Apes know that hidden objects can affect the orientation of other objects

Evidence of object permanence, short-term spatial memory, causality, understanding of object properties and gravity across five different ungulate species

In their natural environment, animals face a variety of ecological and social challenges, which might be linked to the emergence of different cognitive skills. To assess inter-specific variation in cognitive skills, we used ungulates as a study model, testing a total of 26 captive individuals across 5 different species (i.e., dwarf goats, Capra aegagrus hircus, llamas, Lama glama, guanacos, Lama guanicoe, zebras, Equus grevyi, and rhinos, Diceros bicornis michaeli). Across species, we used the same well-established experimental procedures to test individuals' performance in naïve physics tasks, i.e. object permanence, short-term spatial memory, causality, understanding of object properties, and gravity. Our results revealed that study subjects showed object permanence, were able to remember the position of hidden food after up to 60 s, and inferred the position of hidden food from the sound produced or not produced when shaking containers. Moreover, they showed an understanding of basic object properties, being able to locate objects hidden behind occluders based on their size and inclination, and could reliably follow the trajectory of falling objects across different conditions. Finally, inter-specific differences were limited to the understanding of object properties, and suggest that domesticated species as goats might perform better than non-domesticated ones in tasks requiring these skills. These results provide new information on the cognitive skills of a still understudied taxon and confirm ungulates as a promising taxon for the comparative study of cognitive evolution.

Bonobos assign meaning to food calls based on caller food preferences

Human communication relies heavily on pragmatic competence. Speech utterances are often ambiguous requiring listeners to use interaction history, shared knowledge, presumed intention and other contextual variables to make inferences about a speaker’s meaning. To probe the evolutionary origins of pragmatic competence we tested whether bonobos (Pan paniscus) can make inferences about the type of food available from listening to other group members’ food calls. We trained two group members to either prefer blue or pink chow and demonstrated these preferences to observers. A third group member served as an untrained control. In playback experiments, we broadcast the food calls of a trained demonstrator and the untrained group member to investigate whether subjects were able to infer which coloured chow was most likely available, based on the callers’ trained food preferences or lack thereof. As predicted, when hearing the untrained group member’s calls, subjects did not exhibit a bias, whereas they responded with a significant foraging bias when hearing a trained group member’s calls. These findings suggest that bonobos may take into account the idiosyncratic food preferences of others, although subjects probably differed in what they remembered.

What happened? Do preschool children and capuchin monkeys spontaneously use visual traces to locate a reward?

The ability to infer unseen causes from evidence is argued to emerge early in development and to be uniquely human. We explored whether preschoolers and capuchin monkeys could locate a reward based on the physical traces left following a hidden event. Preschoolers and capuchin monkeys were presented with two cups covered with foil. Behind a barrier, an experimenter (E) punctured the foil coverings one at a time, revealing the cups with one cover broken after the first event and both covers broken after the second. One event involved hiding a reward, the other event was performed with a stick (order counterbalanced). Preschoolers and, with additional experience, monkeys could connect the traces to the objects used in the puncturing events to find the reward. Reversing the order of events perturbed the performance of 3-year olds and capuchins, while 4-year-old children performed above chance when the order of events was reversed from the first trial. Capuchins performed significantly better on the ripped foil task than they did on an arbitrary test in which the covers were not ripped but rather replaced with a differently patterned cover. We conclude that by 4 years of age children spontaneously reason backwards from evidence to deduce its cause.

