Is there “pain” in Invertebrates?

Effects of Acetic Acid and Morphine in Shore Crabs, Carcinus maenas: Implications for the Possibility of Pain in Decapods

Noxious chemicals, coupled with morphine treatment, are often used in studies on pain in vertebrates. Here we show that injection of morphine caused several behavioural changes in the crab, Carcinus maenas, including reduced pressing against the sides of the enclosure and more rubbing and picking at the mouth parts and, at least for a short time, more defensive displays. Subsequent injection of acetic acid into one rear leg caused rubbing of the injected leg and the injected leg was held vertically off the ground. These activities directed at or involving the specific leg are consistent with previous observations of directed behaviour following noxious stimuli and are consistent with the idea that decapods experience pain. Further, acetic acid but not injection of water induced autotomy of the injected leg in these animals. Because autotomy is temporally associated with directed behaviour, it is possible that the autotomy is a pain-related response. Acetic acid is clearly a noxious substance when applied to decapods. However, morphine had no effect on the activities associated with acetic acid injection and thus there is no evidence for an analgesic effect. Further, the injection of acetic acid did not interfere with behavioural effects of morphine. The activities directed towards the site of injection are like those observed with injection, or with external application, of various noxious substances and the present study adds to a growing body of knowledge about possible pain in decapods.

The Effects of Caustic Soda and Benzocaine on Directed Grooming to the Eyestalk in the Glass Prawn, Palaemon elegans, Are Consistent with the Idea of Pain in Decapods

Acceptance of the possibility of pain in animals usually requires that various criteria are fulfilled. One such criterion is that a noxious stimulus or wound would elicit directed rubbing or grooming at the site of the stimulus. There is also an expectation that local anaesthetics would reduce these responses to damage. These expectations have been fulfilled in decapod crustaceans but there has been criticism of a lack of replication. Here, we report an experiment on the effects of a noxious chemical, sodium hydroxide, applied to one eyestalk of the glass prawn. This caused an immediate escape tail-flick response. It then caused nipping and picking with the chelipeds at the treated eyestalk but much less so at the alternative eyestalk. Prior treatment with benzocaine also caused an immediate tail-flick and directed behaviour, suggesting that this agent is aversive. Subsequently, however, it reduced the directed behaviour caused by caustic soda. We thus demonstrated responses that are consistent with the idea of pain in decapod crustaceans.

Behavioural Indicators of Pain and Suffering in Arthropods and Might Pain Bite Back?

Pain in response to tissue damage functions to change behaviour so that further damage is minimised whereas healing and survival are promoted. This paper focuses on the behavioural criteria that match the function to ask if pain is likely in the main taxa of arthropods. There is evidence consistent with the idea of pain in crustaceans, insects and, to a lesser extent, spiders. There is little evidence of pain in millipedes, centipedes, scorpions, and horseshoe crabs but there have been few investigations of these groups. Alternative approaches in the study of pain are explored and it is suggested that studies on traumatic mating, agonistic interactions, and defensive venoms might provide clues about pain. The evolution of high cognitive ability, sensory systems, and flexible decision-making is discussed as well as how these might influence the evolution of pain-like states.

The Third R: Refinement

This review attempts to provide an introduction to the complicated subject of refinement, the third R in the concept of alternatives. It starts with a brief discussion of what refinement means and the lack of specific attention paid to this third R. This is followed by an analysis of the conceptual underpinnings of pain, distress and suffering, and the problems of both definition and measurement which must be faced if we are to be objective and consistent in our search for refinement. The review then touches upon husbandry, care and handling issues as they affect animal discomfort and distress. Antibody production, both polyclonal and monoclonal, is discussed as an example of the refinement of research techniques. Finally, a few brief comments are offered on the refinement of a variety of other experimental techniques, including those used in toxicology, cancer research and behavioural research.

