payoff manipulation did not significantly interact with item type. The authors obtained evidence of robust recollection rejection from 3 different dependent measures. Consistent with Experiment 1, they also found evidence of phantom recollection. These findings provide evidence that recollection rejection can be quite robust in the memory conjunction paradigm.

The effects of associations and aging on illusory recollection

Younger and older adults (mean years = 20.5 and 75) studied lists of associated words for a final recognition test. The length (5, 10, or 15 associates) and modality (auditory or visual) of study lists were manipulated within subjects. For both groups, increasing the number of associates increased illusory recollections of a related lure's presentation (measured by source judgments and the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire). This pattern suggests that associative activation of the lure influenced illusory recollection, and aging spared this process. In contrast, age impaired the recollection of source for studied words (auditory or visual) and had identical effects on source attributions for related lures. This pattern suggests that the true recollection of source influenced illusory recollection of source, and age impaired this process. To account for these and other results, we propose that associative activation drives an attribution process that binds subjectively detailed features to a false memory.

Phenomenal characteristics of cryptomnesia

Qualitative characteristics of cryptomnesia, or unintentional plagiarism were investigated. In Experiment 1 we compared accurate and inaccurate source attributions in terms of their level of confidence using instructions that did not require a fixed number of responses. Confidence was lower for plagiarised responses than for correct responses. Nevertheless, participants provided high ratings of certainty for a large proportion of their plagiarised responses. In Experiment 2 the phenomenological differences between plagiarised recall and veridical recall were compared by using an adaptation of the memory characteristics questionnaire (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). Correct responses were associated with more experiential detail than plagiarised responses. However, a considerable number of plagiarised responses were accompanied by a confident memory of at least one qualitative characteristic. Results are discussed in terms of the source monitoring framework developed by Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay (1993).

ERP correlates of true and false recognition after different retention delays: stimulus- and response-related processes

Performance and electrophysiological correlates of true and false recognition were examined after short (40 s) and long (80 s) delays. True recognition showed no significant decrease after a long delay, whereas false recognition increased. Early frontal and parietal ERP old/new effects, considered as correlates of familiarity and recollection, were observed across delay for true recognition. No frontal effect occurred in the long delay for false recognition. This absence may arise from weakened memory traces preventing familiarity discrimination for LUREs. Response-related analysis revealed an error-related negativity (ERN) for true and false recognition, assuming that the effect reflects at least partly an internal misrepresentation of the correct response. The larger and topographically different ERNs for false recognition suggest an additional contribution of increased task demands and conditions of high response uncertainty.

Effects of divided attention and word concreteness on correct recall and false memory reports

Lists of thematically related words were presented to participants with or without a concurrent task. In Experiments 1 and 2, respectively, English or Spanish word lists were either low or high in concreteness (concrete vs abstract words) and were presented, respectively, auditorily or visually for study. The addition of a concurrent visual or auditory task, respectively, substantially reduced correct recall and doubled the frequency of false memory reports (nonstudied critical or theme words). Divided attention was interpreted as having reduced the opportunity for participants to monitor successfully their elicitations of critical associates. Comparisons of concrete and abstract lists revealed significantly more recalls of false memories for abstract than concrete word lists. Comparisons between two levels of attention, two levels of word concreteness, and two presentation modalities failed to support the "more is less" effect by which enhanced correct recall is accompanied by increased frequencies of false memories.

Fuzzy-trace theory: dual processes in memory, reasoning, and cognitive neuroscience

