Neuroenhancement of Love and Marriage: The Chemicals Between Us

Prescription for Love: An Experimental Investigation of Laypeople's Relative Moral Disapproval of Love Drugs

New technologies regularly bring about profound changes in our daily lives. Romantic relationships are no exception to these transformations. Some philosophers expect the emergence in the near future of love drugs: a theoretically achievable biotechnological intervention that could be designed to strengthen and maintain love in romantic relationships. We investigated laypeople's resistance to the use of such technologies and its sources. Across two studies (Study 1, French and Peruvian university students, N after exclusion = 186; Study 2, Amazon Mechanical Turk sample, N after exclusion = 693, pre-registered), we found that the use of love drugs designed to strengthen and maintain love in romantic relationships are considered as more morally problematic than psychological therapy with the same aim. In Study 2, we show that this last effect is partially due to the fact that the love resulting from the use of love drugs is perceived as less authentic, intense, and durable. We discuss the specific role of authenticity in the relative moral disapproval of love drugs.

On pharmacological neuroenhancement as part of the new neurorights' pioneering legislation in Chile: a perspective

The so-called neurorights are emerging human rights, or rather reconfigurations of already existing human rights, seeking to address the impact of the possible misuse of neurotechnologies, which have the potential to become more invasive and harmful in the future if not regulated. The aim of specifying neurorights is to protect the dignity and autonomy of the individual in the face of neurotechnological advances. Recently, Chile proposed a Constitutional reform inspired by the neurorights, opening a debate. One of the proposed neurorights is fair and equitable access to cognitive enhancement, which will be the specific object of this perspective article. Starting from the legal proposal, we analyse and discuss some perspectives on cognitive enhancement, or "neuroenhancement", which could be considered as part of enhancement neurotechnologies, pointing out that pharmacological enhancers, or "smart drugs", might be considered as part of these enhancers. We present a classification of the different types of cognitive enhancements as it has been proposed in the literature, into which pharmacological cognitive enhancement can be included, concluding that there is currently no agreement amongst scholars and lawyers about the ethical consideration of pharmacological cognitive enhancement. We therefore argue that it is necessary for the legislator to explicitly address the issue in the proposed regulations, in order to take a clear position on the topic, as it has been done in the United Kingdom, where the pharmacological neuroenhancers have been explicitly excluded from the regulation. If pharmacological neuroenhancers are going to be considered neurotechnologies, then new law proposals should seek harmonization with the already existing legislation regulating pharmacological health and consumer rights (both globally, taking into account international drug laws, and locally, according to each country's internal regulations) and of course, with the whole system of fundamental rights. Finally, we briefly discuss the ethical problem of equitable access to this new type of neurotechnologies (as part of the neurorights) and leave the debate open for new insights from the scientific community on the possible consequences of including (or not) pharmacological neuroenhancers as neurotechnologies for cognitive enhancement in the framework of the ethical and legal debate.

Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement and Cheapened Achievement: A New Dilemma

Recent discussions of cognitive enhancement often note that drugs and technologies that improve cognitive performance may do so at the risk of “cheapening” our resulting cognitive achievements (e.g., Kass, Life, liberty and the defense of dignity: the challenge for bioethics, Encounter Books, San Francisco, 2004; Agar, Humanity’s end: why we should reject radical enhancement, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2010; Sandel, The case against perfection. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2007; Sandel, The case against perfection: what’s wrong with designer children, bionic athletes, and genetic engineering?”. In: Holland (ed) Arguing about bioethics, Routledge, London, 2012; Harris in Bioethics 25:102–111, 2011). While there are several possible responses to this worry, we will highlight what we take to be one of the most promising—one which draws on a recent strand of thinking in social and virtue epistemology to construct an integrationist defence of cognitive enhancement. (e.g., Pritchard in Synthese 175:133–151, 2010; Palermos in Synthese 192:2955–2286, 2015; Clark in Synthese 192:3757–3375, 2015). According to such a line, there is—despite initial appearances to the contrary—no genuine tension between using enhancements to attain our goals and achieving these goals in a valuable way provided the relevant enhancement is appropriately integrated into the agent’s cognitive architecture (in some suitably specified way). In this paper, however, we show that the kind of integration recommended by such views will likely come at a high cost. More specifically, we highlight a dilemma for users of pharmacological cognitive enhancement: they can (1) meet the conditions for cognitive integration (and on this basis attain valuable achievements) at the significant risk of dangerous dependency, or (2) remain free of such dependency while foregoing integration and the valuable achievements that such integration enables. After motivating and clarifying the import of this dilemma, we offer recommendations for how future cognitive enhancement research may offer potential routes for navigating past it.

