Anxiety impairs spontaneous perspective calculation: Evidence from a level-1 visual perspective-taking task

The link between anxiety and theory of mind in children: A meta-analysis

BACKGROUND

The ability to reason about someone else's mental states, an ability known as theory of mind, is essential to help children navigate social life. However, not all children are socially skilled. Given socialisation is key for healthy development in children, finding what might exacerbate these difficulties is important. Emerging research suggests a potential link between anxiety and theory of mind abilities in children. This meta-analysis aims to characterise that link.

METHOD

Four electronic databases were systematically searched to identify relevant studies. Search terms included variations of terms for theory of mind, anxiety, and children. Studies were screened with inclusion and exclusion criteria for eligibility and identified papers were appraised on quality.

RESULTS

The search returned 3674 papers of which 20 were included in the analysis. These included a total of 3110 participants, aged 4-19. Overall, it was found that anxiety had a negative relationship with theory of mind and this appeared to be more pronounced in theory of mind processes related to affective states. There were no differences in the negative relationship between subtypes of anxiety or between studies with autistic and neurotypical children.

CONCLUSION

The findings suggest that anxious children may have difficulties using theory of mind abilities. Heterogeneity was substantial in the data, which limits the confidence in conclusions. Quality appraisal identified that the quality of theory of mind and anxiety measures varied between studies.

Are there quantitative differences between eye-gaze and arrow cues? A meta-analytic answer to the debate and a call for qualitative differences

Gaze acts from an early age as a cue to orient attention and, thereafter, to infer our social partners' intentions, thoughts, and emotions. Variants of the attentional orienting paradigm have been used to study the orienting capabilities associated to eye gaze. However, to date, it is still unclear whether this methodology truly assesses "social-specific" processes exclusively involved in attention to eye-gaze or the operation of domain-general attentional processes. The present study provides a comprehensive meta-analysis indicating that eye-gaze and non-social directional stimuli, such as arrows, produce equivalent attentional effects. This result casts doubt on the potential utility of the classic cueing task in revealing social-specific processes. On the other hand, we review behavioral evidence suggesting that eye-gaze stimuli may induce higher-order social processes when more specific experimental procedures that analyze qualitative rather than quantitative differences are used. These findings point to an integrated view in which domain-general and social specific processes both contribute to the attentional mechanisms induced by eye-gaze direction. Finally, some proposals about the social components specifically triggered by eye-gaze stimuli are discussed.

Grammatical Perspective-Taking in Comprehension and Production

Language use in conversation requires conversation partners to consider each other's points-of-view, or perspectives. A large body of work has explored how conversation partners take into account differences in knowledge states when choosing referring expressions. This paper explores how well findings from perspective-taking in reference generalize to a relatively understudied domain of perspective: the processing of grammatical perspectival expressions like the motion verbs come and go in English. We re-visit findings from perspective-taking in reference that conversation participants are subject to egocentric biases: they are biased towards their own perspectives. Drawing on theoretical proposals for grammatical perspective-taking and prior experimental studies of perspective-taking in reference, we compare two models of grammatical perspective-taking: a serial anchoring-and-adjustment model, and a simultaneous integration model. We test their differing predictions in a series of comprehension and production experiments using the perspectival motion verbs come and go as a case study. While our comprehension studies suggest that listeners reason simultaneously over multiple perspectives, as in the simultaneous integration model, our production findings are more mixed: we find support for only one of the simultaneous integration model's two key predictions. More generally, our findings suggest a role for egocentric bias in production for grammatical perspective-taking as well as when choosing referring expressions.

Influence of membership in outgroups varying in competence and warmth on observers' Level-2 visual perspective taking

Visual perspective taking (VPT), the ability to adopt another person's viewpoint, entails two distinct processes, Level-1 (L1)-VPT and Level-2 (L2-VPT), referring to the ability to perceive whether and how a target sees an object, respectively. Whereas previous efforts investigated the impact of targets' social characteristics on L1-VPT, the present work is the first to do so regarding L2-VPT. Specifically, we investigate the impact of targets' membership in outgroups varying in perceived competence and warmth, the two fundamental dimensions of social perception. Participants in four experiments engaged in a L2-VPT task. Avatars belonged to a low competence low warmth group (LCLW; e.g. the homeless) or to a high competence low warmth group (HCLW; e.g. bankers) in Experiments 1-3, and to a LCLW or high competence high warmth group (HCHW; e.g. female students) in Experiment 4. Participants answered as quickly as possible whether a cued number matched a number present in a scene from either their own or the avatar's perspective. We consistently found support for the presence of both egocentric and altercentric interference, but this was not modulated by group competence and warmth, suggesting that membership in outgroups varying in competence and warmth does not influence L2-VPT. We discuss the findings' implications in the light of recent views on VPT.

