Parabolic discounting of monetary rewards by physical effort

Perceived fatigue does not alter effort-based decision making but does undermine confidence in the ability to perform physical actions

Fatigue may affect the decision to deploy effort (cost) for a given rewarded outcome (benefit). However, it remains unclear whether these fatigue-associated changes can be attributed to simply feeling fatigued. To investigate this question, twenty-two healthy males made a series of choices between two rewarded options: a fixed, no effort option, where no physical effort was required to obtain a set, low reward vs. a variable, effortful option, in which both the physical effort requirements (i.e. different durations of a sustained contraction performed in the lower limbs) and rewards (i.e. greater monetary incentives) was varied. Effort-based choices were made under two conditions: (1) a rested (control) state, (2) a pre-induced state of perceived fatigue, evoked through physical exertion in the upper-limbs, thus controlling for the physical manifestation of fatigue (i.e. decline in muscular force production in the lower limbs) on the decision process. Though prior physical exertion increased the perception of fatigue, participants choices did not significantly differ between control and fatigue conditions. Across both conditions, participants demonstrated an anticipated aversion to effort, with greater effort requirements reducing the decision to engage in actions associated with higher rewards. However, in the fatigue state only, decision time was prolonged and self-reported confidence in individuals' ability to perform high effort actions was reduced. The findings suggest that a perceived state of fatigue does not necessarily alter cost/benefit comparisons within effort-based decisions, but may introduce greater uncertainty within choice and reduce self-confidence. These findings evidence altered evaluative processes during decision making under conditions of fatigue.

Physical effort precrastination determines preference in an isometric task

How the brain decides when to invest effort is a central question in neuroscience. When asked to walk a mile to a destination, would you choose a path with a hill at the beginning or the end? The traditional view of effort suggests we should be indifferent-all joules are equal so long as it does not interfere with accomplishing the goal. Yet, when total joules are equal across movement decisions, the brain's sensitivity to the temporal profile of effort investment remains poorly understood. Here, we sought to parse the interaction of time and physical effort by comparing subjective preferences in an isometric arm-pushing task that varied the duration and timing of high and low effort. Subjects were presented with a series of two-alternative forced choices, where they chose the force profile they would rather complete. Subjects preferred earlier physical effort (i.e., to precrastinate) but were idiosyncratic about preference for task timing. A model of subjective utility that includes physical effort costs, task costs, and independent temporal sensitivity factors described subject preferences best. Interestingly, deliberation time and response vigor covary with the same subjective utility model for preference, suggesting a utility that underlies both decision making and motor control. These results suggest physical effort costs are temporally sensitive, with earlier investment of effort preferred to later investment, and that the representation of effort is based on not only the total energy required but also when it is required to invest that energy.NEW & NOTEWORTHY We use a novel paradigm that differentiates physical effort costs, task costs, and time, where subjects choose between isometric arm-pushing tasks. Subjects prefer high physical effort earlier than later. They also decide faster and respond more vigorously the greater their preference. We find a generalizable subjective utility model that includes independent time-sensitivity of physical effort and task costs. Together, we demonstrate that subjective effort includes not only the total effort invested but also its timing.

Validation of a novel effort-discounting assessment and evaluation of the effort-delay confound on effort discounting

A vast literature highlights the prevalence of impulsive decision making in maladaptive outcomes. Most research has focused on one form-delay discounting. Less research has focused on effort discounting, possibly because of a lack of a standardized task for assessment. In published effort-discounting tasks, effort is conceptualized in many ways, making it difficult to compare findings across studies. Additionally, most effort-discounting tasks do not control for the time inherent in completing the effortful task, which makes it difficult to disentangle effort discounting from delay discounting. The current study evaluated the validity of a novel hypothetical effort-discounting task. The novel task was used to evaluate the influence of the effort-delay confound on rates of effort discounting in humans. Participants were randomly assigned to complete a confounded or a controlled version of the novel effort-discounting task. The effort-discounting data were well described by hyperbolic and exponential functions. When effort and delay were confounded, effort-discounting rates were significantly higher than when effort alone influenced discounting. The results suggest that data that are produced by effort-discounting tasks that do not control the effort-delay confound should be interpreted cautiously because they are also influenced by delay discounting. Task limitations and future directions are discussed.

Reward invigorates isometric gripping actions

Individuals exhibit a propensity to move faster toward more rewarding stimuli. While this phenomenon has been observed in movements, the effect of reward on implicit control of isometric actions, like gripping or grasping, is relatively unknown. How reward-related invigoration generalizes to other effortful actions is an important question. Reward invigorates reaching movements and saccades, supporting the idea that reward pays the additional effort cost of moving faster. Effort in isometric force generation is less understood, so here we ask whether and how reward-related invigoration generalizes to isometric force gripping. And if so, what implicit characteristics of gripping change when there is a prospect of reward? Participants (N=19) gripped a force transducer and the force applied was mapped to radial position of an onscreen cursor. Each trial, a target appeared in one of four locations; increasing grip force moved the cursor toward the target. The gripping action was interchangeable for all target positions. In each block of 100 trials, one target was consistently rewarded, while the other targets were not. When gripping to acquire the rewarded target, participants reacted faster, generated force more rapidly and to a greater extent, while intriguingly maintaining the same accuracy and integral of force over time. These findings support the generalization of reward-related invigoration in isometric force tasks, and that the brain exquisitely trades-off reward and effort costs to obtain reward more rapidly without compromising accuracy or more effort costs than necessary.

NEW & NOTEWORTHY

Gripping actions are important for day-to-day tasks, for medical diagnostics like strength and force control, and for choice selection in decision-making experiments. Comparing isometric gripping responses to reward and nonreward cues, we observed reward-based invigoration mediated by selective increases in effort. These findings can be leveraged to provide additional insight into the decision making process, and better understand the effect of reward on movement vigor and the implicit control of accuracy.

Risky effort

Decision-making involves weighing up the outcome likelihood, potential rewards, and effort needed. Previous research has focused on the trade-offs between risk and reward or between effort and reward. Here we bridge this gap and examine how risk in effort levels influences choice. We focus on how two key properties of choice influence risk preferences for effort: changes in magnitude and probability. Two experiments assessed people's risk attitudes for effort, and an additional experiment provided a control condition using monetary gambles. The extent to which people valued effort was related to their pattern of risk preferences. Unlike with monetary outcomes, however, there was substantial heterogeneity in effort-based risk preferences: People who responded to effort as costly exhibited a "flipped" interaction pattern of risk preferences. The direction of the pattern depended on whether people treated effort as a loss of resources. Most, but not all, people treat effort as a loss and are more willing to take risks to avoid potentially high levels of effort.

