Why some surprises are more surprising than others: Surprise as a metacognitive sense of explanatory difficulty

From silos to synergy: Integrating approaches to investigate the role of prior knowledge and expectations on episodic memory

Significant progress in the investigation of how prior knowledge influences episodic memory has been made using three sometimes isolated (but not mutually exclusive) approaches: strictly adult behavioral investigations, computational models, and investigations into the development of the system. Here we point out that these approaches are complementary, each approach informs and is informed by the other. Thus, a natural next step for research is to combine all three approaches to further our understanding of the role of prior knowledge in episodic memory. Here we use studies of memory for expectation-congruent and incongruent information from each of these often disparate approaches to illustrate how combining approaches can be used to test and revise theories from the other. This domain is particularly advantageous because it highlights important features of more general memory processes, further differentiates models of memory, and can shed light on developmental change in the memory system. We then present a case study to illustrate the progress that can be made from integrating all three approaches and highlight the need for more endeavors in this vein. As a first step, we also propose a new computational model of memory that takes into account behavioral and developmental factors that can influence prior knowledge and episodic memory interactions. This integrated approach has great potential for offering novel insights into the relationship between prior knowledge and episodic memory, and cognition more broadly.

Understanding the Magnitude of Hypocrisy in Moral Contradictions: The Role of Surprise at Violating Strong Attitudes

Although two people could both enact similar forms of hypocrisy, one person might be judged as more hypocritical than the other. The present research advances a novel, theoretical explanation for a paradigmatic instance of this: the increased hypocrisy ascribed to contradicting a morally (vs. nonmorally) based attitude. In contrast to prior explanations, the present research shows that people infer targets holding morally (vs. nonmorally) based attitudes are more difficult to change. Consequently, when people are hypocritical on these stances, it elicits greater surprise, which amplifies the perceived hypocrisy. Through both statistical mediation and experimental moderation, we provide evidence for this process and show how our explanation generalizes to understanding heightened hypocrisy in other contexts, too (i.e., violating nonmoral attitudes held with certainty vs. uncertainty). Altogether, we provide an integrative, theoretical lens for predicting when moral and nonmoral acts of hypocrisy will be perceived as particularly hypocritical.

The plausibility transition model for sensemaking

When people make plausibility judgments about an assertion, an event, or a piece of evidence, they are gauging whether it makes sense that the event could transpire as it did. Therefore, we can treat plausibility judgments as a part of sensemaking. In this paper, we review the research literature, presenting the different ways that plausibility has been defined and measured. Then we describe the naturalistic research that allowed us to model how plausibility judgments are engaged during the sensemaking process. The model is based on an analysis of 23 cases in which people tried to make sense of complex situations. The model describes the user's attempts to construct a narrative as a state transition string, relying on plausibility judgments for each transition point. The model has implications for measurement and for training.

Emotions in self-regulated learning: A critical literature review and meta-analysis

Emotion has been recognized as an important component in the framework of self-regulated learning (SRL) over the past decade. Researchers explore emotions and SRL at two levels. Emotions are studied as traits or states, whereas SRL is deemed functioning at two levels: Person and Task × Person. However, limited research exists on the complex relationships between emotions and SRL at the two levels. Theoretical inquiries and empirical evidence about the role of emotions in SRL remain somewhat fragmented. This review aims to illustrate the role of both trait and state emotions in SRL at Person and Task × Person levels. Moreover, we conducted a meta-analysis to synthesize 23 empirical studies that were published between 2009 and 2020 to seek evidence about the role of emotions in SRL. An integrated theoretical framework of emotions in SRL is proposed based on the review and the meta-analysis. We propose several research directions that deserve future investigation, including collecting multimodal multichannel data to capture emotions and SRL. This paper lays a solid foundation for developing a comprehensive understanding of the role of emotions in SRL and asking important questions for future investigation.

