Procreation machines: Ectogenesis as reproductive enhancement, proper medicine or a step towards posthumanism?

Full ectogenesis as the complete externalization of human reproduction by bypassing the bodily processes of gestation and childbirth can be considered the culmination of genetic and reproductive technologies. Despite its still being a hypothetical scenario, it has been discussed for decades as the ultimate means to liberate women from their reproductive tasks in society and hence finally end fundamental gender injustices generally. In the debate about the application of artificial wombs to achieve gender equality, one aspect is barely mentioned but is of crucial relevance from a medical-ethical perspective: whether and how could full ectogenesis be justified as a proper use of medicine? After characterizing the technology as a special form of human enhancement and as an extension of medical practice that goes beyond the traditional field of medicine, this paper critically assesses the theoretical possibilities of legitimizing this extension. We identify two ways of justification: either one argues that ectogenesis fulfils a proper goal of medicine (a justification we call pathologization), or one argues that the application of ectogenesis achieves a non-medical goal (which we call medicalization). Because it is important from a medical-ethical point of view to avoid an inappropriate instrumentalization or misuse of medicine and thus an undue medicalization of non-medical problems, a set of necessary conditions has to be met. It is doubtful whether full ectogenesis for non-medical purposes could fulfil these conditions. Rather, its comprehensive usage could be seen as a revolutionary modification of what it means to be human.

Is ugliness a pathology? An ethical critique of the therapeuticalization of cosmetic surgery

Pathologizing ugliness refers to the framing of unattractive features as a type of disease or deformity. By framing ugliness as pathology, cosmetic procedures are reframed as therapy rather than enhancement, thereby potentially avoiding ethical critiques regularly levelled against cosmetic surgery. As such, the practice of pathologizing ugliness and the ensuing therapeuticalization of cosmetic procedures require an ethical analysis that goes beyond that offered by current enhancement critiques. In this article, I propose using a thick description of the goals of medicine as an ethical framework for evaluating problematic medical practices. I first describe the goals of medicine based on Daniel Callahan's account. I then propose that the goals work best in conjunction with ancillary ethical concepts, namely medical knowledge and skills, standards of practice and medical duties and virtues. Next, I apply the thick description of the goals of medicine in critiquing the practice of framing ugliness as disease. Here, I demonstrate ethical conflicts between aesthetic judgments that underpin the practice of pathologizing ugliness and medical judgments that inform ethical medical practices. In particular, the thick description of the goals of medicine helps reveal ethical conflicts in at least three key domains common to clinical practices, which include (a) disease determination, (b) diagnostic evaluation and (c) establishing clinical indications. My analysis offers a novel way of critiquing the practice of pathologizing ugliness in cosmetic surgery, which tends to be neglected by enhancement critiques.

How sociophenomenology of the body problematises the 'problem-oriented approach' to growth hormone treatment

This article examines how people who are shorter than average make sense of their lived experience of embodiment. It offers a sociophenomenological analysis of 10 semistructured interviews conducted in the Netherlands, focusing on if, how, and why height matters to them. It draws theoretically on phenomenological discussions of lived and objective space, intercorporeality and norms about bodies. The analysis shows that height as a lived phenomenon (1) is active engagement in space, (2) coshapes habituated ways of behaving and (3) is shaped by gendered norms and beliefs about height. Based on this analysis, the article challenges what we label as the 'problem-oriented approach' to discussions about growth hormone treatment for children with idiopathic short stature. In this approach, possible psychosocial disadvantages or problems of short stature and quantifiable height become central to the ethical evaluation of growth hormone treatment at the expense of first-hand lived experiences of short stature and height as a lived phenomenon. Based on our sociophenomenological analysis, this paper argues that the rationale for giving growth hormone treatment should combine medical and psychological assessments with investigations of lived experiences of the child. Such an approach would allow considerations not only of possible risks or disadvantages of short stature but also of the actual ways in which the child makes sense of her or his height.