E Pluribus Octo - Building Consensus on Standards of Care and Experimentation in Cephalopod Research; a Historical Outlook

The Directive 2010/63/EU "on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes" originally induced some concern among cephalopod researchers, because of the inclusion of cephalopod mollusks as the only invertebrates among the protected species. Here we reflect on the challenges and issues raised by the Directive on cephalopod science, and discuss some of the arguments that elicited discussion within the scientific community, to facilitate the implementation of the Directive 2010/63/EU in the scientific research context. A short overview of the aims of the COST Action FA1301 "CephsInAction," serves as a paradigmatic instance of a pragmatic and progressive approach adopted to respond to novel legislative concerns through community-building and expansion of the historical horizon. Between 2013 and 2017, the COST Action FA1301 has functioned as a hub for consolidation of the cephalopod research community, including about 200 representatives from 21 countries (19 European). Among its aims, CephsInAction promoted the collection, rationalization, and diffusion of knowledge relevant to cephalopods. In the Supplementary Material to this work, we present the translation of the first-published systematic set of guidelines on the care, management and maintenance of cephalopods in captivity (Grimpe, 1928), as an example of the potential advantages deriving from the confluence of pressing scientific concerns and historical interests.

Feeding live invertebrate prey in zoos and aquaria: Are there welfare concerns?

Invertebrates constitute more than 90% of all species on earth, however, as a rule, humans do not regard invertebrates as creatures that can suffer and they are generally seen as creatures that should be eliminated. As a result, the importance of their welfare may be grossly unappreciated. For instance, the feeding of live food is often viewed as a good method of enrichment and invertebrates are commonly used as live prey in many zoological facilities. As a result, zoos may send mixed messages to their patrons in that welfare is considered only for the invertebrates that are part of their zoological collection and not necessarily for the invertebrates used as feed. Research indicates that many invertebrates possess nociceptors, opioid receptors, and demonstrate behavioral responses indicative of pain sensation. In addition, in some taxa, there may be evidence of higher cognitive functions such as emotions and learning, although studies in this area of research are preliminary and sparse. Therefore, the possibility for suffering exists in many invertebrate species and as such, zoological facilities have an ethical responsibility to take their welfare into consideration. This paper discusses the current research regarding invertebrates' capacity for suffering and discusses methods facilities can use to improve the welfare of their invertebrate live prey.

In search of evidence for the experience of pain in honeybees: A self-administration study

Despite their common use as model organisms in scientific experiments, pain and suffering in insects remains controversial and poorly understood. Here we explore potential pain experience in honeybees (Apis mellifera) by testing the self-administration of an analgesic drug. Foragers were subjected to two different types of injuries: (i) a clip that applied continuous pressure to one leg and (ii) amputation of one tarsus. The bees were given a choice between two feeders, one offering pure sucrose solution, the other sucrose solution plus morphine. We found that sustained pinching had no effect on the amount of morphine consumed, and hence is unlikely to be experienced as painful. The amputated bees did not shift their relative preference towards the analgesic either, but consumed more morphine and more solution in total compared to intact controls. While our data do not provide evidence for the self-administration of morphine in response to pain, they suggest that injured bees increase their overall food intake, presumably to meet the increased energy requirements for an immune response caused by wounding. We conclude that further experiments are required to gain insights into potential pain-like states in honeybees and other insects.

Cephalopods in neuroscience: regulations, research and the 3Rs

Cephalopods have been utilised in neuroscience research for more than 100 years particularly because of their phenotypic plasticity, complex and centralised nervous system, tractability for studies of learning and cellular mechanisms of memory (e.g. long-term potentiation) and anatomical features facilitating physiological studies (e.g. squid giant axon and synapse). On 1 January 2013, research using any of the about 700 extant species of "live cephalopods" became regulated within the European Union by Directive 2010/63/EU on the "Protection of Animals used for Scientific Purposes", giving cephalopods the same EU legal protection as previously afforded only to vertebrates. The Directive has a number of implications, particularly for neuroscience research. These include: (1) projects will need justification, authorisation from local competent authorities, and be subject to review including a harm-benefit assessment and adherence to the 3Rs principles (Replacement, Refinement and Reduction). (2) To support project evaluation and compliance with the new EU law, guidelines specific to cephalopods will need to be developed, covering capture, transport, handling, housing, care, maintenance, health monitoring, humane anaesthesia, analgesia and euthanasia. (3) Objective criteria need to be developed to identify signs of pain, suffering, distress and lasting harm particularly in the context of their induction by an experimental procedure. Despite diversity of views existing on some of these topics, this paper reviews the above topics and describes the approaches being taken by the cephalopod research community (represented by the authorship) to produce "guidelines" and the potential contribution of neuroscience research to cephalopod welfare.