A narrative review of the interconnection between pilot acute stress, startle, and surprise effects in the aviation context: Contribution of physiological measurements

Aviation remains one of the safest modes of transportation. However, an inappropriate response to an unexpected event can lead to flight incidents and accidents. Among several contributory factors, startle and surprise, which can lead to or exacerbate the pilot's state of stress, are often cited. Unlike stress, which has been the subject of much study in the context of driving and piloting, studies on startle and surprise are less numerous and these concepts are sometimes used interchangeably. Thus, the definitions of stress, startle, and surprise are reviewed, and related differences are put in evidence. Furthermore, it is proposed to distinguish these notions in the evaluation and to add physiological measures to subjective measures in their study. Indeed, Landman's theoretical model makes it possible to show the links between these concepts and studies using physiological parameters show that they would make it possible to disentangle the links between stress, startle and surprise in the context of aviation. Finally, we draw some perspectives to set up further studies focusing specifically on these concepts and their measurement.

A New Explanation for the Frog-in-the-Pan Phenomenon Based on the Cognitive-Evolutionary Model of Surprise

The frog-in-the-pan (FIP) phenomenon suggests that investors are more sensitive to abrupt price changes than gradual price changes in the stock market. Based on the cognitive-evolutionary model of surprise and the reinforcement learning model, this paper provides a new explanation for the FIP phenomenon in that this phenomenon could be explained by the elicitation of surprise emotion. We predict that when a change substantially and abruptly occurs, the significant prediction error triggers participants' surprise, which makes participants more sensitive to the change. To ascertain these hypotheses, we recruited 109 participants and compared participants' learning rates and surprise responses under different contexts. We observed that participants' learning rate soared when the prediction error was large enough to trigger surprise emotion under abruptly changed conditions and confirmed that the FIP phenomenon could be explained by the elicitation of surprise emotion. In a word, this research demonstrates the significant role of surprise emotion in the decision-making process.

Violations of expectation trigger infants to search for explanations

Infants look longer and explore more following violations-of-expectation, but the reasons for these surprise-induced behaviors are unclear. One possibility is that expectancy violations heighten arousal generally, thereby increasing infants' post-surprise activity. Another possibility is that infants' exploration reflects the search for an explanation for the surprising event. We tested these alternatives in three experiments. First in Experiment 1 we confirmed that seeing an object violate expectations (by passing through a solid wall) increased infants' exploration of the surprising object, relative to when no expectancy violation was seen. Then in Experiment 2 we measured infants' exploration after they had seen the same violation event, but then an explanation for the event was provided (the wall was revealed to have a large hole in it). We found that providing this explanation abolished infants' surprise-induced exploration. In Experiment 3 we replicated this effect. Furthermore, we found that the longer infants looked at the explanation, the greater their reversal in exploratory preference (i.e., the more they ignored the surprising object). These findings demonstrate that preverbal infants both seek and recognize explanations for surprising events.

Assistive HCI-Serious Games Co-design Insights: The Case Study of i-PROGNOSIS Personalized Game Suite for Parkinson's Disease

Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) and games set a new domain in understanding people's motivations in gaming, behavioral implications of game play, game adaptation to player preferences and needs for increased engaging experiences in the context of HCI serious games (HCI-SGs). When the latter relate with people's health status, they can become a part of their daily life as assistive health status monitoring/enhancement systems. Co-designing HCI-SGs can be seen as a combination of art and science that involves a meticulous collaborative process. The design elements in assistive HCI-SGs for Parkinson's Disease (PD) patients, in particular, are explored in the present work. Within this context, the Game-Based Learning (GBL) design framework is adopted here and its main game-design parameters are explored for the Exergames, Dietarygames, Emotional games, Handwriting games, and Voice games design, drawn from the PD-related i-PROGNOSIS Personalized Game Suite (PGS) (www.i-prognosis.eu) holistic approach. Two main data sources were involved in the study. In particular, the first one includes qualitative data from semi-structured interviews, involving 10 PD patients and four clinicians in the co-creation process of the game design, whereas the second one relates with data from an online questionnaire addressed by 104 participants spanning the whole related spectrum, i.e., PD patients, physicians, software/game developers. Linear regression analysis was employed to identify an adapted GBL framework with the most significant game-design parameters, which efficiently predict the transferability of the PGS beneficial effect to real-life, addressing functional PD symptoms. The findings of this work can assist HCI-SG designers for designing PD-related HCI-SGs, as the most significant game-design factors were identified, in terms of adding value to the role of HCI-SGs in increasing PD patients' quality of life, optimizing the interaction with personalized HCI-SGs and, hence, fostering a collaborative human-computer symbiosis.