Multibiologism: An anthropological and bioethical framework for moving beyond medicalization

Recent approaches in the medical and social sciences have begun to lay stress on "plasticity" as a key feature of human physiological experiences. Plasticity helps to account for significant differences within and between populations, particularly in relation to variations in basic physiological processes, such as brain development, and, in the context of this article, daily sleep needs. This article proposes a novel basis for the redevelopment of institutions in accordance with growing awareness of human variation in physiological needs, and articulates a theory of multibiologism. This approach seeks to expand the range of "normal" physiological experiences to respond to human plasticity, but also to move beyond critiques of medical practice that see medicine as simply responding to capitalist demands through the medicalization of "natural" processes. Instead, by focusing on how the institutions of U.S. everyday life-work, family, and school-structure the lives of individuals and produce certain forms of sleep as pathological, this article proposes that minor alterations in institutions could result in less pathologization for individuals and communities. Multibiologism provides a foundation for shared priorities in the social sciences, in bioethics, and in medical practice, and may lay the groundwork for emergent collaborations in institutional reform.

Not Sick: Liberal, Trans, and Crip Feminist Critiques of Medicalization

Medicalization occurs when an aspect of embodied humanity is scrutinized by the medical industry, claimed as pathological, and subsumed under medical intervention. Numerous critiques of medicalization appear in academic literature, often put forth by bioethicists who use a variety of "lenses" to make their case. Feminist critiques of medicalization raise the concerns of the politically disenfranchised, thus seeking to protect women-particularly natal sex women-from medical exploitation. This article will focus on three feminist critiques of medicalization, which offer an alternative narrative of sickness and health. I will first briefly describe the philosophical origins of medicalization. Then, I will present three feminist critiques of medicalization. Liberal feminism, trans feminism, and crip feminism tend to regard Western medicine with a hermeneutics of suspicion and draw out potential harms of medicalization of reproductive sexuality, gender, and disability, respectively. While neither these branches of feminism-nor their critiques-are homogenous, they provide much-needed commentaries on phallocentric medicine. I will conclude the paper by arguing for the continual need for feminist critiques of medicalization, using uterus transplantation as a relevant case study.

Analysing the ethics of breast cancer overdiagnosis: a pathogenic vulnerability

Breast cancer screening aims to help women by early identification and treatment of cancers that might otherwise be life-threatening. However, breast cancer screening also leads to the detection of some cancers that, if left undetected and untreated, would not have damaged the health of the women concerned. At the time of diagnosis, harmless cancers cannot be identified as non-threatening, therefore women are offered invasive breast cancer treatment. This phenomenon of identifying (and treating) non-harmful cancers is called overdiagnosis. Overdiagnosis is morally problematic as it leads to overall patient harm rather than benefit. Further, breast cancer screening is offered in a context that exaggerates cancer risk and screening benefit, minimises risk of harm and impedes informed choice. These factors combine to create pathogenic vulnerability. That is, breast cancer screening exacerbates rather than reduces women's vulnerability and undermines women's agency. This paper provides an original way of conceptualising agency-supporting responses to the harms of breast cancer overdiagnosis through application of the concept of pathogenic vulnerability.

How to distinguish medicalization from over-medicalization?

Is medicalization always harmful? When does medicine overstep its proper boundaries? The aim of this article is to outline the pragmatic criteria for distinguishing between medicalization and over-medicalization. The consequences of considering a phenomenon to be a medical problem may take radically different forms depending on whether the problem in question is correctly or incorrectly perceived as a medical issue. Neither indiscriminate acceptance of medicalization of subsequent areas of human existence, nor criticizing new medicalization cases just because they are medicalization can be justified. The article: (i) identifies various consequences of both well-founded medicalization and over-medicalization; (ii) demonstrates that the issue of defining appropriate limits of medicine cannot be solved by creating an optimum model of health; (iii) proposes four guiding questions to help distinguish medicalization from over-medicalization. The article should foster a normative analysis of the phenomenon of medicalization and contribute to the bioethical reflection on the boundaries of medicine.

