1
|
Kampis D, Askitis D, Poulsen E, Parise E, Southgate V. 14-month-old infants detect a semantic mismatch when occluded objects are mislabeled. INFANCY 2024; 29:510-524. [PMID: 38687625 DOI: 10.1111/infa.12597] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/26/2023] [Revised: 12/20/2023] [Accepted: 04/16/2024] [Indexed: 05/02/2024]
Abstract
When infants start mastering their first language, they may start to notice when words are used incorrectly. Around 14-months of age, infants detect incorrect labeling when they are presented with an object which is labeled while still visible. However, things that are referred to are often out of sight when we communicate about them. The present study examined infants' detection of semantic mismatch when the object was occluded at the time of labeling. Specifically, we investigated whether mislabeling that referred to an occluded object could elicit a semantic mismatch. We showed 14-month-old Danish-speaking infants events where an onscreen agent showed an object and then hid it in a box. This was followed by another agent's hand pointing at the box, and a concurrent auditory category label played, which either matched or did not match the hidden object. Our results indicate that there is an effect of semantic mismatch with a larger negativity in incongruent trials. Thus, infants detected a mismatch, as indicated by a larger n400, when occluded objects were mislabeled. This finding suggests that infants can sustain an object representation in memory and compare it to a semantic representation of an auditory category label.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Dora Kampis
- University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | | | | | - Eugenio Parise
- CIMeC - Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Trento, Italy
- Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
| | | |
Collapse
|
2
|
Scott-Phillips T, Heintz C. Great ape interaction: Ladyginian but not Gricean. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2023; 120:e2300243120. [PMID: 37824522 PMCID: PMC10589610 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2300243120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/14/2023] Open
Abstract
Nonhuman great apes inform one another in ways that can seem very humanlike. Especially in the gestural domain, their behavior exhibits many similarities with human communication, meeting widely used empirical criteria for intentionality. At the same time, there remain some manifest differences, most obviously the enormous range and scope of human expression. How to account for these similarities and differences in a unified way remains a major challenge. Here, we make a key distinction between the expression of intentions (Ladyginian) and the expression of specifically informative intentions (Gricean), and we situate this distinction within a "special case of" framework for classifying different modes of attention manipulation. We hence describe how the attested tendencies of great ape interaction-for instance, to be dyadic rather than triadic, to be about the here-and-now rather than "displaced," and to have a high degree of perceptual resemblance between form and meaning-are products of its Ladyginian but not Gricean character. We also reinterpret video footage of great ape gesture as Ladyginian but not Gricean, and we distinguish several varieties of meaning that are continuous with one another. We conclude that the evolutionary origins of linguistic meaning lie not in gradual changes in communication systems, but rather in gradual changes in social cognition, and specifically in what modes of attention manipulation are enabled by a species' cognitive phenotype: first Ladyginian and in turn Gricean. The second of these shifts rendered humans, and only humans, "language ready."
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Thom Scott-Phillips
- Institute for Logic, Cognition, Language and Information, 20018Donostia-San Sebastian, Spain
| | - Christophe Heintz
- Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, A-1100Vienna, Austria
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Luchkina E, Waxman S. Talking About the Absent and the Abstract: Referential Communication in Language and Gesture. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2023:17456916231180589. [PMID: 37603076 PMCID: PMC10879458 DOI: 10.1177/17456916231180589] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 08/22/2023]
Abstract
Human language permits us to call to mind objects, events, and ideas that we cannot witness directly, either because they are absent or because they have no physical form (e.g., people we have not met, concepts like justice). What enables language to transmit such knowledge? We propose that a referential link between words, referents, and mental representations of those referents is key. This link enables us to form, access, and modify mental representations even when the referents themselves are absent ("absent reference"). In this review we consider the developmental and evolutionary origins of absent reference, integrating previously disparate literatures on absent reference in language and gesture in very young humans and gesture in nonhuman primates. We first evaluate when and how infants acquire absent reference during the process of language acquisition. With this as a foundation, we consider the evidence for absent reference in gesture in infants and in nonhuman primates. Finally, having woven these literatures together, we highlight new lines of research that promise to sharpen our understanding of the development of reference and its role in learning about the absent and the abstract.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Elena Luchkina
- Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, United States of America
- Institute of Policy Research, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, United States of America
| | - Sandra Waxman
- Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, United States of America
- Institute of Policy Research, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, United States of America
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Carston R. The relevance of words and the language/communication divide. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1187343. [PMID: 37575430 PMCID: PMC10419294 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1187343] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2023] [Accepted: 05/15/2023] [Indexed: 08/15/2023] Open
Abstract
First, the wide applicability of the relevance-theoretic pragmatic account of how new (ad hoc) senses of words and new (ad hoc) words arise spontaneously in communication/comprehension is demonstrated. The lexical pragmatic processes of meaning modulation and metonymy are shown to apply equally to simple words, noun to verb 'conversions', and morphologically complex cases with non-compositional (atomic) meanings. Second, this pragmatic account is situated within a specific view of the cognitive architecture of language and communication, with the formal side of language, its recursive combinatorial system, argued to have different developmental, evolutionary and cognitive characteristics from the meaning side of language, which is essentially pragmatic/communicative. Words straddle the form/meaning (syntax/pragmatics) divide: on the one hand, they are phrasal structures, consisting of a root and variable numbers of functors, with no privileged status in the syntax; on the other hand, they are salient to language users as basic units of communication and are stored as such, in a communication lexicon, together with their families of related senses, which originated as cases of pragmatically derived (ad hoc) senses but have become established, due to their communicative efficacy and frequency of use. Third, in an attempt to find empirical evidence for the proposed linguistic form-meaning divide, two very different cases of atypical linguistic and communicative development are considered: autistic children and deaf children who develop Homesign. The morpho-syntax (the formal side of language) appears to unfold in much the same way in both cases and is often not much different from that of typically developing children, but they diverge markedly from each other in their communication/pragmatics and their development of a system (a lexicon) of meaningful words/signs.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Robyn Carston
- Linguistics, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Being ostensive (reply to commentaries on "Expression unleashed"). Behav Brain Sci 2023; 46:e20. [PMID: 36799045 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x22001728] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/18/2023]
Abstract
One of our main goals with "Expression unleashed" was to highlight the distinctive, ostensive nature of human communication, and the many roles that ostension can play in human behavior and society. The commentaries we received forced us to be more precise about several aspects of this thesis. At the same time, no commentary challenged the central idea that the manifest diversity of human expression is underpinned by a common cognitive unity. Our reply is organized around six issues: (1) languages and their cultural evolution; (2) the pervasiveness of expression in human behavior; (3) artificial intelligence and ostensive communication; (4) communication in other animals; (5) the ecology and evolution of ostensive communication; and (6) biolinguistics and pragmatics.
Collapse
|
6
|
Luchkina E, Waxman S. Acquiring verbal reference: The interplay of cognitive, linguistic, and general learning capacities. Infant Behav Dev 2021; 65:101624. [PMID: 34388367 DOI: 10.1016/j.infbeh.2021.101624] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/15/2020] [Revised: 07/16/2021] [Accepted: 07/29/2021] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Verbal reference is the ability to use language to communicate about objects, events, or ideas, even if they are not witnessed directly, such as past events or faraway places. It rests on a three-way link between words, their referents, and mental representations of those referents. A foundational human capacity, verbal reference extends the communicative power of language beyond the here-and-now, enabling access to language-mediated learning and thus fueling cognitive development. In the current review, we consider how and when verbal reference develops. The existing literature suggests that verbal reference emerges around infants' first birthdays and becomes increasingly robust by their second. In discussing the powerful developmental advantages of acquiring verbal reference we propose that this achievement requires a dynamic interplay among infants' cognitive and language development, fueled by general learning capacities. We close by describing new research directions, aimed at advancing our understanding of how verbal reference emerges.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Elena Luchkina
- Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, United States; Institute of Policy Research, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, United States.
