What causes the insight memory advantage?

Surprise!-Clarifying the link between insight and prediction error

The AHA experience, a moment of deep understanding during insightful problem-solving involving feelings of certainty, pleasure, and surprise, has captivated psychologists for more than a century. Recently, a new theoretical framework has proposed a link between the AHA experience and prediction error (PE), a popular concept in decision-making and reinforcement learning. This framework suggests that participants maintain a meta-cognitive prediction about the time it takes to solve a problem and the AHA experience arises when the problem is solved earlier than expected, resulting in a meta-cognitive PE. In our preregistered online study, we delved deeper into this idea, investigating whether prediction errors also pertain to participants' predictions regarding the solvability of the problem itself, and which dimension of the AHA experience aligns with the meta-cognitive PE. Utilizing verbal insight problems, we found a positive association between the AHA experience and the meta-cognitive PE, specifically in regards to problem solvability. Specifically, the element of surprise, a critical AHA dimension, emerged as a key indicator of the meta-cognitive PE, while other dimensions-such as pleasure, certainty, and suddenness-showed no signs for similar relationships, with suddenness exhibiting a negative correlation with meta-cognitive PE. This new finding provides further evidence that aspects of the AHA experience, surprise in particular, correspond to a meta-cognitive PE. The finding also underscores the multifaceted nature of this phenomenon, linking insights with learning theories and enhancing our understanding of this intriguing phenomenon.

The influence of insight on risky decision making and nucleus accumbens activation

During insightful problem solving, the solution appears unexpectedly and is accompanied by the feeling of an AHA!. Research suggests that this affective component of insight can have consequences beyond the solution itself by motivating future behavior, such as risky (high reward and high uncertainty) decision making. Here, we investigate the behavioral and neural support for the motivational role of AHA in decision making involving monetary choices. The positive affect of the AHA! experience has been linked to internal reward. Reward in turn has been linked to dopaminergic signal transmission in the Nucleus Accumbens (NAcc) and risky decision making. Therefore, we hypothesized that insight activates reward-related brain areas, modulating risky decision making. We tested this hypothesis in two studies. First, in a pre-registered online study (Study 1), we demonstrated the behavioral effect of insight-related increase in risky decision making using a visual Mooney identification paradigm. Participants were more likely to choose the riskier monetary payout when they had previously solved the Mooney image with high compared to low accompanied AHA!. Second, in an fMRI study (Study 2), we measured the effects of insight on NAcc activity using a similar Mooney identification paradigm to the one of Study 1. Greater NAcc activity was found when participants solved the Mooney image with high vs low AHA!. Taken together, our results link insight to enhanced NAcc activity and a preference for high but uncertain rewards, suggesting that insight enhances reward-related brain areas possibly via dopaminergic signal transmission, promoting risky decision making.

Insight and the selection of ideas

Perhaps it is no accident that insight moments accompany some of humanity's most important discoveries in science, medicine, and art. Here we propose that feelings of insight play a central role in (heuristically) selecting an idea from the stream of consciousness by capturing attention and eliciting a sense of intuitive confidence permitting fast action under uncertainty. The mechanisms underlying this Eureka heuristic are explained within an active inference framework. First, implicit restructuring via Bayesian reduction leads to a higher-order prediction error (i.e., the content of insight). Second, dopaminergic precision-weighting of the prediction error accounts for the intuitive confidence, pleasure, and attentional capture (i.e., the feeling of insight). This insight as precision account is consistent with the phenomenology, accuracy, and neural unfolding of insight, as well as its effects on belief and decision-making. We conclude by reflecting on dangers of the Eureka Heuristic, including the arising and entrenchment of false beliefs and the vulnerability of insights under psychoactive substances and misinformation.

