Memories of control: One-shot episodic learning of item-specific stimulus-control associations

Binding of response-independent task rules

Binding theories claim that features of an episode are bound to each other and can be retrieved once these features are re-encountered. Binding effects have been shown in task-switching studies with a strong focus on bindings of observable features such as responses. In this study, we aimed to investigate whether task rules, translating stimulus information into motor output can be bound and subsequently retrieved even if they act independently from specific response codes. To address this question, we utilized a task-switching paradigm with varying visual context features. Unlike previous studies, tasks in the present study did not differ in their response options, and sequential response repetitions were eliminated by design. In three experiments, we observed larger task-switch costs on trials repeating the context of the previous trial than on context-change trials. According to binding accounts, this suggests that response-independent task rules adopted in the previous trial became bound to the context feature and were retrieved upon re-encountering the context feature in the current trial. The results of this study generalize previous findings indicating that binding processes can include response-independent control to task-switching situations.

Task switch costs scale with dissimilarity between task rules

Cognitive flexibility enables humans to voluntarily switch tasks. Task switching requires replacing the previously active task representation with a new one, an operation that typically results in a switch cost. Thus, understanding cognitive flexibility requires understanding how tasks are represented in the brain. We hypothesize that task representations are cognitive map-like, such that the magnitude of the difference between task representations reflects their conceptual differences: The greater the distinction between the two task representations, the more updating is required. This hypothesis predicts that switch costs should increase with between task dissimilarity. To test this hypothesis, we use an experimental design that parametrically manipulates the similarity between task rules. We observe that response time scales with the dissimilarity between the task rules. The findings shed light on the organizational principles of task representations and extend the conventional binary task-switch effect (task repeat vs. switch) to a theoretical framework with parametric task switches. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Transfer of cognitive control adjustments within and between speakers

Congruency effects in conflict tasks are typically larger after congruent compared to incongruent trials. This congruency sequence effect (CSE) indicates that top-down adjustments of cognitive control transfer between processing episodes, at least when controlling for bottom-up memory processes by alternating between stimulus-response (S-R) sets in confound-minimised designs. According to the control-retrieval account, cognitive control is bound to task-irrelevant context features (e.g., stimulus position or modality) and retrieved upon subsequent context feature repetitions. A confound-minimised CSE should therefore be larger when context features repeat rather than change between two trials. This study tested this prediction for a more abstract contextual stimulus feature, speaker gender. In two preregistered auditory prime-probe task experiments, participants classified colour words spoken by a female or male voice. Across both experiments, we found confound-minimised CSEs that were not reliably affected by whether the speaker gender repeated or changed. This indicates that speaker transitions have virtually no influence on the transfer of control adjustments in the absence of S-R repetitions. By contrast, when allowing for bottom-up memory processes by repeating the S-R set, CSEs were consistently larger when the speaker gender repeated compared to changed. This suggests that speaker transitions can in principle influence transfer between processing episodes. The discrepancy also held true when considering learning and test episodes separated by an intervening episode. Thus, the present findings call for a refinement of the control-retrieval account to accommodate the role of more abstract contextual stimulus features for the maintenance of memory traces in auditory conflict processing.

One-shot stimulus-control associations generalize over different stimulus viewpoints and exemplars

Cognitive control processes are central to adaptive behavior, but how control is applied in a context-appropriate manner is not fully understood. One way to produce context-sensitive control is by mnemonically linking particular control settings to specific stimuli that demanded those settings in a prior encounter. In support of this episodic reinstatement of control hypothesis, recent studies have produced evidence for the formation of stimulus-control associations in one-shot, prime-probe learning paradigms. However, since those studies employed perceptually identical stimuli across prime and probe presentations, it is not yet known how generalizable one-shot stimulus-control associations are. In the current study, we therefore probed whether associations formed between a prime object and the control process of task-switching would generalize to probe objects seen from a different viewpoint (Experiment 1), to different exemplars of the same object type (Experiment 2), and to different members of the object category (Experiment 3). We replicated prior findings of one-shot control associations for identical prime/probe stimuli. Importantly, we additionally found that these episodic control effects are expressed regardless of changes in viewpoint and exemplar, but do not seem to generalize to other category members. These findings elucidate the scope of generalization of the episodic reinstatement of cognitive control.

