Chimpanzees gesture to humans in mirrors: using reflection to dissociate seeing from line of gaze

Is self-awareness necessary to have a theory of mind?

Forty years ago, Gallup proposed that theory of mind presupposes self-awareness. Following Humphrey, his hypothesis was that individuals can infer the mental states of others thanks to the ability to monitor their own mental states in similar circumstances. Since then, advances in several disciplines, such as comparative and developmental psychology, have provided empirical evidence to test Gallup's hypothesis. Herein, we review and discuss this evidence.

Dogs do not use their own experience with novel barriers to infer others' visual access

Despite extensive research into the Theory of Mind abilities in non-human animals, it remains controversial whether they can attribute mental states to other individuals or whether they merely predict future behaviour based on previous behavioural cues. In the present study, we tested pet dogs (in total, N = 92) on adaptations of the 'goggles test' previously used with human infants and great apes. In both a cooperative and a competitive task, dogs were given direct experience with the properties of novel screens (one opaque, the other transparent) inserted into identical, but differently coloured, tunnels. Dogs learned and remembered the properties of the screens even when, later on, these were no longer directly visible to them. Nevertheless, they were not more likely to follow the experimenter's gaze to a target object when the experimenter could see it through the transparent screen. Further, they did not prefer to steal a forbidden treat first in a location obstructed from the experimenter's view by the opaque screen. Therefore, dogs did not show perspective-taking abilities in this study in which the only available cue to infer others' visual access consisted of the subjects' own previous experience with novel visual barriers. We conclude that the behaviour of our dogs, unlike that of infants and apes in previous studies, does not show evidence of experience-projection abilities.

Sulcal Morphology in Cingulate Cortex is Associated with Voluntary Oro-Facial Motor Control and Gestural Communication in Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

Individual differences in sulcal variation within the anterior and mid-cingulate cortex of the human brain, particularly the presence or absence of a paracingulate sulcus (PCGS), are associated with various motor and cognitive processes. Recently, it has been reported that chimpanzees possess a PCGS, previously thought to be a unique feature of the human brain. Here, we examined whether individual variation in the presence or absence of a PCGS as well as the variability in the intralimbic sulcus (ILS) are associated with oro-facial motor control, handedness for manual gestures, and sex in a sample of MRI scans obtained in 225 chimpanzees. Additionally, we quantified the depth of the cingulate sulcus (CGS) along the anterior-posterior axis and tested for association with oro-facial motor control, handedness, and sex. Chimpanzees with better oro-facial motor control were more likely to have a PCGS, particularly in the left hemisphere compared to those with poorer control. Male chimpanzees with better oro-facial motor control showed increased leftward asymmetries in the depth of the anterior CGS, whereas female chimpanzees showed the opposite pattern. Significantly, more chimpanzees had an ILS in the left compared to the right hemisphere, but variability in this fold was not associated with sex, handedness, or oro-facial motor control. Finally, significant population-level leftward asymmetries were found in the anterior portion of the CGS, whereas significant rightward biases were evident in the posterior regions. The collective results suggest that the emergence of a PCGS and enhanced gyrification within the anterior and mid-cingulate gyrus may have directly or indirectly evolved in response to selection for increasing oro-facial motor control in primates.

Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent's action in a false-belief test

Human social life depends on theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others. A signature of theory of mind, false belief understanding, requires representing others' views of the world, even when they conflict with one's own. After decades of research, it remains controversial whether any nonhuman species possess a theory of mind. One challenge to positive evidence of animal theory of mind, the behavior-rule account, holds that animals solve such tasks by responding to others' behavioral cues rather than their mental states. We distinguish these hypotheses by implementing a version of the "goggles" test, which asks whether, in the absence of any additional behavioral cues, animals can use their own self-experience of a novel barrier being translucent or opaque to determine whether another agent can see through the same barrier. We incorporated this paradigm into an established anticipatory-looking false-belief test for great apes. In a between-subjects design, apes experienced a novel barrier as either translucent or opaque, although both looked identical from afar. While being eye tracked, all apes then watched a video in which an actor saw an object hidden under 1 of 2 identical boxes. The actor then scuttled behind the novel barrier, at which point the object was relocated and then removed. Only apes who experienced the barrier as opaque visually anticipated that the actor would mistakenly search for the object in its previous location. Great apes, therefore, appeared to attribute differential visual access based specifically on their own past perceptual experience to anticipate an agent's actions in a false-belief test.

Mirror self-recognition and its relationship to social cognition in chimpanzees

Chimpanzees and humans are capable of recognizing their own reflection in mirrors. Little is understood about the selective pressures that led to this evolved trait and about the mechanisms that underlie it. Here, we investigated the hypothesis that mirror self-recognition in chimpanzees is the byproduct of a developed form of self-awareness that was naturally selected for its adaptive use in social cognitive behaviors. We present here the first direct attempt to assess the social cognition hypothesis by analyzing the association between mirror self-recognition in chimpanzees, as measured by a mirror-mark test, and their performance on a variety of social cognition tests. Consistent with the social cognition hypothesis, chimpanzees who showed evidence of mirror self-recognition in the mark test tended to perform significantly better on the social cognition tasks than those who failed the mark test. Additionally, the data as a whole fit the social cognition hypothesis better than the main competing hypothesis of mirror self-recognition in great apes, the secondary representation hypothesis. Our findings strongly suggest that the evolutionary origins of great apes' and humans' capacity to understand ourselves, as revealed by our capacity to recognize ourselves in mirrors, are intimately linked to our ability to understand others.