Reducing Health Disparities and Enhancing the Responsible Conduct of Research Involving LGBT Youth

Although there is clearly a need for evidenced-based behavioral or biomedical prevention or treatment programs for suicide, substance abuse, and sexual health targeted to members of the LGBT population under the age of eighteen, few such programs exist, due in substantial part to limited research knowledge. Ambiguities in regulations that govern human subjects protections and the related inconsistencies in institutional review board (IRB) interpretations of regulatory language are the key reason for the lack of rigorous clinical trial evidence to support treatment choices and prevention approaches to reducing health disparities for this population. Given the socially sensitive nature of suicide, substance abuse, and HIV and STI research in general and LGBT research specifically, in the absence of empirical data to guide their decisions, IRBs must often rely on subjective judgments of minimal risk, which can lead to overestimation of the magnitude and probability of psychological, social, and informational harms that might arise from LGBT youth participation in clinical trials. In addition, more than other youth, LGBT adolescents whose families are unaware of their sexual orientation or gender identity or whose families have victimized them on account of it may be reluctant to participate in studies that require guardian permission. This, in turn, intensifies problems of recruitment and unbiased sampling. However, many IRBs are reluctant to apply federal regulations permitting waiver of guardian permission under conditions in which such permission is clearly not "feasible" or "reasonable" to require. Consequently, many investigators have excluded LGBT individuals under eighteen years of age in health intervention research proposals because of anticipated or actual difficulties obtaining IRB approval. This situation is in conflict with current ethical discourse focusing on the right of youths to participate in trials that will protect them from receiving developmentally untested, inappropriate, and unsafe treatments. In this article, we describe these barriers and recommendations for providing LGBT youth safe and fair access to health research.

Medicine and making sense of queer lives

As practiced, medicine bumps along with the rest of us, doing its level best to cope with the contingencies of this often heartbreaking world. Yet it's a commonplace that much of medicine's self-image, and a good deal of its cultural heft, come from its connection with the natural sciences and, what's more, from a picture of science that has a touch of the transcendental, highlighting the unmatched rigor of its procedures, its exacting rationality, and the reliability of its results. In contrast, the very idea of "queer" carries with it a little taste of the uncanny. What we're inclined to label queer resists understanding, not so much because it's too complicated, but because it tends to be too slippery to capture neatly in our conceptual nets-that queer ache in your side, for instance, or your partner's queer notion of doing laundry. The outmoded use of "queer," as a way to refer disparagingly to gay people, carried similar uncanny connotations: the unnatural, the perverse. One might think, then, that the reclamation of "queer" as an umbrella term referring to the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender spectrum has a pleasing depth to its irony-not only does it wrench the customary direction of evaluation conveyed by the word from condemnation to celebration, but it also hints that what you find comprehensible depends a good deal on who you are and where you're standing. What from the perspective of many heterosexual and cisgendered people may seem opaque, exotic, threatening-erotic love directed toward someone with the same kind of body you have, lives lived in ways that challenge the immutability of birth-assigned gender-are to LGBT folk not uncanny at all, but as familiar as breathing. I like this conceit, but alas, it is too simple. It slights the variety of difficulties associated with making sense of queerness that can vex deeply thoughtful people of undoubted good will-as I found out some years ago when I first talked about my efforts to understand my own transgender identity with a ferociously intelligent, highly sophisticated friend.

Hormone treatment of children and adolescents with gender dysphoria: an ethical analysis

In the context of transgender health, most people are not comfortable with allowing a twelve-year-old child with gender dysphoria to elect to undergo gender reassignment surgery. The likelihood is too high that the child would be unable to fully comprehend the scope of a decision that carries significant, permanent consequences, particularly because the decision to surgically change gender is based upon a conception of gender that can fluctuate during adolescent years. Conversely, however, most people would not contend that this fluidity is reason to wholly deny certain medical care such as hormonal treatments to transgender youth, a demographic with extremely high rates of violent behavior, self-harm, and suicide. This paper will explore ethical considerations to this emerging debate of what therapeutic options should be offered to transgender children and adolescents. Pediatric endocrinologists have been treating gender dysphoric adolescents with puberty-suppressing drugs and, to a lesser extent, with cross-sex hormone therapies for more than twenty years. Clinicians and thought leaders have mentioned ethical components of this emerging practice in the few cohort studies and clinical review articles about the subject. However, ethics have generally been a secondary consideration in the medical academic literature. In this paper, I will provide a brief overview of the practice, summarize the current research on hormone treatment for transgender minors, and provide an ethical analysis of the practice.

How Do Medicalization and Rescue Fantasy Prevent Healthy Dying?