| | - Sandra Waxman
- Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, United States; Institute of Policy Research, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, United States
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
Pomiechowska B, Bródy G, Csibra G, Gliga T. Twelve-month-olds disambiguate new words using mutual-exclusivity inferences. Cognition 2021; 213:104691. [PMID: 33934847 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104691] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/31/2020] [Revised: 03/15/2021] [Accepted: 03/17/2021] [Indexed: 12/12/2022]
Abstract
Representing objects in terms of their kinds enables inferences based on the long-term knowledge made available through kind concepts. For example, children readily use lexical knowledge linked to familiar kind concepts to disambiguate new words (e.g., "find the toma"): they exclude members of familiar kinds falling under familiar kind labels (e.g., a ball) as potential referents and link new labels to available unfamiliar objects (e.g., a funnel), a phenomenon dubbed as 'mutual exclusivity'. Younger infants' failure in mutual exclusivity tasks has been commonly interpreted as a limitation of early word-learning or inferential abilities. Here, we investigated an alternative explanation, according to which infants do not spontaneously represent familiar objects under kind concepts, hence lacking access to the information necessary for rejecting them as referents of novel labels. Building on findings about conceptual development and communication, we hypothesized that nonverbal communication could prompt infants to set up kind-based representations which, in turn, would promote mutual exclusivity inferences. This hypothesis was tested in a looking-while-listening task involving novel word disambiguation. Twelve-month-olds saw pairs of objects, one familiar and one unfamiliar, and heard familiar kind labels or novel words. Across two experiments providing a cross-lab replication in two different languages, infants successfully disambiguated novel words when the familiar object had been pointed at before labeling, but not when it had been highlighted in a non-communicative manner (Experiment 1) or not highlighted at all (Experiment 2). Nonverbal communication induced infants to recruit kind-based representations of familiar objects that they failed to recruit in its absence and that, once activated, supported mutual-exclusivity inferences. Developmental changes in children's appreciation of communicative contexts may modulate the expression of early inferential and word learning competences.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Barbara Pomiechowska
- Cognitive Development Center, Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Hungary.
| | - Gábor Bródy
- Cognitive Development Center, Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Hungary; Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, United States
| | - Gergely Csibra
- Cognitive Development Center, Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Hungary; Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, United Kingdom
| | - Teodora Gliga
- School of Psychology, University of East Anglia, United Kingdom
| |
Collapse
|
8
|
Leavens DA. The Referential Problem Space revisited: An ecological hypothesis of the evolutionary and developmental origins of pointing. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2021; 12:e1554. [PMID: 33511793 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1554] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/12/2020] [Revised: 12/29/2020] [Accepted: 01/04/2021] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Pointing by great apes poses a significant challenge to contemporary theories about the evolutionary and developmental foundations of cognitive development, because pointing has long been viewed by theoreticians as an evolved, human-unique developmental stepping-stone to linguistic reference. Although reports of pointing by great apes have existed in the scientific literature for over a century, only in recent decades has it become clear that ape pointing is definitely an intentionally communicative signal, by the same criteria we adjudge human pointing to be intentionally communicative. Theoretical responses to this changed empirical landscape have generally taken the approach of asserting, without any direct evidence (indeed, in the absence of any possibility of direct evidence), that pointing by humans is psychologically distinct from and more cognitively complex than the pointing of apes. It is commonplace in the contemporary literature to appeal to imaginary, species-unique causal factors to account for human pointing, rendering a large body of contemporary theoretical work untestable with scientific methods: scientific arguments require the public availability of core theoretical entities. In this paper, I will analyze the circumstances of pointing by apes and humans and develop an alternative theoretical model of pointing that does not rely upon non-physical constructs. According to the view espoused, here, pointing develops as a solution to a particular kind of developmental problem, characterized by (a) a developing capacity for tool use, (b) barriers to direct action, and (c) a history of caregiver responsiveness. Pointing by both apes and humans is explicable without invoking imaginary, mental causes. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Psychology > Comparative Psychology.
