Current evidence for automatic Theory of Mind processing in adults

Flexible social monitoring as revealed by eye movements: Spontaneous mental state updating triggered by others' unexpected actions

Successful interactions require not only representing others' mental states but also flexibly updating them, whenever one's original inferences may no longer hold. Such situations arise, for instance, when a partner's behavior is incongruent with one's expectations. Although these situations are rather common, the question whether people update others' mental states spontaneously upon encountering unexpected behaviors and whether they use the updated mental states in novel contexts, has been largely unexplored. We addressed these issues in two experiments. In each experiment participants first performed an anticipatory looking task, reacting to a virtual 'partner', who categorized pictures based on their ambiguous or non-ambiguous color. Importantly, to perform the task participants did not have to track their partner's perspective. Following a correct categorization phase, the 'partner' started to systematically miscategorize one of the ambiguous colors (e.g., as if she would now believe that the greenish blue is green). We measured how participants' anticipatory looking preceding the partner's categorization changed across trials. Afterward, we asked whether participants implicitly transferred their knowledge about the partner's updated perspective to a new task. Finally, they performed an explicit perspective-taking task, to test whether they selectively updated the partner's perspective, but not their own. Results revealed that correct anticipations started to emerge only after a few miscategorizations, indicating the spontaneous updating of the other's perspective regarding the miscategorized color. Signatures of updating emerged somewhat earlier when the partner made similarity judgments (Experiment 2), highlighting the subjective nature of her decisions, compared to when following an explicit color-categorization rule (Experiment 1). In the explicit perspective-taking task of both experiments, roughly half of the participants could categorize items according to the partner's (spontaneously updated) perspective and also used their partner's updated perspective in the implicit transfer task to some degree, while they were the ones who displayed more pronounced anticipatory patterns as well. Such data provides strong evidence that the observed changes in anticipatory looking reflect spontaneous and flexible mental state updating. In addition, the findings also point to a high individual variability both in the updating of attributed mental states and the use of the updated mental state content.

Neural correlates involved in perspective-taking in early childhood

Learning to consider another person's perspective is pivotal in early social development. Still, little is known about the neural underpinnings involved in perspective-taking in early childhood. In this EEG study, we examined 4-year-old children's brain activity during a live, social interaction that involved perspective-taking. Children were asked to pass one of two toys to another person. To decide which toy to pass, they had to consider either their partner's perspective (perspective-taking) or visual features unrelated to their partner's perspective (control). We analyzed power changes in midfrontal and temporal-parietal EEG channels. The results indicated that children showed higher power around 7 Hz at right temporal-parietal channels for perspective-taking compared to control trials. This power difference was positively correlated with children's perspective-taking performance, specifically for trials in which they needed to pass the toy their partner could not see. A similar power difference at right temporal-parietal channels was seen when comparing perspective-taking trials where children's visual access mismatched rather than matched that of their partner. No differences were detected for midfrontal channels. In sum, we identified distinct neural activity as 4-year-olds considered another person's perspective in a live interaction; this activity converges with neural findings of adults' social processing network.

Evaluative contexts facilitate implicit mentalizing: relation to the broader autism phenotype and mental health

One promising account for autism is implicit mentalizing difficulties. However, this account and even the existence of implicit mentalizing have been challenged because the replication results are mixed. Those unsuccessful replications may be due to the task contexts not being sufficiently evaluative. Therefore, the current study developed a more evaluative paradigm by implementing a prompt question. This was assessed in 60 non-autistic adults and compared with a non-prompt version. Additionally, parents of autistic children are thought to show a genetic liability to autistic traits and cognition and often report mental health problems, but the broader autism phenotype (BAP) is an under-researched area. Thus, we also aimed to compare 33 BAP and 26 non-BAP mothers on mentalizing abilities, autistic traits, compensation and mental health. Our results revealed that more evaluative contexts can facilitate implicit mentalizing in BAP and non-BAP populations, and thus improve task reliability and replicability. Surprisingly, BAP mothers showed better implicit mentalizing but worse mental health than non-BAP mothers, which indicates the heterogeneity in the broader autism phenotype and the need to promote BAP mothers' psychological resilience. The findings underscore the importance of contexts for implicit mentalizing and the need to profile mentalizing and mental health in BAP parents.

The protective effects of cognitive empathy and emotional empathy on gambling disorder are mediated by risk aversion and responsible gambling attitude

BACKGROUND

Based on social cognitive theory, this study aimed to examine whether and how social abilities (i.e., cognitive empathy and emotional empathy) are associated with gambling disorder (GD) by incorporating attitudes toward general risk (i.e., risk aversion) and responsible gambling as potential mediators of this link.

METHODS

A convenience sample of 580 past-year lottery gamblers (Mage = 34.07, SD = 13.36; 50.4% female), recruited near lottery sales shops, completed an anonymous paper-version questionnaire on site. Data were collected using the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for GD, Interpersonal Reactivity Index, Risk Aversion Scale, Positive Play Scale, and demographic items. Path analysis and mediation analysis were applied to examine the effects of cognitive empathy and emotional empathy on GD and the mediating roles of risk aversion and responsible gambling attitude.

