The perception of causality in infancy

Children's representation of coincidence

People relish thinking about coincidences-we puzzle over their meanings and delight in conveying our experiences of them to others. But whereas some research has begun to explore how coincidences are represented by adults, little is known about the early development of these representations. Here we explored factors influencing coincidence representations in both adults and children. Across two experiments, participants read stories describing co-occurring events and then judged whether these constituted coincidences. In Experiment 1 we found that adults' coincidence judgments were highly sensitive to the presence or absence of plausible explanations: as expected, adults were more likely to judge co-occurrences as a coincidence when no explanation was available. Importantly, their coincidence judgments were also modulated by the number of events that co-occurred. Adults tended to reject scenarios involving too many co-occurring events as coincidences regardless of whether an explanation was present, suggesting that observing suspiciously many co-occurrences triggered them to infer their own underlying explanation (and thus blocking the events' interpretation as a coincidence). In Experiment 2 we found that 4- to 10-year-old children also represent coincidences, and identify them via the absence of plausible explanations. Older children, like adults, rejected suspiciously large numbers of co-occurring events as coincidental, whereas younger children did not exhibit this sensitivity. Overall, these results suggest that representation of coincidence is available from early in life, but undergoes developmental change during the early school-age years.

Infants' representations of michottean triggering events

The classic Michottean 'launching' event is consistent with a real-world Newtonian elastic collision. Previous research has shown that adult humans distinguish launching events that obey some of the physical constraints on Newtonian elastic collisions from events that do not do so early in visual processing, and that infants do so early in development (< 9 months of age). These include that in a launching event, the speed of the agent can be 3 times faster (or more) than that of the patient but the speed of the patient cannot be detectably greater than the speed of the agent. Experiment 1 shows that 7-8-month-old infants also distinguish canonical launching events from events in which the motion of the patient is rotated 90° from the trajectory of the motion of the agent (another outcome ruled out by the physics of elastic collisions). Violations of both the relative speed and the angle constraints create Michottean 'triggering' events, in which adults describe the motion of the patient as autonomous but not spontaneous, i.e., still initiated by contact with the causal agent. Experiments 2 and 3 begin to explore whether infants of this age construe Michottean triggering events as causal. We find that infants of this age are not sensitive to a reversal of the agent and patient in triggering events, thus failing to exhibit one of the signatures of representing an event as causal. We argue that there are likely several independent events schemas with causal content represented by young infants, and the literature on the origins of causal cognition in infancy would benefit from systematic investigations of event schemas other than launching events.

Causal learning by infants and young children: From computational theories to language practices

Causal reasoning-the ability to reason about causal relations between events-is fundamental to understanding how the world works. This paper reviews two prominent theories on early causal learning and offers possibilities for theory bridging. Both theories grow out of computational modeling and have significant areas of overlap while differing in several respects. Explanation-Based Learning (EBL) focuses on young infants' learning about causal concepts of physical objects and events, whereas Bayesian models have been used to describe causal reasoning beyond infancy across various concept domains. Connecting the two models offers a more integrated approach to clarifying the developmental processes in causal reasoning from early infancy through later childhood. We further suggest that everyday language practices offer a promising space for theory bridging. We provide a review of selective work on caregiver-child conversations, in particular, on the use of scaffolding language including causal talk and pedagogical questions. Linking the research on language practices to the two cognitive theories, we point out directions for further research to integrate EBL and Bayesian models and clarify how causal learning unfolds in real life. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Learning Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development.

The ability of typically developing 2-3 year olds to infer the control mechanism for eye-gaze technology and the impact of causal language instruction

PURPOSE

Little is known about how children learn to control eye-gaze technology, and clinicians lack information to guide decision-making. This paper examines whether typically developing 2-3 year olds can infer for themselves the causal mechanisms by which eye-gaze technology is controlled, whether a teaching intervention based on causal language improves performance and how their performance compares to the same task accessed via a touchscreen.Methods and materials: Typically developing children's (n = 9, Mean Age 28.7 months) performance on a cause and effect game presented on eye-gaze and touchscreen devices was compared. The game was presented first with no specific instruction on how to control the devices. This was followed by a subsequent presentation with explicit instruction about how the access methods worked, using a causal language approach. A final presentation examined whether children had retained any learning.

RESULTS

Performance in the eye-gaze condition without instruction (42.5% successful trials) was significantly below performance in the corresponding touchscreen condition (75%). However, when causal language instruction was added, performance with both access methods rose to comparable levels (90.7% eye-gaze and 94.6% touchscreen success). Performance gains were not retained post-intervention.