Memory for abstract control states does not decay with increasing retrieval delays

Recent studies have suggested that abstract control states (i.e., internal attentional states independent from concrete stimuli and responses) can be stored in episodic memory and retrieved subsequently. However, the duration of such a control state memory remains unclear. Previous research has found a quick and complete decay for stimulus-response bindings after 2000-5000 ms. Here, we tested a possible decay of control state bindings with retrieval delays of 2000, 3000, or 5000 ms. Five preregistered experiments used a confound-minimized prime-target task to measure the congruency sequence effect (CSE) separately for trials in which a nominally irrelevant context feature changed or repeated across trials. Analyses of the individual experiments did not result in conclusive evidence. A mega-analysis integrating the data of all experiments (Ntotal = 326) replicated evidence for binding and retrieval of control states, in that larger CSEs were found for context repetition trials. Importantly, Bayesian analysis indicated that this effect was not modulated by the length of retrieval delay. While this finding suggests that bindings of abstract control states can be relatively robust, we also discuss possible limitations of the present research.

Beyond stimulus-response rules: Task sets incorporate information about performance difficulty

The capacity for goal-directed behavior relies on the generation and implementation of task sets. While task sets are traditionally defined as mnemonic ensembles linking task goals to stimulus-response mappings, we here asked the question whether they may also entail information about task difficulty: does the level of focus required for performing a task become incorporated within the task set? We addressed this question by employing a cued task-switching protocol, wherein participants engaged in two intermixed tasks with trial-unique stimuli. Both tasks were equally challenging during a baseline and a transfer phase, while their difficulty was manipulated during an intermediate learning phase by varying the proportion of trials with congruent versus incongruent response mappings between the two tasks. Comparing congruency effects between the baseline and transfer phases, Experiment 1 showed that the task with a low (high) proportion of congruent trials in the learning phase displayed reduced (increased) cross-task interference effects in the transfer phase, indicating that the level of task focus required in the learning phase had become associated with each task set. Experiment 2 indicated that strengthening of task focus level in the task with a low proportion of congruent trials was the primary driver of this effect. Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility of cue-control associations mediating this effect. Taken together, our results show that task sets can become associated with the focus level required to successfully implement them, thus significantly expanding our concept of the type of information that makes up a task set. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Insights into control over cognitive flexibility from studies of task-switching

Cognitive flexibility denotes the ability to disengage from a current task and shift one's focus to a different activity. An individual's level of flexibility is not fixed; rather, people adapt their readiness to switch tasks to changing circumstances. We here review recent studies in the task-switching literature that have produced new insights into the contextual factors that drive this adaptation of flexibility, as well as proposals regarding the underlying cognitive mechanisms and learning processes. A fast-growing literature suggests that there are several different means of learning the need for, and implementing, changes in one's level of flexibility. These, in turn, have distinct consequences for the degree to which adjustments in cognitive flexibility are transferrable to new stimuli and tasks.

Principles of cognitive control over task focus and task switching

Adaptive behaviour requires the ability to focus on a task and protect it from distraction (cognitive stability) and to rapidly switch tasks when circumstances change (cognitive flexibility). Burgeoning research literatures have aimed to understand how people achieve task focus and task switch readiness. In this Perspective, I integrate these literatures to derive a cognitive architecture and functional rules underlying the regulation of cognitive stability and flexibility. I propose that task focus and task switch readiness are supported by independent mechanisms. However, I also suggest that the strategic regulation of both mechanisms is governed by shared learning principles: an incremental, online learner that nudges control up or down based on the recent history of task demands (a recency heuristic) and episodic reinstatement when the current context matches a past experience (a recognition heuristic). Finally, I discuss algorithmic and neural implementations of these processes, as well as clinical implications.

