How can we help children save? Tell them they can (if they want to)

Imagining the future improves saving in preschoolers

Preschoolers are notoriously poor at delaying gratification and saving limited resources, yet evidence-based methods of improving these behaviors are lacking. Using the marble game saving paradigm, we examined whether young children's saving behavior would increase as a result of engaging in future-oriented imagination using a storyboard. Participants were 115 typically developing 4-year-olds from a midwestern U.S. metropolitan area (Mage = 53.48 months, SD = 4.14, range = 47-60; 54.8% female; 84.5% White; 7.3% Hispanic/Latino ethnicity; median annual household income = $150,000-$174,999). Children were randomly assigned to one of four storyboard conditions prior to the marble game: Positive Future Simulation, Negative Future Simulation, Positive Routine, or Negative Routine. In each condition, children were asked to imagine how they would feel in the future situation using a smiley face rating scale. Results showed that children were significantly more likely to save (and to save more marbles) in the experimental conditions compared with the control conditions (medium effect sizes). Moreover, imagining saving for the future (and how good that would feel) was more effective at increasing saving behaviors than imagining not saving (and how bad that would feel). Emotion ratings were consistent with the assigned condition, but positive emotion alone did not account for these effects. Results held after accounting for game order and verbal IQ. Implications of temporal psychological distancing and emotion anticipation for children's future-oriented decision making are discussed.

The impact of strategies on young children's saving for the future

The ability to save resources for future use, or saving, begins to emerge around 3 years of age, but children show low rates of saving during the preschool years. Thus, several strategies have been used to improve preschoolers' saving, such as providing a prompt, budgeting, increasing psychological distance, and simulating the future. The current study investigated (a) the development of saving in early childhood, (b) the impact of several saving strategies on children's saving (i.e., budgeting, tracking expenses, and psychological distance), and (c) whether the effectiveness of the strategies changed with age. Here, 3- to 5-year-old Canadian children (N = 254) completed the Saving Board Game, and their parents completed the saving subscale of the Children's Future Thinking Questionnaire. In the Saving Board Game, children were randomly assigned to one of the five strategies: (a) control, (b) budgeting, (c) tracking, (d) adult perspective, or (e) child perspective. An analysis of covariance with age, strategy, and response option order (as a covariate) showed a main effect of age, with 5-year-olds saving more than 3-year-olds. There was no effect of strategy or an interaction between strategy and age on children's token saving. Parent-reported child saving was positively correlated with children's Saving Board Game performance only in the control condition. We consider why these strategies failed to increase children's saving.

Moving beyond "Spoon" tasks: When do children autocue their episodic future thought?

Much developmental (and comparative) research has used Tulving's Spoon test (i.e., whether an individual will select an item needed to solve a future problem) as the basis for designing tasks to measure episodic future thinking, defined as the capacity to mentally pre-experience the future. There is, however, intense debate about whether these tasks successfully do so. Most notably, it has been argued that children may pass (i.e., select an item with future utility) by drawing on non-episodic, associative processes, rather than on the capacity to represent the future, per se. Although subsequent developmental tasks have sought to address this limitation, we highlight what we argue is a more fundamental shortcoming of Spoon tasks: they prompt future-directed action making it impossible to determine whether children have used their episodic future thinking to guide their behavior. Accordingly, we know little about children's thought about the future that is independently generated (i.e., without prompting), or autocued, and is subsequently reflected (and measurable) by children's actions. We argue that this capacity is a critical, and heretofore overlooked, transition in future-oriented cognition that may not occur until middle childhood. We further hypothesize that it is reliant on children developing richer and more detailed future event representations, along with the necessary cognitive control to transform these representations into actions that serve to benefit their future selves. The time is ripe for researchers to explore this aspect of cognitive development and we suggest several novel approaches to do so. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development.

Inhibition and cognitive flexibility are related to prediction of one's own future preferences in young British and Chinese children

The ability to shift from current to future perspective is pivotal to future-oriented cognition. With two distinct cultural groups, UK (N = 92) and China (N = 90), we investigated 3 to 5-year-olds' understanding of preference changes occurring within themselves and their peers (another child). We administered a battery of representative tasks of executive function and theory of mind to examine their underlying relationships with children's ability to predict future preferences. British 3-year-olds outperformed Chinese children in predicting future preferences, while no country differences were observed between the 4- and 5-year-olds. Across the UK and China, children were more accurate when predicting for their peers than for themselves. They were also more accurate when their current preferences were identified first, i.e. before answering questions about the future. Chinese children outperformed their British counterparts on inhibition and cognitive flexibility tasks whereas there were no Eastern and Western differences in their theory of mind abilities. After controlling for age and children's knowledge of generic adult preferences, children's performance in the inhibition and cognitive flexibility tasks were significantly correlated with the prediction of their own future preferences, but they were not significantly correlated when predicting for a peer. These results are discussed in relation to the conflicts between multiple perspectives and the cognitive correlates of future-oriented cognition.

