From exploitation to cooperation: social tool use in orang-utan mother–offspring dyads

A cooperation experiment with white-handed gibbons (Hylobates lar)

Cooperative behaviors among individuals of numerous species play a crucial role in social interactions. There is a special interest in investigating the occurrence of cooperation among apes because this knowledge could also shed light on evolutionary processes and help us understand the origin and development of cooperation in humans and primates in general. Gibbons are phylogenetically intermediate between the great apes and monkeys, and therefore represent a unique opportunity for comparisons. The aim of the present study was to discover whether or not white-handed gibbons (Hylobates lar) show cooperative behaviors. In order to test for the respective behaviors, the gibbons were presented with a commonly used experimental cooperative rope-pulling task. The gibbons in this study did not exhibit cooperative behaviors during the problem-solving task. However, prior training procedures could not be fully completed, hence this project constitutes only the onset of exploring cooperative behaviors in gibbons. Additional behavioral observations revealed that the gibbons spent significantly more time "out of arm's reach to everyone", suggesting that they are less often involved in social interactions, than other, more cooperative primates.

A convergent interaction engine: vocal communication among marmoset monkeys

To understand the primate origins of the human interaction engine, it is worthwhile to focus not only on great apes but also on callitrichid monkeys (marmosets and tamarins). Like humans, but unlike great apes, callitrichids are cooperative breeders, and thus habitually engage in coordinated joint actions, for instance when an infant is handed over from one group member to another. We first explore the hypothesis that these habitual cooperative interactions, the marmoset interactional ethology, are supported by the same key elements as found in the human interaction engine: mutual gaze (during joint action), turn-taking, volubility, as well as group-wide prosociality and trust. Marmosets show clear evidence of these features. We next examine the prediction that, if such an interaction engine can indeed give rise to more flexible communication, callitrichids may also possess elaborate communicative skills. A review of marmoset vocal communication confirms unusual abilities in these small primates: high volubility and large vocal repertoires, vocal learning and babbling in immatures, and voluntary usage and control. We end by discussing how the adoption of cooperative breeding during human evolution may have catalysed language evolution by adding these convergent consequences to the great ape-like cognitive system of our hominin ancestors. This article is part of the theme issue 'Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination'.

When and how do non-human great apes communicate to support cooperation?

Several scholars have long suggested that human language and remarkable communicative abilities originate from the need and motivation to cooperate and coordinate actions with others. Yet, little work has focused on when and how great apes communicate during joint action tasks, partly because of the widely held assumption that animal communication is mostly manipulative, but also because non-human great apes' default motivation seems to be competitive rather than cooperative. Here, we review experimental cooperative tasks and show how situational challenges and the degree of asymmetry in terms of knowledge relevant for the joint action task affect the likelihood of communication. We highlight how physical proximity and strength of social bond between the participants affect the occurrence and type of communication. Lastly, we highlight how, from a production point of view, communicators appear capable of calibrating their signalling and controlling their delivery, showing clear evidence of first-order intentionality. On the other hand, recipients appear to struggle in terms of making use of referential information received. We discuss different hypotheses accounting for this asymmetry and provide suggestions concerning how future work could help us unveil to what degree the need for cooperation has shaped our closest living relatives' communicative behaviour.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Revisiting the human ‘interaction engine’: comparative approaches to social action coordination’.

Expression unleashed: The evolutionary and cognitive foundations of human communication

Human expression is open-ended, versatile, and diverse, ranging from ordinary language use to painting, from exaggerated displays of affection to micro-movements that aid coordination. Here we present and defend the claim that this expressive diversity is united by an interrelated suite of cognitive capacities, the evolved functions of which are the expression and recognition of informative intentions. We describe how evolutionary dynamics normally leash communication to narrow domains of statistical mutual benefit, and how expression is unleashed in humans. The relevant cognitive capacities are cognitive adaptations to living in a partner choice social ecology; and they are, correspondingly, part of the ordinarily developing human cognitive phenotype, emerging early and reliably in ontogeny. In other words, we identify distinctive features of our species' social ecology to explain how and why humans, and only humans, evolved the cognitive capacities that, in turn, lead to massive diversity and open-endedness in means and modes of expression. Language use is but one of these modes of expression, albeit one of manifestly high importance. We make cross-species comparisons, describe how the relevant cognitive capacities can evolve in a gradual manner, and survey how unleashed expression facilitates not only language use, but also novel behaviour in many other domains too, focusing on the examples of joint action, teaching, punishment, and art, all of which are ubiquitous in human societies but relatively rare in other species. Much of this diversity derives from graded aspects of human expression, which can be used to satisfy informative intentions in creative and new ways. We aim to help reorient cognitive pragmatics, as a phenomenon that is not a supplement to linguistic communication and on the periphery of language science, but rather the foundation of the many of the most distinctive features of human behaviour, society, and culture.

