Changing Our Implicit Minds: How, When, and Why Implicit Evaluations Can Be Rapidly Revised

AI contextual information shapes moral and aesthetic judgments of AI-generated visual art

Throughout history, art creation has been regarded as a uniquely human means to express original ideas, emotions, and experiences. However, as Generative Artificial Intelligence reshapes visual, aesthetic, legal, and economic culture, critical questions arise about the moral and aesthetic implications of AI-generated art. Despite the growing use of AI tools in art, the moral impact of AI involvement in the art creation process remains underexplored. Understanding moral judgments of AI-generated art is essential for assessing AI's impact on art and its alignment with ethical norms. Across three pre-registered experiments combining explicit and implicit paradigms with Bayesian modelling, we examined how information about AI systems influences moral and aesthetic judgments and whether human art is implicitly associated with positive attributes compared to AI-generated art. Experiment 1 revealed that factual information about AI backend processes reduced moral acceptability and aesthetic appeal in certain contexts, such as gaining financial incentives and art status. Experiment 2 showed that additional information about AI art's success had no clear impact on moral judgments. Experiment 3 demonstrated that an implicit association task did not reliably link human art with positive attributes and AI art with negative ones. These findings show that factual information about AI systems shapes judgments, while different information doses about AI art's success have limited moral impact. Additionally, implicit associations between human-made and AI-generated art are similar. This work enhances understanding of moral and aesthetic perceptions of AI-generated art, emphasizing the importance of examining human-AI interactions in an arts context, and their current and evolving societal implications.

Hypnotic and direct suggestions affect attitudes toward seeking professional psychological help

This study investigated the impact of hypnotic suggestions on improving attitudes toward seeking professional psychological help (ATSPPH). The study administered the Chinese version of the ATSPPH scale on 303 college students, of which 61 with low levels of ATSPPH were recruited as the participants (male: 18; female: 43). All participants were tested with the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A, prior to the formal experiment and assigned with balancing hypnotic susceptibility in hypnotic suggestion, relaxation, or control groups. The main results were as follows: (1) counter-attitudinal information significantly improved explicit ATSPPH only for the hypnotic suggestion and relaxation groups, (2) the hypnotic suggestion group exhibited improvement in implicit ATSPPH and (3) a difference was observed between explicit and implicit attitudes in the process of providing counter-attitudinal information when changing ATSPPH.

When being unattractive is an advantage: effects of face perception on intuitive culpability judgments

This experiment explored the influence of facial attractiveness and trustworthiness on guilty judgments. We recruited 128 participants, randomly assigned to high and low time pressure conditions to act as judges in a simulated blind-date swindle case. Participants judged nine male faces from the Chicago Face Database with three attractiveness levels (unattractive, neutral and attractive), featuring a 2 × 3 mixed factorial design, with consistent standardized average levels of face trustworthiness. We also assessed participants' self-reported processing styles (rational vs. experiential) using the Rational Experiential Inventory. Notably, participants predominantly judged unattractive faces as innocent, indicating an ugly leniency effect. Our results suggest the primacy of perceived face trustworthiness over attractiveness in guilt judgments for cases where the accused's physical appearance might facilitate the crime's success. This highlights the importance of examining the contribution of perceived trustworthiness to guilt judgment biases, and adds to growing evidence exploring extrajudicial factors in criminal verdicts.

Oppressed Groups Engender Implicit Positivity: Seven Demonstrations Using Novel and Familiar Targets

Across seven preregistered studies in online adult volunteer samples (N = 5,323), we measured implicit evaluations of social groups following exposure to historical narratives about their oppression. Although the valence of such information is highly negative and its interpretation was left up to participants, implicit evaluations of oppressed groups shifted toward positivity, including in designs involving fictitious, well-known, and even self-relevant targets. The sole deviation from this pattern was observed in an experiment using a vignette about slavery in the United States, in response to which neither White nor Black Americans exhibited any change in implicit race attitudes. In line with propositional perspectives, these findings suggest that implicit evaluations (including, notably, implicit evaluations of well-known and self-relevant social groups) tend to change toward positivity in response to extremely negative information involving past oppression. However, macro-level phenomena, such as public awareness of histories of oppression, can modulate such updating processes.

