A specific role for efferent information in self-recognition

Interoception, network physiology and the emergence of bodily self-awareness

The interplay between the brain and interoceptive signals is key in maintaining internal balance and orchestrating neural dynamics, encompassing influences on perceptual and self-awareness. Central to this interplay is the differentiation between the external world, others and the self, a cornerstone in the construction of bodily self-awareness. This review synthesizes physiological and behavioral evidence illustrating how interoceptive signals can mediate or influence bodily self-awareness, by encompassing interactions with various sensory modalities. To deepen our understanding of the basis of bodily self-awareness, we propose a network physiology perspective. This approach explores complex neural computations across multiple nodes, shifting the focus from localized areas to large-scale neural networks. It examines how these networks operate in parallel with and adapt to changes in visceral activities. Within this framework, we propose to investigate physiological factors that disrupt bodily self-awareness, emphasizing the impact of interoceptive pathway disruptions, offering insights across several clinical contexts. This integrative perspective not only can enhance the accuracy of mental health assessments but also paves the way for targeted interventions.

Predicting the bodily self in space and time

To understand how the human brain distinguishes itself from external stimulation, it was examined if motor predictions enable healthy adult volunteers to infer self-location and to distinguish their body from the environment (and other agents). By uniquely combining a VR-setup with full-body motion capture, a full-body illusion paradigm (FBI) was developed with different levels of motion control: (A) a standard, passive FBI in which they had no motion control; (B) an active FBI in which they made simple, voluntary movements; and (C) an immersive game in which they real-time controlled a human-sized avatar in third person. Systematic comparisons between measures revealed a causal relationship between (i) motion control (prospective agency), (ii) self-other identification, and (iii) the ability to locate oneself. Healthy adults could recognise their movements in a third-person avatar and psychologically align with it (action observation); but did not lose a sense of place (self-location), time (temporal binding), nor who they are (self/other). Instead, motor predictions enabled them to localise their body and to distinguish self from other. In the future, embodied games could target and strengthen the brain's control networks in psychosis and neurodegeneration; real-time motion simulations could help advance neurorehabilitation techniques by fine-tuning and personalising therapeutic settings.

Augmenting locomotor perception by remapping tactile foot sensation to the back

BACKGROUND

Sensory reafferents are crucial to correct our posture and movements, both reflexively and in a cognitively driven manner. They are also integral to developing and maintaining a sense of agency for our actions. In cases of compromised reafferents, such as for persons with amputated or congenitally missing limbs, or diseases of the peripheral and central nervous systems, augmented sensory feedback therefore has the potential for a strong, neurorehabilitative impact. We here developed an untethered vibrotactile garment that provides walking-related sensory feedback remapped non-invasively to the wearer's back. Using the so-called FeetBack system, we investigated if healthy individuals perceive synchronous remapped feedback as corresponding to their own movement (motor awareness) and how temporal delays in tactile locomotor feedback affect both motor awareness and walking characteristics (adaptation).

METHODS

We designed the system to remap somatosensory information from the foot-soles of healthy participants (N = 29), using vibrotactile apparent movement, to two linear arrays of vibrators mounted ipsilaterally on the back. This mimics the translation of the centre-of-mass over each foot during stance-phase. The intervention included trials with real-time or delayed feedback, resulting in a total of 120 trials and approximately 750 step-cycles, i.e. 1500 steps, per participant. Based on previous work, experimental delays ranged from 0ms to 1500ms to include up to a full step-cycle (baseline stride-time: µ = 1144 ± 9ms, range 986-1379ms). After each trial participants were asked to report their motor awareness.

RESULTS

Participants reported high correspondence between their movement and the remapped feedback for real-time trials (85 ± 3%, µ ± σ), and lowest correspondence for trials with left-right reversed feedback (22 ± 6% at 600ms delay). Participants further reported high correspondence of trials delayed by a full gait-cycle (78 ± 4% at 1200ms delay), such that the modulation of motor awareness is best expressed as a sinusoidal relationship reflecting the phase-shifts between actual and remapped tactile feedback (cos model: 38% reduction of residual sum of squares (RSS) compared to linear fit, p < 0.001). The temporal delay systematically but only moderately modulated participant stride-time in a sinusoidal fashion (3% reduction of RSS compared a linear fit, p < 0.01).

CONCLUSIONS

We here demonstrate that lateralized, remapped haptic feedback modulates motor awareness in a systematic, gait-cycle dependent manner. Based on this approach, the FeetBack system was used to provide augmented sensory information pertinent to the user's on-going movement such that they reported high motor awareness for (re)synchronized feedback of their movements. While motor adaptation was limited in the current cohort of healthy participants, the next step will be to evaluate if individuals with a compromised peripheral nervous system, as well as those with conditions of the central nervous system such as Parkinson's Disease, may benefit from the FeetBack system, both for maintaining a sense of agency over their movements as well as for systematic gait-adaptation in response to the remapped, self-paced, rhythmic feedback.

The use of virtual reality as a perspective-taking manipulation to improve self-awareness in Alzheimer's disease

Lack of awareness of symptoms or having a condition referred to as anosognosia is a common feature of individuals with Alzheimer's Disease (AD). Previous literature on AD reported difficulties in evaluating self-abilities, often showing underestimation of limitations. There is increasing evidence that the perspective through which information is presented may moderate the performance appraisal and that anosognosia in AD might be a consequence of a deficit in assuming a third-person perspective. In this context, some studies showed that subjects may better recognize self-and other-difficulties when exposed to a third-person perspective. Considering the variety of approaches aiming to investigate the lack of awareness, there is still a scarcity of methods that provide great ecological validity and consider more than one facet of awareness, thus failing to offer more accurate evaluations of daily experiences. The present paper primarily addresses the theme of the multidimensional character of awareness of abilities in AD and the effect of perspective-taking on its trajectories. The focus turns to virtual reality as a promising tool for a greater evaluation of perspective-taking and self-awareness. Particularly, these systems offer the possibility to involve users in cognitive and sensorimotor tasks that simulate daily life conditions within immersive and realistic environments, and a great sense of embodiment. We propose that virtual reality might allow a great level of complexity, veracity, and safety that is needed for individuals with AD to behave according to their actual abilities and enable to explore the liaison between the subject's viewpoint, performance, and self-evaluation. In addition, we suggest promising clinical implications of virtual reality-based methods for individualized assessments, investigating specific impacts on subjects' life and possible improvements in their awareness.

Probing corporeal awareness in women through virtual reality induction of embreathment illusion

We capitalized on the respiratory bodily illusion that we discovered in a previous study and called 'Embreathment' where we showed that breathing modulates corporeal awareness in men. Despite the relevance of the issue, no such studies are available in women. To bridge this gap, we tested whether the synchronization of avatar-participant respiration patterns influenced females' bodily awareness. We collected cardiac and respiratory interoceptive measures, administered body (dis)satisfaction questionnaires, and tracked participants' menstrual cycles via a mobile app. Our approach allowed us to characterize the 'Embreathment' illusion in women, and explore the relationships between menstrual cycle, interoception and body image. We found that breathing was as crucial as visual appearance in eliciting feelings of ownership and held greater significance than any other cue with respect to body agency in both women and men. Moreover, a positive correlation between menstrual cycle days and body image concerns, and a negative correlation between interoceptive sensibility and body dissatisfaction were found, confirming that women's body dissatisfaction arises during the last days of menstrual cycle and is associated with interoception. These findings have potential implications for corporeal awareness alterations in clinical conditions like eating disorders and schizophrenia.