Do we "fear for the worst" or "Hope for the best" in thinking about the unexpected?: Factors affecting the valence of unexpected outcomes reported for everyday scenarios

Though we often "fear the worst", worrying that unexpectedly bad things will happen, there are times when we "hope for the best", imagining that unexpectedly good things will happen, too. The paper explores how the valence of the current situation influences people's imagining of unexpected future events when participants were instructed to think of "something unexpected". In Experiment 1, participants (N = 127) were asked to report unexpected events to everyday scenarios under different instructional conditions (e.g., asked for "good" or "bad" unexpected events), and manifested a strong negativity bias in response to non-valenced instructions (i.e., being asked to "think of the unexpected" with no valence given). They mainly reported quite "predictable" unexpected outcomes that were negative; however, a post-test (N = 31) showed that the scenarios used were predominantly positive. In Experiment 2 (N = 257), when participants were instructed to think of "something unexpected and bizarre", under the same instructional manipulations as Experiment 1, this negativity bias was replicated. In Experiment 3, using a design in which positive/negative materials were matched (verified by a pre-test, N = 60), it was found that when participants (N = 102) were given negative scenarios, they reported more positive events than they do when they are given positive scenarios. Though responding still retained an overwhelming negative bias, this result provided some evidence for a weaker valence-countering strategy; that is, where a negative scenario can lead to positive unexpected events being mentioned, and a positive scenario leads to negative unexpected events being reported. The implications of these results for people's projections of unexpected futures in their everyday lives is discussed.

An Examination of Surprise and Emotions in the Processing of Anecdotal Evidence

Low-probability and atypical cases are commonly used as anecdotal evidence to support arguments that are divergent from general medical knowledge, thus challenging current efforts of health promotion and education. The present study proposes an emotion-based model that centers on surprise to explain the effects of critical anecdotal evidence information on risk perception, need for uncertainty reduction, and information searching behavior. Using experimental design and two-group path structural equation models, the study results supported a key role of surprise followed by two development routes that led to a series of attitudinal and behavioral changes after exposure to anecdotal evidence. First, surprise caused a group of correlated negative emotions (sadness, fear, and anger). Second, negative emotions were part of the intermediate stage that subsequently resulted in risk perception and need for uncertainty reduction prior to information seeking behaviors. The research provides a model to explain and predict the emotional, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes associated with anecdotal evidence.

Coincidence judgment in causal reasoning: How coincidental is this?

Given the important conceptual connections between cause and coincidence as well as the extensive prior research on causality asking, "how causal is this?", the present research proposes and evaluated a psychological construction of coincidentality as the answer to the question, "how coincidental is this?" Four experiments measured the judgment properties of a reasonably large set of real coincidences from an initial diary study. These judgements included coincidentality and an array of other judgments about event uncertainty, hypothesis belief and surprise as predictors of coincidentality consistent with and supporting our prior definition of coincidence (Johansen & Osman, 2015): "coincidences are surprising pattern repetitions that are observed to be unlikely by chance but are nonetheless ascribed to chance since the search for causal mechanisms has not produced anything more plausible than mere chance." In particular, we evaluated formal models based on judgements of uncertainty, belief and surprise as predictors to develop a model of coincidentality. Ultimately, we argue that coincidentality is a marker for causal suspicion/discovery in terms of a flag that a new, unknown causal mechanism may be operating.