Before antibiotics, cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), and life-sustaining technologies, humans had little choice about the timing and manner of their deaths. Today, the medicalization of death has enabled patients to delay death, prolonging their living and dying. New technology, the influence of the media, and medical professionals themselves have together transformed dying from a natural part of the human experience into a medical crisis from which a patient must be rescued, often through the aggressive extension of life or through its premature termination. In this paper, we examine problematic forms of rescue medicine and suggest the need to rethink medicalized dying within the context of medicine's orientation to health and wholeness.

Medicalising short children with growth hormone? Ethical considerations of the underlying sociocultural aspects

In 2003, the Food and Drug Administration approved the use of growth hormone treatment for idiopathic short stature children, i.e. children shorter than average due to an unknown medical cause. Given the absence of any pathological conditions, this decision has been contested as a case of medicalisation. The aim of this paper is to broaden the debate over the reasons for and against the treatment, to include considerations of the sociocultural phenomenon of the medicalisation of short stature, by means of a critical understanding of the concept of medicalisation. After defining my understanding of medicalisation and describing both the treatment and the condition of idiopathic short stature, I will problematise two fundamental issues: the medical/non-medical distinction and the debate about the goals of medicine. I will analyse them, combining perspectives of bioethics, medical sociology, philosophy of medicine and medical literature, and I will suggest that there are different levels of normativity of medicalisation. Ultimately, this study shows that: (1) the definition of idiopathic short stature, focusing only on actual height measurement, does not provide enough information to assess the need for treatment or not; (2) the analysis of the goals of medicine should be broadened to include justifications for the treatment; (3) the use of growth hormone for idiopathic short stature involves strong interests from different stakeholders. While the treatment might be beneficial for some children, it is necessary to be vigilant about possible misconduct at different levels of medicalisation.

Distress, disease, desire: perspectives on the medicalisation of premature ejaculation

The discovery that certain selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors delay ejaculation and the later development and approval of dapoxetine as an on-demand treatment option has led to a dramatic increase in medical interest in premature ejaculation. This paper analyses the diagnostic criteria and the discussion within the medical community about suitable treatments against the backdrop of theories of science, sex and gender. Our conclusion is that the diagnosis itself and the suggested treatments contribute to normative models of sexual conduct and therefore reinforce the norms that cause patients' distress over ejaculating 'too soon'.

The muddle of medicalization: pathologizing or medicalizing?

Medicalization appears to be an issue that is both ubiquitous and unquestionably problematic as it seems to signal at once a social and existential threat. This perception of medicalization, however, is nothing new. Since the first main writings in the 1960s and 1970s, it has consistently been used to describe inappropriate or abusive instances of medical authority. Yet, while this standard approach claims that medicalization is a growing problem, it assumes that there is simply one "medical model" and that the expanding realm of "the medical" can be more or less clearly delineated. Moreover, while intended to establish the reality of this growing threat, this research often requires making arbitrary or unjustified distinctions between different practices. To better clarify the concept of medicalization, I will focus more on capturing the variety of medical practices than on the sociological aspects of medical discourse. In doing so, I will explore the distinction between medicalization and pathologization, a distinction that is often overlooked and that brings with it many conceptual and practical implications. After defining these terms, I will use some examples to show that while pathologizing is closely tied to medicalizing, both can occur independently. I will then further develop this distinction in terms of the different individual and social effects of these practices.

Disease prioritarianism: a flawed principle

Disease prioritarianism is a principle that is often implicitly or explicitly employed in the realm of healthcare prioritization. This principle states that the healthcare system ought to prioritize the treatment of disease before any other problem. This article argues that disease prioritarianism ought to be rejected. Instead, we should adopt 'the problem-oriented heuristic' when making prioritizations in the healthcare system. According to this idea, we ought to focus on specific problems and whether or not it is possible and efficient to address them with medical means. This has radical implications for the extension of the healthcare system. First, getting rid of the binary disease/no-disease dichotomy implicit in disease prioritarianism would improve the ability of the healthcare system to address chronic conditions and disabilities that often defy easy classification. Second, the problem-oriented heuristic could empower medical practitioners to address social problems without the need to pathologize these conditions. Third, the problem-oriented heuristic clearly states that what we choose to treat is a normative consideration. Under this assumption, we can engage in a discussion on de-medicalization without distorting preconceptions. Fourth, this pragmatic and de-compartmentalizing approach should allow us to reconsider the term 'efficiency'.