Changes in the nitric oxide system in the shore crab Hemigrapsus sanguineus (Crustacea, decapoda) CNS induced by a nociceptive stimulus

Using NADPH-diaphorase (NADPH-d) histochemistry, inducible nitric oxide synthase (iNOS)-immunohistochemistry and immunoblotting, we characterized the nitric oxide (NO)-producing neurons in the brain and thoracic ganglion of a shore crab subjected to a nociceptive chemical stimulus. Formalin injection into the cheliped evoked specific nociceptive behavior and neurochemical responses in the brain and thoracic ganglion of experimental animals. Within 5–10 min of injury, the NADPH-d activity increased mainly in the neuropils of the olfactory lobes and the lateral antenna I neuropil on the side of injury. Later, the noxious-induced expression of NADPH-d and iNOS was detected in neurons of the brain, as well as in segmental motoneurons and interneurons of the thoracic ganglion. Western blotting analysis showed that an iNOS antiserum recognized a band at 120 kDa, in agreement with the expected molecular mass of the protein. The increase in nitrergic activity induced by nociceptive stimulation suggests that the NO signaling system may modulate nociceptive behavior in crabs.

Is welfare all that matters? A discussion of what should be included in policy-making regarding animals

Policy-making concerned with animals often includes human interests, such as economy, trade, environmental protection, disease control, species conservation etc. When it comes to the interests of the animals, such policy-making often makes use of the results of animal welfare science to provide assessments of ethically relevant concerns for animals. This has provided a scientific rigour that has helped to overcome controversies and allowed debates to move forward according to generally agreed methodologies. However, this focus can lead to policies leaving out other important issues relevant to animals. This can be considered as a problem of what is included in welfare science, or of what is included in policy. This suggests two possible solutions: expanding animal welfare science to address all ethical concerns about animals’ interests or widening the perspective considered in policymaking to encompass other important ethical concerns about animals than welfare. The latter appears the better option. This requires both a ‘philosophy of animal welfare science’, a ‘philosophy of decision-making about animals’, and greater transparency about what is included or excluded from both animal welfare science and the politics of animal policy.

From an animal's point of view: Motivation, fitness, and animal welfare

To study animal welfare empirically we need an objective basis for deciding when an animal is suffering. Suffering includes a wide range ofunpleasant emotional states such as fear, boredom, pain, and hunger. Suffering has evolved as a mechanism for avoiding sources ofdanger and threats to fitness. Captive animals often suffer in situations in which they are prevented from doing something that they are highly motivated to do. The “price” an animal is prepared to pay to attain or to escape a situation is an index ofhow the animal “feels” about that situation. Withholding conditions or commodities for which an animal shows “inelastic demand” (i.e., for which it continues to work despite increasing costs) is very likely to cause suffering. In designing environments for animals in zoos, farms, and laboratories, priority should be given to features for which animals show inelastic demand. The care ofanimals can thereby be based on an objective, animal-centered assessment of their needs.

Invertebrate care

Invertebrates are attracting increasing interest within the veterinary profession. They are also significant in their own right; as the Council of Europe's "Charter on Invertebrates" points out, they are the most important component of wild fauna as well as providing food, contributing to agriculture and forestry, and aiding medicine,industry, and crafts. Whenever invertebrates are kept in captivity they should be subject to high standards of management and care and veterinary attention-whether by the veterinarian or by the veterinary technician-should be based on sound biological and humanitarian principles.