RESULTS

Our results showed that cognitive empathy, but not emotional empathy, was significantly and negatively correlated with GD. Also, the effect of cognitive empathy on GD was fully mediated by risk aversion and responsible gambling attitude, whilst the total indirect effect of emotional empathy on GD was nonsignificant. As hypothesized, the indirect paths from both types of empathy to GD were significantly and serially mediated by risk aversion and responsible gambling attitude.

CONCLUSION

Cognitive empathy, distinct from emotional empathy, was a statistically significant correlate of GD. Moreover, the path model results also suggest that responsible gambling attitude was a salient protective factors against GD. Future GD prevention efforts may benefit from paying more attention to the role of responsible gambling attitude.

Are you thinking what I'm thinking? Perspective-taking in a language game

Many theories of communication claim that perspective-taking is a fundamental component of the successful design of utterances for a specific audience. In three experiments, we investigated perspective-taking in a constrained communication situation: Participants played a word guessing game where each trial required them to select a clue word to communicate a single target word to their partner. In many cases, the task requires participants to take the perspective of their partner when generating, evaluating, and selecting potential clue words. For example, if the target word was 'heart', the first word that came to mind might be 'love', but this would not in fact be a very useful clue word. Instead, a word like 'cardiovascular' is much more likely than 'love' to make the partner guess 'heart'. Pairs of participants took turns giving and receiving clues to guess target words, receiving feedback after each trial. In Experiment 1, participants appeared unable to improve their perspective-taking over repeated interactions, despite a baseline performance that suggested strong perspective-taking abilities. In Experiment 2, which included extensive feedback after each trial and only target words for which good clues existed and which required perspective-taking, some measures of perspective-taking showed modest improvements. In Experiment 3, which was conducted online, we used Experiment 2 feedback with Experiment 1 target words. As in Experiment 1, participants did not improve over the course of the game in Experiment 3. The results of these three experiments show quite strong limits on people's ability to adapt and improve perspective-taking without the context provided by interaction history and growing common ground.

Principles of belief acquisition. How we read other minds

Reading other minds is a pervasive feature of human social life. A decade of research indicates that people can automatically track an agent's beliefs regardless of whether this is required. But little is known about the principles t guide automatic belief tracking. In six experiments adapting a false belief task introduced by Kovács et al. (2010), we tested whether belief tracking is interrupted by either an agent's lack of perceptual access or else by an agent's constrained action possibilities. We also tested whether such manipulations create interruptions when participants were instructed to track beliefs. Our main finding: the agent's lack of perceptual access did not interrupt belief tracking when participants were not instructed to track beliefs. Overall, our findings raise a challenge: some of the phenomena that have been labelled mindreading are perhaps not mindreading at all, or-more likely-they are mindreading but not as we know it.

Increased interference from conflicting perspectives and gender differences: A longitudinal study during adolescence

Adolescents need to develop adequate perspective-taking skills to successfully navigate their increasingly complex social environments. This study investigated adolescents' development of the cognitive processes of egocentric and altercentric interference that influence perspective-taking abilities. Using the Dot Perspective Task, participants' (N = 803; 50.9% female) egocentric and altercentric interference was measured during 3 consecutive years from 12 to 14 years of age. Linear mixed model analyses showed that whereas overall task performance improved over time, egocentric and altercentric interference increased over time. These results suggest that perspective taking develops at slower rates when there are conflicting perspectives than in situations with no conflict. Moreover, we found that girls showed less egocentric interference than boys. This result provides task-based evidence that supports previous findings of higher self-reported perspective taking in adolescent girls than in adolescent boys.

Mentalizing and self-other distinction in visual perspective taking: the analysis of temporal neural processing using high-density EEG

This high density EEG report dissects the neural processing in the visual perspective taking using four experimental comparisons (Arrow, Avatar and Self, Other). Early activation differences occurred between the Avatar and the Arrow condition in primary visual pathways concomitantly with alpha and beta phase locked responses predominant in the Avatar condition. In later time points, brain activation was stronger for the Avatar condition in paracentral lobule of frontal lobe. When taking the other's perspective, there was an increased recruitment of generators in the occipital and temporal lobes and later on in mentalizing and salience networks bilaterally before spreading to right frontal lobe subdivisions. Microstate analysis further supported late recruitment of the medial frontal gyrus and precentral lobule in this condition. Other perspective for the Avatar only showed a strong beta response located first in left occipito-temporal and right parietal areas, and later on in frontal lobes. Our EEG data support distinct brain processes for the Avatar condition with an increased recruitment of brain generators that progresses from primary visual areas to the anterior brain. Taking the other's perspective needs an early recruitment of neural processors in posterior areas involved in theory of mind with later involvement of additional frontal generators.