A systematic framework of creative metacognition

Creative cognition does not just involve cognitive processes in direct service of the main task objective (e.g., idea generation), but also metacognitive processes that monitor and regulate cognition adaptively (e.g., evaluation of ideas and task performance, or development and selection of task strategies). Although metacognition is vital for creative performance, relevant work is sparse, which may be partly due to persistent ambiguities in the theoretical conceptualization of creative metacognition. Therefore, this article proposes a systematic framework of creative metacognition (CMC), which builds on recent advancements in metacognition theory and extends them to meet the specifics of creative cognition. The CMC framework consists of two dynamic components-monitoring and control-and a more static component of metacognitive knowledge, each subsuming metacognitive processes applying to the level of task, performance, and responses. We describe the presumed function of these metacognitive components in the creative process, present evidence in support of each, and discuss their association with related constructs, such as creative self-beliefs. We further highlight the dynamic interplay of metacognitive processes across task performance and identify promising avenues for future research.

Tracing Cognitive Processes in Insight Problem Solving: Using GAMs and Change Point Analysis to Uncover Restructuring

Insight problems are likely to trigger an initial, incorrect mental representation, which needs to be restructured in order to find the solution. Despite the widespread theoretical assumption that this restructuring process happens suddenly, leading to the typical "Aha!" experience, the evidence is inconclusive. Among the reasons for this lack of clarity is that many measures of insight rely solely on the solvers' subjective experience of the solution process. In our previous paper, we used matchstick arithmetic problems to demonstrate that it is possible to objectively trace problem-solving processes by combining eye movements with new analytical and statistical approaches. Specifically, we divided the problem-solving process into ten (relative) temporal phases to better capture possible small changes in problem representation. Here, we go a step further to demonstrate that classical statistical procedures, such as ANOVA, cannot capture sudden representational change processes, which are typical for insight problems. Only nonlinear statistical models, such as generalized additive (mixed) models (GAMs) and change points analysis, correctly identified the abrupt representational change. Additionally, we demonstrate that explicit hints reorient participants' focus in a qualitatively different manner, changing the dynamics of restructuring in insight problem solving. While insight problems may indeed require a sudden restructuring of the initial mental representation, more sophisticated analytical and statistical approaches are necessary to uncover their true nature.

Restructuring insight: An integrative review of insight in problem-solving, meditation, psychotherapy, delusions and psychedelics

Occasionally, a solution or idea arrives as a sudden understanding - an insight. Insight has been considered an "extra" ingredient of creative thinking and problem-solving. Here we propose that insight is central in seemingly distinct areas of research. Drawing on literature from a variety of fields, we show that besides being commonly studied in problem-solving literature, insight is also a core component in psychotherapy and meditation, a key process underlying the emergence of delusions in schizophrenia, and a factor in the therapeutic effects of psychedelics. In each case, we discuss the event of insight and its prerequisites and consequences. We review evidence for the commonalities and differences between the fields and discuss their relevance for capturing the essence of the insight phenomenon. The goal of this integrative review is to bridge the gap between the different views and inspire interdisciplinary research efforts for understanding this central process of human cognition.

Mental navigation and the neural mechanisms of insight

How do new ideas come about? The central hypothesis presented here states that insights might happen during mental navigation and correspond to rapid plasticity at the cellular level. We highlight the differences between neocortical and hippocampal mechanisms of insight. We argue that the suddenness of insight can be related to the sudden emergence of place fields in the hippocampus. According to our hypothesis, insights are supported by a state of mind-wandering that can be tied to the process of combining knowledge pieces during sharp-wave ripples (SWRs). Our framework connects the dots between research on creativity, mental navigation, and specific synaptic plasticity mechanisms in the hippocampus.

The Neural Mechanisms of the Effect of Spontaneous Insight on Re-Solution: An ERP Study