CONCLUSIONS

Although 2-3 years in the study could make use of eye-gaze technology with support, this study found no evidence that these children could infer the causal mechanisms of control independently or intuitively. The lack of spatial contiguity and the comparative lack of feedback from eye-gaze devices are discussed as possible contributory factors.

Perceiving animacy from kinematics: visual specification of life-likeness in simple geometric patterns

Since the seminal work of Heider and Simmel, and Michotte's research, many studies have shown that, under appropriate conditions, displays of simple geometric shapes elicit rich and vivid impressions of animacy and intentionality. The main purpose of this review is to emphasize the close relationship between kinematics and perceived animacy by showing which specific motion cues and spatiotemporal patterns automatically trigger visual perceptions of animacy and intentionality. The animacy phenomenon has been demonstrated to be rather fast, automatic, irresistible, and highly stimulus-driven. Moreover, there is growing evidence that animacy attributions, although usually associated with higher-level cognition and long-term memory, may reflect highly specialized visual processes that have evolved to support adaptive behaviors critical for survival. The hypothesis of a life-detector hardwired in the perceptual system is also supported by recent studies in early development and animal cognition, as well as by the issue of the "irresistibility" criterion, i.e., the persistence of animacy perception in adulthood even in the face of conflicting background knowledge. Finally, further support for the hypothesis that animacy is processed in the earliest stages of vision comes from recent experimental evidence on the interaction of animacy with other visual processes, such as visuomotor performance, visual memory, and speed estimation. Summarizing, the ability to detect animacy in all its nuances may be related to the visual system's sensitivity to those changes in kinematics - considered as a multifactorial relational system - that are associated with the presence of living beings, as opposed to the natural, inert behavior of physically constrained, form-invariant objects, or even mutually independent moving agents. This broad predisposition would allow the observer not only to identify the presence of animates and to distinguish them from inanimate, but also to quickly grasp their psychological, emotional, and social characteristics.

Phy-Q as a measure for physical reasoning intelligence

Humans are well versed in reasoning about the behaviours of physical objects and choosing actions accordingly to accomplish tasks, while this remains a major challenge for artificial intelligence. To facilitate research addressing this problem, we propose a new testbed that requires an agent to reason about physical scenarios and take an action appropriately. Inspired by the physical knowledge acquired in infancy and the capabilities required for robots to operate in real-world environments, we identify 15 essential physical scenarios. We create a wide variety of distinct task templates, and we ensure that all the task templates within the same scenario can be solved by using one specific strategic physical rule. By having such a design, we evaluate two distinct levels of generalization, namely local generalization and broad generalization. We conduct an extensive evaluation with human players, learning agents with various input types and architectures, and heuristic agents with different strategies. Inspired by how the human intelligence quotient is calculated, we define the physical reasoning quotient (Phy-Q score) that reflects the physical reasoning intelligence of an agent using the physical scenarios we considered. Our evaluation shows that (1) all the agents are far below human performance, and (2) learning agents, even with good local generalization ability, struggle to learn the underlying physical reasoning rules and fail to generalize broadly. We encourage the development of intelligent agents that can reach the human-level Phy-Q score.

Early parental causal language input predicts children's later causal verb understanding

How does parental causal input relate to children's later comprehension of causal verbs? Causal constructions in verbs differ across languages. Turkish has both lexical and morphological causatives. We asked whether (1) parental causal language input varied for different types of play (guided vs. free play), (2) early parental causal language input predicted children's causal verb understanding. Twenty-nine infants participated at three timepoints. Parents used lexical causatives more than morphological ones for guided-play for both timepoints, but for free-play, the same difference was only found at Time 2. For Time 3, children were tested on a verb comprehension and a vocabulary task. Morphological causative input, but not lexical causative input, during free-play predicted children's causal verb comprehension. For guided-play, the same relation did not hold. Findings suggest a role of specific types of causal input on children's understanding of causal verbs that are received in certain play contexts.

