Prior familiarity with components enhances unconscious learning of relations

Implicit learning of regularities followed by realistic body movements in virtual reality

The existence of implicit (unconscious) learning has been demonstrated in several laboratory paradigms. Researchers have also suggested that it plays a role in complex real-life human activities. For instance, in social situations, we may follow unconscious behaviour scripts or intuitively anticipate the reaction of familiar persons based on nonconscious cues. Still, it is difficult to make inferences about the involvement of implicit learning in realistic contexts, given that this phenomenon has been demonstrated, almost exclusively, using simple artificial stimuli (e.g., learning structured patterns of letters). In addition, recent analyses show that the amount of unconscious knowledge learned in these tasks has been overestimated by random measurement error. To overcome these limitations, we adapted the artificial grammar learning (AGL) task, and exposed participants (N = 93), in virtual reality, to a realistic agent that executed combinations of boxing punches. Unknown to participants, the combinations were structured by a complex artificial grammar. In a subsequent test phase, participants accurately discriminated novel grammatical from nongrammatical combinations, showing they had acquired the grammar. For measuring awareness, we used trial-by-trial subjective scales, and an analytical method that accounts for the possible overestimation of unconscious knowledge due to regression to the mean. These methods conjointly showed strong evidence for implicit and for explicit learning. The present study is the first to show that humans can implicitly learn, in VR, knowledge regarding realistic body movements, and, further, that implicit knowledge extracted in AGL is robust when accounting for its possible inflation by random measurement error.

Effective Augmentation of Creativity-Involving Productivity Consequent to Spontaneous Selectivity in Knowledge Acquisition

The results of many studies have suggested that we actively select information from the environment. However, the functional consequences of such selectivity in knowledge acquisition remain unclear, even though it is a vital factor in determining the characteristics of our future knowledge and cognition. We hypothesized that spontaneous selectivity in knowledge acquisition results in effective augmentation of productivity, especially in creativity-demanding task. To test this, we conducted experiments in which subjects acquired novel compositional words during their rapid presentation, evaluated memory confidence rates for the acquired words, and then produced essays based on these words. First, in experiment 1, we showed that the level of confidence in the recognition memory for the words positively related with the length of the essays (a measure of creativity-involving productivity in quantity). Additionally, we found that the semantic distance from the essay to the components of the compositional word (a measure of creative-productivity in quality) was farther for the word with higher memory confidence than for the word with lower memory confidence, suggesting creative leaps when writing the former. While this result supported our hypothesis, it might also reflect better memory that was independent of spontaneous selection. Thus, in a different subject group, we conducted a similar experiment (experiment 2) in which two of the 20 compositional words were presented more often (five times per block) to force memorization. Again, consistent with our hypothesis, essays based on spontaneously memorized words (presented once per block) were significantly longer than those produced using the forcedly memorized words. Therefore, better memory per se did not explain the higher productivity. Instead, these results suggested that the higher creativity-involving productivity was consequent to spontaneous selectivity in the knowledge acquisition. Additionally, we propose a possible mechanism for the observed results based on the results of a neural network simulation. In this simulation, we found that novel information that was assigned to locations more easily accessible to the entire network was better assimilated and therefore selectively acquired. Based on this simulation, we moderately suggest that spontaneously acquired knowledge effectively confers productivity because it effectively activates large parts of the neural networks.

Cross-cultural differences in implicit learning of chunks versus symmetries

Three experiments explore whether knowledge of grammars defining global versus local regularities has an advantage in implicit acquisition and whether this advantage is affected by cultural differences. Participants were asked to listen to and memorize a number of strings of 10 syllables instantiating an inversion (i.e. a global pattern); after the training phase, they were required to judge whether new strings were well formed. In Experiment 1, Western people implicitly acquired the inversion rule defined over the Chinese tones in a similar way as Chinese participants when alternative structures (specifically, chunking and repetition structures) were controlled. In Experiments 2 and 3, we directly pitted knowledge of the inversion (global) against chunk (local) knowledge, and found that Chinese participants had a striking global advantage in implicit learning, which was greater than that of Western participants. Taken together, we show for the first time cross-cultural differences in the type of regularities implicitly acquired.