A 3D framework of implicit attitude change

According to early theories, implicit (automatic) social attitudes are difficult if not impossible to change. Although this view has recently been challenged by research relying on experimental, developmental, and cultural approaches, relevant work remains siloed across research communities. As such, the time is ripe to systematize and integrate disparate (and seemingly contradictory) findings and to identify gaps in existing knowledge. To this end, we introduce a 3D framework classifying research on implicit attitude change by levels of analysis (individual vs. collective), sources of change (experimental, ontogenetic, and cultural), and timescales (short term vs. long term). This 3D framework highlights where evidence for implicit attitude change is more versus less well established and pinpoints directions for future research, including at the intersection of fields.

The project implicit international dataset: Measuring implicit and explicit social group attitudes and stereotypes across 34 countries (2009-2019)

For decades, researchers across the social sciences have sought to document and explain the worldwide variation in social group attitudes (evaluative representations, e.g., young-good/old-bad) and stereotypes (attribute representations, e.g., male-science/female-arts). Indeed, uncovering such country-level variation can provide key insights into questions ranging from how attitudes and stereotypes are clustered across places to why places vary in attitudes and stereotypes (including ecological and social correlates). Here, we introduce the Project Implicit:International (PI:International) dataset that has the potential to propel such research by offering the first cross-country dataset of both implicit (indirectly measured) and explicit (directly measured) attitudes and stereotypes across multiple topics and years. PI:International comprises 2.3 million tests for seven topics (race, sexual orientation, age, body weight, nationality, and skin-tone attitudes, as well as men/women-science/arts stereotypes) using both indirect (Implicit Association Test; IAT) and direct (self-report) measures collected continuously from 2009 to 2019 from 34 countries in each country's native language(s). We show that the IAT data from PI:International have adequate internal consistency (split-half reliability), convergent validity (implicit-explicit correlations), and known groups validity. Given such reliability and validity, we summarize basic descriptive statistics on the overall strength and variability of implicit and explicit attitudes and stereotypes around the world. The PI:International dataset, including both summary data and trial-level data from the IAT, is provided openly to facilitate wide access and novel discoveries on the global nature of implicit and explicit attitudes and stereotypes.

Attribution Impacts Implicit (And Explicit) Evaluations

Two studies examined whether the attributional framing of negative events affected explicit evaluations, as measured by differences in liking, and implicit evaluations, as measured by the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998). In Study 1, participants read negative information about a novel target ordered to elicit internal or external attributions. Participants in the internal attribution condition evaluated the target more negatively than did those in the external attribution condition on both implicit and explicit measures. Study 2 replicated these results and tested the effects of attribution on recently formed negative evaluations. Participants who evaluated targets before and after receiving additional negative information about them demonstrated implicit and explicit evaluative change consistent with the attributional framing of that information. This research provides clear evidence that attribution influences the formation and change of implicit evaluations; however, these effects were weaker than those on explicit measures of evaluation.

A Theory of Reliance on Individuating Information and Stereotypes in Implicit Judgments of Individuals and Social Groups

We propose a theory of (a) reliance on stereotypes and individuating information in implicit person perception and (b) the relationship between individuation in implicit person perception and shifts in implicit group stereotypes. The present research preliminarily tested this theory by assessing whether individuating information or stereotypes take primacy in implicit judgments of individuals under circumstances specified by our model and then testing the malleability of implicit group stereotypes in the presence of the same (or additional) counterstereotypic individuating information. Studies 1 and 2 conceptually replicated previous research by examining the effects of stereotype-inconsistent and stereotype-consistent individuating information on implicit stereotype-relevant judgments of individuals. Both studies showed that stereotypic implicit judgments of individuals made in the absence of individuating information were reversed when the individuals were portrayed as stereotype-inconsistent and were strengthened when targets were portrayed as stereotype-consistent (though in Study 2 this strengthening was descriptive rather than inferential). Studies 3 and 4 examined whether the strong effects of individuating information found in studies 1 and 2 extended to the social groups to which the individuals belonged. Even in the presence of up to eight counterstereotypic exemplars, there was no evidence of significant shifts in group stereotypes. Thus, the data showed that the shifts in implicit judgments that were caused by individuating information did not generalize to stereotypes of the social groups to which the individuals belong. Finally, we propose modifications to our theory that include potential reasons for this lack of generalization that we invite future research to explore.