Transcultural ADHD and Bioethics: Reformulating a Doubly Dichotomized Debate

A double dichotomization, of biology and culture, and of cultures (the difference presumption), is to be found in debates about Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) in cross-cultural psychiatric and bioethics literature. The double dichotomy takes biology to explain cross-cultural similarities and culture to explain inter-cultural differences. In this paper, the double dichotomy is explored in debates on the significance of the worldwide prevalence of ADHD, and on the cogency of cross-cultural diagnosis of ADHD in the central character of Chinese classic novel The Dream of the Red Chamber. Contrary to the difference presumption, cultures are not homogenous unities that contrast in toto with one another. The Dream reveals parallels to contemporary US debates-the medicalization of human life and normative disputes about childhood behaviors. To overcome the empirical and theoretical shortcomings of the difference presumption and its underlying characterization of cultural differences, a transcultural approach is proposed and its potential advantages illustrated.

The Invisibility of Disability: Using Dance to Shake from Bioethics the Idea of 'Broken Bodies'

Complex social and ethical problems are often most effectively solved by engaging them at the messy and uncomfortable intersections of disciplines and practices, a notion that grounds the InVisible Difference project, which seeks to extend thinking and alter practice around the making, status, ownership, and value of work by contemporary dance choreographers by examining choreographic work through the lenses of law, bioethics, dance scholarship, and the practice of dance by differently-abled dancers. This article offers a critical thesis on how bioethics has come to occupy a marginal and marginalizing role in questions about the differently-abled body. In doing so, it has rendered the disabled community largely invisible to and in bioethics. It then defends the claim that bioethics - as a social undertaking pursued collaboratively by individuals from different disciplines - must take much better notice of the body and the embodied individual if it is to better achieve its ends, which include constructing a moral and just society. Finally, this article considers how the arts, and specifically dance (and here dance by differently-abled dancers), provides us with rich evidence about the body and our ability to respond positively to normally 'othered' bodies. It concludes that greater attention to empirical evidence like that being generated in InVisible Difference will help to expand the reach and significance of bioethics, and thereby its relevance to (and consciousness of) important questions about the status of bodies and bodily differences, which must be considered as central to its ambitions.

Aging as disease

In this paper, I will argue that ageing can be construed as disease. First, the concept of disease is discussed, where the distinction is made between two lines of thought, an objectivist and a subjectivist one. After determining the disease conception to be used throughout the argument, it is proposed that senescence could be seen as disease. Three common counterarguments are discussed, none of which appears strong enough to effectively counter the advocated view. In the third section, two potential implications of the view advocated here will be briefly touched upon. These are the quest for a cure or treatment for ageing and the general attitude towards the elderly. It is concluded that, utilizing an objective disease concept, ageing could be seen as a disease. None of the considered counterarguments packs enough of a punch to discard this. The implications are complex and intertwined, but need not be negative.

Legal and Ethical Concerns about Sexual Orientation Change Efforts

The United States has recently made significant and positive civil rights gains for LGB people, including expanded recognition of marriages between people of the same sex. Among the central tropes that have emerged in the struggle for the rights of LGB people are that they are "born that way," that sexual orientations cannot change, and that one's sexual orientation is not affected by choice. Writer Andrew Sullivan put it this way: "[H]omosexuality is an essentially involuntary condition that can neither be denied nor permanently repressed.… [S]o long as homosexual adults as citizens insist on the involuntary nature of their condition, it becomes politically impossible to deny or ignore the fact of homosexuality.… [The strategy for obtaining LGB rights is to] seek full public equality for those who, through no fault of their own, happen to be homosexual." This idea of linking LGB rights to empirical claims about sexual orientations has become so central that casting doubt on these claims is, in many circles, tantamount to opposing LGB rights. Nonetheless, claims about innateness, immutability, and lack of choice about sexual orientation should not be the primary basis for LGB rights.

Are gay and lesbian people fading into the history of bioethics?