Seeing in my way or your way: impact of intelligence, attention, and empathy on brain reactivity

Previous studies showed that neurotypical adults are able to engage in unconscious analyses of others' mental states in the context of automatic perspective taking and experience systematic difficulties when judging the conflicts between their own (Self) and another's (Other) perspective. Several functional MRI (fMRI) studies reported widespread activation of mentalizing, salience, and executive networks when adopting the Other compared to Self perspective. This study aims to explore whether cognitive and emotional parameters impact on brain reactivity in dot perspective task (dPT). We provide here an fMRI analysis based on individual z-scores in eighty-two healthy adults who underwent the Samson's dPT after detailed assessment of fluid intelligence, attention, levels of alexithymia and social cognition abilities. Univariate regression models were used to explore the association between brain activation patterns and psychological variables. There was a strong positive association between Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and fMRI z-scores in Self perspective. When the Other perspective is taken, Continuous Performance Test (CPT)-II parameters were negatively associated with fMRI z-scores. Individuals with higher Toronto Alexithymia scale (TAS) score and lower scores in mini-Social cognition and Emotional Assessment (SEA) displayed significantly higher egocentric interference-related fMRI z-scores. Our data demonstrate that brain activation when focusing on our own perspective depends on the levels of fluid intelligence. Decreased attentional recruitment and decreased inhibitory control affects the brain efforts to adopt the Other perspective. Egocentric interference-associated brain fMRI activation was less marked in cases with better empathy abilities but the opposite was true for persons who experience increased difficulties in the recognition of emotions.

Patterns of multiple brain network activation in dot perspective task

In this functional MRI (fMRI) study on 82 healthy adults using the dot perspective task, inconsistency of perspectives was associated with a significant increase of the mean reaction time and number of errors both in Self and Other conditions. Unlike the Arrow (non-mentalizing), the Avatar (mentalizing) paradigm was characterized by the recruitment of parts of the mentalizing and salience networks. These data provide experimental evidence supporting the fMRI distinction between mentalizing and non-mentalizing stimuli. A widespread activation of classical theory of mind (ToM) areas but also of salience network and decision making areas was observed in the Other compared to Self-conditions. Compared to Self-Consistent, Self-Inconsistent trials were related to increased activation in the lateral occipital cortex, right supramarginal and angular gyrus as well as inferior, superior and middle frontal gyri. Compared to the Other-Consistent, Other-Inconsistent trials yielded strong activation in the lateral occipital cortex, precuneus and superior parietal lobule, middle and superior precentral gyri and left frontal pole. These findings reveal that altercentric interference relies on areas involved in self-other distinction, self-updating and central executive functions. In contrast, egocentric interference needs the activation of the mirror neuron system and deductive reasoning, much less related to pure ToM abilities.

Cognitive and Emotional Determinants of Automatic Perspective Taking in Healthy Adults

Previous studies using the dot-perspective task postulated that people automatically take into account others' perspective even when it prevents them from achieving their own goals. This human ability may be of key importance for the ascription of mental states and social interactions. The cognitive and emotional determinants of automatic perspective taking (APT) is still matter of debate. To address this issue, we examined the performance in the Samson et al. APT task in 91 healthy adults who underwent a detailed neuropsychological testing including assessment of their general intelligence (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, WAIS), attention and impulsivity (Conners' Continuous Performance Test-II, CPT-II), alexithymia (Toronto Alexithymia Scale, TAS), and measures of affective empathy and explicit theory of mind (Geneva Social Cognition Scale, GeSoCS, and mini-Social cognition and Emotional Assessment, mini-SEA). Univariate and multiple linear regression models (adjusted for age, gender, and education) were used to explore the association between mean reaction times (respectively, mean number of errors) in the APT task, and the CPT-II parameters, WAIS global score (as well as subscale scores), TAS, and GeSoCS and mini-SEA scores. Only the CPT-II parameters were significantly associated with the mean reaction times. Increased omissions, commissions, and detectability as well as hit reaction time standard error in CPT-II were all related to worse performances both in Self and Other conditions. The mean number of errors was negatively associated with the GeSoCS score. Among the variables studied, only CPT-II parameters had a significant impact on egocentric and altercentric interference. Neither global intelligence nor alexithymia have an effect on dot-perspective task performance. The present findings suggest that people with lower attentional resources and increased impulsivity display worse performances in the APT task and are less responsive to both egocentric and altercentric interference.

Electrocorticographic evidence of a common neurocognitive sequence for mentalizing about the self and others

Neuroimaging studies of mentalizing (i.e., theory of mind) consistently implicate the default mode network (DMN). Nevertheless, the social cognitive functions of individual DMN regions remain unclear, perhaps due to limited spatiotemporal resolution in neuroimaging. Here we use electrocorticography (ECoG) to directly record neuronal population activity while 16 human participants judge the psychological traits of themselves and others. Self- and other-mentalizing recruit near-identical cortical sites in a common spatiotemporal sequence. Activations begin in the visual cortex, followed by temporoparietal DMN regions, then finally in medial prefrontal regions. Moreover, regions with later activations exhibit stronger functional specificity for mentalizing, stronger associations with behavioral responses, and stronger self/other differentiation. Specifically, other-mentalizing evokes slower and longer activations than self-mentalizing across successive DMN regions, implying lengthier processing at higher levels of representation. Our results suggest a common neurocognitive pathway for self- and other-mentalizing that follows a complex spatiotemporal gradient of functional specialization across DMN and beyond.

