Environmentally applied nucleic acids and proteins for purposes of engineering changes to genes and other genetic material

Are null segregants new combinations of heritable material and should they be regulated?

Through genome editing and other techniques of gene technology, it is possible to create a class of organism called null segregants. These genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are products of gene technology but are argued to have no lingering vestige of the technology after the segregation of chromosomes or deletion of insertions. From that viewpoint regulations are redundant because any unique potential for the use of gene technology to cause harm has also been removed. We tackle this question of international interest by reviewing the early history of the purpose of gene technology regulation. The active ingredients of techniques used for guided mutagenesis, e.g., site-directed nucleases, such as CRISPR/Cas, are promoted for having a lower potential per reaction to create a hazard. However, others see this as a desirable industrial property of the reagents that will lead to genome editing being used more and nullifying the promised hazard mitigation. The contest between views revolves around whether regulations could alter the risks in the responsible use of gene technology. We conclude that gene technology, even when used to make null segregants, has characteristics that make regulation a reasonable option for mitigating potential harm. Those characteristics are that it allows people to create more harm faster, even if it creates benefits as well; the potential for harm increases with increased use of the technique, but safety does not; and regulations can control harm scaling.

The role of polyplexes in developing a green sustainable approach in agriculture

Rise in global population has increased the food demands and thus the competition among farmers to produce more and more. In the race to obtain higher productivity, farmers have resorted to injudicious farming practices that include the reckless use of nitrogenous fertilizers and intensive cropping on farmlands. Such practices have paved the path for large scale infestations of crops and plants by pests thus affecting the plant productivity and crop vigour. There are several traditional techniques to control pest infestations in plants such as the use of chemical or bio-pesticides, and integrated pest management practices which face several drawbacks. Delivery of gene/nucleic acid in plants through genetic engineering approaches is a more sustainable and effective method of protection against pests. The technology of RNA interference (RNAi) provides a sustainable solution to counter pest control problems faced by other traditional techniques. The RNAi technique involves delivery of dsDNA/dsRNA or other forms of nucleic acids into target organisms thereby bringing about gene silencing. However, RNAi is also limited to its use because of their susceptibility to degradation wherein the use of cationic polymers can provide a tangible solution. Cationic polymers form stable complexes with the nucleic acids known as "polyplexes", which may be attributed to their high positive charge densities thus protecting the exogenous nucleic acids from extracellular degradation. The current paper focuses on the utility of nucleic acids as a sustainable tool for pest control in crops and the use of cationic polymers for the efficient delivery of nucleic acids in pests thus protecting the plant from infestations.

Advances in Synthetic Biology and Biosafety Governance

Tremendous advances in the field of synthetic biology have been witnessed in multiple areas including life sciences, industrial development, and environmental bio-remediation. However, due to the limitations of human understanding in the code of life, any possible intended or unintended uses of synthetic biology, and other unknown reasons, the development and application of this technology has raised concerns over biosafety, biosecurity, and even cyberbiosecurity that they may expose public health and the environment to unknown hazards. Over the past decades, some countries in Europe, America, and Asia have enacted laws and regulations to control the application of synthetic biology techniques in basic and applied research and this has resulted in some benefits. The outbreak of the COVID-19 caused by novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 and various speculations about the origin of this virus have attracted more attention on bio-risk concerns of synthetic biology because of its potential power and uncertainty in the synthesis and engineering of living organisms. Therefore, it is crucial to scrutinize the control measures put in place to ensure appropriate use, promote the development of synthetic biology, and strengthen the governance of pathogen-related research, although the true origin of coronavirus remains hotly debated and unresolved. This article reviews the recent progress made in the field of synthetic biology and combs laws and regulations in governing bio-risk issues. We emphasize the urgent need for legislative and regulatory constraints and oversight to address the biological risks of synthetic biology.

Facing the 2020 pandemic: What does cyberbiosecurity want us to know to safeguard the future?

As the entire world is under the grip of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), and as many are eagerly trying to explain the origins of the virus and cause of the pandemic, it is imperative to place more attention on related potential biosafety risks. Biology and biotechnology have changed dramatically during the last ten years or so. Their reliance on digitization, automation, and their cyber-overlaps have created new vulnerabilities for unintended consequences and potentials for intended exploitation that are mostly under-appreciated. This study summarizes and elaborates on these new cyberbiosecurity challenges, (1) in terms of comprehending the evolving threat landscape and determining new risk potentials, (2) in developing adequate safeguarding measures, their validation and implementation, and (3) specific critical risks and consequences, many of them unique to the life-sciences. Drawing other's expertise and my previous work, this article reviews and critically interprets our current bio-economy situation. The goal is not to attribute causative aspects of past biosafety or biosecurity events, but to highlight the fact that the bioeconomy harbors unique features that have to be more critically assessed for their potential to unintentionally cause harm to human health or environment, or to be re-tasked with an intention to cause harm. It is concluded with recommendations that will need to be considered to help ensure converging and emerging biorisk challenges, in order to minimize vulnerabilities to the life-science enterprise, public health, and national security.