Do non-human primates really represent others' ignorance? A test of the awareness relations hypothesis

Non-human primates can often predict how another agent will behave based on that agent's knowledge about the world. But how do non-human primates represent others' knowledge states? Researchers have recently proposed that non-human primates form "awareness relations" to attribute objectively true information to other minds, as opposed to human-like representations that track others' ignorance or false belief states. We present the first explicit test of the awareness relations hypothesis by examining when rhesus macaques' understanding of other agents' knowledge falters. In Experiment 1, monkeys watched an agent observe a piece of fruit (the target object) being hidden in one of two boxes. While the agent's view was occluded, either the fruit moved out of its box and directly back into it, or the box containing the fruit opened and immediately closed. We found that monkeys looked significantly longer when the agent reached incorrectly rather than correctly after the box's movement, but not after the fruit's movement. This result suggests that monkeys did not expect the agent to know the fruit's location when it briefly and arbitrarily moved while the agent could not see it, but did expect the agent to know the fruit's location when only the box moved while the agent could not see it. In Experiment 2, we replicated and extended both findings with a larger sample, a different target object, and opposite directions of motion in the test trials. These findings suggest that monkeys reason about others' knowledge of objects by forming awareness relations which are disrupted by arbitrary spatial manipulation of the target object while an agent has no perceptual access to it.

Experience-Projection Methods in Theory-of-Mind Research: Their Limits and Strengths

The capacity to predict the behavior of other individuals is vital to the well-being and reproductive success of many species. There are two main strategies animals can use to make such predictions: (a) infer from observable cues that another agent is in a mental state and use this information to predict the agent’s behavior or (b) use the observable cues alone to predict the agent’s behavior. The first strategy is called theory of mind, the second behavior reading. A long-standing methodological issue has been how to determine experimentally whether animals use theory of mind or behavior reading to predict others’ behavior. One experimental method, called experience projection, may be capable of resolving this issue.

Captive gibbons (Hylobatidae) use different referential cues in an object-choice task: insights into lesser ape cognition and manual laterality

BACKGROUND

Utilization of visual referential cues by non-human primates is a subject of constant scientific interest. However, only few primate species, mostly great apes, have been studied thoroughly in that regard, rendering the understanding of phylogenetic influences on the underlying cognitive patterns difficult.

METHODS

We tested six species of captive gibbons in an object-choice task (n = 11) for their ability to interpret two different pointing gestures, a combination of body orientation and gaze direction as well as glancing as referential cues. Hand preferences were tested in the object-choice task and in a bimanual tube task (n = 18).

RESULTS

We found positive responses to all signals except for the glancing cue at the individual as well as at the group level. The gibbons' success rates partially exceed results reported for great apes in comparable tests and appear to be similarly influenced by prior exposure to human communicative cues. Hand preferences exhibited by the gibbons in the object-choice task as well as in a bimanual tube task suggest that crested gibbons (Nomascus sp.) are strongly lateralized at individual but not at population level for tasks involving object manipulation.

DISCUSSION

Based on the available data, it can be assumed that the cognitive foundations to utilize different visual cues essential to human communication are conserved in extant hominoids and can be traced back at least to the common ancestor of great and lesser apes. However, future studies have to further investigate how the social environment of gibbons influences their ability to exploit referential signals. Gibbons' manual laterality patterns appear to differ in several aspects from the situation found in great apes. While not extensive enough to allow for general conclusions about the evolution of hand preferences in gibbons or apes in general, our results add to the expanding knowledge on manual lateralization in the Hylobatidae.

The goal of ape pointing

Captive great apes regularly use pointing gestures in their interactions with humans. However, the precise function of this gesture is unknown. One possibility is that apes use pointing primarily to direct attention (as in “please look at that”); another is that they point mainly as an action request (such as “can you give that to me?”). We investigated these two possibilities here by examining how the looking behavior of recipients affects pointing in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus). Upon pointing to food, subjects were faced with a recipient who either looked at the indicated object (successful-look) or failed to look at the indicated object (failed-look). We predicted that, if apes point primarily to direct attention, subjects would spend more time pointing in the failed-look condition because the goal of their gesture had not been met. Alternatively, we expected that, if apes point primarily to request an object, subjects would not differ in their pointing behavior between the successful-look and failed-look conditions because these conditions differed only in the looking behavior of the recipient. We found that subjects did differ in their pointing behavior across the successful-look and failed-look conditions, but contrary to our prediction subjects spent more time pointing in the successful-look condition. These results suggest that apes are sensitive to the attentional states of gestural recipients, but their adjustments are aimed at multiple goals. We also found a greater number of individuals with a strong right-hand than left-hand preference for pointing.