The insight memory advantage refers to the situation in which memory performance could be improved by solving a problem with an Aha experience. In re-solution tests and recognition tests, studies demonstrate an insight memory advantage by spontaneous insight or induced insight. For the re-solution test, the neural mechanisms of the effect of induced insight were studied by the fMRI technique. However, the neural mechanisms of the effect of insight on re-solution in the temporal dimension were not known. The neural mechanisms of the effect of spontaneous insight on re-solution were not known. In the present study, we use the compound remote-associated (CRA) task to reveal the neural mechanisms of the effect of spontaneous insight on re-solution by the event-related potentials (ERPs) technique. The 25 participants were asked to solve a series of Chinese verbal CRA tasks and then perform a re-solution test 1 day later. Our results indicated that the solution with the Aha experience evoked a larger N400 in the early solution phase and a more negative wave in the late solution phase than the solution with no Aha experience. In the re-solution phase, items with an Aha during the solution phase were re-solved better with higher Aha rates than items with no Aha. In the re-solution phase, compared with items with no Aha, items with an Aha during the solution phase evoked a larger positive ERP in the 250 to 350 ms time window in the early phase, and a more negative deflection before the response (-900 to -800 ms) in the later phase. In one word, spontaneous insight during the solution phase could promote re-solution and elicit ERP deflection in the re-solution phase.

Where Does Eureka Come From? The Effect of Unreportable Hints on the Phenomenology of Insight

Insight interests researchers given its special cognitive mechanisms and phenomenology (an Aha! experience or Eureka moment). There is a considerable amount of research on the effect of hints on performance in insight problem solving. However, only a few studies address the effect of hints on the subjective experiences of solvers, and the picture their results provide is unclear. We analyze the effect of unreportable true and false hints on different dimensions of the Aha! experience (subjective suddenness, Aha! experience as an effect, and certainty). Using the processing fluency framework, we predict that true hints lead to more insights and stronger Aha! experience and certainty, while false hints lead to the opposite results due to the controlled inhibition of the inappropriate representation. The results showed that false hints decreased the chance of finding a correct solution. The true-hint condition did not lead to more correct solutions but made solutions feel sudden more often than the control condition. The ratings of the Aha! experience and certainty were higher for solutions obtained after true hints than after false hints. We obtained partial support for the effect of unreportable hints on "Eureka!" moments.

Surprise! Why Insightful Solution Is Pleasurable

Insight problems-as a type of ill-defined problems-are often solved without an articulate plan, and finding their solution is accompanied by the Aha! experience (positive feeling from suddenly finding a solution). However, the solution of such problems can also be guided, for example, by expectations in terms of criteria for achieving the goal. We hypothesize that adjusting the expectation accuracy based on the reward prediction error (discrepancy between the reward and its prediction) affects the strength of affective components of the Aha! experience (pleasure and surprise), allowing to learn how to solve similar problems. We manipulated expectation accuracy by varying the similarity in problem solution principle and structure in a short learning set. Each set was followed by a critical problem where both the structure and solution principle were changed (except for control set). Subjective feelings, solution time, and expectation were measured after each problem. The results revealed that problems with similarities become more expected at the end of the set and their solution time is decreased. However, the critical problem featured a rapid increase in pleasure and surprise and decrease in expectedness only in the condition where both the solution principle and structure were expected, suggesting that problem structure is a key feature determining expectedness in insight problem solving. The Aha! experience is not an epiphenomenon; it plays a role in learning of problem solving through adjusting expectations.

Alone or together: The role of gender and social context prior to Aha‐experiences

Prior research indicates that boys show more interest in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) than girls do. Given that Aha-experiences yield positive affect and increase interest, the question arises whether there are gender differences in Aha-experiences that could help explain the gender differences in interest. Derived from social role theory, we hypothesized that men report having Aha-experiences alone, whereas women report having Aha-experiences together with others. In a retrospective survey study comprising three independent samples (N = 899), we conducted chi-square analyses to explore the relationship of gender, social context (alone; not alone), domain, and situational interest. Across all participants, we found that men were more probably alone and women more probably together with others when they had an Aha-experience. More fine-grained analyses revealed that the effect was especially pronounced when the Aha-experience increased situational interest within STEM or the personal domain. The study suggests that social context played a different role in the occurrence of Aha-experiences in men and women. We discuss the implications of our findings for STEM instruction at school.