A practical approach to the ethical use of memory modulating technologies

Background

Recent advancements in neuroscientific techniques have allowed us to make huge progress in our understanding of memories, and in turn has paved the way for new memory modification technologies (MMTs) that can modulate memories with a degree of precision, which was not previously possible. With advancements in such techniques, new and critical ethical questions have emerged. Understanding and framing these ethical questions within the current philosophical theories is crucial in order to systematically examine them as we translate these techniques to the clinic.

Main body

In this paper, we discuss the ethical implications of modern neuroscience techniques that aim to disrupt or enhance memories. We attempt to frame the MMTs in the context of existing ethical philosophical theories to provide a cohesive analysis of the myriad of ethical quagmires that might emerge from such technologies. We argue the application of Aristotle’s Golden Mean and multiple accounts of authenticity are useful in approaching the ethical questions surrounding MMTs. We then propose a framework in which ethical considerations can be systematically examined. Lastly, we provide caveats and considerations for the use of this framework. Overall, we provide a practical approach for the ethical use of MMTs depending on the situation.

Conclusion

While at face value, our model appears to put severe limitations on the application of MMTs, we are not completely opposed to their use, but rather our framework guides the agent to consider the implications before making any decisions. Most importantly, we argue that the use of MMTs does not reduce the responsibility of the initial decision, and the agent must accept the post-MMT self as the new “true self” regardless of the outcome. As the developmental trajectory of MMTs suggests we are getting closer to practical clinical applications, ethical concerns across a wide range of disciplines need to be addressed to develop best strategies and policies when dealing with MMTs. If this can be achieved, we believe the ethical use of MMTs is not only possible but would also be of tremendous benefit to many people suffering from memory-related mental disorders.

Expanding the Romantic Circle

Our romantic lives are influenced, to a large extent, by our perceptions of physical attractiveness - and the societal beauty standards that shape them. But what if we could free our desires from this fixation on looks? Science fiction writer Ted Chiang has explored this possibility in a fascinating short story - and scientific developments might, in the future, move it beyond the realm of fiction. In this paper, I lay out the prudential case for using "attraction-expanding technology," and then consider it from a moral point of view. Using the technology would, in one respect, be morally good: it would benefit those whom prevailing beauty standards marginalize. But attraction-expanding technology also raises a moral concern - one that can be cast in non-harm-based and harm-based terms. I argue that the non-harm-based objection should be rejected, because it is incompatible with a moral principle central to queer rights. And the harm-based objection, I argue, is outweighed by the benefits of attraction-expanding technology, and undermined by the prerogative you have over your personal romantic choices. I conclude by considering whether, from the perspective of society, the development of attraction-expanding technology would be desirable.

[Oxytocin: From a Hormone for Birth to a Social Hormone : The Hormonal Governance of Sociability aka Society]

In the mass media, the hormone Oxytocin is currently being debated as the biochemical basis of sociability and a powerful neuropharmacological solution for (re-)establishing societal cohesion. Given its beginning as a 'bodyhormone' early in the 20th century, this article will trace the extraordinary career of Oxytocin from a regulator of birth to a regulator of society. What makes so strong a claim intelligible and acceptable? Our analysis of the scientific discourse on Oxytocin (1906-1990), the mass media discourse since the 1990s, and its repercussions for the scientific discourse during the same period, suggest a series of re-configurations of scientific theories and practices, as well as of the conception of the substance itself. Oxytocin became established in the first half of the 20th century, and as a neurohormone as early as the 1950s, yet during the following decades attracted little scientific attention. Only following the mass media's focus on the suggested effects of Oxytocin on love and bonding did the substance increasingly become the focus of empirical research. This work argues that the reception of Oxytocin as a potential neurohormonal basis for individual sociability strongly relies on the mass media discourses, biopolitical linkages that had already been made in the first half of the 20th century aiming at the regulation of life, and a technoscientific mode of research on Oxytocin. At their intersection Oxytocin emerged as a social hormone.

Free love? On the relation between belief in free will, determinism, and passionate love

Is love possible if we are not free? Some philosophers consider that true love is necessarily free, while others think that the nature of love makes it incompatible with a certain type of freedom. Here, we explored the relationship between feelings of passionate love, belief in free will and determinism across three online studies. In Study 1 (N=257), participants who believed strongly in free will (or determinism) expressed stronger passionate love. In Study 2 (N=305), we again found a positive association between belief in free will (or determinism) and passionate love, although the passionate love-determinism relationship seems more conditional. Finally, Study 3 (N=309) confirmed the relationship between belief in free will and passionate love but not between belief in determinism and passionate love. These findings, along with a meta-analysis, suggest that both beliefs in free will and determinism are compatible with passionate love.