Using data to solve problems: Children reason flexibly in response to different kinds of evidence

This study examined children's (5- to 9-year-olds, N = 363) abilities to use information seeking and explanation to solve problems using conclusive or inconclusive (i.e., consistent, inconsistent, or ambiguous) evidence. Results demonstrated that inconsistent and ambiguous evidence, not consistent evidence, motivate more requests for information than conclusive evidence. In addition, children's explanations were flexible in response to evidence; explanations based on transitive inference were more likely to be associated with an accurate conclusion than other explanation types. Children's requests for additional information in response to inconclusive evidence increased with age, as did their problem-solving accuracy. The data demonstrate that children's capacity to use information seeking and explanation develop in tandem as tools for problem solving.

Shades of surprise: Assessing surprise as a function of degree of deviance and expectation constraints

Merging recent surprise theories renders the prediction that surprise is a function of how strong an event deviates from what was expected and of how easily this event can be integrated into the constraints of an activated expectation. The present research investigates the impact of both these factors on the behavioral, affective, experiential, and cognitive surprise responses. In two experiments (total N = 1257), participants were instructed that ten stimuli of a certain type would appear on the screen. Crucially, we manipulated the degree of deviance of the last stimulus by showing a stimulus that deviated to either no, a medium, or a high degree from the previous nine stimuli. Orthogonally to this deviation, we induced an expectation with either high, moderate, or low constraints prior to the experimental task. We measured behavioral response delay and explicit ratings of liking, surprise, and expectancy. Our findings point out an overall only low association between the behavioral, affective, experiential, and cognitive surprise responses and reveal rather dichotomous response patterns that differentiate between deviance and non-deviance of an event. Challenging previous accounts, the present evidence further implies that surprise is not about the ease of integrating an event with the constraints of an explicit a-priori expectation but rather reflects the automatic outcome of implicit discrepancy detection, resulting from a continuous cognitive fine-tuning of expectations.

Violations of Core Knowledge Shape Early Learning

Research on cognitive development has revealed that even the youngest minds detect and respond to events that adults find surprising. These surprise responses suggest that infants have a basic set of "core" expectations about the world that are shared with adults and other species. However, little work has asked what purpose these surprise responses serve. Here we discuss recent evidence that violations of core knowledge offer special opportunities for learning. Infants and young children make predictions about the world on the basis of their core knowledge of objects, quantities, and social entities. We argue that when these predictions fail to match the observed data, infants and children experience an enhanced drive to seek and retain new information. This impact of surprise on learning is not equipotent. Instead, it is directed to entities that are relevant to the surprise itself; this drive propels children-even infants-to form and test new hypotheses about surprising aspects of the world. We briefly consider similarities and differences between these recent findings with infants and children, on the one hand, and findings on prediction errors in humans and non-human animals, on the other. These comparisons raise open questions that require continued inquiry, but suggest that considering phenomena across species, ages, kinds of surprise, and types of learning will ultimately help to clarify how surprise shapes thought.

Editors' Introduction and Review: An Appraisal of Surprise: Tracing the Threads That Stitch It Together

Though the scientific study of surprise dates back to Darwin (), there was an upsurge in interest beginning in the 1960s and 70s, and this has continued to the present. Recent developments have shed much light on the cognitive mechanisms and consequences of surprise, but research has often been siloed within sub-areas of Cognitive Science. A central challenge for research on surprise is, therefore, to connect various research programs around their overlapping foci. This issue has its roots in a symposium on surprise, entitled "Triangulating Surprise: Expectations, Uncertainty, and Making Sense," at the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (Quebec City, July 2014). Building on the interdisciplinary conversations that started at the symposium, this issue aims to draw attention to some promising empirical and modeling results and their theoretical implications. The present paper sets the stage for the issue by presenting a historical summary, discussing contrasting definitions of surprise, and then by tracing major threads that run through both this issue and the larger literature on surprise. Our aim is to develop broader, shared understandings of the main insights, theories, and findings regarding surprise, with a view to supporting future integration and progress.