Comparing Theory of Mind Development in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder, Developmental Language Disorder, and Typical Development

BACKGROUND

Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to recognize, comprehend, and consider oneself's and others' mental states and perspectives to predict and explain behaviors and motivations. It is widely accepted that children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) experience difficulties with ToM. However, there are also findings suggesting that ToM abilities might also be compromised in children with Developmental Language Disorders (DLD).

PURPOSE

To assess ToM abilities in three groups of children: 1. ASD with no language difficulties; 2. DLD, known for their language disorder; and 3. TD with no language issues.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

A total of 41 preschool children aged 5-to-6 were examined and assigned to one of the three groups based on previous clinical reports and a standardized Hebrew language assessment tool. Nonverbal IQ was established with a standardized test to verify within average range placement (>75 IQ). ToM skills were examined with a Hebrew version of the ToM Task Battery and parent's questionnaire (ToMI).

RESULTS

Children with ASD had significantly lower ToM scores compared to the children with DLD, and TD. The ToM scores of the children with DLD were similar to the scores of the TD children. According to the parents' questionnaires, both the ASD children and the DLD children had less developed ToM skills compared to their TD peers.

CONCLUSION

The present findings suggest that children with ASD have a fundamental difficulty in ToM that is independent of their language abilities. Children with DLD show difficulties in everyday social interactions that involve ToM. It is possible that both ASD and language disorders influence ToM development, suggesting that different developmental routes affect the acquisition of ToM.

Us and the Virus

Abstract. From a social psychological perspective, the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated protective measures affected individuals’ social relations and basic psychological needs. We aim to identify sources of need frustration (stressors) and possibilities to bolster need satisfaction (buffers). Particularly, we highlight emerging empirical research in which social psychological theorizing can contribute to our understanding of the pandemic’s social consequences: Loneliness, social networks, role conflicts, social identity, compliance, trust, reactance, and conspiracy beliefs. We highlight directions for future social psychological research as the pandemic continues.

The posterior crus II cerebellum is specialized for social mentalizing and emotional self-experiences: a meta-analysis

This meta-analysis explores the role of the posterior cerebellum Crus I/II in social mentalizing. We identified over 200 functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies via NeuroSynth that met our inclusion criteria and fell within bilateral Crus II areas related to ‘sequencing’ during mentalizing (coordinates ±24 −76 −40; from earlier studies) and mere social ‘mentalizing’ or self-related emotional cognition (coordinates ±26 −84 −34; from NeuroSynth), located in the cerebellar mentalizing network. A large majority of these studies (74%) involved mentalizing or self-related emotional cognition. Other functions formed small minorities. This high incidence in Crus II compares very favorably against the lower base rate for mentalizing and self-related emotions (around 35%) across the whole brain as revealed in NeuroSynth. In contrast, there was much less support for a similar role of Crus I (coordinates −40 −70 −40 from earlier ‘sequencing’ studies) as only 35% of the studies were related to mentalizing or self-related emotions. The present findings show that a domain-specific social mentalizing functionality is supported in the cerebellar Crus II. This has important implications for theories of the social cerebellum focusing on sequencing of social actions, and for cerebellar neurostimulation treatments.

The posterior cerebellum supports implicit learning of social belief sequences

Recent studies have documented the involvement of the posterior cerebellar Crus (I & II) in social mentalizing, when sequences play a critical role. We investigated for the first time implicit learning of belief sequences. We created a novel task in which true and false beliefs of other persons were alternated in an adapted serial reaction time (SRT) paradigm (Belief SRT task). Participants observed two protagonists whose beliefs concerning reality were manipulated, depending on their orientation toward the scene (true belief: directly observing the situation) or away from it (false belief: knowing only the prior situation). Unbeknownst to the participants, a fixed sequence related to the two protagonists' belief orientations was repeated throughout the task (Training phase); and to test the acquisition of this fixed sequence, it was occasionally interrupted by random sequences (Test phase). As a nonsocial control, the two protagonists and their orientations were replaced by two different shapes of different colors respectively (Control SRT task). As predicted, the posterior cerebellar Crus I & II were activated during the Belief SRT task and not in the Control SRT task. The Belief SRT task revealed that Crus I was activated during the initial learning of the fixed sequence (Training phase) and when this learned sequence was interrupted by random sequences (Test phase). Moreover, Crus II was activated during occasional reappearance of the learned sequence in the context of sequence violations (Test phase). Our results demonstrate the contribution of the posterior cerebellar Crus during implicit learning and predicting new belief sequences.