The Medicalization of Love

In 2015, we published an article entitled "The Medicalization of Love," in which we argued that both good and bad consequences could be expected to follow from love's medicalization, depending on how the process unfolded. A flurry of commentaries followed; here we offer some preliminary thoughts in reply to the more substantial of the criticisms that were raised. We focus in particular on the nature of love itself as well as the role it plays (or should play) in our lives; we also touch on a number of practical issues concerning the likely effects of any plausible "real-life" love drugs and conclude with a call for careful regulation.

The medicalization of love and narrow and broad conceptions of human well-being

Would a "medicalization" of love be a "good" or "bad" form of medicalization? In discussing this question, Earp, Sandberg, and Savulescu primarily focus on the potential positive and negative consequences of turning love into a medical issue. But it can also be asked whether there is something intrinsically regrettable about medicalizing love. It is argued here that the medicalization of love can be seen as an "evaluative category mistake": it treats a core human value (love) as if it were mainly a means to other ends (viz. physical health and hedonic well-being). It is also argued that Earp et al's closing argument (that a scientific perspective on love actually adds more value to love) can be seen as involving another evaluative category mistake: it treats an object of desire and practical interest (namely, love) as if it mainly were an object of scientific contemplation and theoretical interest. It is concluded that, to relate love to health and well-being in a more satisfying way, we should construe the latter two in broader ways, whereby love is itself a component or element of human flourishing.

Normality, therapy, and enhancement

According to human enhancement advocates, it is morally permissible (and sometimes obligatory) to use biomedical means to modulate or select certain biological traits in order to increase people's welfare, even when there is no pathology to be treated or prevented. Some authors have recently proposed to extend the use of biomedical means to modulate lust, attraction, and attachment. I focus on some conceptual implications of this proposal, particularly with regard to bioconservatives' understanding of the notions of therapy and enhancement I first explain what makes the proposal of medicalizing love interesting and unique, compared to the other forms of bioenhancement usually advocated. I then discuss how the medicalization of love bears on the more general debate on human enhancement, particularly with regard to the key notion of "normality" that is commonly used to define the therapy-enhancement distinction. This analysis suggests that the medicalization of love, in virtue of its peculiarity, requires bioconservatives to reconsider their way of understanding and applying the notions of "therapy" and "enhancement." More in particular, I show that, because a non-arbitrary and value-free notion of "therapy" cannot be applied to the case of love, bioconservatives have the burden of either providing some new criterion that could be used for drawing a line between permissible and impermissible medicalization, or demonstrating that under no circumstances-including the cases in which love is already acknowledged to require medical intervention-can love fall within the domain of medicine.

Does Oxytocin Increase Trust in Humans? A Critical Review of Research

Behavioral neuroscientists have shown that the neuropeptide oxytocin (OT) plays a key role in social attachment and affiliation in nonhuman mammals. Inspired by this initial research, many social scientists proceeded to examine the associations of OT with trust in humans over the past decade. To conduct this work, they have (a) examined the effects of exogenous OT increase caused by intranasal administration on trusting behavior, (b) correlated individual difference measures of OT plasma levels with measures of trust, and (c) searched for genetic polymorphisms of the OT receptor gene that might be associated with trust. We discuss the different methods used by OT behavioral researchers and review evidence that links OT to trust in humans. Unfortunately, the simplest promising finding associating intranasal OT with higher trust has not replicated well. Moreover, the plasma OT evidence is flawed by how OT is measured in peripheral bodily fluids. Finally, in recent large-sample studies, researchers failed to find consistent associations of specific OT-related genetic polymorphisms and trust. We conclude that the cumulative evidence does not provide robust convergent evidence that human trust is reliably associated with OT (or caused by it). We end with constructive ideas for improving the robustness and rigor of OT research.

Cognitive Enhancement: Treating or Cheating?

In this article I provide an overview of the moral and medical questions surrounding the use of cognitive enhancers. This discussion will be framed in light of 4 key considerations: (1) is there a difference between therapy and enhancement? (2) How safe are these interventions? (3) Is the use of nootropics cheating? (4) Would enhancers create a further divide of social inequality where only the very wealthy have access to them?