The role of self-related information in the sense of agency

Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the subjective experience of controlling one's actions and their subsequent consequences. The present study endeavors to investigate the impact of how different degrees of self-related stimuli as action outcomes on the sense of agency by observing the temporal binding effect. Results showed that self-related sound significantly altered temporal binding, notably influencing outcome binding. A post-hoc explanation model effectively elucidated the role of self-related information in the formation of the sense of agency.

Metacognition and sense of agency

Intelligent agents need to understand how they can change the world, and how they cannot change it, in order to make rational decisions for their forthcoming actions, and to adapt to their current environment. Previous research on the sense of agency, based largely on subjective ratings, failed to dissociate the sensitivity of sense of agency (i.e., the extent to which individual sense of agency tracks actual instrumental control over external events) from judgment criteria (i.e., the extent to which individuals self-attribute agency independent of their actual influence over external events). Furthermore, few studies have examined whether individuals have metacognitive access to the internal processes underlying the sense of agency. We developed a novel two-alternative-forced choice (2FAC) control detection task, in which participants identified which of two visual objects was more strongly controlled by their voluntary movement. The actual level of control over the target object was manipulated by adjusting the proportion of its motion that was driven by the participant's movement, compared to the proportion driven by a pre-recorded movement by another agent, using a staircase to hold 2AFC control detection accuracy at 70%. Participants identified which of the two visual objects they controlled, and also made a binary confidence judgment regarding their control detection judgment. We calculated a bias-free measure of first-order sensitivity (d') for detection control at any given level of participant's own movement. The proportion of pre-recorded movements determined by the stairecase could then be used as an index of control detection ability. We identified two distinct processes underlying first-order detection of control: one based on instantaneous sensory predictions for the current movement, and one based on detection of a regular motor-visual relation across a series of movements. Further, we found large individual differences across 40 particpants in metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d') even though first-order sensitivity of control detection was well controlled. Using structural equation modelling (SEM), we showed that metacognition was negatively correlated with the predictive process component of detection of control. This result is inconsistent with previous hypotheses that detection of control relies on metacognitive monitoring of a predictive circuit. Instead, it suggests that predictive mechanisms that compute sense of agency may operate unconsciously.

The bodily self from psychosis to psychedelics

The sense of self is a foundational element of neurotypical human consciousness. We normally experience the world as embodied agents, with the unified sensation of our selfhood being nested in our body. Critically, the sense of self can be altered in psychiatric conditions such as psychosis and altered states of consciousness induced by psychedelic compounds. The similarity of phenomenological effects across psychosis and psychedelic experiences has given rise to the "psychotomimetic" theory suggesting that psychedelics simulate psychosis-like states. Moreover, psychedelic-induced changes in the sense of self have been related to reported improvements in mental health. Here we investigated the bodily self in psychedelic, psychiatric, and control populations. Using the Moving Rubber Hand Illusion, we tested (N = 75) patients with psychosis, participants with a history of substantial psychedelic experiences, and control participants to see how psychedelic and psychiatric experience impacts the bodily self. Results revealed that psychosis patients had reduced Body Ownership and Sense of Agency during volitional action. The psychedelic group reported subjective long-lasting changes to the sense of self, but no differences between control and psychedelic participants were found. Our results suggest that while psychedelics induce both acute and enduring subjective changes in the sense of self, these are not manifested at the level of the bodily self. Furthermore, our data show that bodily self-processing, related to volitional action, is disrupted in psychosis patients. We discuss these findings in relation to anomalous self-processing across psychedelic and psychotic experiences.

Enriched sensory feedback delivered during a voluntary action boosts subjective time compression

Introduction

The subjective experience of time can be influenced by various factors including voluntary actions. In our previous study, we found that the subjective time experience of an action outcome can be compressed when an individual performs a continuous action compared to a single action, suggesting that the sense of agency (SoA), the feeling of control over one's own action outcomes, contributes to the subjective time compression. We hypothesized that enhancing SoA by providing sensory feedback to participants would further compress the subjective time experience.

Methods

To test the hypothesis, we used a temporal reproduction task where participants reproduced the duration of a previously exposed auditory stimulus by performing different voluntary actions: a combination of single actions with single auditory feedback, continuous action with single auditory feedback, or continuous action with multiple auditory feedback.

Results

The results showed that the continuous action conditions, regardless of the type of auditory feedback, led to a compression of the subjective time experience of the reproduced tone, whereas the single action condition did not. Furthermore, a greater degree of subjective time compression during continuous action and a stronger SoA were revealed when enriched with multiple auditory feedback.

Discussion

These results indicate that enriching auditory feedback can increase subjective time compression during voluntary action, which in turn enhances SoA over action outcomes. This suggests the potential for developing new techniques to artificially compress the subjective time experience of daily events.

Human-likeness and attribution of intentionality predict vicarious sense of agency over humanoid robot actions

Sense of Agency (SoA) is the feeling of being in control of one's actions and their outcomes. In a social context, people can experience a "vicarious" SoA over another human's actions; however, it is still controversial whether the same occurs in Human-Robot Interaction (HRI). The present study aimed at understanding whether humanoid robots may elicit vicarious SoA in humans, and whether the emergence of this phenomenon depends on the attribution of intentionality towards robots. We asked adult participants to perform an Intentional Binding (IB) task alone and with the humanoid iCub robot, reporting the time of occurrence of both self- and iCub-generated actions. Before the experiment, participants' degree of attribution of intentionality towards robots was assessed. Results showed that participants experienced vicarious SoA over iCub-generated actions. Moreover, intentionality attribution positively predicted the magnitude of vicarious SoA. In conclusion, our results highlight the importance of factors such as human-likeness and attribution of intentionality for the emergence of vicarious SoA towards robots.

Multisensory and Sensorimotor Integration in the Embodied Self: Relationship between Self-Body Recognition and the Mirror Neuron System

The embodied self is rooted in the self-body in the "here and now". The senses of self-ownership and self-agency have been proposed as the basis of the sense of embodied self, and many experimental studies have been conducted on this subject. This review summarizes the experimental research on the embodied self that has been conducted over the past 20 years, mainly from the perspective of multisensory integration and sensorimotor integration regarding the self-body. Furthermore, the phenomenon of back projection, in which changes in an external object (e.g., a rubber hand) with which one has a sense of ownership have an inverse influence on the sensation and movement of one's own body, is discussed. This postulates that the self-body illusion is not merely an illusion caused by multisensory and/or sensorimotor integration, but is the incorporation of an external object into the self-body representation in the brain. As an extension of this fact, we will also review research on the mirror neuron system, which is considered to be the neural basis of recognition of others, and discuss how the neural basis of self-body recognition and the mirror neuron system can be regarded as essentially the same.