Implicit Learning of True and False Belief Sequences

To investigate whether people can implicitly learn regularities in a social context, we developed a new implicit sequence learning task combining elements from classic false belief and serial reaction time tasks. Participants learned that protagonists were offered flowers at four locations. The protagonists' beliefs concerning the flowers were true or false, depending on their orientation, respectively, toward the scene (so that the flowers could be seen) or away from it. Unbeknown to the participants, there was a fixed belief-related sequence involving three dimensions (identity of the two protagonists, true-false belief orientation held by the protagonists, and flower location as believed by the protagonists). Participants had to indicate as fast as possible where the flowers were located (Experiment 1), or how many flowers were given (Experiment 2) according to the protagonists. Experiment 1 combined perceptual and motor processes (as both the belief-related sequence and motor responses referred to location), whereas Experiment 2 unconfounded the sequence and motor responses, allowing to investigate pure perceptual implicit learning. For reasons of comparison, two non-social conditions were created in Experiment 2 by replacing the protagonists with two non-social objects-colored cameras or shapes. Results revealed significant implicit sequence learning of all belief-related dimensions in Experiment 1, and of true-false belief orientation in Experiment 2, even without a motor confound. Importantly, there were faster reaction times and stronger sequence learning effects in the social than in the non-social conditions. The present findings demonstrate for the first time that people are able to implicitly learn belief-related sequences.

How do non-human primates represent others' awareness of where objects are hidden?

Although non-human primates (NHPs) generally appear to predict how knowledgeable agents use knowledge to guide their behavior, the cognitive mechanisms that enable this remain poorly understood. We assessed the conditions under which NHPs' representations of an agent's awareness break down. Free-ranging rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) watched as an agent observed a target object being hidden in one of two boxes. While the agent could no longer see the boxes, the box containing the object flipped open and the object either changed in size/shape (Experiment 1) or color (Experiment 2). Monkeys looked longer when the agent searched for the object incorrectly rather than correctly following the color change (a non-geometric manipulation), but not the size/shape change (a geometric manipulation). Even though the agent maintained knowledge of the object's location in both cases, monkeys no longer expected the agent to search correctly after it had been geometrically (but not non-geometrically) manipulated. Experiment 3 confirmed that monkeys were sensitive to the color manipulation used in Experiment 2, making it unlikely that a failure to perceive the color manipulation accounted for our findings. Our results show that NHPs do not always expect that knowledgeable agents will act on their knowledge to obtain their goals, consistent with heuristic-based accounts of how NHPs represent others' mental states. These findings also suggest that geometric changes that occur outside the agent's perceptual access may disrupt attribution of awareness more so than non-geometric changes.

Cognitive Empathy in Subtypes of Antisocial Individuals

Cognitive empathy allows individuals to recognize and infer how others think and feel in social situations and provides a foundation for the formation and maintenance of mutually constructive relationships. It may seem intuitive to assume that individuals who engage in antisocial behavior, who disregard the rights of others, might have problems with cognitive empathy. However, careful examination of the literature suggests that any dysfunction in cognitive empathy associated with antisociality varies by subtype of antisocial individual and is specific to subcomponents of cognitive empathy. In this review, we (1) briefly define subtypes of antisocial individuals ("psychopathic" vs. "antisocial-only"), (2) summarize specific components of cognitive empathy; (3) review existing literature examining cognitive empathy through questionnaires, behavioral tasks, and neuroimaging within different antisocial subtypes; and (4) discuss the limitations of the current research and potential future directions. Individuals in the psychopathic subtype fail to implicitly engage in cognitive empathy, and potentially lack insight into this issue reflected in no self-reported problems with cognitive empathy, but show an ability to engage in cognitive empathy when explicitly required. Individuals in the antisocial-only subtype appear able to engage in cognitive empathy, showing no differences on questionnaire or behavioral tasks that tap explicit cognitive empathy, but may display subtle difficulties accurately inferring (affective theory of mind) the emotions of others. We end the review by noting areas for future research, including the need to: (1) document the patterns of equifinality that exist across levels of analysis for these antisocial subtypes; (2) examine the temporality of empathy and antisociality development; (3) carefully consider and label subcomponents of cognitive empathy in research on antisocial behavior; and (4) investigate the intersection among environmental experiences, cognitive empathy, and antisocial behavior.

Strategic Regulation of Empathy

Empathy is an integral part of socioemotional well-being, but recent research has highlighted some of its downsides. Here we examine literature that establishes when, how much, and what aspects of empathy promote specific outcomes. After reviewing a theoretical framework that characterizes empathy as a suite of separable components, we examine evidence showing how dissociations of these components affect important socioemotional outcomes and describe emerging evidence suggesting that these components can be independently and deliberately regulated. Finally, we advocate for an approach to a multicomponent view of empathy that accounts for the interrelations among components. This perspective advances scientific conceptualization of empathy and offers suggestions for tailoring empathy to help people realize their social, emotional, and occupational goals.