Beyond Emotion: Love as an Encounter of Myth and Drive

Starting with a review of research on love as an emotion, with an emphasis on romantic love, it is argued that despite strong emotional correlates evidence is lacking to conclude that love would meet the criteria of basic emotions. Theoretical developments are proposed where love is conceived of as a combination of an objectless drive, a desire for love, and a mythical and scripted representation that offers the possibility of labeling the current core affect. I argue that the basic motive for love is not so much the partner’s personal attributes, but rather the benefits of the transformative power of being in love.

The medicalization of love

Pharmaceuticals or other emerging technologies could be used to enhance (or diminish) feelings of lust, attraction, and attachment in adult romantic partnerships. Although such interventions could conceivably be used to promote individual (and couple) well-being, their widespread development and/or adoption might lead to the 'medicalization' of human love and heartache--for some, a source of a serious concern. In this essay, we argue that the medicalization of love need not necessarily be problematic, on balance, but could plausibly be expected to have either good or bad consequences depending upon how it unfolds. By anticipating some of the specific ways in which these technologies could yield unwanted outcomes, bioethicists and others can help to direct the course of love's medicalization--should it happen to occur--more toward the 'good' side than the 'bad.'

Moral Enhancement Requires Multiple Virtues

Some of the debates around the concept of moral enhancement have focused on whether the improvement of a single trait, such as empathy or intelligence, would be a good in general, or in all circumstances. All virtue theories, however, both secular and religious, have articulated multiple virtues that temper and inform one another in the development of a mature moral character. The project of moral enhancement requires a reengagement with virtue ethics and contemporary moral psychology to develop an empirically grounded model of the virtues and a fuller model of character development. Each of these virtues may be manipulable with electronic, psychopharmaceutical, and genetic interventions. A set of interdependent virtues is proposed, along with some of the research pointing to ways such virtues could be enhanced.

Brave New Love: The Threat of High-Tech "Conversion" Therapy and the Bio-Oppression of Sexual Minorities

Our understanding of the neurochemical bases of human love and attachment, as well as of the genetic, epigenetic, hormonal, and experiential factors that conspire to shape an individual's sexual orientation, is increasing exponentially. This research raises the vexing possibility that we may one day be equipped to modify such variables directly, allowing for the creation of “high-tech” conversion therapies or other suspect interventions. In this article, we discuss the ethics surrounding such a possibility, and call for the development of legal and procedural safeguards for protecting vulnerable children from the application of such technology. We also consider the more difficult case of voluntary, adult “conversion” and argue that in rare cases, such attempts might be permissible under strict conditions.

Cohen's Conservatism and Human Enhancement

In an intriguing essay, G. A. Cohen has defended a conservative bias in favour of existing value. In this paper, we consider whether Cohen's conservatism raises a new challenge to the use of human enhancement technologies. We develop some of Cohen's suggestive remarks into a new line of argument against human enhancement that, we believe, is in several ways superior to existing objections. However, we shall argue that on closer inspection, Cohen's conservatism fails to offer grounds for a strong sweeping objection to enhancement, and may even offer positive support for forms of enhancement that preserve valuable features of human beings. Nevertheless, we concede that Cohen's arguments may suggest some plausible and important constraints on the modality of legitimate and desirable enhancements.

Could intranasal oxytocin be used to enhance relationships? Research imperatives, clinical policy, and ethical considerations

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

Well-functioning romantic relationships are important for long-term health and well being, but they are often difficult to sustain. This difficulty arises (in part) because of an underlying tension between our psychobiological natures, culture/environment, and modern love and relationship goals. One possible solution to this predicament is to intervene at the level of psychobiology, enhancing partners' interpersonal connection through neurochemical modulation. This article focuses on a single, promising biobehavioral sub-system for such intervention: the attachment system, based largely upon the expression of the neuropeptide oxytocin. Could the exogenous administration of oxytocin - under the right conditions - be used to facilitate relational or marital well being?

RECENT FINDINGS

If so, it would require considerable forethought. Recent research complicates the popular image of oxytocin as a universal social enhancer or 'love hormone' and shows that it may exert a variety of different effects, at different dosages, on different people, under different circumstances. Accordingly, we discuss what is known about oxytocin, including its 'good' and 'bad' effects on human behavior and on higher-order functional processes.

SUMMARY

Building upon animal-model, human preclinical, and clinical findings, we outline a proposal for the use of oxytocin in the therapeutic neuroenhancement of contemporary romantic relationships. Highlighting key targets for future research along the way, we then conclude by discussing some of the clinical and ethical considerations that would pertain to the implementation of this knowledge in applied settings.