Collapse
|
9
|
Improving Interactions with Healthcare Robots: A Review of Communication Behaviours in Social and Healthcare Contexts. Int J Soc Robot 2020. [DOI: 10.1007/s12369-020-00719-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
|
10
|
Tennie C, van Schaik CP. Spontaneous (minimal) ritual in non-human great apes? Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2020; 375:20190423. [PMID: 32594873 PMCID: PMC7423263 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2019.0423] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 03/17/2020] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
The potential for rituals in non-human great apes (apes) is an understudied topic. We derive a minimal definition of ritual and then examine the currently available evidence for it in untrained and non-enculturated apes. First, we examine whether such apes show evidence for the two main components of our minimal definition of ritual: symbolism and copying. Second, we examine if there are actual cases already identifiable today that may fit all aspects of our minimal definition of ritual-or whether there are at least cases that fit some aspects (proto-ritual). We find that apes are not likely to spontaneously practise minimal ritual, but we claim that the highest expected likelihood of occurrence is in the results-copying domain. Yet, we did not find actual cases of minimal ritual in apes-including those involving environmental results. We did, however, find some cases that may match at least part of our minimal ritual definition-which we termed proto-ritual. At least two out of three potential cases of such proto-rituals that we identified (rain dance, object-in-ear and surplus nest-making procedures) do revolve around results. Overall, apes do not show much, or very clear, evidence for even minimal ritual, but may sometimes show proto-ritual. However, dedicated ape ritual studies are currently lacking, and future work may identify ape ritual (or clearer cases of proto-ritual). We discuss the implications of our preliminary finding for inferences of ritual in the last common ancestor of humans and apes. This article is part of the theme issue 'Ritual renaissance: new insights into the most human of behaviours'.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Claudio Tennie
- Department for Early Prehistory and Quaternary Ecology, University of Tübingen, 72070 Tübingen, Germany
| | | |
Collapse
|
11
|
Tauzin T, Bohn M, Gergely G, Call J. Context-sensitive adjustment of pointing in great apes. Sci Rep 2020; 10:1048. [PMID: 31974479 PMCID: PMC6978377 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-56183-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/16/2018] [Accepted: 12/05/2019] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Abstract
Great apes are able to request objects from humans by pointing. It is unclear, however, whether this is an associated response to a certain set of cues (e.g. the presence and attention of a human addressee) or a communicative signal which can be adjusted to relevant aspects of the spatial and social context. In three experiments, we tested captive great apes’ flexible use of pointing gestures. We manipulated the communicative context so that the default pointing response of apes would have indicated an undesired object, either due to 1) the spatial arrangements of the target objects, 2) the perspective of the addressee or 3) the knowledge of the addressee about the target objects’ location. The results of the three experiments indicate that great apes can successfully adjust their pointing to the spatial configuration of the referent environment such as distance and location of food. However, we found no evidence that they take the perspective or the knowledge of the addressee into account when doing so. This implies that pointing in great apes is a context-sensitive, but maybe less versatile, communicative signal compared to human pointing.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Manuel Bohn
- Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.,Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA.,Leipzig University, Leipzig, Germany
| | | | - Josep Call
- Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.,University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, UK
| |
Collapse
|
12
|
Abstract
Language is a fundamentally social endeavor. Pragmatics is the study of how speakers and listeners use social reasoning to go beyond the literal meanings of words to interpret language in context. In this article, we take a pragmatic perspective on language development and argue for developmental continuity between early nonverbal communication, language learning, and linguistic pragmatics. We link phenomena from these different literatures by relating them to a computational framework (the rational speech act framework), which conceptualizes communication as fundamentally inferential and grounded in social cognition. The model specifies how different information sources (linguistic utterances, social cues, common ground) are combined when making pragmatic inferences. We present evidence in favor of this inferential view and review how pragmatic reasoning supports children's learning, comprehension, and use of language.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Manuel Bohn
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, USA
- Leipzig Research Center for Early Child Development, Leipzig University, 04109 Leipzig, Germany
| | - Michael C. Frank
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, USA
| |
Collapse
|
13
|
Novack MA, Waxman S. Becoming human: human infants link language and cognition, but what about the other great apes? Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2019; 375:20180408. [PMID: 31735145 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2018.0408] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Human language has no parallel elsewhere in the animal kingdom. It is unique not only for its structural complexity but also for its inextricable interface with core cognitive capacities such as object representation, object categorization and abstract rule learning. Here, we (i) review recent evidence documenting how (and how early) language interacts with these core cognitive capacities in the mind of the human infant, and (ii) consider whether this link exists in non-human great apes-our closest genealogical cousins. Research with human infants demonstrates that well before they begin to speak, infants have already forged a link between language and core cognitive capacities. Evident by just three months of age, this language-cognition link unfolds in a rich developmental cascade, with each advance providing the foundation for subsequent, more precise and more powerful links. This link supports our species' capacity to represent and convey abstract concepts and to communicate beyond the immediate here and now. By contrast, although the communication systems of great apes are sophisticated in their own right, there is no conclusive evidence that apes establish reference, convey information declaratively or pass down communicative devices via cultural transmission. Thus, the evidence currently available reinforces the uniqueness of human language and the power of its interface to cognition. This article is part of the theme issue 'What can animal communication teach us about human language?'
