The dissociation paradigm and its discontents: How can unconscious perception or memory be inferred?

The importance of awareness in face processing: A critical review of interocular suppression studies

Human faces convey essential information for understanding others' mental states and intentions. The importance of faces in social interaction has prompted suggestions that some relevant facial features such as configural information, emotional expression, and gaze direction may promote preferential access to awareness. This evidence has predominantly come from interocular suppression studies, with the most common method being the Breaking Continuous Flash Suppression (bCFS) procedure, which measures the time it takes different stimuli to overcome interocular suppression. However, the procedures employed in such studies suffer from multiple methodological limitations. For example, they are unable to disentangle detection from identification processes, their results may be confounded by participants' response bias and decision criteria, they typically use small stimulus sets, and some of their results attributed to detecting high-level facial features (e.g., emotional expression) may be confounded by differences in low-level visual features (e.g., contrast, spatial frequency). In this article, we review the evidence from the bCFS procedure on whether relevant facial features promote access to awareness, discuss the main limitations of this very popular method, and propose strategies to address these issues.

Processing of a Subliminal Rebus during Sleep: Idiosyncratic Primary versus Secondary Process Associations upon Awakening from REM- versus Non-REM-Sleep

Primary and secondary processes are the foundational axes of the Freudian mental apparatus: one horizontally as a tendency to associate, the primary process, and one vertically as the ability for perspective taking, the secondary process. Primary process mentation is not only supposed to be dominant in the unconscious but also, for example, in dreams. The present study tests the hypothesis that the mental activity during REM-sleep has more characteristics of the primary process, while during non-REM-sleep more secondary process operations take place. Because the solving of a rebus requires the ability to non-contexually condensate the literal reading of single stimuli into a new one, rebus solving is a primary process operation by excellence. In a replication of the dream-rebus study of Shevrin and Fisher (1967), a rebus, which consisted of an image of a comb (German: "Kamm") and an image of a raft (German: "Floß"), resulting in the German rebus word "kampflos" (Engl.: without a struggle), was flashed subliminally (at 1 ms) to 20 participants before going to sleep. Upon consecutive awakenings participants were asked for a dream report, free associations and an image description. Based on objective association norms, there were significantly more conceptual associations referring to Kamm and Floß indexing secondary process mentation when subjects were awakened from non-REM sleep as compared to REM-awakenings. There were not significantly more rebus associations referring to kampflos indexing primary process mentation when awakened from REM-sleep as compared to non-REM awakenings. However, when the associations were scored on the basis of each subject's individual norms, there was a rebus effect with more idiosyncratic rebus associations in awakenings after REM than after non-REM-sleep. Our results support the general idea that REM-sleep is characterized by primary process thinking, while non-REM-sleep mentation follows the rules of the secondary process.

Neural processing of visual information under interocular suppression: a critical review

When dissimilar stimuli are presented to the two eyes, only one stimulus dominates at a time while the other stimulus is invisible due to interocular suppression. When both stimuli are equally potent in competing for awareness, perception alternates spontaneously between the two stimuli, a phenomenon called binocular rivalry. However, when one stimulus is much stronger, e.g., due to higher contrast, the weaker stimulus can be suppressed for prolonged periods of time. A technique that has recently become very popular for the investigation of unconscious visual processing is continuous flash suppression (CFS): High-contrast dynamic patterns shown to one eye can render a low-contrast stimulus shown to the other eye invisible for up to minutes. Studies using CFS have produced new insights but also controversies regarding the types of visual information that can be processed unconsciously as well as the neural sites and the relevance of such unconscious processing. Here, we review the current state of knowledge in regard to neural processing of interocularly suppressed information. Focusing on recent neuroimaging findings, we discuss whether and to what degree such suppressed visual information is processed at early and more advanced levels of the visual processing hierarchy. We review controversial findings related to the influence of attention on early visual processing under interocular suppression, the putative differential roles of dorsal and ventral areas in unconscious object processing, and evidence suggesting privileged unconscious processing of emotional and other socially relevant information. On a more general note, we discuss methodological and conceptual issues, from practical issues of how unawareness of a stimulus is assessed to the overarching question of what constitutes an adequate operational definition of unawareness. Finally, we propose approaches for future research to resolve current controversies in this exciting research area.