If I could just stop loving you: anti-love biotechnology and the ethics of a chemical breakup

"Love hurts"-as the saying goes-and a certain amount of pain and difficulty in intimate relationships is unavoidable. Sometimes it may even be beneficial, since adversity can lead to personal growth, self-discovery, and a range of other components of a life well-lived. But other times, love can be downright dangerous. It may bind a spouse to her domestic abuser, draw an unscrupulous adult toward sexual involvement with a child, put someone under the insidious spell of a cult leader, and even inspire jealousy-fueled homicide. How might these perilous devotions be diminished? The ancients thought that treatments such as phlebotomy, exercise, or bloodletting could "cure" an individual of love. But modern neuroscience and emerging developments in psychopharmacology open up a range of possible interventions that might actually work. These developments raise profound moral questions about the potential uses-and misuses-of such anti-love biotechnology. In this article, we describe a number of prospective love-diminishing interventions, and offer a preliminary ethical framework for dealing with them responsibly should they arise.

Natural Selection, Childrearing, and the Ethics of Marriage (and Divorce): Building a Case for the Neuroenhancement of Human Relationships

We argue that the fragility of contemporary marriages—and the corresponding high rates of divorce—can be explained (in large part) by a three-part mismatch: between our relationship values, our evolved psychobiological natures, and our modern social, physical, and technological environment. “Love drugs” could help address this mismatch by boosting our psychobiologies while keeping our values and our environment intact. While individual couples should be free to use pharmacological interventions to sustain and improve their romantic connection, we suggest that they may have an obligation to do so as well, in certain cases. Specifically, we argue that couples with offspring may have a special responsibility to enhance their relationships for the sake of their children. We outline an evolutionarily informed research program for identifying promising biomedical enhancements of love and commitment.

Neuroethics: the ethical, legal, and societal impact of neuroscience

Advances in cognitive, affective, and social neuroscience raise a host of new questions concerning the ways in which neuroscience can and should be used. These advances also challenge our intuitions about the nature of humans as moral and spiritual beings. Neuroethics is the new field that grapples with these issues. The present article surveys a number of applications of neuroscience to such diverse arenas as marketing, criminal justice, the military, and worker productivity. The ethical, legal, and societal effects of these applications are discussed. Less practical, but perhaps ultimately more consequential, is the impact of neuroscience on our worldview and our understanding of the human person.

Enhancing who? Enhancing what? Ethics, bioethics, and transhumanism

Transhumanists advance a "posthuman" condition in which technological and genetic enhancements will transform humankind. They are joined in this goal by bioethicists arguing for genetic selection as a means of "enhancing evolution," improving if not also the species then at least the potential lives of future individuals. The argument of both, this paper argues, is a new riff on the old eugenics tune. As ever, it is done in the name of science and its presumed knowledge base. As ever, the result is destructive rather than instructive, bad faith promoted as high ideal. The paper concludes with the argument that species advancement is possible but in a manner thoroughly distinct from that advanced by either of these groups.

Why should addiction medicine be an attractive field for young physicians?

AIMS

The clinical practice and science of addiction are increasingly active fields, which are attracting professionals from diverse disciplines such as psychology and neurobiology. Our scientific knowledge of the pathophysiology of addiction is rapidly growing, along with the variety of effective treatments available to clinicians. Yet, we believe that the medical specialties of addiction medicine/psychiatry are not attracting the interest and enthusiasm of young physicians. What can be done?

METHODS

We offer the opinions of two experience addiction psychiatrists.

RESULTS

In the US, there has been a decline in the number of psychiatrists seeking training or board certification in addiction psychiatry; about one-third of graduates with such training are not practicing in an addiction psychiatry setting. There is widespread neglect of addiction medicine/psychiatry among the medical profession, academia and national health authorities. This neglect is unfortunate, given the enormous societal costs of addiction (3-5% of the gross domestic product in some developed countries), the substantial unmet need for addiction treatment, and the highly favourable benefit to cost yield (at least 7:1) from treatment.

CONCLUSIONS

We believe that addiction medicine/psychiatry can be made more attractive for young physicians. Helpful steps include widening acceptance as a medical specialty or subspecialty, reducing the social stigma against people with substance use disorders, expanding insurance coverage and increasing the low rates of reimbursement for physicians. These steps would be easier to take with broader societal (and political) recognition of substance use disorders as a major cause of premature death, morbidity and economic burden.