IntPhys 2019: A Benchmark for Visual Intuitive Physics Understanding

In order to reach human performance on complex visual tasks, artificial systems need to incorporate a significant amount of understanding of the world in terms of macroscopic objects, movements, forces, etc. Inspired by work on intuitive physics in infants, we propose an evaluation benchmark which diagnoses how much a given system understands about physics by testing whether it can tell apart well matched videos of possible versus impossible events constructed with a game engine. The test requires systems to compute a physical plausibility score over an entire video. To prevent perceptual biases, the dataset is made of pixel matched quadruplets of videos, enforcing systems to focus on high level temporal dependencies between frames rather than pixel-level details. We then describe two Deep Neural Networks systems aimed at learning intuitive physics in an unsupervised way, using only physically possible videos. The systems are trained with a future semantic mask prediction objective and tested on the possible versus impossible discrimination task. The analysis of their results compared to human data gives novel insights in the potentials and limitations of next frame prediction architectures.

Dogs' looking times and pupil dilation response reveal expectations about contact causality

Contact causality is one of the fundamental principles allowing us to make sense of our physical environment. From an early age, humans perceive spatio-temporally contiguous launching events as causal. Surprisingly little is known about causal perception in non-human animals, particularly outside the primate order. Violation-of-expectation paradigms in combination with eye-tracking and pupillometry have been used to study physical expectations in human infants. In the current study, we establish this approach for dogs (Canis familiaris). We presented dogs with realistic three-dimensional animations of launching events with contact (regular launching event) or without contact between the involved objects. In both conditions, the objects moved with the same timing and kinematic properties. The dogs tracked the object movements closely throughout the study but their pupils were larger in the no-contact condition and they looked longer at the object initiating the launch after the no-contact event compared to the contact event. We conclude that dogs have implicit expectations about contact causality.

Causality and continuity close the gaps in event representations

Imagine you see a video of someone pulling back their leg to kick a soccer ball, and then a soccer ball soaring toward a goal. You would likely infer that these scenes are two parts of the same event, and this inference would likely cause you to remember having seen the moment the person kicked the soccer ball, even if that information was never actually presented (Strickland & Keil, 2011, Cognition, 121[3], 409-415). What cues trigger people to "fill in" causal events from incomplete information? Is it due to the experience they have had with soccer balls being kicked toward goals? Is it the visual similarity of the object in both halves of the video? Or is it the mere spatiotemporal continuity of the event? In three experiments, we tested these different potential mechanisms underlying the "filling-in" effect. Experiment 1 showed that filling in occurs equally in familiar and unfamiliar contexts, indicating that familiarity with specific event schemas is unnecessary to trigger false memory. Experiment 2 showed that the visible continuation of a launched object's trajectory is all that is required to trigger filling in, regardless of other occurrences in the second half of the scene. Finally, Experiment 3 found that, using naturalistic videos, this filling-in effect is more heavily affected if the object's trajectory is discontinuous in space/time compared with if the object undergoes a noticeable transformation. Together, these findings indicate that the spontaneous formation of causal event representations is driven by object representation systems that prioritize spatiotemporal information over other object features.

The trajectory of counterfactual simulation in development

Young children often struggle to answer the question "what would have happened?" particularly in cases where the adult-like "correct" answer has the same outcome as the event that actually occurred. Previous work has assumed that children fail because they cannot engage in accurate counterfactual simulations. Children have trouble considering what to change and what to keep fixed when comparing counterfactual alternatives to reality. However, most developmental studies on counterfactual reasoning have relied on binary yes/no responses to counterfactual questions about complex narratives and so have only been able to document when these failures occur but not why and how. Here, we investigate counterfactual reasoning in a domain in which specific counterfactual possibilities are very concrete: simple collision interactions. In Experiment 1, we show that 5- to 10-year-old children (recruited from schools and museums in Connecticut) succeed in making predictions but struggle to answer binary counterfactual questions. In Experiment 2, we use a multiple-choice method to allow children to select a specific counterfactual possibility. We find evidence that 4- to 6-year-old children (recruited online from across the United States) do conduct counterfactual simulations, but the counterfactual possibilities younger children consider differ from adult-like reasoning in systematic ways. Experiment 3 provides further evidence that young children engage in simulation rather than using a simpler visual matching strategy. Together, these experiments show that the developmental changes in counterfactual reasoning are not simply a matter of whether children engage in counterfactual simulation but also how they do so. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Developing an Understanding of Science

Young children are adept at several types of scientific reasoning, yet older children and adults have difficulty mastering formal scientific ideas and practices. Why do “little scientists” often become scientifically illiterate adults? We address this question by examining the role of intuition in learning science, both as a body of knowledge and as a method of inquiry. Intuition supports children's understanding of everyday phenomena but conflicts with their ability to learn physical and biological concepts that defy firsthand observation, such as molecules, forces, genes, and germs. Likewise, intuition supports children's causal learning but provides little guidance on how to navigate higher-order constraints on scientific induction, such as the control of variables or the coordination of theory and data. We characterize the foundations of children's intuitive understanding of the natural world, as well as the conceptual scaffolds needed to bridge these intuitions with formal science.