In many ways, we live in propitious times for gay and lesbian people. In 1996, the Supreme Court struck down Colorado law prohibiting any kind of protected status based on sexual orientation. In 2003, the Supreme Court held that states may not criminalize sexual conduct between consenting adults of the same sex in private, so long as no money changes hands. In 2010, the Congress repealed the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy that excluded openly gay men and lesbians from military service. In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down key elements of the Defense of Marriage Act that prohibited any federal recognition of same-sex marriage. Most states do not allow same-sex marriage, but more and more states are joining the fold. Likewise, most U.S. states do not forbid discrimination based on sexual orientation, but the number that does is increasing. Arguably, no other social minority has made as much legal progress in so short a time. Despite these advances, the story of gay and lesbian people and the law is not yet finished, and the meaning of homosexuality for bioethics is still being written too. Concerns about gay and lesbian people remain important to bioethics in key domains, especially in seeing to the conferral of optimal health care benefits and in sorting through the priorities and social effects of research. Progress in these domains still involves lifting certain burdens of medical and social misjudgments about same-sex attraction.

Identity or Behavior: A Moral and Medical Basis for LGBTQ Rights

The progress of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, and queer rights entails the erosion of prejudice, and erosion is a slow process. Much press accrues to the dramatic advancement of gay marriage, but that progress reflects decades of committed activism that antedate the sea change. Social science, physical science, politics, philosophy, religion, and innumerable other fields have bearing on the emergence of healthy LGBTQ identities. The field of bioethics is implicated both in revolutionizing attitudes and in determining how best to utilize such ameliorated positions. For decades, the debate around homosexuality has centered on whether it is a choice or an inherent quality. A growing segment of the population believes that gay people are "made that way" and therefore do not deserve to be treated with the prejudice they might warrant if they had simply elected what others resisted. In effect, they are like disabled people, who can't help the challenges they face, and unlike murderers, who could choose not to kill. Anti-gay arguments tend to hinge on a view of gayness as a behavior; the liberatory ones, on gayness as an identity. A behavior can be avoided; an identity is integral and therefore warrants acceptance-or even celebration. People have a right to their identities, even if they have the capacity to act out other, different identities. Bioethics is the field in which this distinction between gay acts and a gay self may be argued most directly.

Big pharma and the problem of disease inflation

Over the course of the past decade, critics have increasingly called attention to the corrosive influence of the pharmaceutical industry on both biomedical research and the practice of medicine. Critics describe the industry's use of ghostwriting and other unethical techniques to expand their markets as evidence that medical science is all-too-frequently subordinated to the goals of corporate profit. While we do not dispute this perspective, we argue that it is imperative to also recognize that the goals of medical science and industry profit are now tightly wed to one another. As a result, medical science now operates to expand disease definitions, lower diagnostic thresholds, and otherwise advance the goals of corporate profit through the redefinition and expansion of what it means to be ill. We suggest that this process has led to a variety of ethical problems that are not fully captured by current critiques of ghostwriting and other troubling practices by the pharmaceutical industry. In our conclusion, we call for physicians, ethicists, and other concerned observers to embrace a more fundamental critique of the relationship between biomedical science and corporate profit.

On good and bad forms of medicalization

The ongoing 'enhancement' debate pits critics of new self-shaping technologies against enthusiasts. One important thread of that debate concerns medicalization, the process whereby 'non-medical' problems become framed as 'medical' problems. In this paper I consider the charge of medicalization, which critics often level at new forms of technological self-shaping, and explain how that charge can illuminate--and obfuscate. Then, more briefly, I examine the charge of pharmacological Calvinism, which enthusiasts, in their support of technological self-shaping, often level at critics. And I suggest how that charge, too, can illuminate and obfuscate. Exploring the broad charge of medicalization and the narrower counter charge of pharmacological Calvinism leads me to conclude that, as satisfying as it can be to level one of those charges at our intellectual opponents, and as tempting as it is to lie down and rest with our favorite insight, we need to gather the energy to have a conversation about the difference between good and bad forms of medicalization. Specifically, I suggest that if we consider the 'medicalization of love,' we can see why critics of and enthusiasts about technological self-shaping should want (and in some cases have already begun) to distinguish between good and bad forms of such medicalization.