The contingency symmetry bias (affirming the consequent fallacy) as a prerequisite for word learning: A comparative study of pre-linguistic human infants and chimpanzees

Humans are known to possess an "affirming the consequent fallacy," which assumes that a learned contingency holds true even when the order is reversed. In contrast, non-human animals do not fall for this fallacy, as they do not have the contingency symmetry bias. Importantly, language is founded on the symmetrical relationship between symbols and referents, and the contingency symmetry bias plays a key role in word learning. A critical problem for the ontogenesis of language is whether the contingency symmetry bias has been acquired through the experience of word learning or if it is present before infants begin word learning. Using a habituation switch paradigm, 8-month-old human infants and adult chimpanzees were familiarized with two object-then-movement sequences, whereby Object A (or B) was always paired with Movement A (or B). At test, the order of the contingency was reversed. The infants showed surprise when observing the violation of the object-movement pairings in the reversed sequence (Experiment 1). In contrast, despite the chimpanzees being able to detect the violation of the pairings in the original direction (Experiment 2a), they did not discriminate the learned and novel pairings when the order of the contingency was reversed (Experiment 2b). The results suggest that the contingency symmetry bias is a uniquely human cognitive bias, one which plays a critical role for language acquisition ontogenetically. This contingency symmetry bias likely gives humans a great advantage, by enabling them to rapidly expand their knowledge without direct training and making them strikingly different from other animal species. (250 words).

Inferring Unseen Causes: Developmental and Evolutionary Origins

Human adults can infer unseen causes because they represent the events around them in terms of their underlying causal mechanisms. It has been argued that young preschoolers can also make causal inferences from an early age, but whether or not non-human apes can go beyond associative learning when exploiting causality is controversial. However, much of the developmental research to date has focused on fully-perceivable causal relations or highlighted the existence of a causal relationship verbally and these were found to scaffold young children's abilities. We examined inferences about unseen causes in children and chimpanzees in the absence of linguistic cues. Children (N = 129, aged 3-6 years) and zoo-living chimpanzees (N = 11, aged 7-41 years) were presented with an event in which a reward was dropped through an opaque forked-tube into one of two cups. An auditory cue signaled which of the cups contained the reward. In the causal condition, the cue followed the dropping event, making it plausible that the sound was caused by the reward falling into the cup; and in the arbitrary condition, the cue preceded the dropping event, making the relation arbitrary. By 4-years of age, children performed better in the causal condition than the arbitrary one, suggesting that they engaged in reasoning. A follow-up experiment ruled out a simpler associative learning explanation. Chimpanzees and 3-year-olds performed at chance in both conditions. These groups' performance did not improve in a simplified version of the task involving shaken boxes; however, the use of causal language helped 3-year-olds. The failure of chimpanzees could reflect limitations in reasoning about unseen causes or a more general difficulty with auditory discrimination learning.

Context-sensitive adjustment of pointing in great apes

Great apes are able to request objects from humans by pointing. It is unclear, however, whether this is an associated response to a certain set of cues (e.g. the presence and attention of a human addressee) or a communicative signal which can be adjusted to relevant aspects of the spatial and social context. In three experiments, we tested captive great apes’ flexible use of pointing gestures. We manipulated the communicative context so that the default pointing response of apes would have indicated an undesired object, either due to 1) the spatial arrangements of the target objects, 2) the perspective of the addressee or 3) the knowledge of the addressee about the target objects’ location. The results of the three experiments indicate that great apes can successfully adjust their pointing to the spatial configuration of the referent environment such as distance and location of food. However, we found no evidence that they take the perspective or the knowledge of the addressee into account when doing so. This implies that pointing in great apes is a context-sensitive, but maybe less versatile, communicative signal compared to human pointing.

Comparative metaphysics: Evolutionary and ontogenetic roots of essentialist thought about objects

How do animals and young children see the world around them in its most basic structure, and how do such world-views develop over time? These are questions of what could be called comparative and developmental metaphysics. The present paper gives an introduction to this newly emerging field of research. Special emphasis is put on thinking about the world as made up of discrete and enduring objects as the most fundamental form of objective thought. The paper discusses whether language is necessary for such basic forms of objective thought, and whether thinking about objects, in turn, may lay a foundation for psychological essentialism. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Psychology > Comparative Psychology.