Assessing the Durability of One-Shot Stimulus-Control Bindings

It has been proposed that cognitive control processes may be implemented in a contextually appropriate manner through the encoding, and cued retrieval, of associations between stimuli and the control processes that were active during their encoding, forming "stimulus-control bindings" as part of episodic event files. Prior work has found strong evidence for such a mechanism by observing behavioral effects of stimulus-control bindings based on a single pairing (one-shot learning). Here, we addressed the important question of how durable these one-shot stimulus-control bindings are. Over three experiments, we investigated the durability of one-shot stimulus-control bindings in relation to both the passage of time and the number of intervening events between the encoding (prime) and retrieval (probe) of the stimulus-control bindings. We found that stimulus-control bindings are quite robust to temporal decay, lasting at least up to 5 minutes in the absence of similar intervening events. By contrast, binding effects were more short-lived in the face of interference from the encoding of similar events between the prime and probe, with a maximum duration of ~2 minutes. Together, these results shed new light on the characteristics of the binding mechanisms underlying the integration of internal control processes in episodic event files and highlight that interference, rather than temporal decay, may be the main limiting factor on long-term effects of item-specific one-shot control learning.

Evaluating the learning of stimulus-control associations through incidental memory of reinforcement events

Cognitive control describes the ability to use internal goals to strategically guide how we process and respond to our environment. Changes in the environment lead to adaptation in control strategies. This type of control learning can be observed in performance adjustments in response to varying proportions of easy to hard trials over blocks of trials on classic control tasks. Known as the list-wide proportion congruent (LWPC) effect, increased difficulty is met with enhanced attentional control. Recent research has shown that motivational manipulations may enhance the LWPC effect, but the underlying mechanisms are not yet understood. We manipulated Stroop proportion congruency over blocks of trials and, after each trial, provided participants with either performance-contingent feedback ("correct/incorrect") or noncontingent feedback ("response logged") above trial-unique, task-irrelevant images (reinforcement events). The LWPC task was followed by a surprise recognition memory task, which allowed us to test whether attention to feedback (incidental memory for the images) varies as a function of proportion congruency, time, performance contingency, and individual differences. We replicated a robust LWPC effect in a large sample (N = 402) but observed no differences in behavior between feedback groups. Importantly, the memory data revealed better encoding of feedback images from context-defining trials (e.g., congruent trials in a mostly congruent block), especially early in a new context and in congruent conditions. Individual differences in reward and punishment sensitivity were not strongly associated with control-learning effects. These results suggest that statistical learning of contextual demand may have a larger impact on control learning than individual differences in motivation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Minimal impact of consolidation on learned switch-readiness

Adaptive behavior is characterized by our ability to create, maintain, and update (or switch) rules by which we categorize and respond to stimuli across changing contexts (cognitive flexibility). Recent research suggests that people can link the control process of task-switching to contextual cues through associative learning, whereby the behavioral cost of switching is reduced for contexts that require frequent switching. One example is the listwide proportion switch (LWPS) effect, denoting smaller switch costs in blocks of trials where switching is more frequent. However, the conditions that govern such learned cognitive flexibility are poorly understood. One major unanswered question is whether this type of learning benefits from memory consolidation effects. To address this question, we manipulated whether task-sets and/or specific task stimuli were more frequently linked with task-switching (vs. repeating), and ran participants over two experimental sessions, separated by a 24-hr delay. We expected that consolidation would facilitate learned cognitive flexibility, resulting in a greater reduction of switch costs with increasing task-switch likelihood on Session 2 compared with Session 1. Across two experiments, we observed robust LWPS effects in both sessions. However, we found little evidence for effects of consolidation on learned cognitive flexibility: The magnitude of the LWPS effect did not change from Session 1 to 2. Altogether our results suggest that people reliably and quickly acquire task-set and stimulus-based switch associations, but this form of control learning-unlike many instances of reward-based learning-does not benefit from long-term memory consolidation. Possible reasons for these findings are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Mind wandering at encoding, but not at retrieval, disrupts one-shot stimulus-control learning