Non-motor cues do not generate the perception of self-agency: A critique of cue-integration

How does one know that (s)he is the causal agent of their motor actions? Earlier theories of sense of agency have attributed the capacity for perception of self-agency to the comparator process of the motor-control/action system. However, with the advent of the findings implying a role of non-motor cues (like affective states, beliefs, primed concepts, and social instructions or previews of actions) in the sense of agency literature, the perception of self-agency is hypothesized to be generated even by non-motor cues (based on their relative reliability or weighting estimate); and, this theory is come to be known as the cue-integration of sense of agency. However, the cue-integration theory motivates skepticism about whether it is falsifiable and whether it is plausible that non-motor cues that are sensorily unrelated to typical sensory processes of self-agency have the capacity to produce a perception of self-agency. To substantiate this skepticism, I critically analyze the experimental operationalizations of cue-integration-with the (classic) vicarious agency experiment as a case study-to show that (1) the participants in these experiments are ambiguous about their causal agency over motor actions, (2) thus, these participants resort to reports of self-agency as heuristic judgments (under ambiguity) rather than due to cue-integration per se, and (3) there might not have occurred cue-integration based self-agency reports if these experimental operationalizations had eliminated ambiguity about the causal agency. Thus, I conclude that the reports of self-agency (observed in typical non-motor cues based cue-integration experiments) are not instances of perceptual effect-that are hypothesized to be produced by non-motor cues-but are of heuristic judgment effect.

I overthink-Therefore I am not: An active inference account of altered sense of self and agency in depersonalisation disorder

This paper considers the phenomenology of depersonalisation disorder, in relation to predictive processing and its associated pathophysiology. To do this, we first establish a few mechanistic tenets of predictive processing that are necessary to talk about phenomenal transparency, mental action, and self as subject. We briefly review the important role of 'predicting precision' and how this affords mental action and the loss of phenomenal transparency. We then turn to sensory attenuation and the phenomenal consequences of (pathophysiological) failures to attenuate or modulate sensory precision. We then consider this failure in the context of depersonalisation disorder. The key idea here is that depersonalisation disorder reflects the remarkable capacity to explain perceptual engagement with the world via the hypothesis that "I am an embodied perceiver, but I am not in control of my perception". We suggest that individuals with depersonalisation may believe that 'another agent' is controlling their thoughts, perceptions or actions, while maintaining full insight that the 'other agent' is 'me' (the self). Finally, we rehearse the predictions of this formal analysis, with a special focus on the psychophysical and physiological abnormalities that may underwrite the phenomenology of depersonalisation.

Phenomenological Origins of Psychological Ownership

Motivated by a set of converging empirical findings and theoretical suggestions pertaining to the construct of ownership, we survey literature from multiple disciplines and present an extensive theoretical account linking the inception of a foundational naïve theory of ownership to principles governing the sense of (body) ownership. The first part of the account examines the emergence of the non-conceptual sense of ownership in terms of the minimal self and the body schema—a dynamic mental model of the body that functions as an instrument of directed action. A remarkable feature of the body schema is that it expands to incorporate objects that are objectively controlled by the person. Moreover, this embodiment of extracorporeal objects is accompanied by the phenomenological feeling of ownership towards the embodied objects. In fact, we argue that the sense of agency and ownership are inextricably linked, and that predictable control over an object can engender the sense of ownership. This relation between objective agency and the sense of ownership is moderated by gestalt-like principles. In the second part, we posit that these early emerging principles and experiences lead to the formation of a naïve theory of ownership rooted in notions of agential involvement.

Breathing affects self-other voice discrimination in a bodily state associated with somatic passivity

A growing number of studies have focused on identifying cognitive processes that are modulated by interoceptive signals, particularly in relation to the respiratory or cardiac cycle. Considering the fundamental role of interoception in bodily self‐consciousness, we here investigated whether interoceptive signals also impact self‐voice perception. We applied an interactive, robotic paradigm associated with somatic passivity (a bodily state characterized by illusory misattribution of self‐generated touches to someone else) to investigate whether somatic passivity impacts self‐voice perception as a function of concurrent interoceptive signals. Participants' breathing and heartbeat signals were recorded while they performed two self‐voice tasks (self‐other voice discrimination and loudness perception) and while simultaneously experiencing two robotic conditions (somatic passivity condition; control condition). Our data reveal that respiration, but not cardiac activity, affects self‐voice perception: participants were better at discriminating self‐voice from another person’s voice during the inspiration phase of the respiration cycle. Moreover, breathing effects were prominent in participants experiencing somatic passivity and a different task with the same stimuli (i.e., judging the loudness and not identity of the voices) was unaffected by breathing. Combining interoception and voice perception with self‐monitoring framework, these data extend findings on breathing‐dependent changes in perception and cognition to self‐related processing.

Impact StatementThe contents of this page will be shown on the eTOC on the online version only. It will not be published as part of the article PDF.

We combined psychophysics with robotics and voice‐morphing technology to evaluate the effect of breathing on self‐voice perception. Our results show that listeners better perceive their own voice during inspiration, an effect that is modulated by self‐related bodily processing. This extends previous findings documenting the effect of interoceptive signals on perception and suggests that the bodily self may serve as a scaffold for cognition.

Insights on embodiment induced by visuo-tactile stimulation during robotic telepresence

Using a simple neuroscience-inspired procedure to beam human subjects into robots, we previously demonstrated by visuo-motor manipulations that embodiment into a robot can enhance the acceptability and closeness felt towards the robot. In that study, the feelings of likeability and closeness toward the robot were significantly related to the sense of agency, independently of the sensations of enfacement and location. Here, using the same paradigm we investigated the effect of a purely sensory manipulation on the sense of robotic embodiment associated to social cognition. Wearing a head-mounted display, participants saw the visual scene captured from the robot eyes. By positioning a mirror in front of the robot, subjects saw themselves as a robot. Tactile stimulation was provided by stroking synchronously or not with a paintbrush the same location of the subject and robot faces. In contrast to the previous motor induction of embodiment which particularly affected agency, tactile induction yields more generalized effects on the perception of ownership, location and agency. Interestingly, the links between positive social feelings towards the robot and the strength of the embodiment sensations were not observed. We conclude that the embodiment into a robot is not sufficient in itself to induce changes in social cognition.

Transparency in Human-Machine Mutual Action

Recent advances in human-computer integration (HInt) have focused on the development of human-machine systems, where both human and machine autonomously act upon each other. However, a key challenge in designing such systems is augmenting the user’s physical abilities while maintaining their sense of self-attribution. This challenge is particularly prevalent when both human and machine are capable of acting upon each other, thereby creating a human-machine mutual action (HMMA) system. To address this challenge, we present a design framework that is based on the concept of transparency. We define transparency in HInt as the degree to which users can self-attribute an experience when machines intervene in the users’ action. Using this framework, we form a set of design guidelines and an approach for designing HMMA systems. By using transparency as our focus, we aim to provide a design approach for not only achieving human-machine fusion into a single agent, but also controlling the degrees of fusion at will. This study also highlights the effectiveness of our design approach through an analysis of existing studies that developed HMMA systems. Further development of our design approach is discussed, and future prospects for HInt and HMMA system designs are presented.