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Miriam A Novack
- Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, USA
| | - Sandra Waxman
- Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, USA
| |
Collapse
|
14
|
Leavens DA, Bard KA, Hopkins WD. The mismeasure of ape social cognition. Anim Cogn 2019; 22:487-504. [PMID: 28779278 PMCID: PMC6647540 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-017-1119-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 50] [Impact Index Per Article: 10.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/31/2016] [Revised: 07/08/2017] [Accepted: 07/25/2017] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
In his classic analysis, Gould (The mismeasure of man, WW Norton, New York, 1981) demolished the idea that intelligence was an inherent, genetic trait of different human groups by emphasizing, among other things, (a) its sensitivity to environmental input, (b) the incommensurate pre-test preparation of different human groups, and (c) the inadequacy of the testing contexts, in many cases. According to Gould, the root cause of these oversights was confirmation bias by psychometricians, an unwarranted commitment to the idea that intelligence was a fixed, immutable quality of people. By virtue of a similar, systemic interpretive bias, in the last two decades, numerous contemporary researchers in comparative psychology have claimed human superiority over apes in social intelligence, based on two-group comparisons between postindustrial, Western Europeans and captive apes, where the apes have been isolated from European styles of social interaction, and tested with radically different procedures. Moreover, direct comparisons of humans with apes suffer from pervasive lapses in argumentation: Research designs in wide contemporary use are inherently mute about the underlying psychological causes of overt behavior. Here we analyze these problems and offer a more fruitful approach to the comparative study of social intelligence, which focuses on specific individual learning histories in specific ecological circumstances.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- David A Leavens
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, BN1 9QH, UK.
| | - Kim A Bard
- University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK
| | | |
Collapse
|
15
|
Genty E. Vocal–gestural combinations in infant bonobos: new insights into signal functional specificity. Anim Cogn 2019; 22:505-518. [DOI: 10.1007/s10071-019-01267-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/13/2018] [Revised: 04/30/2019] [Accepted: 05/06/2019] [Indexed: 02/03/2023]
|
16
|
Lameira AR, Call J. Time-space-displaced responses in the orangutan vocal system. SCIENCE ADVANCES 2018; 4:eaau3401. [PMID: 30443595 PMCID: PMC6235548 DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.aau3401] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/31/2018] [Accepted: 10/18/2018] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
One of the defining features of language is displaced reference-the capacity to transmit information about something that is not present or about a past or future event. It is very rare in nature and has not been shown in any nonhuman primate, confounding, as such, any understanding of its precursors and evolution in the human lineage. Here, we describe a vocal phenomenon in a wild great ape with unparalleled affinities with displaced reference. When exposed to predator models, Sumatran orangutan mothers temporarily suppressed alarm calls up to 20 min until the model was out of sight. Subjects delayed their vocal responses in function of perceived danger for themselves, but four major predictions for stress-based mechanisms were not met. Conversely, vocal delay was also a function of perceived danger for another-an infant-suggesting high-order cognition. Our findings suggest that displaced reference in language is likely to have originally piggybacked on akin behaviors in an ancestral hominid.