Cross-modal impression updating: Dynamic impression updating from face to voice and the other way around

Research has shown that faces and voices shape impression formation. Most studies have examined either the impact of faces and voices in isolation or the relative contribution of each source when presented simultaneously. However, only a few studies have questioned whether and how impressions formed via one source can be updated due to incremental information gathered from the alternative source. Yet, cross-modal impression updating is key to shed light on person perception. Thus, we tested whether positive and negative face- and voice-based impressions could be updated by inconsistent cross-modal information. In Experiment 1 (N = 130), we tested whether face-based impressions could be updated by (in)consistent voices. In Experiment 2 (N = 262), we compared face-to-voice and voice-to-face impression updating. In Experiment 3 (N = 242), we favoured a more direct comparison of the two types of stimuli (i.e., the co-occurrence of both cue types when the new information is revealed). Results showed that voices have the greatest updating impact and that the updating effect of faces was halved when voices co-occurred for a second time. We discussed these results as evidence of the dynamical evolution of cross-modal impressions.

Persuading the Implicit Mind: Changing Negative Implicit Evaluations With an 8-Minute Podcast

Implicit evaluations can be malleable via reinterpretation of previously encountered evidence. Here, we report three studies ( N = 1,007) investigating the robustness of this updating modality using ecologically realistic materials. Participants were first introduced to a target who killed an endangered black rhino in Namibia. They then listened to a real podcast providing counterattitudinal information on the benefits of trophy hunting. The podcast resulted in considerable revisions of initially negative implicit evaluations toward positivity, consistently across implicit measures (affect misattribution procedures vs. implicit association test), samples (American students vs. nonstudents from various countries), study settings (lab vs. online), and the presence versus absence of a memory retrieval manipulation prompting reflection on participants’ views on trophy hunting. Taken together, these findings suggest that reinterpretation can shift implicit evaluations of even highly negative targets, including under conditions of external validity.

Implicit bias reflects systemic racism

Implicit bias refers to automatically evoked mental associations about social groups. The idea has been influential across the social sciences as a way to explain persistent racial disparities amid changing self-report attitudes. Most research has treated implicit bias as an individual attitude. However, evidence suggests that it is neither a stable individual difference nor a strong correlate of individual behavior. Moreover, the individual-focused approach can lead researchers to neglect systemic racism as a cause of persistent disparities. We argue that implicit bias can be considered a cognitive reflection of systemic racism in the environment. In this view, implicit bias is an ongoing set of associations based on inequalities and stereotypes in the environment. As such, implicit bias changes when contexts change.

Attitudes as propositional representations

Attitudes are mental representations that help to explain why stimuli evoke positive or negative responses. Until recently, attitudes were often thought of as associations in memory. This idea inspired extensive research on evaluative conditioning (EC) and implicit evaluation. However, attitudes can also be seen as propositional representations, which, unlike associations, specify relational information and have a truth value. We review research on EC and implicit evaluation that tested the basic tenets of the propositional perspective on attitudes. In line with this perspective, studies show that both phenomena are moderated by relational and truth information. We discuss implications for the prediction and influencing of seemingly irrational behavior such as excessive alcohol intake and implicit racial bias.

Easy to Make, Hard to Revise: Updating Spontaneous Trait Inferences in the Presence of Trait-Inconsistent Information

Previous research has shown that perceivers spontaneously form trait inferences from others' behaviors received at a single point in time. The present work examined the persistence of spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) in the presence of trait-inconsistent information about others. We hypothesized that STIs should be resistant to change over time and in the presence of new trait-inconsistent information due to perceivers forming and storing multiple STIs independently in memory. Consistently, Experiments 1a and 1b showed that initial STIs were not affected by new trait-inconsistent information. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that STIs were persistent over 48 hours. Two experiments also tested memory reconsolidation as a possible mechanism of updating first impressions. While STIs were not substantially affected, spontaneous goal inferences (SGIs) were elevated among those with a better explicit memory of behaviors after learning trait-inconsistent information following a memory reactivation procedure. Implications of these findings on impression formation and updating processes are discussed.