Sensorimotor conflicts induce somatic passivity and louden quiet voices in healthy listeners

Sensorimotor conflicts are known to alter the perception of accompanying sensory signals, and deficits in sensory attenuation have been observed in schizophrenia. In the auditory domain, self-generated tones or voices (compared to tones or voices presented passively or with temporal delays) have been associated with changes in loudness perception and attenuated neural responses. It has been argued that for sensory signals to be attenuated, predicted and sensory consequences must have a consistent spatiotemporal relationship, between button presses and reafferent signals, via predictive sensory signaling, a process altered in schizophrenia. Here, we investigated auditory sensory attenuation for a series of morphed voices while healthy participants applied sensorimotor stimulations that had no spatiotemporal relationship to the voice stimuli and that have been shown to induce mild psychosis-like phenomena. In two independent groups of participants, we report a loudening of silent voices and found this effect only during maximal sensorimotor conflicts (versus several control conditions). Importantly, conflicting sensorimotor stimulation also induced a mild psychosis-like state in the form of somatic passivity and participants who experienced stronger passivity lacked the sensorimotor loudening effect. We argue that this conflict-related sensorimotor loudness amplification may represent a reduction of auditory self-attenuation that is lacking in participants experiencing a concomitant mild psychosis-like state. We interpret our results within the framework of the comparator model of sensorimotor control, and discuss the implications of our findings regarding passivity experiences and hallucinations in schizophrenia.

The Role of Temporal Contingency and Integrity of Visual Inputs in the Sense of Agency: A Psychophysical Study

The sense of agency is a subjective feeling that one's own actions drive action outcomes. Previous studies have focused primarily on the temporal contingency between actions and sensory inputs as a possible mechanism for the sense of agency. However, the contribution of the integrity of visual inputs has not been systematically addressed. In the current study, we developed a psychophysical task to examine the role of visual inputs as well as temporal contingencies toward the sense of agency. Specifically, participants were required to track a target on a sinusoidal curve on a computer screen. Visual integrity of sensory inputs was manipulated by gradually occluding a computer cursor, and participants were asked to report the sense of agency on a nine-point Likert scale. Temporal contingency was manipulated by varying the delay between finger movements on a touchpad and cursor movements. The results showed that the sense of agency was influenced by both visual integrity and temporal contingency. These results are discussed in the context of current models that have proposed that the sense of agency emerges from the comparison of visual inputs with motor commands.

Multisensory integration of visual cues from first- to third-person perspective avatars in the perception of self-motion

In the perception of self-motion, visual cues originating from an embodied humanoid avatar seen from a first-person perspective (1^st-PP) are processed in the same way as those originating from a person's own body. Here, we sought to determine whether the user's and avatar's bodies in virtual reality have to be colocalized for this visual integration. In Experiment 1, participants saw a whole-body avatar in a virtual mirror facing them. The mirror perspective could be supplemented with a fully visible 1^st-PP avatar or a suggested one (with the arms hidden by a virtual board). In Experiment 2, the avatar was viewed from the mirror perspective or a third-person perspective (3^rd-PP) rotated 90° left or right. During an initial embodiment phase in both experiments, the avatar's forearms faithfully reproduced the participant's real movements. Next, kinaesthetic illusions were induced on the static right arm from the vision of passive displacements of the avatar's arms enhanced by passive displacement of the participant's left arm. Results showed that this manipulation elicited kinaesthetic illusions regardless of the avatar's perspective in Experiments 1 and 2. However, illusions were more likely to occur when the mirror perspective was supplemented with the view of the 1st-PP avatar's body than with the mirror perspective only (Experiment 1), just as they are more likely to occur in the latter condition than with the 3^rd-PP (Experiment 2). Our results show that colocalization of the user's and avatar's bodies is an important, but not essential, factor in visual integration for self-motion perception.

The Redundant Signals Effect and the Full Body Illusion: not Multisensory, but Unisensory Tactile Stimuli Are Affected by the Illusion

During a full body illusion (FBI), participants experience a change in self-location towards a body that they see in front of them from a third-person perspective and experience touch to originate from this body. Multisensory integration is thought to underlie this illusion. In the present study we tested the redundant signals effect (RSE) as a new objective measure of the illusion that was designed to directly tap into the multisensory integration underlying the illusion. The illusion was induced by an experimenter who stroked and tapped the participant's shoulder and underarm, while participants perceived the touch on the virtual body in front of them via a head-mounted display. Participants performed a speeded detection task, responding to visual stimuli on the virtual body, to tactile stimuli on the real body and to combined (multisensory) visual and tactile stimuli. Analysis of the RSE with a race model inequality test indicated that multisensory integration took place in both the synchronous and the asynchronous condition. This surprising finding suggests that simultaneous bodily stimuli from different (visual and tactile) modalities will be transiently integrated into a multisensory representation even when no illusion is induced. Furthermore, this finding suggests that the RSE is not a suitable objective measure of body illusions. Interestingly however, responses to the unisensory tactile stimuli in the speeded detection task were found to be slower and had a larger variance in the asynchronous condition than in the synchronous condition. The implications of this finding for the literature on body representations are discussed.

The toolish hand illusion: embodiment of a tool based on similarity with the hand

A tool can function as a body part yet not feel like one: Putting down a fork after dinner does not feel like losing a hand. However, studies show fake body-parts are embodied and experienced as parts of oneself. Typically, embodiment illusions have only been reported when the fake body-part visually resembles the real one. Here we reveal that participants can experience an illusion that a mechanical grabber, which looks scarcely like a hand, is part of their body. We found changes in three signatures of embodiment: the real hand’s perceived location, the feeling that the grabber belonged to the body, and autonomic responses to visible threats to the grabber. These findings show that artificial objects can become embodied even though they bear little visual resemblance to the hand.

Social Agency as a continuum

Sense of Agency, the phenomenology associated with causing one's own actions and corresponding effects, is a cornerstone of human experience. Social Agency can be defined as the Sense of Agency experienced in any situation in which the effects of our actions are related to a conspecific. This can be implemented as the other's reactions being caused by our action, joint action modulating our Sense of Agency, or the other's mere social presence influencing our Sense of Agency. It is currently an open question how such Social Agency can be conceptualized and how it relates to its nonsocial variant. This is because, compared with nonsocial Sense of Agency, the concept of Social Agency has remained oversimplified and underresearched, with disparate empirical paradigms yielding divergent results. Reviewing the empirical evidence and the commonalities and differences between different instantiations of Social Agency, we propose that Social Agency can be conceptualized as a continuum, in which the degree of cooperation is the key dimension that determines our Sense of Agency, and how it relates to nonsocial Sense of Agency. Taking this perspective, we review how the different factors that typically influence Sense of Agency affect Social Agency, and in the process highlight outstanding empirical questions within the field. Finally, concepts from wider research areas are discussed in relation to the ecological validity of Social Agency paradigms, and we provide recommendations for future methodology.