Prevailing theories of consciousness are challenged by novel cross-modal associations acquired between subliminal stimuli

While theories of consciousness differ substantially, the 'conscious access hypothesis', which aligns consciousness with the global accessibility of information across cortical regions, is present in many of the prevailing frameworks. This account holds that consciousness is necessary to integrate information arising from independent functions such as the specialist processing required by different senses. We directly tested this account by evaluating the potential for associative learning between novel pairs of subliminal stimuli presented in different sensory modalities. First, pairs of subliminal stimuli were presented and then their association assessed by examining the ability of the first stimulus to prime classification of the second. In Experiments 1-4 the stimuli were word-pairs consisting of a male name preceding either a creative or uncreative profession. Participants were subliminally exposed to two name-profession pairs where one name was paired with a creative profession and the other an uncreative profession. A supraliminal task followed requiring the timed classification of one of those two professions. The target profession was preceded by either the name with which it had been subliminally paired (concordant) or the alternate name (discordant). Experiment 1 presented stimuli auditorily, Experiment 2 visually, and Experiment 3 presented names auditorily and professions visually. All three experiments revealed the same inverse priming effect with concordant test pairs associated with significantly slower classification judgements. Experiment 4 sought to establish if learning would be more efficient with supraliminal stimuli and found evidence that a different strategy is adopted when stimuli are consciously perceived. Finally, Experiment 5 replicated the unconscious cross-modal association achieved in Experiment 3 utilising non-linguistic stimuli. The results demonstrate the acquisition of novel cross-modal associations between stimuli which are not consciously perceived and thus challenge the global access hypothesis and those theories embracing it.

fMRI Investigation on Gradual Change of Awareness States in Implicit Sequence Learning

Awareness of implicit knowledge is a changing process. Previous studies have examined brain activation patterns corresponding to the start and end stages of implicit learning, but failed to reveal the gradual changing course of awareness in implicit learning. The present study explored brain activation changes corresponding to different awareness states elicited by two different stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA, 850 ms and 1350 ms) over the whole course of implicit sequence learning (i.e., divided into three phases), by using a process dissociation procedure (PDP) paradigm and the technique of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In the results, it was found that the 850 ms SOA elicited primarily an awareness state of unconsciousness, under which the frontal lobe was significantly activated during the early phase of implicit sequence learning, with its activation levels correlated positively to consciousness levels. In contrast, the 1350 ms SOA triggered predominantly an awareness state of consciousness, under which the activation levels of the inferior parietal lobule correlated positively to consciousness levels during the middle phase, and positively to consciousness levels as well as negatively to unconsciousness levels during the late phase of implicit sequence learning. Overall, the frontal lobe and inferior parietal lobule were found to play critical roles in mediating awareness states over the course of implicit sequence learning.

The neural basis of implicit learning of task-irrelevant Chinese tonal sequence

The present study sought to investigate the neural basis of implicit learning of task-irrelevant perceptual sequence. A novel SRT task, the serial syllable identification task (SSI task), was used in which the participants were asked to recognize which one of two Chinese syllables was presented. The tones of the syllables were irrelevant to the task but followed an underlying structured sequence. Participants were scanned while they performed the SSI task. Results showed that, at the behavioral level, faster RTs for the sequential material indicated that task-irrelevant sequence knowledge could be learned. In the subsequent prediction test of knowledge of the tonal cues using subjective measures, we found that the knowledge was obtained unconsciously. At the neural level, the left caudate, bilateral hippocampus and bilateral superior parietal lobule were engaged during the sequence condition relative to the random condition. Further analyses revealed that greater learning-related activation (relative to random) in the right caudate nucleus, bilateral hippocampus and left superior parietal lobule were found during the second half of the training phase compared with the first half. When people reported that they were guessing, the magnitude of the right hippocampus and left superior parietal lobule activations was positively related to the accuracy of prediction test, which was significantly better than chance. Together, the present results indicated that the caudate, hippocampus and superior parietal lobule played critical roles in the implicit perceptual sequence learning even when the perceptual features were task irrelevant.

Blind insight: metacognitive discrimination despite chance task performance

Blindsight and other examples of unconscious knowledge and perception demonstrate dissociations between judgment accuracy and metacognition: Studies reveal that participants' judgment accuracy can be above chance while their confidence ratings fail to discriminate right from wrong answers. Here, we demonstrated the opposite dissociation: a reliable relationship between confidence and judgment accuracy (demonstrating metacognition) despite judgment accuracy being no better than chance. We evaluated the judgments of 450 participants who completed an AGL task. For each trial, participants decided whether a stimulus conformed to a given set of rules and rated their confidence in that judgment. We identified participants who performed at chance on the discrimination task, utilizing a subset of their responses, and then assessed the accuracy and the confidence-accuracy relationship of their remaining responses. Analyses revealed above-chance metacognition among participants who did not exhibit decision accuracy. This important new phenomenon, which we term blind insight, poses critical challenges to prevailing models of metacognition grounded in signal detection theory.