Dopamine and acetylcholine have distinct roles in delay- and effort-based decision-making in humans

In everyday life, we encounter situations that require tradeoffs between potential rewards and associated costs, such as time and (physical) effort. The literature indicates a prominent role for dopamine in discounting of both delay and effort, with mixed findings for delay discounting in humans. Moreover, the reciprocal antagonistic interaction between dopaminergic and cholinergic transmission in the striatum suggests a potential opponent role of acetylcholine in these processes. We found opposing effects of dopamine D2 (haloperidol) and acetylcholine M1 receptor (biperiden) antagonism on specific components of effort-based decision-making in healthy humans: haloperidol decreased, whereas biperiden increased the willingness to exert physical effort. In contrast, delay discounting was reduced under haloperidol, but not affected by biperiden. Together, our data suggest that dopamine, acting at D2 receptors, modulates both effort and delay discounting, while acetylcholine, acting at M1 receptors, appears to exert a more specific influence on effort discounting only.

Brain stimulation over the left DLPFC enhances motivation for effortful rewards in patients with major depressive disorder

BACKGROUND

Amotivation is a typical feature in major depressive disorder (MDD), which produces reduced willingness to exert effort. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is a crucial structure in goal-directed actions and therefore is a potential target in modulating effortful motivation. However, it remains unclear whether the intervention is effective for patients with MDD.

METHODS

We employed transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), computational modelling and event-related potentials (ERPs) to reveal the causal relationship between the left DLPFC and motivation for effortful rewards in MDD. Fifty patients underwent both active and sham TMS sessions, each followed by performing an Effort-Expenditure for Rewards Task, during which participants chose and implemented between low-effort/low-reward and high-effort/high-reward options.

RESULTS

The patients showed increased willingness to exert effort for rewards during the DLPFC facilitated session, compared with the sham session. They also had a trend in larger P3 amplitude for motivated attention toward chosen options, larger CNV during preparing for effort exertion, and larger SPN during anticipating a high reward. Besides, while behavior indexes for effortful choices were negatively related to depression severity in the sham session, this correlation was weakened in the active stimulation session.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings provide behavioral, computational, and neural evidence for the left DLPFC on effortful motivation for rewards. Facilitated DLPFC improves motor preparation and value anticipation after making decisions especially for highly effortful rewards in MDD. Facilitated DLPFC also has a potential function in enhancing motivated attention during cost-benefit trade-off. This neuromodulation effect provides a potential treatment for improving motivation in clinics.

Human ventromedial prefrontal cortex is necessary for prosocial motivation

Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is vital for decision-making. Functional neuroimaging links vmPFC to processing rewards and effort, while parallel work suggests vmPFC involvement in prosocial behaviour. However, the necessity of vmPFC for these functions is unknown. Patients with rare focal vmPFC lesions (n = 25), patients with lesions elsewhere (n = 15) and healthy controls (n = 40) chose between rest and exerting effort to earn rewards for themselves or another person. vmPFC damage decreased prosociality across behavioural and computational measures. vmPFC patients earned less, discounted rewards by effort more, and exerted less force when another person benefited, compared to both control groups. Voxel-based lesion mapping revealed dissociations between vmPFC subregions. While medial damage led to antisocial behaviour, lateral damage increased prosocial behaviour relative to patients with damage elsewhere. vmPFC patients also showed reduced effort sensitivity overall, but reward sensitivity was limited to specific subregions. These results reveal multiple causal contributions of vmPFC to prosocial behaviour, effort and reward.

Effort-based decision making and motivational deficits in stroke patients

Motivational deficits in patients recovering from stroke are common and can reduce active participation in rehabilitation and thereby impede functional recovery. We investigated whether stroke patients with clinically reduced drive, initiation, and endurance during functional rehabilitative training (n = 30) display systematic alterations in effort-based decision making compared to age, sex, and severity-matched stroke patients (n = 30) whose drive appeared unaffected. Notably, the two groups did not differ in self-reported ratings of apathy and depression. However, on an effort-based decision-making task, stroke patients with clinically apparent drive impairment showed intact willingness to accept effort for reward, but were more likely to fail to execute the required effort compared to patients without apparent drive impairments. In other words, the decision behavioural assessment revealed that stroke patients that displayed reduced drive, initiation, and endurance during inpatient neurorehabilitation failed to persist in goal-directed effort production, even over very short periods. These findings indicate that reduced drive during rehabilitative therapy in post-stroke patients is not due to a diminished motivation to invest physical effort, but instead is related to a reduced persistence with effortful behaviour.

Mood fluctuations shift cost-benefit tradeoffs in economic decisions

Mood effects on economic choice seem blatantly irrational, but might rise from mechanisms adapted to natural environments. We have proposed a theory in which mood helps adapting the behaviour to statistical dependencies in the environment, by biasing the expected value of foraging actions (which involve taking risk, spending time and making effort to get more reward). Here, we tested the existence of this mechanism, using an established mood induction paradigm combined with independent economic choices that opposed small but uncostly rewards to larger but costly rewards (involving either risk, delay or effort). To maximise the sensitivity to mood fluctuations, we developed an algorithm ensuring that choice options were continuously adjusted to subjective indifference points. In 102 participants tested twice, we found that during episodes of positive mood (relative to negative mood), choices were biased towards better rewarded but costly options, irrespective of the cost type. Computational modelling confirmed that the incidental mood effect was best explained by a bias added to the expected value of costly options, prior to decision making. This bias is therefore automatically applied even in artificial environments where it is not adaptive, allowing mood to spill over many sorts of decisions and generate irrational behaviours.

Learned industriousness as a translational mechanism in anorexia nervosa

It remains unexplained why some behaviours persist despite being non-hedonic and ostensibly aversive. This phenomenon is especially baffling when such behaviours are taken to excess in the form of psychopathology. Anorexia nervosa is one psychiatric disorder in which effortful behaviours that most people find unpleasant (suchas restrictive eating) are persistently performed. We propose thatthe social psychology theory of learned industriousness providesa novel mechanistic account for such phenomena. This theoryposits that high-effort behaviour can be conditioned to acquire secondary reinforcing properties through repeated pairing with reward. Accordingly, effort sensations become less aversive andmore appetitive, increasing willingness to engage in effortful behaviour. In this Perspective, we review pre-clinical behaviouraland biological data that support learned industriousness, contrast learned industriousness with other models of non-hedonic persistence (such as habit learning), highlight evidence that supports learned industriousness in individuals with anorexia nervosa and consider implications of the model, including translation to other psychiatric presentations.

Examining tradeoffs between cognitive effort and relief among adults with self-injurious behavior

BACKGROUND

People engage in nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI) to reduce negative affect, but it is not clear why they engage in this harmful type of behavior instead of using healthier strategies. The primary goal of this study was to evaluate whether people choose NSSI to reduce negative affect because they perceive it to be less cognitively costly than other available strategies.