Measuring the Sense of Agency: A French Adaptation and Validation of the Sense of Agency Scale (F-SoAS)

Sense of Agency (SoA) is the subject of growing attention. It corresponds to the capacity to claim authorship over an action, associate specific consequences with a specific action, and it has been claimed to be a key point in the development of consciousness. It can be measured using the Sense of Agency Scale (SoAS), originally proposed by Tapal et al. (2017), who distinguished it into two-factor: Sense of Positive Agency (SoPA) and Sense of Negative Agency (SoNA). This study reports on the first adaptation of the SoAS into another language, French. For this French version of the Sense of Agency Scale (F-SoAS), we analyzed responses from a sample of 517 native French-speakers. Our results indicate that the scale has good psychometric properties. Factor analysis confirms the same two-factor model as Tapal et al. (2017). However, some items were removed due to insufficient loadings with factors, leading to a short version of the scale (7-item). Furthermore, we observed gender differences that are consistent with findings in the literature. Specifically, women report higher SoNA scores and lower SoPA scores than men. We conclude by discussing possible uses and future directions for the scale.

Sense of external agency is sustained by multisensory functional integration in the somatosensory cortex

"Sense of agency" (SoA), the feeling of control for events caused by one's own actions, is deceived by visuomotor incongruence. Sensorimotor networks are implicated in SoA, however little evidence exists on brain functionality during agency processing. Concurrently, it has been suggested that the brain's intrinsic resting-state (rs) activity has a preliminary influence on processing of agency cues. Here, we investigated the relation between performance in an agency attribution task and functional interactions among brain regions as derived by network analysis of rs functional magnetic resonance imaging. The action-effect delay was adaptively increased (range 90-1,620 ms) and behavioral measures correlated to indices of cognitive processes and appraised self-concepts. They were then regressed on local metrics of rs brain functional connectivity as to isolate the core areas enabling self-agency. Across subjects, the time window for self-agency was 90-625 ms, while the action-effect integration was impacted by self-evaluated personality traits. Neurally, the brain intrinsic organization sustaining consistency in self-agency attribution was characterized by high connectiveness in the secondary visual cortex, and regional segregation in the primary somatosensory area. Decreased connectiveness in the secondary visual area, regional segregation in the superior parietal lobule, and information control within a primary visual cortex-frontal eye fields network sustained self-agency over long-delayed effects. We thus demonstrate that self-agency is grounded on the intrinsic mode of brain function designed to organize information for visuomotor integration. Our observation is relevant for current models of psychopathology in clinical conditions in which both rs activity and sense of agency are altered.

Confusion within feedback control between cognitive and sensorimotor agency cues in self-other attribution

Self-other sensory attribution is necessary to realize feedback control because the self-attribution of sensations can drive feedback control. Some studies have suggested that self-other attribution is realized by the integration of both sensorimotor cues, including internal prediction and/or sensory feedback, and cognitive cues, such as knowledge or thought. However, in motor control, it remains unclear whether and how cognitive cues affect self-other attribution. In a feedback-control task, this study manipulated the movements (sensorimotor cue) and appearances (cognitive cue) of the cursor provided as visual feedback on participants' sinusoidal movement. Participants were required to make a self-other attribution regarding whether the cursor's movement reflected their actual movement without being confused by the cursor's appearance. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that participants made illusory self-other attributions within feedback control based on cursor appearance only when the information on cursor movement was reduced by causing the cursor to flicker at 8 Hz. However, in Experiment 3, in which the cursor flickering at 4 Hz reduced the information on cursor movement to a level too low for conscious self-other attribution, cursor appearance was not utilized. Our findings suggest that the effects of cognitive cues on self-other attribution are determined by the cue integration strategy selected for the given situation.

Embodied Predictions, Agency, and Psychosis

Psychotic symptoms, i.e., hallucinations and delusions, involve gross departures from conscious apprehension of consensual reality; respectively, perceiving and believing things that, according to same culture peers, do not obtain. In schizophrenia, those experiences are often related to abnormal sense of control over one's own actions, often expressed as a distorted sense of agency (i.e., passivity symptoms). Cognitive and computational neuroscience have furnished an account of these experiences and beliefs in terms of the brain's generative model of the world, which underwrites inferences to the best explanation of current and future states, in order to behave adaptively. Inference then involves a reliability-based trade off of predictions and prediction errors, and psychotic symptoms may arise as departures from this inference process, either an over- or under-weighting of priors relative to prediction errors. Surprisingly, there is empirical evidence in favor of both positions. Relatedly, there is evidence for both an enhanced and a diminished sense of agency in schizophrenia. How can this be? We argue that there is more than one generative model in the brain, and that ego- and allo-centric models operate in tandem. In brief, ego-centric models implement corollary discharge signals that cancel out the effects of self-generated actions while allo-centric models compare several hypothesis regarding the causes of sensory inputs (including the self among the potential causes). The two parallel hierarchies give rise to different levels of agency, with ego-centric models subserving "feelings of agency" and allo-centric predictions giving rise to "judgements of agency." Those two components are weighted according to their reliability and combined, generating a higher-level "sense of agency." We suggest that in schizophrenia a failure of corollary discharges to suppress self-generated inputs results in the absence of a "feeling of agency" and in a compensatory enhancement of allo-centric priors, which might underlie hallucinations, delusions of control but also, under certain circumstances, the enhancement of "judgments of agency." We discuss the consequences of such a model, and potential courses of action that could lead to its falsification.

Mechanotactile Sensory Feedback Improves Embodiment of a Prosthetic Hand During Active Use

There have been several advancements in the field of myoelectric prostheses to improve dexterity and restore hand grasp patterns for persons with upper limb loss, including robust control strategies, novel sensory feedback, and multifunction prosthetic terminal devices. Although these advancements have shown to improve prosthesis performance, a key element that may further improve acceptance is often overlooked. Embodiment, which encompasses the feeling of owning, controlling and locating the device without the need to constantly look at it, has been shown to be affected by sensory feedback. However, the specific aspects of embodiment that are influenced are not clearly understood, particularly when a prosthesis is actively controlled. In this work, we used a sensorized simulated prosthesis in able-bodied participants to investigate the contribution of sensory feedback, active motor control, and the combination of both to the components of embodiment; using a common methodology in the literature, namely the rubber hand illusion (RHI). Our results indicate that (1) the sensorized simulated prosthesis may be embodied by able-bodied users in a similar fashion as prosthetic devices embodied by persons with upper limb amputation, and (2) mechanotactile sensory feedback might not only be useful for improving certain aspects of embodiment, i.e., ownership and location, but also may have a modulating effect on other aspects, namely sense of agency, when provided asynchronously during active motor control tasks. This work may allow us to further investigate and manipulate factors contributing to the complex phenomenon of embodiment in relation to active motor control of a device, enabling future study of more precise quantitative measures of embodiment that do not rely as much on subjective perception.

Agency judgments in post-stroke patients with sensorimotor deficits

Sense of agency refers to the feeling of being in control of one's actions. Previous research has demonstrated that sense of agency is produced through the sensorimotor system, which is involved in comparing internal predictions with sensory feedback in motor control. Therefore, sensorimotor deficits might impair agency through a sensorimotor system malfunction. The present study examined this hypothesis by investigating post-stroke patients who had suffered a subcortical stroke that damaged regions associated with sensorimotor function. To examine agency judgments with respect to motor control, we adopted a self-other attribution task and applied it to post-stroke patients. Participants traced a horizontal straight line and received visual feedback through a cursor on a monitor. The cursor movement reflected either the participants' actual movement or the movement of an "other" that had been previously recorded. Participants judged whether the cursor movement reflected their own movement (self) or an other's movement while they engaged in four cycles of the horizontal tracing movement. After each trial, participants reported their self-other judgment on a nine-point scale. Post-stroke patients completed the experiment with their paretic as well as their non-paralyzed upper limbs. Compared to healthy controls, patients made significantly more self-attributions of others' movements. Interestingly, such misattributions were observed in the patients' performance using both paretic and non-paralyzed upper limbs. These results suggest that post-stroke patients with sensorimotor deficits form misattributions that cannot be explained solely by the sensorimotor system's role in motor control. We discuss these misattributions in post-stroke patients in terms of cue integration theory.