Characterizing Physiological Responses to Fear, Frustration, and Insight in Virtual Reality

Physiological sensing often complements studies of human behavior in virtual reality (VR) to detect users' affective and cognitive states. Some psychological states, such as fear and frustration, can be particularly hard to differentiate from a physiological perspective as they are close in the arousal and valence emotional space. Moreover, it is largely unclear how users' physiological reactions are expressed in response to transient psychological states such as fear, frustration, and insight-especially since these are rich indicators for characterizing users' responses to dynamic systems but are hard to capture in highly interactive settings. We conducted a study ($N=24$) to analyze participants' pulmonary, electrodermal, cardiac, and pupillary responses to moments of fear, frustration, and insight in immersive settings. Participants interacted in five VR environments, throughout which we measured their physiological reactions and analyzed the patterns we observed. We also measured subjective fear and frustration using questionnaires. We found differences between fear and frustration pupillary, respiratory, and electrodermal responses, as well as between the pupillary changes that followed fear in a horror game and those that followed fear in a vertigo experiment. We present the relationships between fear levels, frustration levels, and their physiological responses. To detect these affective events and states, we introduce user-independent binary classification models that achieved an average micro $F_{1}$ score of 71% for detecting fear in a horror game, 75% for fear of vertigo, 76% for frustration, and 75% for insight, showing the promise for detecting these states from passive and objective signals.

How Difficult Was It? Metacognitive Judgments About Problems and Their Solutions After the Aha Moment

The insight phenomenon is thought to comprise two components: cognitive and affective (the Aha! experience). The exact nature of the Aha! experience remains unclear; however, several explanations have been put forward. Based on the processing fluency account, the source of the Aha! experience is a sudden increase in processing fluency, associated with emerging of a solution. We hypothesized that in a situation which the Aha! experience accompanies the solution in, the problem would be judged as less difficult, regardless of the objective difficulty. We also planned to confirm previously discovered associations between the Aha! experience and accuracy, confidence, and pleasure. To test the proposed hypothesis, during the preliminary stage of the study, we developed a set of 100 remote associate problems in Russian (RAT-RUS) and asked 125 participants to solve problems and indicate the Aha! moment (after solution generation or solution presentation), confidence, difficulty, and likability of each problem. As expected, the Aha! experience often accompanied correct solutions and correlated with confidence judgments. We also found a positive correlation between the Aha! experience and problem likability. As for the main hypothesis, we confirmed that the Aha! experience after the presentation of the solution was associated with a decrease in subjective difficulty. When participants could not solve a problem but experienced the Aha! moment after the solution was presented to them, the problem was perceived as easier than one without the Aha! experience. We didn’t find the same effect for the Aha! after solution generation. Thus, our study partially supports the processing fluency account and demonstrates the association between the Aha! experience and metacognitive judgments about the accuracy and difficulty of problems.

Long-Latency Event-Related Potentials (300-1000 ms) of the Visual Insight

The line of insight research methods that have high temporal and surface resolution is not large—these are EEGs, EPs, and fMRI, as well as their combinations and various options for assessing temporal events of random understanding. The objective of this research was to study the classification of insight for visual illusory images consisting of several objects simultaneously according to the analysis of early, middle, late, and ultra-late components (up to 1000 ms) of event-related potentials (ERPs). ERP research on 42 healthy subjects (men) aged 20–28 years was performed. The stimuli were a line of visual images with an incomplete set of signs, as well as images-illusions, which, with different perceptions, represent different images. The results showed the similarity of the tests to correct recognition of fragments of unrecognition and double images. At the intermediate stage of perception (100–200 ms), in both cases, the activity of the central and frontal cortex decreased, mainly in the left hemisphere. At the later stages of information processing (300–500 ms), the temporal-parietal and occipital brain parts on the right were activated, with the difference that when double objects were perceived, this process expanded to 700–800 ms with the activation of the central and occipital fields of the right hemisphere. Outcomes allowed discussing two possible options for actualizing the mechanisms of long-term memory that ensure the formation of insight—the simultaneous perception of images as part of an illusion. The first of them is associated with the inhibition of the frontal cortex at the stage of synthesis of information flows, with the subsequent activation of the occipital brain parts. The second variant is traditional and manifests itself in the activation of the frontal brain areas, with the subsequent excitation of all brain fields by the mechanisms of exhaustive search.