METHOD

In experiment one, 43 adults completed a novel, relief-based effort discounting task designed to index preferences about exerting cognitive effort to achieve relief. In experiment two, 149 adults, 52 % with a history of NSSI, completed our effort discounting task.

RESULTS

Our main results suggest that people will accept less relief from an aversive experience if doing so requires expending less effort, i.e. they demonstrate effort discounting in the context of decisions about relief. We also found and that effort discounting is stronger among those with a history of NSSI, but this association became nonsignificant when simultaneously accounting for other conditions associated with aberrant effort tradeoffs.

LIMITATIONS

The use of a control group without NSSI or other potentially harmful relief-seeking behaviors limits our ability to draw specific conclusions about NSSI. The ecological validity of our task was limited by a modestly effective affect manipulation, and because participants made hypothetical choices.

CONCLUSIONS

This study demonstrates that preferences about exerting cognitive effort may be a barrier to using healthier affect regulation strategies. Further, the preference not to exert cognitive effort, though present in NSSI, is likely not unique to NSSI. Instead, effort discounting may be a transdiagnostic mechanism promoting an array of harmful relief-seeking behaviors.

Is It Really Worth the Effort? Examining the Effects of Mental Fatigue on Physical Activity Effort Discounting

Physical activity (PA) guidelines are informed by epidemiological evidence but do not account for people's motivation for exerting physical effort. Previous research has shown that people are less motivated to engage in moderate- to vigorous-intensity PA when fatigued. In a two-study series, we investigated how intensity and duration affected people's willingness to engage in PA using an effort-discounting paradigm. A secondary purpose was to examine whether effort discounting was affected by mental fatigue. Both studies revealed a significant Intensity × Duration interaction demonstrating a reduced willingness to engage in PA of higher intensities across increasing duration levels. Study 1 demonstrated greater effort discounting for vigorous-intensity PA with increasing mental fatigue; however, this effect was not observed in Study 2. Findings provide novel insight toward people's motivation for engaging in PA based on the properties of the task, and some evidence suggesting feelings of fatigue may also influence motivation to exert physical effort.

Preferences for seeking effort or reward information bias the willingness to work

Research suggests that the temporal order in which people receive information about costs and benefits whilst making decisions can influence their choices. But, do people have a preference for seeking information about costs or benefits when making effort-based decisions, and does this impact motivation? Here, participants made choices about whether to exert different levels of physical effort to obtain different magnitudes of reward, or rest for low reward. Prior to each effort-based choice, they also had to decide which information they wanted to see first: how much physical effort would be required, or how large the reward would be. We found no overall preference for seeking reward or effort information first, but motivation did change when people saw reward or effort information first. Seeking effort information first, both someone's average tendency to do so and their choice to see effort first on a given trial, was associated with reductions in the willingness to exert higher effort. Moreover, the tendency to prefer effort information first was associated with reduced vigorous exercise and higher levels of fatigue in everyday life. These findings highlight that preferences for seeking effort information may be a bias that reduces people's willingness to exert effort in the lab and in everyday life.

Distinct neural representations for prosocial and self-benefiting effort

Prosocial behaviors-actions that benefit others-are central to individual and societal well-being. Although the mechanisms underlying the financial and moral costs of prosocial behaviors are increasingly understood, this work has often ignored a key influence on behavior: effort. Many prosocial acts are effortful, and people are averse to the costs of exerting them. However, how the brain encodes effort costs when actions benefit others is unknown. During fMRI, participants completed a decision-making task where they chose in each trial whether to "work" and exert force (30%-70% of maximum grip strength) or "rest" (no effort) for rewards (2-10 credits). Crucially, on separate trials, they made these decisions either to benefit another person or themselves. We used a combination of multivariate representational similarity analysis and model-based univariate analysis to reveal how the costs of prosocial and self-benefiting efforts are processed. Strikingly, we identified a unique neural signature of effort in the anterior cingulate gyrus (ACCg) for prosocial acts, both when choosing to help others and when exerting force to benefit them. This pattern was absent for self-benefiting behaviors. Moreover, stronger, specific representations of prosocial effort in the ACCg were linked to higher levels of empathy and higher subsequent exerted force to benefit others. In contrast, the ventral tegmental area and ventral insula represented value preferentially when choosing for oneself and not for prosocial acts. These findings advance our understanding of the neural mechanisms of prosocial behavior, highlighting the critical role that effort has in the brain circuits that guide helping others.

Cognitive effort for self, strangers, and charities

Effort is aversive and often avoided, even when earning benefits for oneself. Yet, people sometimes work hard for others. How do people decide who is worth their effort? Prior work shows people avoid physical effort for strangers relative to themselves, but invest more physical effort for charity. Here, we find that people avoid cognitive effort for others relative to themselves, even when the cause is a personally meaningful charity. In two studies, participants repeatedly decided whether to invest cognitive effort to gain financial rewards for themselves and others. In Study 1, participants (N = 51; 150 choices) were less willing to invest cognitive effort for a charity than themselves. In Study 2, participants (N = 47; 225 choices) were more willing to work cognitively for a charity than an intragroup stranger, but again preferred cognitive exertion that benefited themselves. Computational modeling suggests that, unlike prior physical effort findings, cognitive effort discounted the subjective value of rewards linearly. Exploratory machine learning analyses suggest that people who represented others more similarly to themselves were more willing to invest effort on their behalf, opening up new avenues for future research.

A computational account of why more valuable goals seem to require more effortful actions

To decide whether a course of action is worth pursuing, individuals typically weigh its expected costs and benefits. Optimal decision-making relies upon accurate effort cost anticipation, which is generally assumed to be performed independently from goal valuation. In two experiments (n = 46), we challenged this independence principle of standard decision theory. We presented participants with a series of treadmill routes randomly associated to monetary rewards and collected both 'accept' versus 'decline' decisions and subjective estimates of energetic cost. Behavioural results show that higher monetary prospects led participants to provide higher cost estimates, although reward was independent from effort in our design. Among candidate cognitive explanations, they support a model in which prospective cost assessment is biased by the output of an automatic computation adjusting effort expenditure to goal value. This decision bias might lead people to abandon the pursuit of valuable goals that are in fact not so costly to achieve.