Auditory-induced body distortions in children and adults

Recent studies have shown that body-representations can be altered by dynamic changes in sound. In the so-called “auditory Pinocchio illusion” participants feel their finger to be longer when the action of pulling their finger is paired with a rising pitch. Here, we investigated whether preschool children - an age group in which multisensory body-representations are still fine-tuning - are also sensitive to this illusion. In two studies, sixty adult and sixty child participants heard sounds rising or falling in pitch while the experimenter concurrently pulled or pressed their index finger on a vertical (Experiment 1) or horizontal axis (Experiment 2). Results showed that the illusion was subjected to axis and age: both adults and children reported their finger to be longer in Experiment 1, but not in Experiment 2. However, while in adults the feeling of finger elongation corresponded to a recalibration of the fingertip’s felt position upwards, this was not the case in children, who presented a dissociation between the feeling of finger elongation and the perceived fingertip position. Our results reveal that the ‘auditory Pinocchio illusion’ is constrained to the vertical dimension and suggest that multisensory interactions differently contribute to subjective feelings and sense of position depending on developmental stage.

Actions Speak Louder Than Words: The Role of Action in Self-Referential Advantage in Children With Autism

Impaired self-processing in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is believed to be closely associated with social-communicative deficits, a core symptom of ASD. In three experiments, we aimed to investigate (a) whether children with ASD exhibited deficient in self-processing, as reflected by their superior memory for self-related items as compared to other-related items, and (b) the role that action played in promoting self-processing in ASD. In Experiment 1, children with ASD, children with intellectual disability (ID), and typically developing children were asked to memorize items on the cards assigned to them or to the experimenter. The results indicated that the TD and ID groups had a self-referential memory advantage, but the ASD group did not. Experiments 2 and 3 examined whether the deficit in self-processing among children with ASDs was ameliorated when participants performed or observed an action to indicate the ownership of the items. We found that when children with ASD performed self-generated actions or observed virtual actions, they displayed a similar self-referential memory advantage as the other two groups. Our findings reveal that action plays an important role in the self-processing in children with ASD, and thereby contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of self-processing deficits in this population. Autism Res 2020, 13: 810-820. © 2020 International Society for Autism Research,Wiley Periodicals, Inc. LAY SUMMARY: We aimed to study whether children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) exhibited deficient in self-processing and the role of action in promoting self-processing in ASD. We found that the typically developing and intellectual disability groups had a self-referential memory advantage, but the ASD group did not. However, children with ASD showed a significant self-referential advantage when they performed or observed an action to indicate the ownership of items. These findings highlight the vital role that action plays in cognitively enhancing their self-processing.

Defective Embodiment of Alien Hand Uncovers Altered Sensorimotor Integration in Schizophrenia

The observation that people with schizophrenia misattribute the source of their own actions has led to the hypothesis that they suffer from altered sensorimotor processes underlying sense of agency. Furthermore, rubber hand studies suggest an abnormal experience of embodiment in schizophrenia. However, this latter finding is based on a procedure that elicits ownership sensations for a fake hand by visuo-tactile stimulation, leaving the agency subcomponent of embodiment relatively untouched. By using a visuo-motor version of the embodiment illusion able to actively elicit also sense of agency for an alien hand, we tested whether the putative sensorimotor deficits are also involved in altering embodiment sensations in schizophrenia. Subjective (questionnaire) and perceptual (forearm bisection performance) indexes of the embodiment illusion were collected. Differently from controls, both the explicit agency component and the implicit body metrics update were not modulated by the extent of visuo-motor congruency in participants with schizophrenia. We conclude that motor prediction and/or temporal binding window impairments may alter the feeling of embodiment and body representation in schizophrenia.

The rubber hand illusion is influenced by self-recognition

Susceptibility to the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) demonstrates that body ownership can be modulated by visuotactile inputs. In contrast to body-like images, other objects cannot be embodied suggesting that crossmodal interactions on body ownership are based on a 'goodness-of-fit' mechanism relative to one's own body. However, it is not clear whether visual self-recognition influences susceptibility to the RHI, although evidence for individual differences in the perceptual body image on the RHI suggests that this may be the case. We investigated the role of self-recognition on the subjective experience of the RHI and measured proprioceptive drift and onset time of the RHI between two groups, one with the ability to identify an image of their own hand and the other without this ability. A typical RHI response was found overall with no group difference in the subjective experience of the RHI. However, a larger proprioceptive drift and an earlier onset time for the RHI was found for the non-recognisers than the self-recognition group. Our findings provide evidence for a link between a visual representation of one's own body in long-term memory and plasticity of the body representation.

Abnormal Sensorimotor Integration in Adults Who Stutter: A Behavioral Study by Adaptation of Delayed Auditory Feedback

Stuttering is a fluency disorder, partially alleviated during altered auditory feedback, suggesting abnormal sensorimotor integration in adults who stutter (AWS). As weighting of multiple integrating-information sources would be decided based on their reliabilities, the use of external (auditory feedback) and internal information (prediction of sensory consequences) could correlate with speech processing. We hypothesized that abnormal auditory-feedback processing in AWS could be related to decrease in internal processing precision. We used a perceptual-adaptation experiment of delayed auditory feedback (DAF) to verify the hypothesis. Seventeen AWS and 17 adults who do not stutter (ANS) were required to say "ah" and judge the simultaneity between their motor sensations and vocal sounds in each stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) (0, 25, 50, 75, 100, 125, or 150 ms) after inducing adaptation of DAF (three conditions with 0-, 66-, or 133-ms delay). While no adaptation occurred during the 0 ms condition, perceptual change in simultaneity judgment (adaptation effect) occurred during the 66 and 133 ms conditions. The simultaneity judgments following exposure in each SOA were fitted to the psychometric function in each condition for the AWS and ANS groups. We calculated the μ (signifying the point of subjective simultaneity and adaptation-effect degree) and σ (signifying the detecting precision) of each function and analyzed them by parametric analyses. For the μ, participant groups and adaptation conditions showed a significant interaction; the adaptation effect was greater in the AWS than in the ANS group. Additionally, the μ and σ were only positively correlated in the AWS group. The point of subjective simultaneity for auditory delay by inducing DAF was higher in AWS than in ANS, indicating that perception of simultaneity in AWS was influenced by DAF to a greater extent. Moreover, the significant positive correlation between the μ and σ in AWS showed that the more imprecise the internal auditory processing, the more AWS relied on auditory feedback. It is suggested that the reliability of internal information differed within the AWS group, and AWS with reduced internal reliability appeared to compensate by relying to a great extent on auditory feedback information.