Mapping Mind-Brain Development: Towards a Comprehensive Theory

The relations between the developing mind and developing brain are explored. We outline a theory of intellectual development postulating that the mind comprises four systems of processes (domain-specific, attention and working memory, reasoning, and cognizance) developing in four cycles (episodic, realistic, rule-based, and principle-based representations, emerging at birth, 2, 6, and 11 years, respectively), with two phases in each. Changes in reasoning relate to processing efficiency in the first phase and working memory in the second phase. Awareness of mental processes is recycled with the changes in each cycle and drives their integration into the representational unit of the next cycle. Brain research shows that each type of processes is served by specialized brain networks. Domain-specific processes are rooted in sensory cortices; working memory processes are mainly rooted in hippocampal, parietal, and prefrontal cortices; abstraction and alignment processes are rooted in parietal, frontal, and prefrontal and medial cortices. Information entering these networks is available to awareness processes. Brain networks change along the four cycles, in precision, connectivity, and brain rhythms. Principles of mind-brain interaction are discussed.

What Is Causal Cognition?

While gaining an understanding of cause-effect relations is the key goal of causal cognition, its components are less clearly delineated. Standard approaches in the field focus on how individuals detect, learn, and reason from statistical regularities, thereby prioritizing cognitive processes over content and context. This article calls for a broadened perspective. To gain a more comprehensive understanding of what is going on when humans engage in causal cognition—including its application to machine cognition—it is argued, we also need to take into account the content that informs the processing, the means and mechanisms of knowledge accumulation and transmission, and the cultural context in which both accumulation and transmission take place.

Origins of the concepts cause, cost, and goal in prereaching infants

We investigated the origins and interrelations of causal knowledge and knowledge of agency in 3-month-old infants, who cannot yet effect changes in the world by reaching for, grasping, and picking up objects. Across 5 experiments, n = 152 prereaching infants viewed object-directed reaches that varied in efficiency (following the shortest physically possible path vs. a longer path), goal (lifting an object vs. causing a change in its state), and causal structure (action on contact vs. action at a distance and after a delay). Prereaching infants showed no strong looking preference between a person's efficient and inefficient reaches when the person grasped and displaced an object. When the person reached for and caused a change in the state of the object on contact, however, infants looked longer when this action was inefficient than when it was efficient. Three-month-old infants also showed a key signature of adults' and older infants' causal inferences: This looking preference was abolished if a short spatial and temporal gap separated the action from its effect. The basic intuition that people are causal agents, who navigate around physical constraints to change the state of the world, may be one important foundation for infants' ability to plan their own actions and learn from the acts of others.

Causal events enter awareness faster than non-causal events

Philosophers have long argued that causality cannot be directly observed but requires a conscious inference (Hume, 1967). Albert Michotte however developed numerous visual phenomena in which people seemed to perceive causality akin to primary visual properties like colour or motion (Michotte, 1946). Michotte claimed that the perception of causality did not require a conscious, deliberate inference but, working over 70 years ago, he did not have access to the experimental methods to test this claim. Here we employ Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS)-an interocular suppression technique to render stimuli invisible (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005)-to test whether causal events enter awareness faster than non-causal events. We presented observers with 'causal' and 'non-causal' events, and found consistent evidence that participants become aware of causal events more rapidly than non-causal events. Our results suggest that, whilst causality must be inferred from sensory evidence, this inference might be computed at low levels of perceptual processing, and does not depend on a deliberative conscious evaluation of the stimulus. This work therefore supports Michotte's contention that, like colour or motion, causality is an immediate property of our perception of the world.

The Development of Causal Structure without a Language Model

Across a diverse range of languages, children proceed through similar stages in their production of causal language: their initial verbs lack internal causal structure, followed by a period during which they produce causative overgeneralizations, indicating knowledge of a productive causative rule. We asked in this study whether a child not exposed to structured linguistic input could create linguistic devices for encoding causation and, if so, whether the emergence of this causal language would follow a trajectory similar to the one observed for children learning language from linguistic input. We show that the child in our study did develop causation-encoding morphology, but only after initially using verbs that lacked internal causal structure. These results suggest that the ability to encode causation linguistically can emerge in the absence of a language model, and that exposure to linguistic input is not the only factor guiding children from one stage to the next in their production of causal language.