Learning From Surprise: Harnessing a Metacognitive Surprise Signal to Build and Adapt Belief Networks

One's level of surprise can be thought of as a metacognitive signal indicating how well one can explain new information. We discuss literature on how this signal can be used adaptively to build, and, when necessary, reorganize belief networks. We present challenges in the use of a surprise signal, such as hindsight bias and the tendency to equate difficulty with implausibility, and point to evidence suggesting that one can overcome these challenges through consideration of alternative outcomes-especially before receiving feedback on actual outcomes-and by calibrating task difficulty with one's knowledge level. As such, we propose that a major function of education-broadly construed as the work of teachers, journalists, parents, etc.-is to assist learners in using their metacognitive surprise signals to facilitate the building and adaptation of belief networks.

The Role of Surprise in Learning: Different Surprising Outcomes Affect Memorability Differentially

Surprise has been explored as a cognitive-emotional phenomenon that impacts many aspects of mental life from creativity to learning to decision-making. In this paper, we specifically address the role of surprise in learning and memory. Although surprise has been cast as a basic emotion since Darwin's () The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, recently more emphasis has been placed on its cognitive aspects. One such view casts surprise as a process of "sense making" or "explanation finding": metacognitive explanation-based theory proposes that people's perception of surprise is a metacognitive assessment of the cognitive work done to explain a surprising outcome. Or, to put it more simply, surprise increases with the explanatory work required to resolve it. This theory predicts that some surprises should be more surprising than others because they are harder to explain. In the current paper, this theory is extended to consider the role of surprise in learning as evidenced by memorability. This theory is tested to determine how scenarios with differentially surprising outcomes impact the memorability of those outcomes. The results show that surprising outcomes (less-known outcomes) that are more difficult to explain are recalled more accurately than less-surprising outcomes that require little (known outcomes) or no explanation (normal).

Training Pilots for Unexpected Events: A Simulator Study on the Advantage of Unpredictable and Variable Scenarios

OBJECTIVE

This study tested whether simulator-based training of pilot responses to unexpected or novel events can be improved by including unpredictability and variability in training scenarios.

BACKGROUND

Current regulations allow for highly predictable and invariable training, which may not be sufficient to prepare pilots for unexpected or novel situations in-flight. Training for surprise will become mandatory in the near future.

METHOD

Using an aircraft model largely unfamiliar to the participants, one group of 10 pilots (the unpredictable and variable [U/V] group) practiced responses to controllability issues in a relatively U/V manner. A control group of another 10 pilots practiced the same failures in a highly predictable and invariable manner. After the practice, performance of all pilots was tested in a surprise scenario, in which the pilots had to apply the learned knowledge. To control for surprise habituation and familiarization with the controls, two control tests were included.

RESULTS

Whereas the U/V group required more time than the control group to identify failures during the practice, the results indicated superior understanding and performance in the U/V group as compared to the control group in the surprise test. There were no significant differences between the groups in surprise or performance in the control tests.

CONCLUSION

Given the results, we conclude that organizing pilot training in a more U/V way improves transfer of training to unexpected situations in-flight.

APPLICATION

The outcomes suggest that the inclusion of U/V simulator training scenarios is important when training pilots for unexpected situations.

Why the Conjunction Effect Is Rarely a Fallacy: How Learning Influences Uncertainty and the Conjunction Rule

In this article we explore the relationship between learning and the conjunction fallacy. The interpretation of the conjunction effect as a fallacy assumes that all observers share the same knowledge, and that nobody has access to privileged information. Such situations are actually quite rare in everyday life. Building on an existing model of surprise, we prove formally that in the more typical scenarios, where observers are alert to the possibility of learning from event outcomes, the conjunction rule does not apply. Scenarios which have been engineered to produce the so-called conjunction “fallacy” (e.g., Tverksy and Kahneman, 1983) often imply subjective uncertainty and hence the possibility of learning. In Experiment 1 we demonstrate that when these scenarios are rephrased so as to eliminate subjective uncertainty, the effect is mitigated. In Experiment 2 we demonstrate that when subjective uncertainty is reduced by allowing participants to learn about the mechanism behind a conjunction-inducing scenario, the conjunction effect again diminishes. We conclude that the conjunction effect arises due to the unnaturalness of interpreting verbal descriptions in terms of a situation in which all observers share the same knowledge. Instead, when people hear descriptions of real world situations, they are likely to assume that learning is possible, and that subjective rather than objective uncertainty applies.