Intuitive optics: what great apes infer from mirrors and shadows

There is ongoing debate about the extent to which nonhuman animals, like humans, can go beyond first-order perceptual information to abstract structural information from their environment. To provide more empirical evidence regarding this question, we examined what type of information great apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans) gain from optical effects such as shadows and mirror images. In an initial experiment, we investigated whether apes would use mirror images and shadows to locate hidden food. We found that all examined ape species used these cues to find the food. Follow-up experiments showed that apes neither confused these optical effects with the food rewards nor did they merely associate cues with food. First, naïve chimpanzees used the shadow of the hidden food to locate it but they did not learn within the same number of trials to use a perceptually similar rubber patch as indicator of the hidden food reward. Second, apes made use of the mirror images to estimate the distance of the hidden food from their own body. Depending on the distance, apes either pointed into the direction of the food or tried to access the hidden food directly. Third, apes showed some sensitivity to the geometrical relation between mirror orientation and mirrored objects when searching hidden food. Fourth, apes tended to interpret mirror images and pictures of these mirror images differently depending on their prior knowledge. Together, these findings suggest that apes are sensitive to the optical relation between mirror images and shadows and their physical referents.

Domestic horses (Equus ferus caballus) fail to intuitively reason about object properties like solidity and weight

From early infancy, humans reason about the external world in terms of identifiable, solid, cohesive objects persisting in space and time. This is one of the most fundamental human skills, which may be part of our innate conception of object properties. Although object permanence has been extensively studied across a variety of taxa, little is known about how non-human animals reason about other object properties. In this study, we therefore tested how domestic horses (Equus ferus caballus) intuitively reason about object properties like solidity and height, to locate hidden food. Horses were allowed to look for a food reward behind two opaque screens, only one of which had either the proper height or inclination to hide food rewards. Our results suggest that horses could not intuitively reason about physical object properties, but rather learned to select the screen with the proper height or inclination from the second set of 5 trials.

Reasoning about "Capability": Wild Robins Respond to Limb Visibility in Humans

Little comparative work has focused on what nonhumans understand about what physical acts others are capable of performing, and none has yet done so in the wild, or within a competitive framework. This study shows that North Island robins visually attend to human limbs in the context of determining who to steal food from. We presented 24 wild North Island Robins (Petroica longipes) with two experimenters. Robins could choose to steal a mealworm from one of two experimenters: one whose limbs were exposed and one who underwent a range of visual obstructions in two experiments. In most conditions, robins preferred to steal food located near the experimenter whose limbs were obscured by a cloth or board rather than food located near the experimenter whose limbs were not obscured. The robins’ responses indicate that human limb visibility is associated with reduced access to food. Current findings lay the groundwork for a closer look at the potential general use of causal reasoning in an inter-specific context of using limbs to perform physical acts, specifically within the context of pilfering. This study presents one of the first tests of the role of visual attendance of potential limb availability in a competitive context, and could provide an alternative hypothesis for how other species have passed tests designed to examine what individuals understand about the physical acts others are capable of performing.

Inferences about food location in three cercopithecine species: an insight into the socioecological cognition of primates

Many animal species use a variety of cognitive strategies to locate food resources. One strategy is to make inferences by exclusion, i.e., perceiving the absence of reward as a cue that another location should be investigated. The use of such advanced cognitive strategies may be more prominent in species that are known to frequently solve social challenges, and inferential reasoning has mainly been investigated in social species such as corvids, dogs, dolphins and non-human primates. In this paper, we investigate how far social intricacy may explain the disparity of reasoning performances observed in three cercopithecine species that differ in the density of their social network and the diversity of their social partners. We used standard reasoning tasks, testing the volume concept and inference by exclusion using visual and auditory modalities. We showed that Old World monkeys can infer the location of invisible food by exclusion. In addition, Tonkean macaques and olive baboons had greater performances in most tasks compared to rhesus macaques. These responses are consistent with the social complexity displayed by these three species. We suggest that the cognitive strategies required to navigate through a demanding social world are involved in the understanding of the physical domain.