Everything Comes at a Price: Considerations in Modeling Effort-Based Choice

When observing human behavior, one of the key factors determining choice is effort. It is often assumed that people prefer an easier course of action when the alternative yields the same benefits. However, recent research demonstrates that this is not always the case: effort is not always costly and can also add value. A promising avenue to study effort-based choice is to utilize formal decision models that enable quantitative modeling. In this paper, we aim to present an overview of the current approaches to modeling effort-based choice and discuss some considerations that stem from theoretical and practical issues (present and previous) in studies on the role of effort, focusing on the connections and discrepancies between formal models and the findings from the body of empirical research. Considering that effort can, in some circumstances, act as a cost and as a benefit, reconciling these discrepancies is a practical and theoretical challenge that can ultimately lead to better predictions and increased model validity. Our review identifies and discusses these discrepancies providing direction for future empirical research.

Choices favoring cognitive effort in a foraging environment decrease when multiple forms of effort and delay are interleaved

Cognitive and physical effort are typically regarded as costly, but demands for effort also seemingly boost the appeal of prospects under certain conditions. One contextual factor that might influence choices for or against effort is the mix of different types of demand a decision maker encounters in a given environment. In two foraging experiments, participants encountered prospective rewards that required equally long intervals of cognitive effort, physical effort, or unfilled delay. Monetary offers varied per trial, and the two experiments differed in whether the type of effort or delay cost was the same on every trial, or varied across trials. When each participant faced only one type of cost, cognitive effort persistently produced the highest acceptance rate compared to trials with an equivalent period of either physical effort or unfilled delay. We theorized that if cognitive effort were intrinsically rewarding, we would observe the same pattern of preferences when participants foraged for varying cost types in addition to rewards. Contrary to this prediction, in the second experiment, an initially higher acceptance rate for cognitive effort trials disappeared over time amid an overall decline in acceptance rates as participants gained experience with all three conditions. Our results indicate that cognitive demands may reduce the discounting effect of delays, but not because decision makers assign intrinsic value to cognitive effort. Rather, the results suggest that a cognitive effort requirement might influence contextual factors such as subjective delay duration estimates, which can be recalibrated if multiple forms of demand are interleaved.

Examining the reliability and validity of two versions of the Effort-Expenditure for Rewards Task (EEfRT)

The Effort-Expenditure for Rewards Task (EEfRT) has gained validity evidence from several studies. However, various modifications have been applied to the original version, which have never been compared systematically. In Study 1, we tested 120 healthy participants to directly compare two versions of the EEfRT. In Study 2, we tested a larger sample of 394 healthy participants to further examine the original EEfRT. We replicated the split-half reliability of both task versions. However, self-reported personality traits (e.g., trait BAS) correlated with only some task performance parameters in Study 1, which did not replicate for the original EEfRT in Study 2. Our results indicate complex and sometimes inconsistent relations between different personality traits, task properties, and reward attributes.

Sleep Restriction Reduces Cognitive but Not Physical Motivation

PURPOSE

Motivation is an important driver of behaviour, and several frameworks distinguish the willingness of individuals to invest cognitive versus physical effort to achieve a goal. One outstanding question is whether sleep loss lowers motivation within specific domains of effort, or has a global effect on motivation across multiple domains. Here, we investigated the effects of sleep restriction on the motivation to invest cognitive or physical effort in return for reward.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

24 healthy young adults (11 females) completed an effort-based decision-making task over two laboratory sessions - once while sleep restricted (three consecutive nights with a three-hour sleep opportunity), and the other while fully rested (nine-hour sleep opportunity on each night). In an initial reinforcement phase, participants were trained to ceiling performance across six levels of effort on separate cognitively and physically demanding tasks. Then, in the critical decision-making phase, participants revealed their preference for how much cognitive or physical effort they would be willing to invest for reward.

RESULTS

Sleep restriction reduced the willingness to exert cognitive effort, but spared motivation in the physical domain. Furthermore, the reduction in cognitive motivation appeared to be a primary motivational deficit, which could not be attributed to differences in reward-likelihood of different levels of effort or the temporal structure of the task.

CONCLUSION

The results suggest that sleep restriction has a selective effect on cognitive over physical motivation, which has significant implications for real-world settings in which individuals must maintain high levels of cognitive motivation in the face of chronic sleep loss.

Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying the subjective value of information

Humans have a striking desire to actively seek new information, even when it is devoid of any instrumental utility. However, the mechanisms that drive individuals' subjective preference for information remain unclear. Here, we used fMRI to examine the processing of subjective information value, by having participants decide how much effort they were willing to trade-off for non-instrumental information. We showed that choices were best described by a model that accounted for: (1) the variability in individuals' estimates of uncertainty, (2) their desire to reduce that uncertainty, and (3) their subjective preference for positively valenced information. Model-based analyses revealed the anterior cingulate as a key node that encodes the subjective value of information across multiple stages of decision-making - including when information was prospectively valued, and when the outcome was definitively delivered. These findings emphasise the multidimensionality of information value, and reveal the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying the variability in individuals' desire to physically pursue informative outcomes.

More Effort, Less Fatigue: The Role of Interest in Increasing Effort and Reducing Mental Fatigue

People generally prefer easier over more difficult mental tasks. Using two different adaptations of a demand selection task, we show that interest can influence this effect, such that participants choose options with a higher cognitive workload. Interest was also associated with lower feelings of fatigue. In two studies, participants (N = 63 and N = 158) repeatedly made a choice between completing a difficult or easy math problem. Results show that liking math predicts choosing more difficult (vs. easy) math problems (even after controlling for perceived math skill). Two additional studies used the Academic Diligence Task (Galla et al., 2014), where high school students (N = 447 and N = 884) could toggle between a math task and playing a video game/watching videos. In these studies, we again find that math interest relates to greater proportion of time spent on the math problems. Three of these four studies also examined perceived fatigue, finding that interest relates to lower fatigue. An internal meta-analysis of the four studies finds a small but robust effect of interest on both the willingness to exert greater effort and the experience of less fatigue (despite engaging in more effort).

Heightened effort discounting is a common feature of both apathy and fatigue

Apathy and fatigue have distinct aetiologies, yet can manifest in phenotypically similar ways. In particular, each can give rise to diminished goal-directed behaviour, which is often cited as a key characteristic of both traits. An important issue therefore is whether currently available approaches are capable of distinguishing between them. Here, we examined the relationship between commonly administered inventories of apathy and fatigue, and a measure of goal-directed activity that assesses the motivation to engage in effortful behaviour. 103 healthy adults completed self-report inventories on apathy (the Dimensional Apathy Scale), and fatigue (the Multidimensional Fatigue Inventory, and/or Modified Fatigue Impact Scale). In addition, all participants performed an effort discounting task, in which they made choices about their willingness to engage in physically effortful activity. Importantly, self-report ratings of apathy and fatigue were strongly correlated, suggesting that these inventories were insensitive to the fundamental differences between the two traits. Furthermore, greater effort discounting was strongly associated with higher ratings across all inventories, suggesting that a common feature of both traits is a lower motivation to engage in effortful behaviour. These results have significant implications for the assessment of both apathy and fatigue, particularly in clinical groups in which they commonly co-exist.