Altercentric Cognition: How Others Influence Our Cognitive Processing

Humans are ultrasocial, yet, theories of cognition have often been occupied with the solitary mind. Over the past decade, an increasing volume of work has revealed how individual cognition is influenced by the presence of others. Not only do we rapidly identify others in our environment, but we also align our attention with their attention, which influences what we perceive, represent, and remember, even when our immediate goals do not involve coordination. Here, we refer to the human sensitivity to others and to the targets and content of their attention as 'altercentrism'; and aim to bring seemingly disparate findings together, suggesting that they are all reflections of the altercentric nature of human cognition.

Strategic Deception in Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder

Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is often associated with impaired perspective-taking skills. Deception is an important indicator of perspective-taking, and therefore may be thought to pose difficulties to people with ASD (e.g., Baron-Cohen in J Child Psychol Psychiatry 3:1141–1155, 1992). To test this hypothesis, we asked participants with and without ASD to play a computerised deception game. We found that participants with ASD were equally likely—and in complex cases of deception even more likely—to deceive and detect deception, and learned deception at a faster rate. However, participants with ASD initially deceived less frequently, and were slower at detecting deception. These results suggest that people with ASD readily engage in deception but may do so through conscious and effortful reasoning about other people’s perspective.

Theory of Mind as a Mediator Between Emotional Trust Beliefs and Interpersonal Communication Competence in a Group of Young Adults

Research has provided direct and indirect evidence of associations between trust beliefs and social-perceptual theory of mind (ToM) and between social-perceptual ToM and interpersonal communication competence during childhood and adolescence. This research (a) developed a scale for evaluating trust beliefs in young Italian adults (Study 1) and (b) examined how social-perceptual ToM mediates the relationship between emotional trust beliefs and interpersonal communication competences such as assertiveness and empathy (Study 2). In Study 1, a sample of 168 university students (M = 23.3, SD = 3 months) completed the Italian Adults' Generalized Trust Beliefs (AGTB) scale and two second-order false beliefs tasks. In Study 2, 318 Italian university students (M = 22.96 years, SD = 2 months) completed the AGTB scale, the Experiences in Close Relationships-Revised questionnaire, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, and items measuring assertiveness and empathy. As expected, the AGTB scale exhibited acceptable internal consistency, structural validity, and construct validity. Furthermore, path analysis confirmed the existence of the hypothesized paths between adults' emotional trust beliefs, social-perceptual ToM, assertiveness, and empathy. This study also identified the effects of gender on the other variables, but sex did not moderate the relationships between variables.

The neural basis of belief-attribution across the lifespan: False-belief reasoning and the N400 effect

The current study examined how social cognition – specifically, belief-state processing – changes across the lifespan, using a large sample (N = 309) of participants aged 10–86 years. Participants completed an event-related brain potential study in which they listened to stories involving a character who held either a true- or false-belief about the location of an object, and then acted in a manner consistent or inconsistent to this belief-state. Analysis of the N400 revealed that when the character held a true-belief, inconsistent outcomes led to a more negative-going N400 waveform than consistent outcomes. In contrast, when the character held a false-belief, consistent outcomes led to a more negative-going N400 waveform than inconsistent outcomes, indicating that participants interpreted the character's actions according to their own more complete knowledge of reality. Importantly, this egocentric bias was not modulated by age in an early time window (200–400 msec post-stimulus onset), meaning that initial processing is grounded in reality, irrespective of age. However, this egocentric effect was correlated with age in a later time window (400–600 msec post-stimulus onset), as older adults continued to consider the story events according to their own knowledge of reality, but younger participants had now switched to accommodate the character's perspective. In a final 600–1000 msec time window, this age modulation was no longer present. Interestingly, results suggested that this extended egocentric processing in older adults was not the result of domain-general cognitive declines, as no significant relationship was found with executive functioning (inhibitory control and working memory).

Social Cognition and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder: A Review of Subdomains of Social Functioning

Disturbances in social cognitive processes such as the ability to infer others' mental states importantly contribute to social and functional impairments in psychiatric disorders. Yet, despite established social, emotional, and cognitive problems, the role of social cognition in obsessive-compulsive disorder is largely overlooked. The current review provides a first comprehensive overview of social (neuro)cognitive disturbances in adult patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Results of our review indicate various social cognitive alterations. Patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder show deficits in the recognition of affective social cues, specifically facial expressions of disgust, and more general deficits in theory of mind/mentalizing. Additionally, patients show heightened affective reactions and altered neural responding to emotions of self and others, as well as poor emotion regulation skills, which may contribute to poor social functioning of patients. However, the discrepancies in findings and scarcity of studies make it difficult to draw firm conclusions with regard to the specificity of social cognitive disturbances. The review offers directions for future research and highlights the need to investigate obsessive-compulsive disorder from an interactive social neurocognitive perspective in addition to the prevalent passive spectator perspective to advance our understanding of this intricate and burdensome disorder.