Progressive Training for Motor Imagery Brain-Computer Interfaces Using Gamification and Virtual Reality Embodiment

This paper presents a gamified motor imagery brain-computer interface (MI-BCI) training in immersive virtual reality. The aim of the proposed training method is to increase engagement, attention, and motivation in co-adaptive event-driven MI-BCI training. This was achieved using gamification, progressive increase of the training pace, and virtual reality design reinforcing body ownership transfer (embodiment) into the avatar. From the 20 healthy participants performing 6 runs of 2-class MI-BCI training (left/right hand), 19 were trained for a basic level of MI-BCI operation, with average peak accuracy in the session = 75.84%. This confirms the proposed training method succeeded in improvement of the MI-BCI skills; moreover, participants were leaving the session in high positive affect. Although the performance was not directly correlated to the degree of embodiment, subjective magnitude of the body ownership transfer illusion correlated with the ability to modulate the sensorimotor rhythm.

Illusory agency attribution to others performing actions similar to one's own

When people observe others performing actions similar to their own while dancing or playing musical instruments, they sometimes feel as if their actions were subsumed into others’ actions or others’ actions led their own actions. Many studies have been conducted to investigate agency attribution. However, these studies have mainly examined agency attribution in cases where people do not know the true agent. Few studies have focused on how people attribute agency to others despite knowing that they themselves are actual agents. This study investigates agency attribution to others performing actions similar to one’s own when one knows who the actual agent is. We evaluated agency attribution when participants manipulated a mouse to control a cursor while observing another person performing similar actions. Our findings demonstrated that participants could attribute agency to others despite knowing that they themselves were actual agents. We refer to this illusory sense as “illusory agency attribution to others.” We suggest that illusory agency attribution to others is determined by multiple factors including a bottom-up process with a subjective feeling of agency in addition to a top-down process with an interpretative judgement of agency.

The relationship and difference between delay detection ability and judgment of sense of agency

Judgment of agency involves the comparison of motor intention and proprioceptive/visual feedback, in addition to a range of cognitive factors. However, few studies have experimentally examined the differences or correlations between delay detection ability and judgment of agency. Thus, the present study investigated the relationship between delay detection ability and agency judgment using the delay detection task and the agency attribution task. Fifty-eight participants performed the delay detection and agency attribution tasks, and the time windows of each measure were analyzed using logistic curve fitting. The results revealed that the time window of judgment of agency was significantly longer than that of delay detection, and there was a slight correlation between the time windows in each task. The results supported a two-step model of agency, suggesting that judgment of agency involved not only comparison of multisensory information but also several cognitive factors. The study firstly revealed the model in psychophysical experiments.

Environmental control and psychosis-relevant traits modulate the prospective sense of agency in non-clinical individuals

The sense of agency concerns the experience of being the source of one's own actions and their consequences. An altered sense of agency can occur due to task automation and in psychosis. We tested in a non-clinical sample the hypothesis that reducing voluntary task control diminishes intentional binding as an implicit indicator of the sense of agency, possibly interacting with psychosis-relevant personality traits. Agent-device interactions were manipulated obtaining positive-control (voluntary interaction), no-control (automation), and negative-control (device-commanded interaction) groups. The main results showed reduced prospective intentional binding (predictive coding of action consequences) in the no-control and negative-control groups, compared to the positive-control group. Psychosis-like experiences covaried positively with intentional binding in the no-control group, but negatively in the negative-control group. Moreover, positive-social traits were associated with increased intentional binding in the positive-control group. These findings demonstrate the interplay between environmental and individual differences variables in establishing the implicit sense of agency.

Cultural group perception enhances sense of agency in a multicultural society

Group, which involves collective actions for achieving shared goals, can be conceptually understood as an important source of agency and control. The current research investigated whether group identity salience can enhance sense of agency within the individual. Specifically, we examined whether an activated cultural group identity, through presenting different types of cultural photographs in a predictable way, would facilitate people's sense of agency by using an implicit method, namely, intentional binding effect paradigm. Experiment 1a found that an activated cultural group identity enhanced the sense of agency. Next, Experiment 1b replicated the findings by recruiting a different ethnic group in the same society. Experiment 2 explored what may affect the intensity of induced sense of agency and found that perceived representativeness of the presented cultural stimuli was positively correlated with the intensity of induced sense of agency. Finally, Experiment 3 explored whether ethnic minority and majority groups would demonstrate different intensity of agency when their cultural identity was activated. The results showed that the sense of agency induced by the mainstream cultural stimuli was greater than that induced by the foreign cultural photographs. These patterns were not different between the two ethnic groups. Taken together, these findings reflected the dynamic nature of cultural identity construction in a multicultural society.

The boundaries of the self: The sense of agency across different sensorimotor aspects

The sense of agency (SoA) is the sensation of control over our actions. SoA is thought to rely mainly upon the comparison of predictions regarding the sensory outcomes of one's actions and the actual sensory outcomes. Previous studies have shown that when a discrepancy is introduced between one's actions and the sensory feedback, the reported SoA is reduced. Experimental manipulations of SoA are typically induced by introducing a discrepancy between a motor action and visual feedback of a specific sensorimotor aspect. For example, introducing a delay or a spatial deviation between the action and its sensory feedback reduces SoA. However, it is yet unclear whether the sensorimotor prediction processes underlying SoA are related between different aspects. Here in one exploratory and one preregistered experiment we tested the sense of agency across temporal, spatial, and anatomical aspects in a within-subject design. Using a novel virtual-reality task allowing the manipulation of the visual feedback of a motor action across different aspects, we show that the sensitivity of agency is different across aspects, agency judgments are correlated across aspects within subjects and bias toward attributing the viewed action to the self or to an external source is correlated as well. Our results suggest that sensorimotor prediction mechanisms underlying SoA are related between different aspects and that people have a predisposition for the directionality of agency judgments. These findings reveal the psychophysical attributes of SoA across sensorimotor aspects. Data and preregistration are available at https://goo.gl/SkbGrb.

A match does not make a sense: on the sufficiency of the comparator model for explaining the sense of agency

The development of a sense of agency is indispensable for a cognitive entity (biological or artificial) to become a cognitive agent. In developmental psychology, researchers have taken inspiration from adult cognitive psychology and neuroscience literature and use the comparator model to assess the presence of a sense of agency in early infancy. Similarly, robotics researchers have taken components of the proposed mechanism in attempts to build a sense of agency into artificial systems. In this article, we identify an invalidating theoretical flaw in the reasoning underlying this conversion from adult studies to developmental science and cognitive systems research, rooted in an oversight in the conceptualization of the comparator model as currently used in experimental practice. In these experiments, the emphasis has been put solely on testing for a match between predicted and observed sensory consequences. We argue that the match by itself can exclusively generate a simple categorization or a representation of equality between predicted and observed sensory consequences, both of which are insufficient to generate the causal representations required for a sense of agency. Consequently, the comparator model, as it has been described in the context of the sense of agency and as it is commonly used in experimental designs, is insufficient to generate the sense of agency: infants and robots require more than developing the ability to match predicted and observed sensory consequences for a sense of agency. We conclude with outlining possible solutions and future directions for researchers in developmental science and artificial intelligence.