Dealing With Unexpected Events on the Flight Deck: A Conceptual Model of Startle and Surprise

OBJECTIVE

A conceptual model is proposed in order to explain pilot performance in surprising and startling situations.

BACKGROUND

Today's debate around loss of control following in-flight events and the implementation of upset prevention and recovery training has highlighted the importance of pilots' ability to deal with unexpected events. Unexpected events, such as technical malfunctions or automation surprises, potentially induce a "startle factor" that may significantly impair performance.

METHOD

Literature on surprise, startle, resilience, and decision making is reviewed, and findings are combined into a conceptual model. A number of recent flight incident and accident cases are then used to illustrate elements of the model.

RESULTS

Pilot perception and actions are conceptualized as being guided by "frames," or mental knowledge structures that were previously learned. Performance issues in unexpected situations can often be traced back to insufficient adaptation of one's frame to the situation. It is argued that such sensemaking or reframing processes are especially vulnerable to issues caused by startle or acute stress.

CONCLUSION

Interventions should focus on (a) increasing the supply and quality of pilot frames (e.g., though practicing a variety of situations), (b) increasing pilot reframing skills (e.g., through the use of unpredictability in training scenarios), and (c) improving pilot metacognitive skills, so that inappropriate automatic responses to startle and surprise can be avoided.

APPLICATION

The model can be used to explain pilot behavior in accident cases, to design experiments and training simulations, to teach pilots metacognitive skills, and to identify intervention methods.

The Cognitive-Evolutionary Model of Surprise: A Review of the Evidence

Research on surprise relevant to the cognitive-evolutionary model of surprise proposed by Meyer, Reisenzein, and Schützwohl (1997) is reviewed. The majority of the assumptions of the model are found empirically supported. Surprise is evoked by unexpected (schema-discrepant) events and its intensity is determined by the degree if schema-discrepancy, whereas the novelty and the valence of the eliciting events probably do not have an independent effect. Unexpected events cause an automatic interruption of ongoing mental processes that is followed by an attentional shift and attentional binding to the events, which is often followed by causal and other event analysis processes and by schema revision. The facial expression of surprise postulated by evolutionary emotion psychologists has been found to occur rarely in surprise, for as yet unknown reasons. A physiological orienting response marked by skin conductance increase, heart rate deceleration, and pupil dilation has been observed to occur regularly in the standard version of the repetition-change paradigm of surprise induction, but the specificity of these reactions as indicators of surprise is controversial. There is indirect evidence for the assumption that the feeling of surprise consists of the direct awareness of the schema-discrepancy signal, but this feeling, or at least the self-report of surprise, is also influenced by experienced interference. In contrast, facial feedback probably does contribute substantially to the feeling of surprise and the evidence for the hypothesis that surprise is affected by the difficulty of explaining an unexpected event is, in our view, inconclusive. Regardless of how the surprise feeling is constituted, there is evidence that it has both motivational and informational effects. Finally, the prediction failure implied by unexpected events sometimes causes a negative feeling, but there is no convincing evidence that this is always the case, and we argue that even if it were so, this would not be a sufficient reason for regarding this feeling as a component, rather than as an effect of surprise.

Science Is Awe-Some: The Emotional Antecedents of Science Learning

Scientists from Einstein to Sagan have linked emotions like awe with the motivation for scientific inquiry, but no research has tested this possibility. Theoretical and empirical work from affective science, however, suggests that awe might be unique in motivating explanation and exploration of the physical world. We synthesize theories of awe with theories of the cognitive mechanisms related to learning, and offer a generative theoretical framework that can be used to test the effect of this emotion on early science learning.