Deciding while moving: Cognitive interference biases value-based decisions

When people act, they repeatedly have to make value-based decisions about the further course of actions. For example, when driving on the highway, they must decide whether to overtake other cars by changing lanes to arrive at their destination quicker; concurrently, they are required to stay on their momentary lane by controlling the steering wheel. Embodied choice models predict that concurrent action execution modulates value-based decisions. Here, we examined whether value-based decisions are influenced by a change of action costs and/or cognitive interference between concurrent actions and decision making. In a novel, computerized multilane tracking task paradigm, participants (N = 50) controlled a cursor moving on one of three horizontal lanes. During tracking (concurrent action), participants had to switch to other lanes to avoid obstacles or collect rewards (value-based decisions). The action costs associated with a lane switch depended on the cursor position relative to the currently tracked lane, and this relationship varied between conditions. Results showed that value-based lane switching decisions were biased by the cursor state. While this influence was partly attributed to minimizing action costs, a considerable part of the influence could be attributed to cognitive interference. Our findings provide further evidence for embodied choice models, showing that both cognitive interference as well as action costs bias value-based decisions.

Carrots for the donkey: Influence of evaluative conditioning and training on self-paced exercise intensity and delay discounting of exercise in healthy adults

To choose exercise over alternative behaviours, subjective reward evaluation of the potential choices is a principal step in decision making. However, the selection of exercise intensity might integrate acute visceral responses (i.e. pleasant or unpleasant feelings) and motives related to goals (i.e. enjoyment, competition, health). To understand the factors determining the selection of exercise in its intensity and evaluation as a modality, we conducted a study combining exercise training and evaluative conditioning. Evaluative conditioning was performed by using a novel technique using a primary reinforcer (sweetness) as the unconditioned stimulus and physical strain i.e. heart rate elevation as the conditioned stimulus during interval training, using a randomized control design (N = 58). Pre, post-three weeks interval training w/o conditioning, and after 4 weeks follow-up, participants were tested on self-paced speed selection on treadmill measuring heart rate, subjective pleasantness, and effort levels, as well as delay-discounting of exercise and food rewards. Results revealed that the selection of exercise intensity was significantly increased by adaptation to training and evaluative conditioning, revealing the importance of visceral factors as well as learned expected rewards. Delay discounting rates of self-paced exercise were transiently reduced by training but not affected by evaluative conditioning. In conclusion, exercise decisions are suggested to separate the decision-making process into a modality-specific cognitive evaluation of exercise, and an exercise intensity selection based on acute visceral experience integrating effort, pleasantness, and learned rewards.

Neural and computational mechanisms of momentary fatigue and persistence in effort-based choice

From a gym workout, to deciding whether to persevere at work, many activities require us to persist in deciding that rewards are ‘worth the effort’ even as we become fatigued. However, studies examining effort-based decisions typically assume that the willingness to work is static. Here, we use computational modelling on two effort-based tasks, one behavioural and one during fMRI. We show that two hidden states of fatigue fluctuate on a moment-to-moment basis on different timescales but both reduce the willingness to exert effort for reward. The value of one state increases after effort but is ‘recoverable’ by rests, whereas a second ‘unrecoverable’ state gradually increases with work. The BOLD response in separate medial and lateral frontal sub-regions covaried with these states when making effort-based decisions, while a distinct fronto-striatal system integrated fatigue with value. These results provide a computational framework for understanding the brain mechanisms of persistence and momentary fatigue.

The willingness to exert effort into demanding tasks often declines over time through fatigue. Here the authors provide a computational account of the moment-to-moment dynamics of fatigue and its impact on effort-based choices, and reveal the neural mechanisms that underlie such computations.

Anticipatory Energization Revealed by Pupil and Brain Activity Guides Human Effort-Based Decision Making

An organism's fitness is determined by how it chooses to adapt to effort in response to challenges. Exertion of effort correlates with activity in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and noradrenergic pupil dilation, but little is known about the role of these neurophysiological processes for decisions about future efforts, they may provide anticipatory energization to help us accept the challenge or a cost representation that is weighted against the expected rewards. Here, we provide evidence for the former, by measuring pupil and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) brain responses while 52 human participants (29 females) chose whether to exert efforts to obtain rewards. Both pupil-dilation rate and dmPFC fMRI activity increased with anticipated effort level, and these increases differ depending on the choice outcome: they were stronger when participants chose to accept the challenge compared with when the challenge was declined. Crucially, the choice-dependent modulation of pupil and brain-activity effort representations were stronger in participants whose behavioral choices were more sensitive to effort. Our results identify a process involving the peripheral and central human nervous system that simulates the required energization before overt response, suggesting a role in guiding effort-based decisions.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The brain's arousal system tracks the effort we engage in during strenuous activity. But much less is known about what role this effort signaling may play when we decide whether to exert effort in the future. Here, we characterize pupil-linked arousal and brain signals that guide decisions whether to engage in effort to gain money. During such choices, increases in brain activity and pupil dilation correlated with the effort involved in the chosen option, and these increases were stronger when people decided to accept the effort compared with when they rejected it. These results suggest that the brain arousal system guides decisions by energizing the organism for the prospective challenge.

Using metabolic energy to quantify the subjective value of physical effort

Economists have known for centuries that to understand an individual's decisions, we must consider not only the objective value of the goal at stake, but its subjective value as well. However, achieving that goal ultimately requires expenditure of effort. Surprisingly, despite the ubiquitous role of effort in decision-making and movement, we currently do not understand how effort is subjectively valued in daily movements. Part of the difficulty arises from the lack of an objective measure of effort. Here, we use a physiological approach to address this knowledge gap. We quantified objective effort costs by measuring metabolic cost via expired gas analysis as participants performed a reaching task against increasing resistance. We then used neuroeconomic methods to quantify each individual's subjective valuation of effort. Rather than the diminishing sensitivity observed in reward valuation, effort was valued objectively, on average. This is significantly less than the near-quadratic sensitivity to effort observed previously in force-based motor tasks. Moreover, there was significant inter-individual variability with many participants undervaluing or overvaluing effort. These findings demonstrate that in contrast with monetary decisions in which subjective value exhibits diminishing marginal returns, effort costs are valued more objectively in low-effort reaching movements common in daily life.