Probing the Cultural Constitution of Causal Cognition - A Research Program

To what extent is the way people perceive, represent, and reason about causal relationships dependent on culture? While there have been sporadic attempts to explore this question, a systematic investigation is still lacking. Here, we propose that human causal cognition is not only superficially affected by cultural background, but that it is co-constituted by the cultural nature of the human species. To this end, we take stock of on-going research, with a particular focus on the methodological approaches taken: cross-species comparisons, archeological accounts, developmental studies, cross-cultural, and cross-linguistic experiments, as well as in-depth within-culture analyses of cognitive concepts, processes, and changes over time. We argue that only a combination of these approaches will allow us to integrate different components of cognition, levels of analysis, and points of view—the key requirements for a comprehensive, interdisciplinary research program to advance this field.

Learning Perceptual Causality from Video

Perceptual causality is the perception of causal relationships from observation. Humans, even as infants, form such models from observation of the world around them [Saxe and Carey 2006]. For a deeper understanding, the computer must make similar models through the analogous form of observation: video. In this article, we provide a framework for the unsupervised learning of this perceptual causal structure from video. Our method takes action and object status detections as input and uses heuristics suggested by cognitive science research to produce the causal links perceived between them. We greedily modify an initial distribution featuring independence between potential causes and effects by adding dependencies that maximize information gain. We compile the learned causal relationships into a Causal And-Or Graph, a probabilistic and-or representation of causality that adds a prior to causality. Validated against human perception, experiments show that our method correctly learns causal relations, attributing status changes of objects to causing actions amid irrelevant actions. Our method outperforms Hellinger’s χ 2 -statistic by considering hierarchical action selection, and outperforms the treatment effect by discounting coincidental relationships.

Twelve-Month-Old Infants' Encoding of Goal and Source Paths in Agentive and Non-Agentive Motion Events

Across languages and event types (agentive and non-agentive motion, transfer, change of state, attach/detach), goal paths are privileged over source paths in the linguistic encoding of events. Furthermore, some linguistic analyses suggest that goal paths are more central than source paths in the semantic and syntactic structure of motion verbs. However, in the non-linguistic memory of children and adults, a goal bias shows up only for events involving intentional, goal-directed, action. Three experiments explored infants' non-linguistic representations of goals and sources in motion events. The findings revealed that 12-month-old infants privilege goals over sources only when the event involves action of an agent. Thus, unlike language (but similar to the memory of children and adults), an endpoint bias in infant thought may be restricted to events involving goal-directed motion by an agent. These results raise the question of how children later learn to collapse over conceptual domains for purposes of coding paths in language.

Differences and commonalities in the judgment of causality in physical and social contexts: an fMRI study

Understanding cause and effect is a fundamental aspect of human cognition. When shown videos of simple two-dimensional shapes colliding, humans experience one object causing the other to move, e.g., one billiard-like ball seeming to hit and move the other. The impression of causality can also occur when people attribute social interactions to moving objects. Whether the judgment of social and physical causality engages distinct or shared neural networks is not known. In a functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) study, participants were presented with two types of dynamic videos: a blue ball colliding with a red ball (P; physical condition) and a blue ball ("Mr. Blue") passing a red ball ("Mrs. Red") without making contact (S; social condition). Participants judged causal relationships (C) or movement direction (D; control task) in both video types, resulting in four conditions (PC; SC; PD; SD). We found common neural activations for physical and social causality judgments (SC > SD)∩(PC > PD) in the right middle/inferior frontal gyrus, right inferior parietal lobule, the right supplementary motor area, and bilateral insulae. For social causal judgments (SC > PC), we found distinct neural activity in the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ). These results provide evidence for a common neural network underlying judgments of causality that apply to both physical and social situations. The results also indicate that social causality judgments recruit additional neural resources in an area critical for determining animacy and intentionality.