Individual Goffin´s cockatoos (Cacatua goffiniana) show flexible targeted helping in a tool transfer task

Flexible targeted helping is considered an advanced form of prosocial behavior in hominoids, as it requires the actor to assess different situations that a conspecific may be in, and to subsequently flexibly satisfy different needs of that partner depending on the nature of those situations. So far, apart from humans such behaviour has only been experimentally shown in chimpanzees and in Eurasian jays. Recent studies highlight the prosocial tendencies of several bird species, yet flexible targeted helping remained untested, largely due to methodological issues as such tasks are generally designed around tool-use, and very few bird species are capable of tool-use. Here, we tested Goffin's cockatoos, which proved to be skilled tool innovators in captivity, in a tool transfer task in which an actor had access to four different objects/tools and a partner to one of two different apparatuses that each required one of these tools to retrieve a reward. As expected from this species, we recorded playful object transfers across all conditions. Yet, importantly and similar to apes, three out of eight birds transferred the correct tool more often in the test condition than in a condition that also featured an apparatus but no partner. Furthermore, one of these birds transferred that correct tool first more often before transferring any other object in the test condition than in the no-partner condition, while the other two cockatoos were marginally non-significantly more likely to do so. Additionally, there was no difference in the likelihood of the correct tool being transferred first for either of the two apparatuses, suggesting that these birds flexibly adjusted what to transfer based on their partner´s need. Future studies should focus on explanations for the intra-specific variation of this behaviour, and should test other parrots and other large-brained birds to see how this can be generalized across the class and to investigate the evolutionary history of this trait.

Gibbon strategies in a food competition task

Social primates face conflicts of interest with other partners when their individual and collective interests collide. Despite living in small, primarily bonded, groups compared to other social primates, gibbons are not exempt from these conflicts in their everyday lives. In the current task, we asked whether dyads of gibbons would solve a conflict of interest over food rewards. We presented dyads of gibbons with a situation in which they could decide whether to take an active role and pull a handle to release food rewards at a distance or take a passive role and avoid action. In this situation, the passive partner could take an advantageous position to obtain the rewards over the active partner. Gibbons participated in three conditions: a control condition with no food rewards, a test condition with indirect food rewards and a test condition with direct food rewards. In both test conditions, five rewards were released at a distance from the handle. In addition, the active individual could obtain one extra food reward from the handle in the direct food condition. We found that gibbons acted more often in the two conditions involving food rewards, and waited longer in the indirect compared to the direct food condition, thus suggesting that they understood the task contingencies. Surprisingly, we found that in a majority of dyads, individuals in the active role obtained most of the payoff compared to individuals in the passive role in both food conditions. Furthermore, in some occasions individuals in the active role did not approach the location where the food was released. These results suggest that while gibbons may strategize to maximize benefits in a competitive food task, they often allowed their partners to obtain better rewards. Our results highlight the importance of social tolerance and motivation as drivers promoting cooperation in these species.

No evidence for a relationship between breed cooperativeness and inequity aversion in dogs

Inequity aversion, the resistance to inequitable outcomes, has been demonstrated in a wide variety of animal species. Inequity aversion was hypothesised to have co-evolved with cooperation but only limited evidence supports this. Dogs provide a suitable model species to test this hypothesis as dogs were previously shown to be inequity averse and dog breeds vary in the extent to which they were selected for cooperativeness. Here, we compared the response of 12 individuals of "cooperative worker" breeds with that of 12 individuals of "independent worker" breeds in the "paw task" previously used to demonstrate inequity aversion in dogs. We also compared the two breed groups' subsequent social behaviours in a food tolerance test and free interaction session. Although subjects in both breed groups were inequity averse, we found no considerable difference between the groups in the extent of the negative response to inequity or in the impact of the inequity on subsequent social behaviours. However, we found differences between the breed groups in the response to reward omission with cooperative breeds tending to work for longer than independent breeds. Additionally, in the free interaction session, individuals of cooperative breeds spent more time in proximity to their partner in the baseline condition than individuals of independent breeds. Overall, our results do not provide support for the hypothesis that inequity aversion and cooperation co-evolved. However, they illuminate potential differences in selection pressures experienced by cooperative worker and independent worker dog breeds throughout their evolutionary history.