Body dynamics of gait affect value-based decisions

Choosing among different options typically entails weighing their anticipated costs and benefits. Previous research has predominantly focused on situations, where the costs and benefits of choices are known before an action is effectuated. Yet many decisions in daily life are made on the fly, for instance, making a snack choice while walking through the grocery store. Notably, the costs of actions change dynamically while moving. Therefore, in this study we examined whether the concurrent action dynamics of gait form part of and affect value-based decisions. In three experiments, participants had to decide which lateral (left vs. right) target (associated with different rewards) they would go to, while they were already walking. Results showed that the target choice was biased by the alternating stepping behavior, even at the expense of receiving less reward. These findings provide evidence that whole-body action dynamics affect value-based decisions.

Aging Increases Prosocial Motivation for Effort

Social cohesion relies on prosociality in increasingly aging populations. Helping other people requires effort, yet how willing people are to exert effort to benefit themselves and others, and whether such behaviors shift across the life span, is poorly understood. Using computational modeling, we tested the willingness of 95 younger adults (18-36 years old) and 92 older adults (55-84 years old) to put physical effort into self- and other-benefiting acts. Participants chose whether to work and exert force (30%-70% of maximum grip strength) for rewards (2-10 credits) accrued for themselves or, prosocially, for another. Younger adults were somewhat selfish, choosing to work more at higher effort levels for themselves, and exerted less force in prosocial work. Strikingly, compared with younger adults, older people were more willing to put in effort for others and exerted equal force for themselves and others. Increased prosociality in older people has important implications for human behavior and societal structure.

Energy investment and motivation: The additive impact of task demand and reward value on exerted force in hand grip tasks

According to motivational intensity theory, individuals are motivated to conserve energy when pursuing goals. They should invest only the energy required for success and disengage if success is not important enough to justify the required energy. We tested this hypothesis in five experiments assessing exerted muscle force in isometric hand grip tasks as indicator of energy investment. Our results provided mixed evidence for motivational intensity theory. Corroborating its predictions, energy investment was a function of task demand. However, we did not find evidence for the predicted disengagement, and we observed that participants exerted in most conditions more force than required. Furthermore, the data could be better explained by a model that predicted an additive effect of task demand and success importance than by models drawing on motivational intensity theory’s predictions. These results illustrate the strong link between energy investment and task demand but challenge motivational intensity theory’s primacy of energy conservation.

The effort-doors task: Examining the temporal dynamics of effort-based reward processing using ERPs

Aberrant reward processing is a cardinal feature of various forms of psychopathology. However, recent research indicates that aberrant reward processing may manifest at temporally distinct substages and involve interdependent subcomponents of reward processing. To improve our understanding of both the temporal dynamics and distinct subcomponents of reward processing, we added an effort manipulation to the "doors" reward-task paradigm, to derive behavioral and event-related potential (ERP) measures of effort-based reward processing. Behavioral measures consisting of reaction time, response rate, and response rate change were used to index effort expenditure, and ERP measures were used to index attention allocated toward effort-completion cues, anticipation of reward, valuation of reward, and attention toward monetary feedback. Reduced response rate and slowing of response were evident during the high effort versus the low effort condition. ERP findings indicated increased attention to signals of high- compared to low-effort completion cues-as well as reduced anticipation of rewards, and reduced attention toward feedback information following high effort expenditure. Participants showing the most response-rate slowing evidenced the greatest reward devaluation following high versus low effort. Findings demonstrate that the addition of an effort expenditure manipulation to the doors reward paradigm produced reliable ERP and behavioral measures of effort-based reward processing, providing opportunities for future researchers to utilize the effort-doors task to parse the temporal dynamics of both anticipatory and consummatory reward processing components.

Effort-Related Decision-Making in ADHD

ADHD is defined by behavioral symptoms that are not well characterized in relation to ADHD’s neurobiological mechanisms. This approach has limited our ability to define ADHD nosology and predict outcomes because it does not systematically examine facets of the disorder such as the inability to maintain cognitively effortful activities, as promoted in the NIMH RDoC approach. Existing data indicate ADHD is associated with differences in reward valuation and processing, but we do not know whether ADHD is also associated with higher levels of aversion to exerting cognitive effort and/or altered reward x effort interactions. Our ongoing study addresses this knowledge gap by examining individuals’ preferences between rewards associated with minimal effort and reward alternatives with a higher payoff but higher effort costs (“effort discounting”); thereby permitting us to characterize differences in biases and tradeoffs during effort-related decision-making in ADHD. The study takes advantage of a well-defined sample of ADHD-diagnosed and healthy control individuals to address three aims. First, we determine whether ADHD is associated with steeper discounting of larger, more effortful rewards. Second, we examine the subjective perception of effort in youth diagnosed with ADHD and healthy controls using tasks requiring varying levels of cognitive effort. Third, we explore relationships amongst indices of effort discounting, theoretically-related traits (e.g., grit, distress tolerance), biomarkers of effort-related decision-making (eye movements and pupil size), and various cognitive measures. Successful completion of the aims will permit us to better characterize ADHD-healthy control differences and lay a foundation for more computational approaches to ADHD diagnostic criteria.

Perceptual decision confidence is sensitive to forgone physical effort expenditure

Contemporary theoretical accounts of metacognition propose that action-related information is used in the computation of perceptual decision confidence. We investigated whether the amount of expended physical effort, or the 'motoric sunk cost' of a decision, influences perceptual decision confidence judgements in humans. In particular, we examined whether people feel more confident in decisions which required more effort to report. Forty-two participants performed a luminance discrimination task that involved identifying which of two flickering grayscale squares was brightest. Participants reported their choice by squeezing hand-held dynamometers. Across trials, the effort required to report a decision was varied across three levels (low, medium, high). Critically, participants were only aware of the required effort level on each trial once they had initiated their motor response, meaning that the varying effort requirements could not influence their initial decisions. Following each decision, participants rated their confidence in their choice. We found that participants were more confident in decisions that required greater effort to report. This suggests that humans are sensitive to motoric sunk costs and supports contemporary models of metacognition in which actions inform the computation of decision confidence.

Forced choices reveal a trade-off between cognitive effort and physical pain

Cognitive effort is described as aversive, and people will generally avoid it when possible. This aversion to effort is believed to arise from a cost-benefit analysis of the actions available. The comparison of cognitive effort against other primary aversive experiences, however, remains relatively unexplored. Here, we offered participants choices between performing a cognitively demanding task or experiencing thermal pain. We found that cognitive effort can be traded off for physical pain and that people generally avoid exerting high levels of cognitive effort. We also used computational modelling to examine the aversive subjective value of effort and its effects on response behaviours. Applying this model to decision times revealed asymmetric effects of effort and pain, suggesting that cognitive effort may not share the same basic influences on avoidance behaviour as more primary aversive stimuli such as physical pain.