Irrelevant insights make worldviews ring true

Our basic beliefs about reality can be impossible to prove and yet we can feel a strong intuitive conviction about them, as exemplified by insights that imbue an idea with immediate certainty. Here we presented participants with worldview beliefs such as "people's core qualities are fixed" and simultaneously elicited an aha moment. In the first experiment (N = 3000, which included a direct replication), participants rated worldview beliefs as truer when they solved anagrams and also experienced aha moments. A second experiment (N = 1564) showed that the worldview statement and the aha moment must be perceived simultaneously for this 'insight misattribution' effect to occur. These results demonstrate that artificially induced aha moments can make worldview beliefs seem truer, possibly because humans partially rely on feelings of insight to appraise an idea's veracity. Feelings of insight are therefore not epiphenomenal and should be investigated for their effects on decisions, beliefs, and delusions.

Eliciting false insights with semantic priming

The insight experience (or ‘Aha moment’) generally evokes strong feelings of certainty and confidence. An ‘Aha’ experience for a false idea could underlie many false beliefs and delusions. However, for as long as insight experiences have been studied, false insights have remained difficult to elicit experimentally. That difficulty, in turn, highlights the fact that we know little about what causes people to experience a false insight. Across two experiments (total N = 300), we developed and tested a new paradigm to elicit false insights. In Experiment 1 we used a combination of semantic priming and visual similarity to elicit feelings of insight for incorrect solutions to anagrams. These false insights were relatively common but were experienced as weaker than correct ones. In Experiment 2 we replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and found that semantic priming and visual similarity interacted to produce false insights. These studies highlight the importance of misleading semantic processing and the feasibility of the solution in the generation of false insights.

Quantifying the roles of conscious and unconscious processing in insight-related memory effectiveness within standard and creative advertising

To maximize marketing effectiveness, many conscious and unconscious elements are simultaneously employed within campaign advertising. However, little is known about the individual contributions that conscious and unconscious processes make to the cognitive effectiveness of creative advertisements, some of which may also induce insight experiences. To quantify the roles of conscious and unconscious processes in memory effectiveness within commercial advertising, a dual-process, signal-detection technique was adopted to separate the contributions of conscious recollection and unconscious discrimination induced by 80 printed advertisements, among which half were considered standard and the other half creative. A total of 51 participants completed immediate (5 min later) and delayed (3 days later) memory recognition tests. In contrast to standard advertising, creative advertising was found to enhance recognition and to demonstrate advantages in both conscious and unconscious memory, which decreased across the test-time intervals. Further analyses showed that a moment of insight induced by an advertisement, regardless of whether it is standard or creative, can consolidate unconscious memory, whereas advertisements that do not induce insight improve conscious memory. The implications of these findings are discussed.

Learning by Insight-Like Sudden Comprehension as a Potential Strategy to Improve Memory Encoding in Older Adults

Several cognitive functions show a decline with advanced age, most prominently episodic memory. Problem-solving by insight represents a special associative form of problem-solving that has previously been shown to facilitate long-term memory formation. Recent neuroimaging evidence suggests that the encoding network involved in insight-based memory formation is largely hippocampus-independent. This may represent a potential advantage in older adults, as the hippocampus is one of the earliest brain structures to show age-related volume loss and functional impairment. Here, we investigated the potential beneficial effects of learning by insight in healthy older (60-79 years) compared to young adults (19-28 years). To this end, we compared later memory performance for verbal riddles encoded incidentally via induced insight-like sudden comprehension in both age groups. We employed a variant of the Compound Remote Associate Task (CRAT) for incidental encoding, during which participants were instructed to judge the solvability of items. In a 24-h delayed surprise memory test, participants attempted to solve previously encountered items and additionally performed a recognition memory test. During this test, older adults correctly solved an equal proportion of new CRA items compared to young adults and both age groups reported a similar frequency of Aha! experiences. While overall memory performance was better in young participants (higher proportion of correctly solved and correctly recognized old CRA items), older participants exhibited a stronger beneficial effect of insight-like sudden comprehension on later recognition memory for CRA items. Our results suggest that learning via insight might constitute a promising approach to improve memory function in old age.