Belief of agency changes dynamics in sensorimotor networks

Controlling an event through one's own action usually induces a sense of agency, a feeling that arises when an expected outcome matches the intention. The neural correlates of this feeling remain controversial however, as experimental manipulation of the action-outcome chain often introduces mismatch or prediction errors that strongly correlate with the sense of agency. Here, we took a different approach and manipulated the causal belief (self-attribution vs. computer-attribution) by external cues during matched visuo-motor tapping conditions. With magneto-encephalography, we studied the sense of agency from a network perspective, investigating in source space the modulation of local population activity and changes in functional connectivity with motor cortex. Our results show that during the belief of agency primary motor cortex (M1) shows stronger functional connectivity (mediated by the beta band) to inferior parietal lobe and right middle temporal gyrus (MTG). Furthermore, the local feed-forward activity (gamma band power) in extrastriate body area and MTG disappears with that belief. After changes in action context, left M1 shows stronger connectivity in the alpha band with right premotor cortex and left insular-temporal cortex a network that might support active inference in social action context. Finally, a better tapping performance in this rhythmic task was related to alpha power modulations in the bilateral cerebellum and bilateral fusiform body-area, with power suppression during a more precise performance. These findings highlight the role of multiple networks supporting the sense of agency by changing their relative contribution for different causal beliefs.

Violation of expectations about movement and goal achievement leads to Sense of Agency reduction

The control of one's own movements and of their impact on the external world generates a feeling of control referred to as Sense of Agency (SoA). SoA is experienced when actions match predictions and is reduced by unpredicted events. The present study investigated the contribution of monitoring two fundamental components of action-movement execution and goal achievement-that have been most often explored separately in previous research. We have devised a new paradigm in which participants performed goal-directed actions while viewing an avatar's hand in a mixed-reality scenario. The hand performed either the same action or a different one, simultaneously or after various delays. Movement of the virtual finger and goal attainment were manipulated, so that they could match or conflict with the participants' expectations. We collected judgments of correspondence (an explicit index of SoA that overcomes the tendency to over-attribute actions to oneself) by asking participants if the observed action was synchronous or not with their action. In keeping with previous studies, we found that monitoring both movement execution and goal attainment is relevant for SoA. Moreover, we expanded previous findings by showing that movement information may be a more constant source of SoA modulation than goal information. Indeed, an incongruent movement impaired SoA irrespective of delay duration, while a missed goal did so only when delays were short. Our novel paradigm allowed us to simultaneously manipulate multiple action features, a characteristic that makes it suitable for investigating the contribution of different sub-components of action in modulating SoA in healthy and clinical populations.

Delirium clinical motor subtypes: a narrative review of the literature and insights from neurobiology

INTRODUCTION

Clinical motor subtypes have been long recognised in delirium and, despite a growing body of research, a lack of clarity exists regarding the importance of these motor subtypes. The aims of this review are to (1) examine how the concept of motor subtypes has evolved, (2) explore their relationship to the clinical context, (3) discuss the relationship between the phenomenology of delirium and motor activity, (4) discuss the application of neurobiology to the theory of delirium motor subtypes, and (5) identify methodological issues and provide solutions for further studies.

METHODS

The following databases were searched: PubMed, PsychInfo, EBSCO, Medline, BioMed central and Science Direct. Inclusion criteria specified peer-reviewed research assessing delirium motor subtypes published between 1990 and 2016.

RESULTS

Sixty-one studies met the inclusion criteria. The majority of studies (n = 50) were found to use validated psychometric tools, while the remainder (n = 11) used clinical criteria. The majority of studies (n = 45) were conducted in the medical setting, while the remainder were in the ICU/post-operative setting (n = 17).

CONCLUSION

Although host sensitivities (e.g. frailty) and exogenous factors (e.g. medication exposure) may determine the type of motor disturbance, it remains unclear to what extent motor subtypes are influenced by other features of delirium. The use of more specialised tools (e.g. delirium motor subtyping scale), may enable researchers to develop an approach to delirium that has a greater nosological consistency. Future studies investigating delirium motor subtypes may benefit from enhanced theoretical considerations of the dysfunctional neural substrate of the delirious state.

My action lasts longer: Potential link between subjective time and agency during voluntary action

Time perception distorts across different phases of bodily movement. During motor execution, sensory feedback matching an internal sensorimotor prediction is perceived to last longer. The sensorimotor prediction also underlies sense of agency. We investigated association between subjective time and agency during voluntary action. Participants performed hand action while watching a video feedback of their hand with various delays to manipulate agency. The perceived duration and agency over the video feedback were judged. Minimal delay of the video feedback resulted in longer perceived duration than the actual duration and stronger agency, while substantial feedback delay resulted in shorter perceived duration and weaker agency. These fluctuations of perceived duration and agency were nullified by the feedback of other's hand instead of their own, but not by inverted feedback from a third-person perspective. Subjective time during action might be associated with agency stemming from sensorimotor prediction, and self-other distinction based on bodily appearance.

COMT genotype is associated with plasticity in sense of body ownership: a pilot study

The sense of body ownership constantly adapts to new environments, and awareness of a distinction between oneself and others is a fundamental ability. However, it remains unclear whether plasticity in the sense of body ownership is dependent on genetic factors. The present study investigated the influence of the catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) Val¹⁵⁸Met genotype on illusory learning of a sense of body ownership and dissociation. 76 healthy Japanese participants experienced the rubber hand illusion (RHI), which is produced by sensory integration of conflicting modalities, with the intent to experimentally alter objective perceived locations and subjective ownership ratings. We found that Val/Val homozygous participants had more intense RHI experiences than Val/Met heterozygous and Met homozygous participants. Furthermore, RHI sensation was correlated with a dissociative personality trait in Val/Val homozygous participants. Our findings indicate an interaction between COMT genotype, RHI sensation, and dissociative personality traits: Val/Val genotypes were associated with RHI induction and greater vulnerability to dissociation. The findings suggest that Val/Val homozygous individuals may be more flexible regarding self-attribution/body ownership and that biological factors may contribute to reduced awareness regarding the distinction between self and others.

Removal of proprioception by BCI raises a stronger body ownership illusion in control of a humanlike robot

Body ownership illusions provide evidence that our sense of self is not coherent and can be extended to non-body objects. Studying about these illusions gives us practical tools to understand the brain mechanisms that underlie body recognition and the experience of self. We previously introduced an illusion of body ownership transfer (BOT) for operators of a very humanlike robot. This sensation of owning the robot’s body was confirmed when operators controlled the robot either by performing the desired motion with their body (motion-control) or by employing a brain-computer interface (BCI) that translated motor imagery commands to robot movement (BCI-control). The interesting observation during BCI-control was that the illusion could be induced even with a noticeable delay in the BCI system. Temporal discrepancy has always shown critical weakening effects on body ownership illusions. However the delay-robustness of BOT during BCI-control raised a question about the interaction between the proprioceptive inputs and delayed visual feedback in agency-driven illusions. In this work, we compared the intensity of BOT illusion for operators in two conditions; motion-control and BCI-control. Our results revealed a significantly stronger BOT illusion for the case of BCI-control. This finding highlights BCI’s potential in inducing stronger agency-driven illusions by building a direct communication between the brain and controlled body, and therefore removing awareness from the subject’s own body.