Pharmacological evidence for the implication of noradrenaline in effort

The trade-off between effort and reward is one of the main determinants of behavior, and its alteration is at the heart of major disorders such as depression or Parkinson's disease. Monoaminergic neuromodulators are thought to play a key role in this trade-off, but their relative contribution remains unclear. Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) performed a choice task requiring a trade-off between the volume of fluid reward and the amount of force to be exerted on a grip. In line with a causal role of noradrenaline in effort, decreasing noradrenaline levels with systemic clonidine injections (0.01 mg/kg) decreased exerted force and enhanced the weight of upcoming force on choices, without any effect on reward sensitivity. Using computational modeling, we showed that a single variable ("effort") could capture the amount of resources necessary for action and control both choices (as a variable for decision) and force production (as a driving force). Critically, the multiple effects of noradrenaline manipulation on behavior could be captured by a specific modulation of this single variable. Thus, our data strongly support noradrenaline's implication in effort processing.

Effort-reward balance and work motivation in rats: Effects of context and order of experience

Being motivated means exerting effort toward a goal. The 'law of least work' emphasizes a preference for exerting relatively less effort. The law crosses boundaries among species and between physical and mental work. Organisms should be highly sensitive to shifts in effort-reward balance (ERB) in order to make optimal choices. We used a free operant-foraging task to investigate changes in ERB on choice between options requiring more or less effort. Results showed a consistent preference for the option with less effort and insensitivity to shifts in ERB. A second aim explored the influence of order of experience on effort choice. Choice for the more effortful option significantly increased after experiencing an equal effort-reward relationship during the initial free operant-foraging session. This relative increase in choice for the effortful option persisted even after effort-reward imbalance. The findings highlight the importance of contextual factors such as order of experience when examining the impact of shifting effort-reward associations. Instead of ignoring or reducing order effects, the sequence of experience (e.g. for shifts in ERB) could be manipulated to enhance or reduce value of outcomes or effort itself.

Losses Motivate Cognitive Effort More Than Gains in Effort-Based Decision Making and Performance

Human behavior is more strongly driven by the motivation to avoid losses than to pursue gains (loss aversion). However, there is little research on how losses influence the motivation to exert effort. We compared the effects of loss and gain incentives on cognitive task performance and effort-based decision making. In three experiments, participants performed a cognitively effortful task under gain and loss conditions and made choices about effort expenditure in a decision-making task. Results consistently showed significant loss aversion in effort-based decision making. Participants were willing to invest more effort in the loss compared to the gain condition (i.e., perform a longer duration task: Experiments 1 and 2; or higher task load: Experiment 3). On the other hand, losses did not lead to improved performance (sustained attention), or higher physiological effort (pupil diameter) in Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 3, losses did enhance working memory performance, but only at the highest load level. Taken together, these results suggest that loss aversion motivates higher effort investment in effort-based decision-making, while the effect of loss aversion during a performance may depend on the task type or effort level.

EEG correlates of physical effort and reward processing during reinforcement learning

Effort-based decision making is often modeled using subjective value, a function of reward discounted by effort. We asked whether EEG event-related potential (ERP) correlates of reward processing are also modulated by physical effort. Human participants performed a task in which they were required to accurately produce target levels of muscle activation to receive rewards. Quadriceps muscle activation was recorded with electromyography (EMG) during isometric knee extension. On a given trial, the target muscle activation required either low or high effort. The effort was determined probabilistically according to a binary choice, such that the responses were associated with 20% and 80% probability of high effort. This contingency could only be learned through experience, and it reversed periodically. Binary reinforcement feedback depended on accurately producing the target muscle activity. Participants adaptively avoided effort by switching responses more frequently after choices that resulted in hard effort. Feedback after participants' choices that revealed the resulting effort requirement did not elicit modulation of the feedback-related negativity/reward positivity (FRN/RP). However, the neural response to reinforcement outcome after effort production was increased by preceding physical effort. Source decomposition revealed separable early and late positive deflections contributing to the ERP. The main effect of reward outcome, characteristic of the FRN/RP, loaded onto the earlier component, whereas the reward × effort interaction was observed only in the later positivity, which resembled the P300. Thus, retrospective effort modulates reward processing. This may explain paradoxical behavioral findings whereby rewards requiring more effort to obtain can become more powerful reinforcers.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Choices probabilistically determined the physical effort requirements for a subsequent task, and reward depended on task performance. Feedback revealing whether choices resulted in easy or hard effort did not elicit reinforcement learning signals. However, the neural responses to reinforcement were modulated by preceding effort. Thus, effort itself was not treated as loss or punishment, but it affected the responses to subsequent reinforcement outcomes. This may explain how effort can enhance the motivational effect of reward.

Causal role of lateral prefrontal cortex in mental effort and fatigue

Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is well‐known for its role in exerting mental work, however the contribution of DLPFC for deciding whether or not to engage in effort remains unknown. Here, we assessed the causal role of DLPFC in effort‐based decision making. We disrupted functioning of DLPFC with noninvasive brain stimulation before participants repeatedly decided whether to exert mental effort in a working memory task. We found the same DLPFC subregion involved in mental effort exertion to influence also effort‐based decisions: First, it enhanced effort discounting, suggesting that DLPFC may signal the capacity to successfully deal with effort demands. Second, a novel computational model integrating the costs of enduring effort into the effort‐based decision process revealed that DLPFC disruption reduced fatigue after accumulated effort exertion, linking DLPFC activation with fatigue. Together, our findings indicate that in effort‐based decisions DLPFC represents the capacity to exert mental effort and the updating of this information with enduring time‐on‐task, informing theoretical accounts on the role of DLPFC in the motivation to exert mental effort and the fatigue arising from it.

Subjective (dis)utility of effort: mentally and physically demanding tasks

Effort as a concept, whether momentary, sustained, or as a function of different task conditions, is of critical importance to resource theories of attention, fatigue/boredom, workplace motivation, career selection, performance, job incentives, and other applied psychology concerns. Various models of motivation suggest that there is an inverted-U-shaped function describing the personal utility of effort, but there are expected to be individual differences in the optimal levels of effort that also are related to specific domain preferences. The current study assessed the disutility of effort for 125 different tasks/activities and also explored individual differences correlates of task preferences, in a sample of 77 undergraduate participants. The participants rated each activity in terms of the amount of compensation they would require to perform the task for a period of 4 h. They also completed paired comparisons for a subset of 24 items, followed by a set of preference judgments. Multidimensional scaling and preference scaling techniques were used to determine individual differences in task preference. Personality, motivation, and interest traits were shown to be substantially related to task preferences. Implications for understanding which individuals are oriented toward or away from tasks with different effort demands are discussed, along with considerations for the dynamics of attentional effort allocations during task performance.