The cradle of causal reasoning: newborns' preference for physical causality

Perception of mechanical (i.e. physical) causality, in terms of a cause-effect relationship between two motion events, appears to be a powerful mechanism in our daily experience. In spite of a growing interest in the earliest causal representations, the role of experience in the origin of this sensitivity is still a matter of dispute. Here, we asked the question about the innate origin of causal perception, never tested before at birth. Three experiments were carried out to investigate sensitivity at birth to some visual spatiotemporal cues present in a launching event. Newborn babies, only a few hours old, showed that they significantly preferred a physical causality event (i.e. Michotte's Launching effect) when matched to a delay event (i.e. a delayed launching; Experiment 1) or to a non-causal event completely identical to the causal one except for the order of the displacements of the two objects involved which was swapped temporally (Experiment 3). This preference for the launching event, moreover, also depended on the continuity of the trajectory between the objects involved in the event (Experiment 2). These results support the hypothesis that the human system possesses an early available, possibly innate basic mechanism to compute causality, such a mechanism being sensitive to the additive effect of certain well-defined spatiotemporal cues present in the causal event independently of any prior visual experience.

Are Implicit Causality Pronoun Resolution Biases Consistent Across Languages and Cultures?

The referent of a nonreflexive pronoun depends on context, but the nature of these contextual restrictions is controversial. For instance, in causal dependent clauses, the preferred referent of a pronoun varies systematically with the verb in the main clause (Sally frightens Mary because she … vs. Sally loves Mary because she …). Several theories claim that verbs with similar meanings across languages should show similar pronoun resolution effects, but these claims run contrary to recent analyses on which much of linguistic and nonlinguistic cognition is susceptible to cross-cultural variation, and in fact there is little data in the literature to decide the question one way or another. Analysis of data in eight languages representing four historically unrelated language families reveals consistent pronoun resolution biases for emotion verbs, suggesting that the information upon which implicit causality pronoun resolution biases are derived is stable across languages and cultures.

Emerging perception of causality in action-and-reaction sequences from 4 to 6 months of age: is it domain-specific?

Two experiments (N=136) studied how 4- to 6-month-olds perceive a simple schematic event, seen as goal-directed action and reaction from 3 years of age. In our causal reaction event, a red square moved toward a blue square, stopping prior to contact. Blue began to move away before red stopped, so that both briefly moved simultaneously at a distance. Primarily, our study sought to determine from what age infants see the causal structure of this reaction event. In addition, we looked at whether this causal percept depends on an animate style of motion and whether it correlates with tasks assessing goal perception and goal-directed action. Infants saw either causal reactions or noncausal delayed control events in which blue started some time after red stopped. These events involved squares that moved either rigidly or nonrigidly in an apparently animate manner. After habituation to one of the four events, infants were tested on reversal of the habituation event. Spatiotemporal features reversed for all events, but causal roles changed only in reversed reactions. The 6-month-olds dishabituated significantly more to reversal of causal reaction events than to noncausal delay events, whereas younger infants reacted similarly to reversal of both. Thus, perceptual causality for reaction events emerges by 6 months of age, a younger age than previously reported but, crucially, the same age at which perceptual causality for launch events has emerged in prior research. On our second question, animate/inanimate motion had no effect at any age, nor did significant correlations emerge with our additional tasks assessing goal perception or goal-directed object retrieval. Available evidence, here and elsewhere, is as compatible with a view that infants initially see A affecting B, without differentiation into physical or psychological causality, as with the standard assumption of distinct physical/psychological causal perception.

Visual impressions of pushing and pulling: the object perceived as causal is not always the one that moves first

Stimuli were presented in which a moving object (A) contacted a stationary object (B), whereupon both objects moved back in the direction from which object A had come. When object B rapidly decelerated to a standstill, so that the two objects did not remain in contact, object B was perceived as pushing object A. Thus, even though object B only moved when contacted by object A, it was perceived as the causal object, as making something happen to object A. This is contrary to the hypothesis that the object perceived as causal is always the object that moves first. It is, however, consistent with a theoretical account, in which visual causal impressions occur through a process in which visually picked-up kinematic information is matched to stored representations, based on experiences of actions on objects, which specify forces and causality as part of the perceptual interpretation of the event.

Infants' representations of causation

It is consistent with the evidence in The Origin of Concepts to conjecture that infants' causal representations, like their numerical representations, are not continuous with adults', so that bootstrapping is needed in both cases.