Domestic pigs' (Sus scrofa domestica) use of direct and indirect visual and auditory cues in an object choice task

Recently, foraging strategies have been linked to the ability to use indirect visual information. More selective feeders should express a higher aversion against losses compared to non-selective feeders and should therefore be more prone to avoid empty food locations. To extend these findings, in this study, we present a series of studies investigating the use of direct and indirect visual and auditory information by an omnivorous but selective feeder-the domestic pig. Subjects had to choose between two buckets, with only one containing a reward. Before making a choice, the subjects in Experiment 1 (N = 8) received full information regarding both the baited and non-baited location, either in a visual or auditory domain. In this experiment, the subjects were able to use visual but not auditory cues to infer the location of the reward spontaneously. Additionally, four individuals learned to use auditory cues after a period of training. In Experiment 2 (N = 8), the pigs were given different amounts of visual information about the content of the buckets-lifting either both of the buckets (full information), the baited bucket (direct information), the empty bucket (indirect information) or no bucket at all (no information). The subjects as a group were able to use direct and indirect visual cues. However, over the course of the experiment, the performance dropped to chance level when indirect information was provided. A final experiment (N = 3) provided preliminary results for pigs' use of indirect auditory information to infer the location of a reward. We conclude that pigs at a very young age are able to make decisions based on indirect information in the visual domain, whereas their performance in the use of indirect auditory information warrants further investigation.

Can orangutans (Pongo abelii) infer tool functionality?

It is debatable whether apes can reason about the unobservable properties of tools. We tested orangutans for this ability with a range of tool tasks that they could solve by using observational cues to infer tool functionality. In experiment 1, subjects successfully chose an unbroken tool over a broken one when each tool's middle section was hidden. This prevented seeing which tool was functional but it could be inferred by noting the tools' visible ends that were either disjointed (broken tool) or aligned (unbroken tool). We investigated whether success in experiment 1 was best explained by inferential reasoning or by having a preference per se for a hidden tool with an aligned configuration. We conducted a similar task to experiment 1 and included a functional bent tool that could be arranged to have the same disjointed configuration as the broken tool. The results suggested that subjects had a preference per se for the aligned tool by choosing it regardless of whether it was paired with the broken tool or the functional bent tool. However, further experiments with the bent tool task suggested this preference was a result of additional demands of having to attend to and remember the properties of the tools from the beginning of the task. In our last experiment, we removed these task demands and found evidence that subjects could infer the functionality of a broken tool and an unbroken tool that both looked identical at the time of choice.

Chimpanzees predict that a competitor's preference will match their own

The ability to predict how another individual will behave is useful in social competition. Chimpanzees can predict the behaviour of another based on what they observe her to see, hear, know and infer. Here we show that chimpanzees act on the assumption that others have preferences that match their own. All subjects began with a preference for a box with a picture of food over one with a picture of nothing, even though the pictures had no causal relation to the contents. In a back-and-forth food competition, chimpanzees then avoided the box with the picture of food when their competitor had chosen one of the boxes before them-presumably on the assumption that the competitor shared their own preference for it and had already chosen it. Chimpanzees predicted that their competitor's preference would match their own and adjusted their behavioural strategies accordingly.

Understanding of and reasoning about object-object relationships in long-tailed macaques?