On the status of unconscious memory: Merikle and Reingold (1991) revisited

Four experiments are reported that reevaluate P. M. Merikle and E. M. Reingold's (1991) demonstration of unconscious memory: the greater sensitivity to familiarity (repetition) of an indirect (implicit) memory task than of a comparable direct (explicit) task. At study, participants named the cued member of a pair of visually presented words. At test, new and uncued study words were presented against a background mask. Participants judged whether each word was old or new (direct task) or whether the contrast between the word and the background was high or low (indirect task). Contrary to the original findings, the sensitivity of the indirect task to familiarity never exceeded that of the direct task. These findings pose a challenge to a key pillar of evidence for unconscious influences of memory.

Measuring automatic retrieval: a comparison of implicit memory, process dissociation, and speeded response procedures

Using the stem completion task, we compared estimates of automatic retrieval from an implicit memory task, the process dissociation procedure, and the speeded response procedure. Two standard manipulations were employed. In Experiment 1, a depth of processing effect was found on automatic retrieval using the speeded response procedure although this effect was substantially reduced in Experiment 2 when lexical processing was required of all words. In Experiment 3, the speeded response procedure showed an advantage of full versus divided attention at study on automatic retrieval. An implicit condition showed parallel effects in each study, suggesting that implicit stem completion may normally provide a good estimate of automatic retrieval. Also, we replicated earlier findings from the process dissociation procedure, but estimates of automatic retrieval from this procedure were consistently lower than those from the speeded response procedure, except when conscious retrieval was relatively low. We discuss several factors that may contribute to the conflicting outcomes, including the evidence for theoretical assumptions and criterial task differences between implicit and explicit tests.

To what extent are emotional visual stimuli processed without attention and awareness?

In the past few years, important contributions have been made to the study of emotional visual perception. Researchers have reported responses to emotional stimuli in the human amygdala under some unattended conditions (i.e. conditions in which the focus of attention was diverted away from the stimuli due to task instructions), during visual masking and during binocular suppression. Taken together, these results reveal the relative degree of autonomy of emotional processing. At the same time, however, important limitations to the notion of complete automaticity have been revealed. Effects of task context and attention have been shown, as well as large inter-subject differences in sensitivity to the detection of masked fearful faces (whereby briefly presented, target fearful faces are immediately followed by a neutral face that 'masks' the initial face). A better understanding of the neural basis of emotional perception and how it relates to visual attention and awareness is likely to require further refinement of the concepts of automaticity and awareness.

Target Visibility and Visual Awareness Modulate Amygdala Responses to Fearful Faces

The goals of the present study were twofold. First, we wished to investigate the neural correlates of aware and unaware emotional face perception after characterizing each subject's behavioral performance via signal detection theory methods. Second, we wished to investigate the extent to which amygdala responses to fearful faces depend on the physical characteristics of the stimulus independently of the percept. We show that amygdala responses depend on visual awareness. Under conditions in which subjects were not aware of fearful faces flashed for 33 ms, no differential activation was observed in the amygdala. On the other hand, differential activation was observed for 67 ms fearful targets that the subjects could reliably detect. When trials were divided into hits, misses, correct rejects, and false alarms, we show that target visibility is an important factor in determining amygdala responses to fearful faces. Taken together, our results further challenge the view that amygdala responses occur automatically.

Imaging implicit perception: promise and pitfalls

The study of implicit perception - perception in the absence of awareness - has a long history. Decades of behavioural work have identified crucial theoretical and methodological issues that must be considered when evaluating claims of implicit perception. Neuroimaging methods provide an important new avenue for illuminating our understanding of perception both with and without awareness, but most imaging experiments have not met the rigorous conditions that the behavioural work has shown are necessary for inferring implicit perception. Here, we review the literature of both behavioural and neuroimaging studies, and note the pitfalls of studying implicit perception as well as the promise that neuroimaging studies have for providing insights about implicit perception when combined with appropriately rigorous behavioural measures of awareness.

Subliminality, consciousness, and temporal shifts in awareness: Implications within and beyond the laboratory

In his analysis of subliminal perception research, documented two important (but neglected) phenomena: subchance perception and temporal variability in stimulus availability and accessibility. This Commentary addresses three issues raised by Erdelyi's review: (1) the importance of distinguishing "micro" from "macro" temporal shifts; (2) the need to analyze perception without awareness data at the level of the individual as well as the group; and (3) parallels between the dissociations associated with neuroclinical phenomena (e.g., hemispheric isolation) and those observed in patients with certain forms of personality pathology. Continued integration of laboratory findings with in vivo observations of clinical syndromes will yield a more cohesive and heuristic approach to the study of implicit mental states.