Comparing the incommensurable: where science and politics collide

Cognition in behavior therapy: agreements and differences

The issue of cognition has often been divisive among behavior therapists. Typically the debate has centered around the causal status of cognition. Cognitive psychologists have argued for the causal efficacy of cognition, while behavior analysts have argued against it. These disputes are not entirely empirical matters. In part, they reflect irreconcilable differences at the level of theory and philosophy. Such differences may make theoretical integration impossible. However, in this paper we examine the potential for reconciliation of the cognitive and behavioral wings of behavior therapy when the issue of cognition is approached as a shared content area, rather than at the level of theory and philosophy. Behavior therapy has always been comprised of very diverse theoretical positions. Historically they found common ground around a set of shared values centered on an empirical science of clinical work. We will argue that this core of shared values still exists, and that even controversial topics can provide an arena for reconciliation when we focus on the core values that initially brought us together.

Cognitive vs. contextual causation: different world views but perhaps not irreconcilable

In this commentary, we address some of the divisive issues between cognitive theorists and behavior analysts concerning the aims and goals of science and differing views of causality. We suggest that evidence for the causal status of cognition has been inconclusive, largely due to the fact that most of this research can be framed in terms of environmental causes. We examine (1) what we can consider as causes of behavior and (2) how we can manipulate these causes in therapy. We conclude that a rapprochement between cognitivists and behavior analysts will require more careful description of the multiple causal pathways responsible for experimental and therapeutic effects.

The Darwinian status of mind

Behavioristic criticisms of cognitive psychology stem from a Skinnerian argument by analogy, to wit, natural selection of species replaced divine creation, and therefore shaping of behavior by reinforcement replaces the immaterial mind. But Darwin argued that mind existed materially in mental organs evolved by natural selection, thus Skinner's analogy is false. Neuroscientists are rapidly amassing evidence for the Darwinian status of cognitive functions within the central nervous systems of animals and humans.

What are the benefits from a debate about cognition, behavior, and causality?

Some authors have argued that the debate about whether or not self-efficacy can be legitimately viewed as a cause of behavior is futile due to incommensurability between underlying philosophies. Nevertheless, the debate provides a valuable case study of comparative paradigms in psychology for teaching purposes. It also stimulates a secondary debate about whether clinical utility is a sufficient criterion in clinical decision making. Another consequence of the debate has been a reminder of the negative consequences of the focus on the individual in contemporary psychology.

Ontological and epistemological terrains revisited

The present commentary discusses the scientific legitimacy of theories confined to correlations of observables and those that specify the mechanisms governing the relations between observable events. Operant analysts frame the theoretical differences misleadingly when the operant approach is portrayed as addressing environmental influence for effecting change but cognitive approaches are depicted as disembodied from environmental influences and thus can only provide correlates with action. In point of fact, both approaches encompass environmental influences. The major issues in contention are whether human thinking is entirely or only partially shaped by environmental influences; whether the influences in the person-environment relation flow unidirectionally or bidirectionally; and whether human thought serves a determinative function or is a functionless epiphenomenon. Proponents of epiphenomenalism regard other people's thinking as functionless by-products of conditioned responses, but present their own thoughts on matters as the right ones that provide functional guides for structuring interventions. This commentary discusses the self-negating nature of the epiphenomenalism argument. It also corrects misunderstandings and misrepresentations of self-efficacy theory.

Science, philosophy and man's mind

This paper argues, in disagreement with most of the writers in the special issue [see Reyna (1995) Cognition, behavior and causality: A broad exchange of views stemming from the debate on the causal efficacy of human thought, Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 20(3)], that: (1) science cannot be separated from philosophy even for the purpose of trying to see which set of assumptions is more "pragmatically useful;" (2) a true understanding of causality eliminates skepticism and reveals why private, conscious events are causes of action; (3) consciousness is directly observable; and (4) the belief in cognition, far from divorcing man from the real world of action, points to the actual cause of action and of political change.