Diagnostic reasoning, defined as the ability to infer unobserved causes based on the observation of their effects, is a central cognitive competency of humans. Yet, little is known about diagnostic reasoning in non-human primates, and what we know is largely restricted to the Great Apes. To track the evolutionary history of these skills within primates, we investigated long-tailed macaques’ understanding of the significance of inclinations of covers of hidden food as diagnostic indicators for the presence of an object located underneath. Subjects were confronted with choices between different objects that might cover food items. Based on their physical characteristics, the shape and orientation of the covers did or did not reveal the location of a hidden reward. For instance, hiding the reward under a solid board led to its inclination, whereas a hollow cup remained unaltered. Thus, the type of cover and the occurrence or absence of a change in their appearance could potentially be used to reason diagnostically about the location of the reward. In several experiments, the macaques were confronted with a varying number of covers and their performance was dependent on the level of complexity and on the type of change of the covers’ orientation. The macaques could use a board’s inclination to detect the reward, but failed to do so if the lack of inclination was indicative of an alternative hiding place. We suggest that the monkeys’ performance is based on a rudimentary understanding of causality, but find no good evidence for sophisticated diagnostic reasoning in this particular domain.

Chimpanzee 'folk physics': bringing failures into focus

Differences between individuals are the raw material from which theories of the evolution and ontogeny of cognition are built. For example, when 4-year-old children pass a test requiring them to communicate the content of another's falsely held belief, while 3-year-olds fail, we know that something must change over the course of the third year of life. In the search for what develops or evolves, the typical route is to probe the extents and limits of successful individuals' ability. Another is to focus on those that failed, and find out what difference or lack prevented them from passing the task. Recent research in developmental psychology has harnessed individual differences to illuminate the cognitive mechanisms that emerge to enable success. We apply this approach to explaining some of the failures made by chimpanzees when using tools to solve problems. Twelve of 16 chimpanzees failed to discriminate between a complete and a broken tool when, after being set down, the ends of the broken one were aligned in front of them. There was a correlation between performance on this aligned task and another in which after being set down, the centre of both tools was covered, suggesting that the limiting factor was not the representation of connection, but memory or attention. Some chimpanzees that passed the aligned task passed a task in which the location of the broken tool was never visible but had to be inferred.

Old world monkeys compare to apes in the primate cognition test battery

Understanding the evolution of intelligence rests on comparative analyses of brain sizes as well as the assessment of cognitive skills of different species in relation to potential selective pressures such as environmental conditions and social organization. Because of the strong interest in human cognition, much previous work has focused on the comparison of the cognitive skills of human toddlers to those of our closest living relatives, i.e. apes. Such analyses revealed that apes and children have relatively similar competencies in the physical domain, while human children excel in the socio-cognitive domain; in particular in terms of attention sharing, cooperation, and mental state attribution. To develop a full understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of primate intelligence, however, comparative data for monkeys are needed. We tested 18 Old World monkeys (long-tailed macaques and olive baboons) in the so-called Primate Cognition Test Battery (PCTB) (Herrmann et al. 2007, Science). Surprisingly, our tests revealed largely comparable results between Old World monkeys and the Great apes. Single comparisons showed that chimpanzees performed only better than the macaques in experiments on spatial understanding and tool use, but in none of the socio-cognitive tasks. These results question the clear-cut relationship between cognitive performance and brain size and--prima facie--support the view of an accelerated evolution of social intelligence in humans. One limitation, however, is that the initial experiments were devised to tap into human specific skills in the first place, thus potentially underestimating both true nonhuman primate competencies as well as species differences.

Core knowledge of object, number, and geometry: a comparative and neural approach

Studies on the ontogenetic origins of human knowledge provide evidence for a small set of separable systems of core knowledge dealing with the representation of inanimate and animate objects, number, and geometry. Because core knowledge systems are evolutionarily ancient, they can be investigated from a comparative perspective, making use of various animal models. In this review, I discuss evidence showing precocious abilities in nonhuman species to represent (a) objects that move partly or fully out of view and their basic mechanical properties such as solidity, (b) the cardinal and ordinal/sequential aspects of numerical cognition and rudimentary arithmetic with small numerosities, and (c) the geometrical relationships among extended surfaces in the surrounding layout. Controlled rearing studies suggest that the abilities associated with core knowledge systems of objects, number, and geometry are observed in animals in the absence (or with very reduced) experience, supporting a nativistic foundation of such cognitive mechanisms. Animal models also promise a fresh approach to the issue of the neurobiological and genetic mechanisms underlying the expression of core knowledge systems.