Anxiety symptoms and theory of mind in older and younger adults: curvilinearity moderated by age group

OBJECTIVES

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to reason about mental states, declines in later life. While anxiety symptoms may predict ToM abilities, the nature of associations requires more elucidation. Further, it is unknown whether age group moderates associational patterns. We examined associations between anxiety symptoms (linear and curvilinear) and cognitive ToM (C-ToM) and affective ToM (A-ToM); and moderation by age group (older vs. younger adults).

METHODS

In a sample of healthy younger (n = 90, M_age = 20.17 years) and older adults (n = 87, M_age = 71.52), we used hierarchical regressions with polynomial and interaction terms to assess the association between anxiety symptoms and ToM in younger and older adults.

RESULTS

Anxiety symptoms were associated with C-ToM but not A-ToM. Age group interacted linearly with anxiety (β = -1.64, p = .02), and with anxiety's quadratic polynomial (β = .84, p = .04). The inverted-U shaped association in younger adults (highest C-ToM at moderate anxiety) contrasted with older adults' linear decline in C-ToM with increasing anxiety.

CONCLUSION

We highlight the importance of anxiety symptoms for predicting ToM, and clarify that associations vary by age. Elucidating associations may be critical to developing interventions that improve social wellbeing.

Interactions between interoception and perspective-taking: Current state of research and future directions

Interoception, the sense of the physiological state of the body, and perspective-taking, the ability to take another's point of view, are two fundamental components contributing to our perception and interaction with the external world. However, whether the perception of our inner body influences how we perceive the external world and other people remains poorly understood. Here, we review recent behavioural and neuroimaging evidence investigating the links between dimensions of interoception (i.e., accuracy, sensibility and awareness) and perspective-taking (i.e., affective, cognitive and visual). So far, only a limited subset of these dimensions has been investigated together and the results suggest that interoceptive abilities may only interact with perspective-taking when embodied mental transformations are required. Furthermore, mainly the emotional aspects of perspective-taking are related to interoception, influencing the ability to empathise with others. Future research should systematically investigate the links between all dimensions of interoception and perspective-taking to provide full understanding of the specific role interoception has on how we perceive the world and take another's point of view.

Action co-representation under threat: A Social Simon study

Several studies have shown that individuals automatically integrate the actions of other individuals into their own action plans, thus facilitating action coordination. What happens to this mechanism in situations of danger? This capacity could either be reduced, in order to allocate more cognitive resources for individualistic actions, or be maintained or enhanced to enable cooperation under threat. In order to determine the impact of the perception of danger on this capacity, two groups of participants carried out, in pairs, the Social Simon task, which provides a measure of co-representation. The task was performed during so-called 'threat blocks' (during which participants could be exposed at any time to an aversive stimulus) and so-called 'safety blocks' (during which no aversive stimulation could occur). In a first group of participants, both individuals were exposed at the same time to threat blocks. In a second group, only one of the two participants was exposed to them at a time. Our results indicate that co-representation, an important cognitive mechanism for cooperation, (i) is preserved in situations of danger; and (ii) may even be increased in participants who are confronted alone to threat but in the presence of a safe partner. Contrarily to popular belief, danger does not shut down our capacities for social interaction.

Willing and able? Theory of mind, social motivation, and social competence in middle childhood and early adolescence

This study investigated the links between theory of mind, social motivation, and children's social competence in middle childhood and early adolescence. Two hundred and sixty four children (136 girls, 128 boys) aged between 8 and 13 years (M Age = 10.88 years, SD = 1.45) completed theory-of-mind tests and self-report questionnaires measuring social motivation. Teachers rated children's social competence at school. Teacher-rated social competence was associated with individual differences in both theory of mind and children's motivation to develop and maintain social relationships. Results suggest that while individual differences in social motivation and theory of mind are partially overlapping, both theory of mind ability and social motivation contribute to successful social interaction at school.