Causation From Perception

Beginning with the research of Albert Michotte, investigators have identified simple perceptual events that observers report as causal. For example, suppose a square moves across a screen and comes to a halt when it makes contact with a second square. If the second square then begins moving in the same direction, observers sometimes report that the first square “pushed” the second or “caused it to move.” Based on such reports, Michotte claimed that people perceive causality, and a number of psychologists and philosophers have followed his lead. This article examines Michotte’s hypothesis by comparing it with its chief rival: Observers possess representations of pushings, pullings, and other events in long-term memory. A Michottean display triggers one of these representations, and the representation classifies the display as an instance of pushing (or pulling, etc.). According to this second explanation, recognizing an event as a pushing is similar to classifying an object as a cup or a dog. Data relevant to this debate come from infant and animal studies, cognitive and neuropsychological dissociation experiments, and studies of context effects and individual differences. However, a review of research in these paradigms finds no reason to prefer Michotte’s theory over its competitor.

Correspondences between what infants see and know about causal and self-propelled motion

The associative learning account of how infants identify human motion rests on the assumption that this knowledge is derived from statistical regularities seen in the world. Yet, no catalog exists of what visual input infants receive of human motion, and of causal and self-propelled motion in particular. In this manuscript, we demonstrate that the frequency with which causal agency and self-propelled motion appear in the visual environment predicts infants' understanding of these motions. In an observational study, an infant wearing a head-mounted camera saw people act as agents in causal events three times more often than he saw people engaged in self-propelled motion. Subsequent experiments with the habituation paradigm revealed that infants begin to generalize self-propulsion to agents in causal events between 10 and 14 months of age. However, infants cannot generalize causal agency to a self-propelled object at 14 or 18 months unless the object exhibits additional cues to animacy. The results are discussed within a domain-general framework of learning about human action.

The property transmission hypothesis: a possible explanation for visual impressions of pulling and other kinds of phenomenal causality

Under certain circumstances, stimuli involving two moving objects that do not come into contact reliably give rise to the illusory perceptual impression that one of the objects is pulling the other, as if there is an unseen connection between them. It is proposed that the conditions determining the occurrence of this impression can be explained as cases of application of the property-transmission hypothesis. This is a general hypothesis that causal objects operate in part by transmitting some of their own properties to effect objects under conditions where the causal object is active, where there are cues to the occurrence of generative transmission between the causal object and an effect object, and where there is a time-ordered relation of resemblance between properties of the causal object and those of the effect object. This hypothesis predicts that the pulling impression should occur only when the effect object adopts kinematic properties (speed and direction) that resemble those of the causal object. An experiment is reported that supports this prediction.

Infants' causal representations of state change events

Five experiments extended studies of infants' causal representations of Michottian launching events to 8-month-olds' causal representations of physical state changes. Infants were habituated to events in which a potential causal agent moved behind a screen, after which a box partially visible on the other side of the screen underwent some change (motion or state change). After habituation the screen was removed, and infants observed full events in which the potential agent either did or did not contact the box (contact vs. gap events). Infants were credited with causal representations of the events if their attention was drawn both to gap events in which the effect nonetheless occurred and to events with contact in which the effect did not happen. The experiments varied the nature of the effect (motion vs. state change) and the nature of the possible causal agent (train, hand, novel intentional agent). Both the nature of the effect and the nature of the possible agent influenced the likelihood of causal attribution. The events involving motion of the patient replicated previous studies of infants' representations of Michottian launching events: the toy train was taken as the source of the boxes motion. In contrast, infants attributed the cause of the box's physical state change to a hand and novel self-moving entity with eyes, but not to a toy train. These data address early developing causal schemata, and bring new information to bear on theories of the origin of human causal cognition.

Causality attribution biases oculomotor responses

When viewing one object move after being struck by another, humans perceive that the action of the first object "caused" the motion of the second, not that the two events occurred independently. Although established as a perceptual and linguistic concept, it is not yet known whether the notion of causality exists as a fundamental, preattentional "Gestalt" that can influence predictive motor processes. Therefore, eye movements of human observers were measured while viewing a display in which a launcher impacted a tool to trigger the motion of a second "reaction" target. The reaction target could move either in the direction predicted by transfer of momentum after the collision ("causal") or in a different direction ("noncausal"), with equal probability. Control trials were also performed with identical target motion, either with a 100 ms time delay between the collision and reactive motion, or without the interposed tool. Subjects made significantly more predictive movements (smooth pursuit and saccades) in the causal direction during standard trials, and smooth pursuit latencies were also shorter overall. These trends were reduced or absent in control trials. In addition, pursuit latencies in the noncausal direction were longer during standard trials than during control trials. The results show that causal context has a strong influence on predictive movements.