Chimpanzees know that others make inferences

If chimpanzees are faced with two opaque boards on a table, in the context of searching for a single piece of food, they do not choose the board lying flat (because if food was under there it would not be lying flat) but, rather, they choose the slanted one- presumably inferring that some unperceived food underneath is causing the slant. Here we demonstrate that chimpanzees know that other chimpanzees in the same situation will make a similar inference. In a back-and-forth foraging game, when their competitor had chosen before them, chimpanzees tended to avoid the slanted board on the assumption that the competitor had already chosen it. Chimpanzees can determine the inferences that a conspecific is likely to make and then adjust their competitive strategies accordingly.

Intuitive physical reasoning about occluded objects by inexperienced chicks

Questions concerning the role of nature and nurture in higher cognition appear to be intractable if one restricts one's attention to development in humans. However, in other domains, such as sensory development, much information has been gained from controlled rearing studies with animals. Here, we used a similar experimental strategy to investigate intuitive reasoning about occluded objects. Newborn domestic chicks (Gallus gallus) were reared singly with a small object that became their social partner. They were then accustomed to rejoin such an imprinting object when it was made to move and disappear behind either one of two identical opaque screens. After disappearance of the imprinting object, chicks were faced with two screens of different slants, or of different height or different width, which may or may not have been compatible with the presence of the imprinting object hidden beneath/behind them. Chicks consistently chose the screen of slant/height/width compatible with the presence of the object beneath/behind it. Preventing chicks from touching and pecking at the imprinting object before testing did not affect the results, suggesting that intuitive reasoning about physical objects is largely independent of specific experience of interaction with objects and of objects' occluding events.

Great apes' performance in discriminating weight and achromatic color

Much work has been done on visual discrimination in primates over the past decade. In contrast, very little is known about the relevance of non-visual information in discrimination learning. We investigated weight and achromatic color (color, henceforth) discrimination in bonobos, gorillas and orangutans, using the exchange paradigm in which subjects have to give objects to the experimenter in order to receive a reward. Unlike previous studies, subjects were not trained to lift objects because lifting the objects was an integral part of the exchange procedure. This methodology also allowed us a direct comparison between visual and weight discrimination. We presented 12 subjects (5 bonobos, 2 gorillas and 5 orangutans) with two sets of objects corresponding to two conditions. The objects in the color condition (white/black) differed only in color and those in the weight condition (light/heavy) differed only in weight. Five apes learned to discriminate weight and six to discriminate color. Subjects learned color discrimination faster than weight discrimination. Our results suggest that bonobos and orangutans are sensitive to differences in weight and able to learn discriminating objects that differ in this property.

Behavioral cues that great apes use to forage for hidden food

We conducted three studies to examine whether the four great ape species (chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans) are able to use behavioral experimenter-given cues in an object-choice task. In the subsequent experimental conditions subjects were presented with two eggs, one of which contained food and the other did not. In Study 1 the experimenter examined both eggs by smelling or shaking them, but only made a failed attempt to open (via biting) the egg containing food. In a control condition, the experimenter examined and attempted to open both eggs, but in reverse order to control for stimulus enhancement. The apes significantly preferred the egg that was first examined and then bitten, but had no preference in a baseline condition in which there were no cues. In Study 2, we investigated whether the apes could extend this ability to cues not observed in apes so far (i.e., attempting to pull apart the egg), as well as whether they made this discrimination based on the function of the action the experimenter performed. Subjects significantly preferred eggs presented with this novel cue, but did not prefer eggs presented with a novel but functionally irrelevant action. In Study 3, apes did not interpret human actions as cues to food-location when they already knew that the eggs were empty. Thus, great apes were able to use a variety of experimenter-given cues associated with foraging actions to locate hidden food and thereby were partially sensitive to the general purpose underlying these actions.