The presence of other-race people disrupts spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking

Visual perspective taking is an essential skill for effective social interaction. Previous studies have tested various perceiver-based factors that affect intentional perspective taking; however, the factors affecting spontaneous perspective taking remain unknown. To fill this gap, the present study used a novel spontaneous visual perspective taking paradigm to explore how an agent's race and emotion affect spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking. In Experiment 1, the participants completed a mental rotation task while a human agent simultaneously gazed at the target with positive, negative, or neutral facial expressions. The agent was African, Caucasian, or Chinese. The results revealed that the other-race agents disrupted the participants' spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking, while emotion weakly affected it. Experiment 2 retested whether emotion could affect spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking while only own-race agents were used. The participants completed the same task as that in Experiment 1. The results revealed that emotions weakly affected spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking. In summary, the present study first examined what target-based factors affect spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking. The results extend the representation and incorporation of the close others' responses (RICOR) model. Specifically, people routinely construct representations of other people's points of view when they share the same racial group.

Tracking multiple perspectives: Spontaneous computation of what individuals in high entitative groups see

Perspective-taking ability is crucial for supporting social interactions. It has been widely suggested that the calculation of an individual's perspective is spontaneous. Nevertheless, people typically engage with more than one individual, and computing what individuals in a crowd see is important. The current study explored whether people spontaneously compute the perspectives of individuals displayed in a crowd. The classic visual perspective-taking task was adopted, but the picture of the room was presented with four human avatars facing two walls. The results showed that if the crowd of individuals was treated as a high entitative group, when none of the perspectives of the individuals contained the same number of discs as that from the perspective of the participant, the judgment of the participant's perspective was slower than when a proportion of the perspectives of the individuals displayed in the crowd were consistent with the participant's perspective, even if the perspectives of the multiple individuals in a crowd were not explicitly noticed. This altercentric intrusion effect was not present when the crowd had low entitativity. These findings were replicated by using different methods to operationalize group entitativity. Hence, this study demonstrates that spontaneously tracking the perspectives of individuals displayed in a crowd has a boundary condition and that people can spontaneously compute what individuals in high entitative groups see.

Modulation of behavioral and brain responses to visual perspective taking by social rejection: Evidence from electrophysiology

Visual perspective taking (VPT) is crucial for reasoning about other people's mental states. To explore the modulation of behavioral and neural responses to visual perspective taking by social rejection, we firstly manipulated rejection using get-acquainted oral communication and a two-person visual perspective task, then explored how the experience of social rejection affected the behavioral and neural responses during the follow-up classical one-person visual perspective task. The subjective rating and behavior results showed that social rejection increased individuals' negative affect level and feelings of need-threat, decreased self-regulation and impulsive control. The event-related potentials (ERP) and standardized low resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) results mainly showed that the increased parietal late slow wave (LSW) showed greater activities in SPL and rTPJ after social rejection. Moreover, compared with making judgments from self-perspective, making judgments from other-perspective yielded later TP450 and greater late frontal wave (LFW). In addition, the left LFW of socially rejected group showed more positive amplitude for other-inconsistent condition than that for other-consistent condition. These results suggested that social rejection might decrease impulsive control behaviorally, as well as increase neural processing of perspective taking, including visual-spatial perspective taking (indexed by the LSW), calculating of the self and other perspectives (indexed by the TP450), and processing of others' visual perspectives (indexed by the LFW). Our findings provide powerful evidence on neural mechanism underlying how social rejection modulates visual perspective taking, and support the model of social monitoring system, in that socially rejected individuals motivate to attend more carefully to social cues, such as other people's perspective.

Spontaneous Theory of Mind is reduced for nonhuman-like agents as compared to human-like agents

Theory of Mind research has shown that we spontaneously take into account other's beliefs. In the current study, we investigate, with a spontaneous Theory of Mind (ToM) task, if this belief representation also applies to nonhuman-like agents. In a series of three experiments, we show here that we do not spontaneously take into account beliefs of nonhuman-like others, or at least we do it to a lesser extent than for human and human-like agents. Further, the experience we have with the other agent, in our case a dog, does not modulate spontaneous ToM: the same pattern of results was obtained when dog owners and no owners were compared. However, when more attention was attracted to the dog behavior, participants' behavior was influenced by the beliefs of the dog. In sum, spontaneous belief representation seems to be primarily restricted to human and human-like agents, but can be facilitated when more attention is drawn to a nonhuman-like agent.