The role of context in "over-imitation": Evidence of movement-based goal inference in young children

Children, as well as adults, often imitate causally unnecessary actions. Three experiments investigated whether such "over-imitation" occurs because these actions are interpreted as performed for the movement's sake (i.e., having a "movement-based" goal). Experiment 1 (N = 30, 2-5-year-olds) replicated previous findings; children imitated actions with no goal more precisely than actions with external goals. Experiment 2 (N = 58, 2-5-year-olds) confirmed that the difference between these conditions was not due to the absence/presence of external goals but rather was also found when actions brought about external goals in a clearly inefficient way. Experiment 3 (N = 36, 3-5-year-olds) controlled for the possibility that imitation fidelity was affected by the number of actions and objects present during the demonstration and confirmed that identical actions were imitated more precisely when they appeared to be more inefficient toward an external goal. Our findings suggest that movement-based goal inference encourages over-imitation.

Level 2 perspective-taking distinguishes automatic and non-automatic belief-tracking

Little is known about whether human beings' automatic mindreading is computationally restricted to processing a limited kind of content, and what exactly the nature of that signature limit might be. We developed a novel object-detection paradigm to test adults' automatic processing in a Level 1 perspective-taking (L1PT) context (where an agent's belief, but not his visuospatial perspective, is relevantly different) and in a Level 2 perspective-taking (L2PT) context (where both the agent's belief and visuospatial perspective are relevantly different). Experiment 1 uncovered that adults' reaction times in the L1PT task were helpfully speeded by a bystander's irrelevant belief when tracking two homogenous objects but not in the L2PT task when tracking a single heterogeneous object. The limitation is especially striking given that the heterogeneous nature of the single object was fully revealed to participants as well as the bystander. The results were replicated in two further experiments, which confirmed that the selective modulation of adults' reaction times was maintained when tracking the location of a single object (Experiment 2) and when attention checks were removed (Experiment 3). Our findings suggest that automatic mindreading draws upon a distinctively minimalist model of the mental that underspecifies representation of differences in perspective relative to an agent's position in space.

Why can some implicit Theory of Mind tasks be replicated and others cannot? A test of mentalizing versus submentalizing accounts

In the last 15 years, Theory of Mind research has been revolutionized by the development of new implicit tasks. Such tasks aim at tapping children’s and adults’ uninstructed, largely automatic mental state ascription, indicated in spontaneous looking behavior when observing agents who act on the basis of false beliefs. Studies with anticipatory looking, in particular, have suggested that basic ToM capacities operate from very early in life and remain in unconscious operation throughout the lifespan. Recently, however, systematic replication attempts of anticipatory looking measures have yielded a complex and puzzling mixture of successful, partial and non-replications. The present study aimed at shedding light on the question whether there is a system to this pattern. More specifically, in a set of three preregistered experiments, it was tested whether those conditions that could previously be replicated and those that could not differ in crucial conceptual respects such that the former do not strictly require ToM whereas the latter do. This was tested by the implementation of novel control conditions. The results were complex. There was generally no unambiguous evidence for reliable spontaneous ToM and no effect of the number of passed familiarization trials. Neither was there any unambiguous evidence that the previous mixed patterns of (non-)replications could be explained (away) by the sub-mentalizing account tested in the new control conditions. The empirical situation remains puzzling, and the question whether there is some such thing as implicit and spontaneous ToM remains to be clarified.

Repetitive TMS of the temporo-parietal junction disrupts participant's expectations in a spontaneous Theory of Mind task

A recent debate about Theory of Mind (ToM) concerns whether spontaneous and explicit mentalizing are based on the same mechanisms. However, only a few neuroimaging studies have investigated the neural bases of spontaneous ToM, with inconsistent results. The present study had two goals: first, to investigate whether the right Temporo-Parietal Junction (rTPJ) is crucially involved in spontaneous ToM and second, to gain insight into the role of the rTPJ in ToM. For the first time, we applied rTMS to the rTPJ while participants were engaged in a spontaneous false belief task. Participants watched videos of a scene including an agent who acquires a true or false belief about the location of an object. At the end of the movie, participants reacted to the presence of the object. Results show that, during stimulation of the control site, RTs were affected by both the participant's expectations and the belief of the agent. Stimulation of the rTPJ significantly modulated task performance, supporting the idea that spontaneous ToM, as well as explicit ToM, relies on TPJ activity. However, we did not observe a disruption of the representation of the agent's belief. Rather, the stimulation interfered with participant's predictions, supporting the idea that rTPJ is crucially involved in self-other distinction.

Spontaneous Theory of Mind is reduced for nonhuman-like agents as compared to human-like agents

Theory of Mind research has shown that we spontaneously take into account other's beliefs. In the current study, we investigate, with a spontaneous Theory of Mind (ToM) task, if this belief representation also applies to nonhuman-like agents. In a series of three experiments, we show here that we do not spontaneously take into account beliefs of nonhuman-like others, or at least we do it to a lesser extent than for human and human-like agents. Further, the experience we have with the other agent, in our case a dog, does not modulate spontaneous ToM: the same pattern of results was obtained when dog owners and no owners were compared. However, when more attention was attracted to the dog behavior, participants' behavior was influenced by the beliefs of the dog. In sum, spontaneous belief representation seems to be primarily restricted to human and human-like agents, but can be facilitated when more attention is drawn to a nonhuman-like agent.