Collapse
|
17
|
Skov M, Nadal M. Art is not special: an assault on the last lines of defense against the naturalization of the human mind. Rev Neurosci 2018; 29:699-702. [PMID: 29373323 DOI: 10.1515/revneuro-2017-0085] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/12/2017] [Accepted: 10/30/2017] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
The assumption that human cognition requires exceptional explanations holds strong in some domains of behavioral and brain sciences. Scientific aesthetics in general, and neuroaesthetics in particular, abound with claims for art-specific cognitive or neural processes. This assumption fosters a conceptual structure disconnected from other fields and biases the sort of processes to be studied. More generally, assuming that art is special is to cling to the idea that some aspect of our species' mental constitution makes us unique, special, and meaningful. This assumption continues to relegate scientific aesthetics to the periphery of science and hampers a naturalized view of the human mind.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Martin Skov
- Danish Research Centre for Magnetic Resonance, Copenhagen University Hospital Hvidovre, Kettegaards Allé 30, DK-2650 Hvidovre, Denmark.,Center for Decision Neuroscience, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3, DK-2000 Frederiksberg C, Denmark
| | - Marcos Nadal
- Human Evolution and Cognition Group (EvoCog), University of the Balearic Islands and IFISC, Crta. de Valldemossa, km 7.5, E- Palma (Illes Balears), Palma de Mallorca, 07122, Spain
| |
Collapse
|
18
|
Liszkowski U. Emergence of shared reference and shared minds in infancy. Curr Opin Psychol 2018; 23:26-29. [DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.11.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/04/2017] [Accepted: 11/03/2017] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
|
19
|
Bohn M, Zimmermann L, Call J, Tomasello M. The social-cognitive basis of infants’ reference to absent entities. Cognition 2018; 177:41-48. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2018.03.024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/29/2016] [Revised: 03/19/2018] [Accepted: 03/30/2018] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
|
20
|
Tomasello M, Call J. Thirty years of great ape gestures. Anim Cogn 2018; 22:461-469. [PMID: 29468285 PMCID: PMC6647417 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-018-1167-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 43] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/28/2017] [Revised: 12/18/2017] [Accepted: 02/10/2018] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
We and our colleagues have been doing studies of great ape gestural communication for more than 30 years. Here we attempt to spell out what we have learned. Some aspects of the process have been reliably established by multiple researchers, for example, its intentional structure and its sensitivity to the attentional state of the recipient. Other aspects are more controversial. We argue here that it is a mistake to assimilate great ape gestures to the species-typical displays of other mammals by claiming that they are fixed action patterns, as there are many differences, including the use of attention-getters. It is also a mistake, we argue, to assimilate great ape gestures to human gestures by claiming that they are used referentially and declaratively in a human-like manner, as apes’ “pointing” gesture has many limitations and they do not gesture iconically. Great ape gestures constitute a unique form of primate communication with their own unique qualities.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Michael Tomasello
- Max Planck Institute of Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany. .,Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, USA.
| | - Josep Call
- Max Planck Institute of Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.,School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK
| |
Collapse
|
21
|
Affiliation(s)
- Manuel Bohn
- Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology
- Stanford University
- Leipzig University
| | | |
Collapse
|
22
|
Rohlfing KJ, Grimminger A, Lüke C. An Interactive View on the Development of Deictic Pointing in Infancy. Front Psychol 2017; 8:1319. [PMID: 28824500 PMCID: PMC5539654 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01319] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/06/2017] [Accepted: 07/18/2017] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
In this review, we will focus on the development of deictic pointing gestures. We propose that they are based on infants’ sensitivities to human motion. Since both conventionalized gestures and bodily movements can be interpreted as communicative, of special interest to us is how pointing gestures are employed within early social interactions. We push forward the idea of a conventionalization process taking place when the interaction partners guide infants’ participation toward joint goals. On their way to deploy pointing gestures and thus to successfully influence the partner for a specific purpose, infants need also to disengage from their own object perception or manipulation. In addition, infants accompany their gestures increasingly with verbal utterances—this form of communication is multimodal and offers the possibility to combine modalities for the purpose of expressing more complex utterances. The multimodal behavior will be picked up by caregivers and extended into linguistically more complex forms. Because of this emerging relationship to language and its social use, gestural behavior in early infancy is a powerful predictor for later language development.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Angela Grimminger
- Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Paderborn UniversityPaderborn, Germany
| | - Carina Lüke
- Faculty of Rehabilitation Sciences, TU Dortmund UniversityDortmund, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
23
|
Osina MA, Saylor MM, Ganea PA. Out of Reach, Out of Mind? Infants’ Comprehension of References to Hidden Inaccessible Objects. Child Dev 2016; 88:1572-1580. [DOI: 10.1111/cdev.12656] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
|