Do individualism and collectivism on three levels (country, individual, and situation) influence theory-of-mind efficiency? A cross-country study

This study investigated whether individualism and collectivism (IC) at country, individual, and situational level influence how quickly and accurately people can infer mental states (i.e. theory of mind, or ToM), indexed by accuracy and reaction time in a ToM task. We hypothesized that collectivism (having an interdependent self and valuing group concerns), compared to individualism (having an independent self and valuing personal concerns), is associated with greater accuracy and speed in recognizing and understanding the thoughts and feelings of others. Students (N = 207) from individualism-representative (the Netherlands) and collectivism-representative (Vietnam) countries (Country IC) answered an individualism-collectivism questionnaire (Individual IC) and were randomly assigned to an individualism-primed, collectivism-primed, or no-prime task (Situational IC) before performing a ToM task. The data showed vast differences between the Dutch and Vietnamese groups that might not be attributable to experimental manipulation. Therefore, we analyzed the data for the groups separately and found that Individual IC did not predict ToM accuracy or reaction time performance. Regarding Situational IC, when primed with individualism, the accuracy performance of Vietnamese participants in affective ToM trials decreased compared to when primed with collectivism and when no prime was used. However, an interesting pattern emerged: Dutch participants were least accurate in affective ToM trials, while Vietnamese participants were quickest in affective ToM trials. Our research also highlights a dilemma faced by cross-cultural researchers who use hard-to-reach populations but face the challenge of disentangling experimental effects from biases that might emerge due to an interaction between cultural differences and experimental settings. We propose suggestions for overcoming such challenges.

Level-2 perspectives computed quickly and spontaneously: Evidence from eight- to 9.5-year-old children

It has been widely assumed that computing how a scene looks from another perspective (level-2 perspective taking, PT) is an effortful process, as opposed to the automatic capacity of tracking visual access to objects (level-1 PT). Recently, adults have been found to compute both forms of visual perspectives in a quick but context-sensitive way, indicating that the two functions share more features than previously assumed. However, the developmental literature still shows the dissociation between automatic level-1 and effortful level-2 PT. In the current paper, we report an experiment showing that in a minimally social situation, participating in a number verification task with an adult confederate, eight- to 9.5-year-old children demonstrate similar online level-2 PT capacities as adults. Future studies need to address whether online PT shows selectivity in children as well and develop paradigms that are adequate to test preschoolers' online level-2 PT abilities. Statement of Contribution What is already known on this subject? Adults can access how objects appear to others (level-2 perspective) spontaneously and online Online level-1, but not level-2 perspective taking (PT) has been documented in school-aged children What the present study adds? Eight- to 9.5-year-olds performed a number verification task with a confederate who had the same task Children showed similar perspective interference as adults, indicating spontaneous level-2 PT Not only agent-object relations but also object appearances are computed online by eight- to 9.5-year-olds.

Intergroup visual perspective-taking: Shared group membership impairs self-perspective inhibition but may facilitate perspective calculation

Reasoning about what other people see, know, and want is essential for navigating social life. Yet, even neurodevelopmentally healthy adults make perspective-taking errors. Here, we examined how the group membership of perspective-taking targets (ingroup vs. outgroup) affects processes underlying visual perspective-taking. In three experiments using two bases of group identity (university affiliation and minimal groups), interference from one's own differing perspective (i.e., egocentric intrusion) was stronger when responding from an ingroup versus an outgroup member's perspective. Spontaneous perspective calculation, as indexed by interference from another's visual perspective when reporting one's own (i.e., altercentric intrusion), did not differ across target group membership in any of our experiments. Process-dissociation analyses, which aim to isolate automatic processes underlying altercentric-intrusion effects, further revealed negligible effects of target group membership on perspective calculation. Meta-analytically, however, there was suggestive evidence that shared group membership facilitates responding from others' perspectives when self and other perspectives are aligned.

Dissociating processes underlying level-1 visual perspective taking in adults

Although reasoning about other people's mental states has typically been thought to require effortful deliberation, evidence from indirect measures suggests that people may implicitly track others' perspectives, spontaneously calculating what they see and know. We used a process-dissociation approach to investigate the unique contributions of automatic and controlled processes to level-1 visual perspective taking in adults. In Experiment 1, imposing time pressure reduced the ability to exert control over one's responses, but it left automatic processing of a target's perspective unchanged. In Experiment 2, automatic processing of a target's perspective was greater when the target was a human avatar versus a non-social entity, whereas controlled processing was relatively unaffected by the specific target. Our findings highlight the utility of a process-dissociation approach for increasing theoretical precision and generating new questions about the nature of perspective taking.