Animal Consciousness, Cognition and Welfare

The level of priority and resource given to the care of organisms is influenced by beliefs and understanding about their capacities for conscious awareness. Variation in attitudes to animal welfare around the world today is partly a reflection of this. Improved understanding of the range of phenomena of which animals may be conscious is likely to lead to greater global consensus about the importance of high standards of animal welfare. This is a matter of current relevance. In the global free market there is a danger that efforts in one country to raise standards for farm or laboratory animals will be compromised by competition from others which employ cheaper, less welfare-friendly systems. Scientific developments which inform us about animals’ capacities for pleasant and unpleasant feelings will play an important role in the development of global agreement about animal welfare standards. Deciding which animals might have the capacity for consciousness, and thus for suffering, and of what they might be conscious, are fundamental issues which set boundaries to the ranges of species to be given basic or special forms of welfare protection. In practice, such lines have to be drawn and it is crucial that they are drawn in the right place. This is a difficult but essential task and society looks to scientists for guidance on the matter. There have been many developments in recent years in scientific approaches to the study of consciousness in animals which are pertinent to this debate.

Can Invertebrates Suffer? or, How Robust is Argument-By-Analogy?

It is a popular notion that, compared to vertebrates, invertebrates have a reduced capacity to experience suffering. This is usually based on arguments that invertebrates show only simple forms of learning, have little memory capacity, do not show behavioural responses to stimuli that would cause ‘higher’ vertebrates to exhibit responses indicative of pain, and have differences in their physiology that would preclude the capacity for suffering. But, how convincing is this ‘evidence’ of a reduced capacity to suffer? Suffering is a negative mental state - a private experience - and, as such, it cannot be measured directly. When assessing the capacity of an animal to experience suffering, we often compare the similarity of its responses with those of ‘higher’ animals, conceptualized in the principle of argument-by-analogy. By closely examining the responses of invertebrates, it can be seen that they often behave in a strikingly analogous manner to vertebrates. In this paper, I discuss published studies that show that invertebrates such as cockroaches, flies and slugs have short- and long-term memory; have age effects on memory; have complex spatial, associative and social learning; perform appropriately in preference tests and consumer demand studies; exhibit behavioural and physiological responses indicative of pain; and, apparently, experience learned helplessness. The similarity of these responses to those of vertebrates may indicate a level of consciousness or suffering that is not normally attributed to invertebrates. This indicates that we should either be more cautious when using argument-by-analogy, or remain open-minded to the possibility that invertebrates are capable of suffering in a similar way to vertebrates.

Invertebrate anesthesia

One hundred years ago (January 5th, 1901), an article in the Veterinary Record declared: The use of chloroform by practitioners is now common, and the amount of pain and suffering prevented is enormous. By its aid we are enabled to perform operations with success which without it were seldom satisfactory. A century later, in an age of sophisticated veterinary medicine, those words seem quaint, a relic of a bygone age. Our understanding of anesthesia of invertebrates in 2000 is very much at a comparable stage, however, and a great deal of research is needed to remedy this situation.

Pain, suffering, and anxiety in animals and humans

We attempt to bring the concepts of pain, suffering, and anxiety into sufficient focus to make them serviceable for empirical investigation. The common-sense view that many animals experience these phenomena is supported by empirical and philosophical arguments. We conclude, first, that pain, suffering, and anxiety are different conceptually and as phenomena, and should not be conflated. Second, suffering can be the result--or perhaps take the form--of a variety of states including pain, anxiety, fear, and boredom. Third, pain and nociception are not equivalent and should be carefully distinguished. Fourth, nociception can explain the behavior of insects and perhaps other invertebrates (except possibly the cephalopods). Fifth, a behavioral inhibition system associated with anxiety in humans seems to be present in mammals and most or all other vertebrates. Based on neurochemical and behavioral evidence, it seems parsimonious to claim that these animals are capable of experiencing anxious states.