The one-shot pairing of a stimulus with a specific cognitive control process, such as task switching, can bind the two together in memory. The episodic control-binding hypothesis posits that the formation of temporary stimulus-control bindings, which are held in event-files supported by episodic memory, can guide the contextually appropriate application of cognitive control. Across two experiments, we sought to examine the role of task-focused attention in the encoding and implementation of stimulus-control bindings in episodic event-files. In Experiment 1, we obtained self-reports of mind wandering during encoding and implementation of stimulus-control bindings. Results indicated that, whereas mind wandering during the implementation of stimulus-control bindings does not decrease their efficacy, mind wandering during the encoding of these control-state associations interferes with their successful deployment at a later point. In Experiment 2, we complemented these results by using trial-by-trial pupillometry to measure attention, again demonstrating that attention levels at encoding predict the subsequent implementation of stimulus-control bindings better than attention levels at implementation. These results suggest that, although encoding stimulus-control bindings in episodic memory requires active attention and engagement, once encoded, these bindings are automatically deployed to guide behavior when the stimulus recurs. These findings expand our understanding of how cognitive control processes are integrated into episodic event files.

Proactive and reactive metacontrol in task switching

While cognitive control enables the selection of goal-relevant responses, metacontrol enables the selection of context-appropriate control operations. In task switching, metacontrol modulates task-switching efficiency by retrieving the associations between a contextual cue and a particular cognitive control demand. While the automatic retrieval of cognitive control is appealing due to its time and energy efficiency, the effects of different contextual cues have been shown in separate studies and appear to have different characteristics. Here, we devised a single task-switching paradigm to test whether we can observe both list-wide and item-specific metacontrol within subjects. In two experiments, we demonstrated reduced switch costs in lists associated with a high probability of switching as compared with lists with a low probability of switching (i.e., a list-wide switch probability [LWSP] effect). Similarly, we observed an analogous item-specific switch probability (ISSP) effect such that items associated with a high probability of switching incurred smaller switch costs as compared with items associated with a low probability of switching. We also confirmed that both list-wide and item-specific switch probability effects were not dependent on lower-level stimulus-response associations. However, the LWSP and the ISSP effects were uncorrelated, suggesting a lack of dependence. Together, these findings suggest that there are two distinct modes of metacontrol that are deployed in a context-sensitive manner in order to adapt to specific cognitive demands.

The congruency sequence effect in a modified prime-probe task indexes response-general control

Adapting flexibly to recent events is essential in everyday life. A robust measure of such adaptive behavior is the congruency sequence effect (CSE) in the prime-probe task, which refers to a smaller congruency effect after incongruent trials than after congruent trials. Prior findings indicate that the CSE in the prime-probe task reflects control processes that modulate response activation after the prime onsets but before the probe appears. They also suggest that similar control processes operate even in a modified prime-probe task wherein the initial prime is a relevant target, rather than merely a distractor. Because adaptive behavior frequently occurs in the absence of irrelevant stimuli, the present study investigates the nature of the control processes that operate in this modified prime-probe task. Specifically, it investigates whether these control processes modulate only the response cued by the prime (response-specific control) or also other responses (response-general control). To make this distinction, we employed a novel variant of the modified prime-probe task wherein primes and probes are mapped to different responses (i.e., effectors), such that only response-general control processes can engender a CSE. Critically, we observed a robust CSE in each of 2 experiments. This outcome supports the response-general control hypothesis. More broadly, it suggests that the control processes underlying the CSE overlap with general mechanisms for adapting to sequential dependencies in the environment. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).