The Future of Women in Psychological Science

There has been extensive discussion about gender gaps in representation and career advancement in the sciences. However, psychological science itself has yet to be the focus of discussion or systematic review, despite our field's investment in questions of equity, status, well-being, gender bias, and gender disparities. In the present article, we consider 10 topics relevant for women's career advancement in psychological science. We focus on issues that have been the subject of empirical study, discuss relevant evidence within and outside of psychological science, and draw on established psychological theory and social-science research to begin to chart a path forward. We hope that better understanding of these issues within the field will shed light on areas of existing gender gaps in the discipline and areas where positive change has happened, and spark conversation within our field about how to create lasting change to mitigate remaining gender differences in psychological science.

Can the Implicit Association Test Serve as a Valid Measure of Automatic Cognition? A Response to Schimmack (2021)

Much of human thought, feeling, and behavior unfolds automatically. Indirect measures of cognition capture such processes by observing responding under corresponding conditions (e.g., lack of intention or control). The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is one such measure. The IAT indexes the strength of association between categories such as “planes” and “trains” and attributes such as “fast” and “slow” by comparing response latencies across two sorting tasks (planes–fast/trains–slow vs. trains–fast/planes–slow). Relying on a reanalysis of multitrait–multimethod (MTMM) studies, Schimmack (this issue, p. 396) argues that the IAT and direct measures of cognition, for example, Likert scales, can serve as indicators of the same latent construct, thereby purportedly undermining the validity of the IAT as a measure of individual differences in automatic cognition. Here we note the compatibility of Schimmack’s empirical findings with a range of existing theoretical perspectives and the importance of considering evidence beyond MTMM approaches to establishing construct validity. Depending on the nature of the study, different standards of validity may apply to each use of the IAT; however, the evidence presented by Schimmack is easily reconcilable with the potential of the IAT to serve as a valid measure of automatic processes in human cognition, including in individual-difference contexts.

Moving Beyond System 1 and System 2

It is generally assumed that relational knowledge is the foundation of higher cognition such as (analogical and conditional) reasoning, language, the use of relational categories, and planning. Dual-system models (e.g., Kahneman, 2011) that divide the realm of cognition into two systems with opposing properties (e.g., fast vs. slow, intentional vs. unintentional, conscious vs. unconscious, associative vs. propositional) foster the view that other psychological phenomena are not relational in nature. In this paper, I argue that the impact of relational knowledge is more widespread than dual-system models imply. More specifically, I review evidence suggesting that also Pavlovian conditioning, implicit evaluation, and habitual responding are mediated by relational knowledge. Considering the idea that relational knowledge underlies also fast, unintentional, unconscious, and seemingly associative psychological phenomena is not only theoretically important but also reveals new opportunities for influencing thinking and behavior.

Changing Deep-Rooted Implicit Evaluation in the Blink of an Eye: Negative Verbal Information Shifts Automatic Liking of Gandhi

It is often assumed that, once established, spontaneous or implicit evaluations are resistant to immediate change. Recent research contradicts this theoretical stance, showing that a person’s implicit evaluations of an attitude object can be changed rapidly in the face of new counterattitudinal information. Importantly, it remains unknown whether such changes can also occur for deep-rooted implicit evaluations of well-known attitude objects. We address this question by examining whether the acquisition of negative information changes implicit evaluations of a well-known positive historic figure: Mahatma Gandhi. We report three experiments showing rapid changes in implicit evaluations of Gandhi as measured with an affect misattribution procedure and evaluative priming task but not with an implicit association test (IAT). These findings suggest that implicit evaluations based on deep-rooted representations are subjective to rapid changes in the face of expectancy-violating information while pointing to limitations of the IAT for assessing such changes.