Is Implicit Theory of Mind a Real and Robust Phenomenon? Results From a Systematic Replication Study

Recently, theory-of-mind research has been revolutionized by findings from novel implicit tasks suggesting that at least some aspects of false-belief reasoning develop earlier in ontogeny than previously assumed and operate automatically throughout adulthood. Although these findings are the empirical basis for far-reaching theories, systematic replications are still missing. This article reports a preregistered large-scale attempt to replicate four influential anticipatory-looking implicit theory-of-mind tasks using original stimuli and procedures. Results showed that only one of the four paradigms was reliably replicated. A second set of studies revealed, further, that this one paradigm was no longer replicated once confounds were removed, which calls its validity into question. There were also no correlations between paradigms, and thus, no evidence for their convergent validity. In conclusion, findings from anticipatory-looking false-belief paradigms seem less reliable and valid than previously assumed, thus limiting the conclusions that can be drawn from them.

Does altercentric interference rely on mentalizing?: Results from two level-1 perspective-taking tasks

Considerable debate has focused on whether adults possess an implicit system for representing others' mental states. Some argue that people automatically represent the perspective of others using evidence from altercentric interference-cases in which another agent's perspective affects the speed with which one can report one's own perspective. Others have argued that altercentric interference is not always specific to social stimuli and thus may represent a simpler process such as submentalizing. To distinguish between these positions, Study 1 developed a novel measure of altercentric interference-a "sandbox" measure-that allowed us to more sensitively assess altercentric interference across social and non-social conditions. We replicated previous findings showing that participants experience both egocentric and altercentric interference, but we found that these effects emerge equally in social and non-social conditions. To further test whether altercentric interference emerges in social perspective-taking situations, Study 2 conducted a conceptual replication of a study which used a novel "goggle" paradigm to assess whether individuals implicitly represent others' perspectives. Although we failed to find evidence of altercentric interference in response times, participants' accuracy reflected the possibility of interference from others' perspectives. We argue that these findings provide support for the idea that altercentric interference in response to social stimuli (an avatar) is driven by perspective-taking mechanisms, while such interference in response to non-social stimuli (an arrow) is driven by attention-cuing mechanisms.

Implicit Mentalising during Level-1 Visual Perspective-Taking Indicated by Dissociation with Attention Orienting

Experiments demonstrating level-1 visual perspective-taking have been interpreted as providing important evidence for 'implicit mentalising'-the ability to track simple mental states in a fast and efficient manner. However, this interpretation has been contested by a rival 'submentalising' account that proposes that these experiments can be explained by the general purpose mechanisms responsible for attentional orienting. Here, we aim to discriminate between these competing accounts by examining whether a gaze aversion manipulation expected to enhance attention orienting would have similar effects on both perspective-taking and attention orienting tasks. Gaze aversion was operationalised by manipulating head position relative to torso of the avatar figures employed in two experiments (gaze-averted vs. gaze-maintained). Experiment 1 used a Posner cueing task to establish that gaze aversion enhanced attention orienting cued by these avatars. Using the avatar task, Experiment 2 revealed level-1 visual perspective-taking effects of equivalent magnitude for gaze-averted and gaze-maintained conditions. These results indicate that gaze aversion moderated attention orienting but not perspective-taking. This dissociation in performance favours implicit mentalising by casting doubt on the submentalising account. It further constrains theorising by implying that attention orienting is not integral to the system permitting the relatively automatic tracking of mental states.

Do implicit and explicit belief processing share neural substrates?

Humans rely on their ability to infer another person's mental state to understand and predict others' behavior ("theory of mind," ToM). Multiple lines of research suggest that not only are humans able to consciously process another person's belief state, but also are able to do so implicitly. Here we explored how general implicit belief states are represented in the brain, compared to those substrates involved in explicit ToM processes. Previous work on this topic has yielded conflicting results, and thus, the extent to which the implicit and explicit ToM systems draw on common neural bases is unclear. Participants were presented with "Sally-Anne" type movies in which a protagonist was falsely led to believe a ball was in one location, only for a puppet to later move it to another location in their absence (false-belief condition). In other movies, the protagonist had their back turned the entire time the puppet moved the ball between the two locations, meaning that they had no opportunity to develop any pre-existing beliefs about the scenario (no-belief condition). Using a group of independently localized explicit ToM brain regions, we found greater activity for false-belief trials, relative to no-belief trials, in the right temporoparietal junction, right superior temporal sulcus, precuneus, and left middle prefrontal gyrus. These findings extend upon previous work on the neural bases of implicit ToM by showing substantial overlap between this system and the explicit ToM system, suggesting that both abilities might recruit a common set of mentalizing processes/functional brain regions. Hum Brain Mapp 38:4760-4772, 2017. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.