How animals collaborate: Underlying proximate mechanisms

Collaboration or social interactions in which two or more individuals coordinate their behavior to produce outcomes from which both individuals benefit are common in nature. Individuals from many species hunt together, defend their territory, and form coalitions in intragroup competition. However, we still know very little about the proximate mechanisms underlying these behaviors. Recent theories of human cognitive evolution have emphasized the role collaboration may have played in the selection of socio-cognitive skills. It has been argued that the capacity to form shared goals and joint intentions with others, is what allows humans to collaborate so flexibly and efficiently. Although there is no evidence that nonhuman animals are capable of shared intentionality, there is conceivably a wide range of proximate mechanisms that support forms of, potentially flexible, collaboration in other species. We review the experimental literature with the aim of evaluating what we know about how other species achieve collaboration; with a particular focus on chimpanzees. We structure the review with a new categorization of collaborative behavior that focuses on whether individuals intentionally coordinate actions with others. We conclude that for a wider comparative perspective we need more data from other species but the findings so far suggest that chimpanzees, and possibly other great apes, are capable of understanding the causal role of a partner in collaboration. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Psychology > Comparative Psychology.

Gorillas' (Gorilla g. gorilla) knowledge of conspecifics' affordances: intraspecific social tool use for food acquisition

The use of tools, long thought to be uniquely human, has now been observed in other animal taxa including several species of birds, non-primate mammals as well as some non-human primate species. Chimpanzees, one of humankind’s closest living relatives, exceed all other non-human animal species as they have been reported to use an exceptionally large toolkit. However, relatively little is known about the tool-use skills of the other great ape species. While the majority of tools described are inanimate objects, the use of social tools has received relatively little attention. Here we provide the first evidence of naturally occurring spontaneous exploitative behaviour of a conspecific as a social tool for food acquisition in non-human animals. We observed gorillas in captivity utilising a conspecific as a ladder to gain access to unreachable food. We discuss our findings in the light of other studies on social tool use and suggest the need for more nuanced interpretations of gorillas’ cognitive skills.

Children, chimpanzees, and bonobos adjust the visibility of their actions for cooperators and competitors

Chimpanzees and bonobos are highly capable of tracking other's mental states. It has been proposed, however, that in contrast to humans, chimpanzees are only able to do this in competitive interactions but this has rarely been directly tested. Here, pairs of chimpanzees or bonobos (Study 1) and 4-year-old children (Study 2) were presented with two almost identical tasks differing only regarding the social context. In the cooperation condition, players' interests were matched: they had to make corresponding choices to be mutually rewarded. To facilitate coordination, subjects should thus make their actions visible to their partner whose view was partially occluded. In the competition condition, players' interests were directly opposed: the partner tried to match the subject's choice but subjects were only rewarded if they chose differently, so that they benefited from hiding their actions. The apes successfully adapted their decisions to the social context and their performance was markedly better in the cooperation condition. Children also distinguished between the two contexts, but somewhat surprisingly, performed better in the competitive condition. These findings demonstrate experimentally that chimpanzees and bonobos can take into account what others can see in cooperative interactions. Their social-cognitive skills are thus more flexible than previously assumed.

Social manipulation in nonhuman primates: Cognitive and motivational determinants

Social interactions are the result of individuals' cooperative and competitive tendencies expressed over an extended period of time. Although social manipulation, i.e., using another individual to achieve one's own goals, is a crucial aspect of social interactions, there has been no comprehensive attempt to differentiate its various types and to map its cognitive and motivational determinants. For this purpose, we survey in this article the experimental literature on social interactions in nonhuman primates. We take social manipulation, illustrated by a case study with orangutans (Pongo abelii), as our starting point and move in two directions. First, we will focus on a flexibility/sociality axis that includes technical problem solving, social tool-use and communication. Second, we will focus on a motivational/prosociality axis that includes exploitation, cooperation, and helping. Combined, the two axes offer a way to capture a broad range of social interactions performed by human and nonhuman primates.

Distal Communication by Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): Evidence for Common Ground?

van der Goot et al. (2014) proposed that distal, deictic communication indexed the appreciation of the psychological state of a common ground between a signaler and a receiver. In their study, great apes did not signal distally, which they construed as evidence for the human uniqueness of a sense of common ground. This study exposed 166 chimpanzees to food and an experimenter, at an angular displacement, to ask, "Do chimpanzees display distal communication?" Apes were categorized as (a) proximal or (b) distal signalers on each of four trials. The number of chimpanzees who communicated proximally did not statistically differ from the number who signaled distally. Therefore, contrary to the claim by van der Goot et al., apes do communicate distally.

New Caledonian crows rapidly solve a collaborative problem without cooperative cognition

There is growing comparative evidence that the cognitive bases of cooperation are not unique to humans. However, the selective pressures that lead to the evolution of these mechanisms remain unclear. Here we show that while tool-making New Caledonian crows can produce collaborative behavior, they do not understand the causality of cooperation nor show sensitivity to inequity. Instead, the collaborative behavior produced appears to have been underpinned by the transfer of prior experience. These results suggest that a number of possible selective pressures, including tool manufacture and mobbing behaviours, have not led to the evolution of cooperative cognition in this species. They show that causal cognition can evolve in a domain specific manner–understanding the properties and flexible uses of physical tools does not necessarily enable animals to grasp that a conspecific can be used as a social tool.