Parenting Styles Predict Future-Oriented Cognition in Children: A Cross-Sectional Study

Parenting is a crucial environmental factor in children’s social and cognitive development. This study investigated the association between parenting styles and future-oriented cognition skills in elementary school-aged children. Cross-sectional data were collected from parents of 200 Iranian elementary school aged children (6–13 years), 139 boys and 61 girls. Baumrind’s Parenting Styles Questionnaire and Children’s Future Thinking Questionnaire (CFTQ) were administered to parents. There was a significant positive association between authoritative parenting and children’s abilities in prospective memory, episodic foresight, planning, delay of gratification, and future-oriented cognition total score. In contrast, authoritarian parenting was negatively correlated with children’s abilities in planning, delay of gratification, and future-oriented cognition. Increases in authoritative parenting scores predicted better future-oriented cognition abilities in children.

Imagination and social cognition in childhood

Imagination is a cognitive process used to generate new ideas from old, not just in the service of creativity and fantasy, but also in our ordinary thoughts about alternatives to current reality. In this article, I argue for the central function of imagination in the development of social cognition in infancy and childhood. In Section 1, I review a work showing that even in the first year of life, social cognition can be viewed through a nascent ability to imagine the physical possibilities and physical limits on action. In Section 2, I discuss how imagination of what should happen is appropriately constrained by what can happen, and how this influences children's moral evaluations. In the final section, I suggest developmental changes in imagination—especially the ability to imagine improbable events—may have implications for social inference, leading children to learn that inner motives can conflict. These examples point to a flexible and domain‐general process that operates on knowledge to make social meaning.

This article is categorized under:

Psychology > Development and Aging

Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development

Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief

Children's future-oriented cognition

Children's future-oriented cognition has become a well-established area of research over the last decade. Future-oriented cognition encompasses a range of processes, including those involved in conceiving the future, imagining and preparing for future events, and making decisions that will affect how the future unfolds. We consider recent empirical advances in the study of such processes by outlining key findings that have yielded a clearer picture of how future thinking emerges and changes over childhood. Our interest in future thinking stems from a broader interest in temporal cognition, and we argue that a consideration of developmental changes in how children understand and represent time itself provides a valuable framework in which to study future-oriented cognition.

Thinking about the future: Comparing children's forced-choice versus "generative" responses in the "spoon test"

One of the most popular methods to assess children's foresight is to present children with a problem (e.g., locked box with no key) in one room and then later, in another room, give them the opportunity to select the item (e.g., key) that will solve it. Whether or not children choose the correct item to bring back to the first room is the dependent measure of interest in this "spoon test." Although children as young as 3 or 4 years typically succeed on this test, whether they would pass a more stringent version in which they must verbally generate (vs. select) the correct item in the absence of any cues is unknown. This is an important point given that humans must often make decisions about the future without being explicitly "prompted" by the future-oriented option. In Experiment 1, using an adapted version of the spoon test, we show that as the "generative" requirements of the task increase, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds' (N = 99) performance significantly decreases. We replicate this effect in Experiment 2 (N = 48 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds) and also provide preliminary evidence that the capacity to verbally generate the correct item in a spoon test may draw more heavily on children's category fluency skills than does their capacity to select this item among a set of distracters. Our findings underscore the importance of examining more generative forms of future thought in young children.

Future-oriented objects

Hoerl & McCormack suggest that saving tools does not require temporal reasoning. However, we identify a class of objects that are only possessed (i.e., saved) in anticipation of future needs. We propose that investigating these future-oriented objects may help identify temporal reasoning in populations where this ability is uncertain.

Preschoolers' Saving Behavior: The Role of Planning and Self-Control

Planning and self-control were examined in relation to preschoolers' (41- to 74-months) saving behavior. Employing a marble run paradigm, 54 children participated in two trials in which they could use their marbles immediately on a less desirable run, or save for a more desirable run. Twenty-nine children received the opportunity to create a budget. On Trial 1, children in the budgeting condition saved significantly more than did children in the control condition, and their planning ability related to saving (after controlling for age and language). Those who consistently budgeted at least one marble for the more desirable run were more likely to save. Control children's performance improved across trials, with no between-condition differences on Trial 2. Self-control was not related to saving.