Modeling Dynamic Allocation of Effort in a Sequential Task Using Discounting Models

Most rewards in our lives require effort to obtain them. It is known that effort is seen by humans as carrying an intrinsic disutility which devalues the obtainable reward. Established models for effort discounting account for this by using participant-specific discounting parameters inferred from experiments. These parameters offer only a static glance into the bigger picture of effort exertion. The mechanism underlying the dynamic changes in a participant's willingness to exert effort is still unclear and an active topic of research. Here, we modeled dynamic effort exertion as a consequence of effort- and probability-discounting mechanisms during goal reaching, sequential behavior. To do this, we developed a novel sequential decision-making task in which participants made binary choices to reach a minimum number of points. Importantly, the time points and circumstances of effort allocation were decided by participants according to their own preferences and not imposed directly by the task. Using the computational model to analyze participants' choices, we show that the dynamics of effort exertion arise from a combination of changing task needs and forward planning. In other words, the interplay between a participant's inferred discounting parameters is sufficient to explain the dynamic allocation of effort during goal reaching. Using formal model comparison, we also inferred the forward-planning strategy used by participants. The model allowed us to characterize a participant's effort exertion in terms of only a few parameters. Moreover, the model can be adapted to a number of tasks used in establishing the neural underpinnings of forward-planning behavior and meta-control, allowing for the characterization of behavior in terms of model parameters.

Conquering the inner couch potato: precommitment is an effective strategy to enhance motivation for effortful actions

Letting effort-free gratification derail us from effort-requiring goals is one reason why we fail to realize health-relevant intentions like 'exercise regularly'. We tested the effectiveness of the self-control strategy precommitment in such effort-related conflicts, using a novel laboratory choice paradigm, where participants could precommit to an effort-requiring large reward by pre-eliminating an effort-free small reward from their choice set. Our participants used precommitment frequently and effectively, such that they reached effort-requiring large rewards more often. Using computational modelling and Bayesian model comparisons, we assessed whether participants employed precommitment to avoid anticipated willpower failures (i.e. as a self-regulatory measure) or to maximize their motivation to choose the effort-requiring option (i.e. as a self-motivational measure). Observed choices and precommitment decisions were consistent with the motivation maximization hypothesis, but not the willpower hypothesis. Our findings show that offering precommitment is effective in helping individuals optimize their motivation and choice behaviour and thereby achieve effort-requiring goals, and strongly encourage application of precommitment schemes in exercise and rehabilitation interventions. This article is part of the theme issue 'Risk taking and impulsive behaviour: fundamental discoveries, theoretical perspectives and clinical implications'.

Dopamine restores cognitive motivation in Parkinson's disease

Disorders of motivation, such as apathy, are common in Parkinson's disease, and a key feature of such disorders is a greater aversion to effort. In humans, the experience of cognitive effort is ubiquitous, and cognitive apathy has traditionally been considered distinct and separable from other subtypes. Surprisingly, however, the neurobiology of cognitive motivation is poorly understood. In particular, although dopamine has a well-characterized role in incentivizing physically effortful behaviour, a critical, unresolved issue is whether its facilitatory role generalizes to other domains. Here, we asked how dopamine modulates the willingness of patients with Parkinson's disease to invest cognitive effort in return for reward. We tested 20 patients with idiopathic Parkinson's disease across two counterbalanced sessions-ON and OFF their usual dopaminergic medication-and compared their performance to 20 healthy age-matched controls. We applied a novel task in which we manipulated cognitive effort as the number of rapid serial visual presentation streams to which participants had to attend. After training participants to ceiling performance, we then asked them to choose between a low-effort/low-reward baseline option, and a higher-effort/higher-reward offer. Computational models of choice behaviour revealed four key results. First, patients OFF medication were significantly less cognitively motivated than controls, as manifest by steeper cognitive effort discounting functions in the former group. Second, dopaminergic therapy improved this deficit, such that choices in patients ON medication were indistinguishable from controls. Third, differences in motivation were also accompanied by independent changes in the stochasticity of individuals' decisions, such that dopamine reduced the variability in choice behaviour. Finally, choices on our task correlated uniquely with the subscale of the Dimensional Apathy Scale that specifically indexes cognitive motivation, which suggests a close relationship between our laboratory measure of cognitive effort discounting and subjective reports of day-to-day cognitive apathy. Importantly, participants' choices were not confounded by temporal discounting, probability discounting, physical demand, or varying task performance. These results are the first to reveal the central role of dopamine in overcoming cognitive effort costs. They provide an insight into the computational mechanisms underlying cognitive apathy in Parkinson's disease, and demonstrate its amenability to dopaminergic therapy. More broadly, they offer important empirical support for prominent frameworks proposing a domain-general role for dopamine in value-based decision-making, and provide a critical link between dopamine and multidimensional theories of apathy.

Dopamine-Dependent Loss Aversion during Effort-Based Decision-Making

From psychology to economics, there has been substantial interest in how costs (e.g., delay, risk) are represented asymmetrically during decision-making when attempting to gain reward or avoid punishment. For example, in decision-making under risk, individuals show a tendency to prefer to avoid punishment rather than to acquire the equivalent reward (loss aversion). Although the cost of physical effort has recently received significant attention, it remains unclear whether loss aversion exists during effort-based decision-making. On the one hand, loss aversion may be hardwired due to asymmetric evolutionary pressure on losses and gains and therefore exists across decision-making contexts. On the other hand, distinct brain regions are involved with different decision costs, making it questionable whether similar asymmetries exist. Here, we demonstrate that young healthy human participants (females, 16; males, 6) exhibit loss aversion during effort-based decision-making by exerting more physical effort to avoid punishment than to gain a same-size reward. Next, we show that medicated Parkinson's disease (PD) patients (females, 9; males, 9) show a reduction in loss aversion compared with age-matched control subjects (females, 11; males, 9). Behavioral and computational analysis revealed that people with PD exerted similar physical effort in return for a reward but were less willing to produce effort to avoid punishment. Therefore, loss aversion is present during effort-based decision-making and can be modulated by altered dopaminergic state. This finding could have important implications for our understanding of clinical disorders that show a reduced willingness to exert effort in the pursuit of reward.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Loss aversion-preferring to avoid punishment rather than to acquire equivalent reward-is an important concept in decision-making under risk. However, little is known about whether loss aversion also exists during decisions where the cost is physical effort. This is surprising given that motor cost shapes human behavior, and a reduced willingness to exert effort is a characteristic of many clinical disorders. Here, we show that healthy human individuals exert more effort to minimize punishment than to maximize reward (loss aversion). We also demonstrate that medicated Parkinson's disease patients exert similar effort to gain reward but less effort to avoid punishment when compared with healthy age-matched control subjects. This indicates that dopamine-dependent loss aversion is crucial for explaining effort-based decision-making.