Fuzzy-trace theory has evolved in response to counterintuitive data on how memory development influences the development of reasoning. The two traditional perspectives on memory-reasoning relations--the necessity and constructivist hypotheses--stipulate that the accuracy of children's memory for problem information and the accuracy of their reasoning are closely intertwined, albeit for different reasons. However, contrary to necessity, correlational and experimental dissociations have been found between children's memory for problem information that is determinative in solving certain problems and their solutions of those problems. In these same tasks, age changes in memory for problem information appear to be dissociated from age changes in reasoning. Contrary to constructivism, correlational and experimental dissociations also have been found between children's performance on memory tests for actual experience and memory tests for the meaning of experience. As in memory-reasoning studies, age changes in one type of memory performance do not seem to be closely connected to age changes in the other type of performance. Subsequent experiments have led to dual-process accounts in both the memory and reasoning spheres. The account of memory development features four other principles: parallel verbatim-gist storage, dissociated verbatim-gist retrieval, memorial bases of conscious recollection, and identity/similarity processes. The account of the development of reasoning features three principles: gist extraction, fuzzy-to-verbatim continua, and fuzzy-processing preferences. The fuzzy-processing preference is a particularly important notion because it implies that gist-based intuitive reasoning often suffices to deliver "logical" solutions and that such reasoning confers multiple cognitive advantages that enhance accuracy. The explanation of memory-reasoning dissociations in cognitive development then falls out of fuzzy-trace theory's dual-process models of memory and reasoning. More explicitly, in childhood reasoning tasks, it is assumed that both verbatim and gist traces of problem information are stored. Responding accurately to memory tests for presented problem information depends primarily on verbatim memory abilities (preserving traces of that information and accessing them when the appropriate memory probes are administered). However, accurate solutions to reasoning problems depend primarily on gist-memory abilities (extracting the correct gist from problem information, focusing on that gist during reasoning, and accessing reasoning operations that process that gist). Because verbatim and gist memories exhibit considerable dissociation, both during storage and when they are subsequently accessed on memory tests, dissociations of verbatim-based memory performance from gist-based reasoning are predictable. Conversely, associations are predicted in situations in which memory and reasoning are based on the same verbatim traces (Brainerd & Reyna, 1988) and in situations in which memory and reasoning are based on the same gist traces (Reyna & Kiernan, 1994). Fuzzy-trace theory's memory and reasoning principles have been applied in other research domains. Four such domains are developmental cognitive neuroscience studies of false memory, studies of false memory in brain-damaged patients, studies of reasoning errors in judgment and decision making, and studies of retrieval mechanisms in recall. In the first domain, the principles of parallel verbatim-gist storage, dissociated verbatim-gist retrieval, and identity/similarity processes have been used to explain both spontaneous and implanted false reports in children and in the elderly. These explanations have produced some surprising predictions that have been verified: false reports do not merely decline with age during childhood but increase under theoretically specified conditions; reports of events that were not experienced can nevertheless be highly persistent over time; and false reports can be suppressed by retrieving verbatim traces of corresponding true events. In the second domain, the same principles have been invoked to explain why some forms of brain damage lead to elevated levels of false memory and other forms lead to reduced levels of false memory. In the third domain, the principles of gist extraction, fuzzy-to-verbatim continua, and fuzzy-processing preferences have been exploited to formulate a general theory of loci of processing failures in judgment and decision making, cluminating in a developmental account of degrees of rationality that distinguishes more and less advanced reasoning. This theory has in turn been used to formulate local models, such as the inclusion illusions model, that explain the characteristic reasoning errors that are observed on specific judgment and decision-making tasks. Finally, in the fourth domain, a dual-process conception of recall has been derived from the principles of parallel verbatim-gist storage and dissociated verbatim-gist retrieval. In this conception, which has been used to explain cognitive triage effects in recall and robust false recall, targets are recalled either by directly accessing their verbatim traces and reading the retrieved information out of consciousness or by reconstructively processing their gist traces.

Comparing recollective experience in true and false autobiographical memories

This study investigated whether true autobiographical memories are qualitatively distinct from false autobiographical memories using a variation of the interview method originally reported by E. F. Loftus and J. Pickrell (1995). Participants recalled events provided by parents on 3 separate occasions and were asked to imagine true and false unremembered events. True memories were rated by both participants and observers as more rich in recollective experience and were rated by participants as more important, more emotionally intense, as having clearer imagery, and as less typical than false memories. Rehearsal frequency was used as a covariate, eliminating these effects. Imagery in true memories was most often viewed from the field perspective, whereas imagery in false memories was most often viewed from the observer perspective. More information was communicated in true memories, and true memories contained more information concerning the consequences of described events. Results suggest repeated remembering can make false memories more rich in recollective experience and more like true memories. Differences between true and false memories suggest some potentially distinct characteristics of false memories and provide insight into the process of false memory creation.

Conjoint recognition and phantom recollection

A new methodology for measuring illusory conscious experience of the "presentation" of unstudied material (phantom recollection) is evaluated that extracts measurements directly from recognition responses, rather than indirectly from introspective reports. Application of this methodology in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Experiments 1 and 2) and in a more conventional paradigm (Experiment 3) showed that 2 processes (phantom recollection and familiarity) contribute to false recognition of semantically related distractors. Phantom recollection was the larger contributor to false recognition of critical distractors in the DRM paradigm, but surprisingly, it was also the larger contributor to false recognition of other types of distractors. Variability in false recognition was tied to variability in phantom recollection. Experimental control of phantom recollection was achieved with manipulations that were motivated by fuzzy-trace theory's hypothesis that the phenomenon is gist-based.