Artificial grammar learning of melody is constrained by melodic inconsistency: Narmour's principles affect melodic learning

Considerable evidence suggests that people acquire artificial grammars incidentally and implicitly, an indispensable capacity for the acquisition of music or language. However, less research has been devoted to exploring constraints affecting incidental learning. Within the domain of music, the extent to which Narmour's (1990) melodic principles affect implicit learning of melodic structure was experimentally explored. Extending previous research (Rohrmeier, Rebuschat & Cross, 2011), the identical finite-state grammar is employed having terminals (the alphabet) manipulated so that melodies generated systematically violated Narmour's principles. Results indicate that Narmour-inconsistent melodic materials impede implicit learning. This further constitutes a case in which artificial grammar learning is affected by prior knowledge or processing constraints.

Explicit feedback maintains implicit knowledge

The role of feedback was investigated with respect to conscious and unconscious knowledge acquired during artificial grammar learning (AGL). After incidental learning of training sequences, participants classified further sequences in terms of grammaticality and reported their decision strategy with or without explicit veridical feedback. Sequences that disobeyed the learning structure conformed to an alternative structure. Feedback led to an increase in the amount of reported conscious knowledge of structure (derived rules and recollections) but did not increase its accuracy. Conversely, feedback maintained the accuracy of unconscious knowledge of structure (intuition or familiarity-based responses) which otherwise degraded. Results support a dual-process account of AGL. They suggest that implicit learning of the to-be-rejected structure at test contaminates familiarity-based classifications whereas feedback allows competing familiarity signals to be contextualised, which is incompatible with theories that consider familiarity context-insensitive.

The speed of metacognition: taking time to get to know one's structural knowledge

The time course of different metacognitive experiences of knowledge was investigated using artificial grammar learning. Experiment 1 revealed that when participants are aware of the basis of their judgments (conscious structural knowledge) decisions are made most rapidly, followed by decisions made with conscious judgment but without conscious knowledge of underlying structure (unconscious structural knowledge), and guess responses (unconscious judgment knowledge) were made most slowly, even when controlling for differences in confidence and accuracy. In experiment 2, short response deadlines decreased the accuracy of unconscious but not conscious structural knowledge. Conversely, the deadline decreased the proportion of conscious structural knowledge in favour of guessing. Unconscious structural knowledge can be applied rapidly but becomes more reliable with additional metacognitive processing time whereas conscious structural knowledge is an all-or-nothing response that cannot always be applied rapidly. These dissociations corroborate quite separate theories of recognition (dual-process) and metacognition (higher order thought and cross-order integration).

Social intuition as a form of implicit learning: Sequences of body movements are learned less explicitly than letter sequences

In the current paper, we first evaluate the suitability of traditional serial reaction time (SRT) and artificial grammar learning (AGL) experiments for measuring implicit learning of social signals. We then report the results of a novel sequence learning task which combines aspects of the SRT and AGL paradigms to meet our suggested criteria for how implicit learning experiments can be adapted to increase their relevance to situations of social intuition. The sequences followed standard finite-state grammars. Sequence learning and consciousness of acquired knowledge were compared between 2 groups of 24 participants viewing either sequences of individually presented letters or sequences of body-posture pictures, which were described as series of yoga movements. Participants in both conditions showed above-chance classification accuracy, indicating that sequence learning had occurred in both stimulus conditions. This shows that sequence learning can still be found when learning procedures reflect the characteristics of social intuition. Rule awareness was measured using trial-by-trial evaluation of decision strategy (Dienes & Scott, 2005; Scott & Dienes, 2008). For letters, sequence classification was best on trials where participants reported responding on the basis of explicit rules or memory, indicating some explicit learning in this condition. For body-posture, classification was not above chance on these types of trial, but instead showed a trend to be best on those trials where participants reported that their responses were based on intuition, familiarity, or random choice, suggesting that learning was more implicit. Results therefore indicate that the use of traditional stimuli in research on sequence learning might underestimate the extent to which learning is implicit in domains such as social learning, contributing to ongoing debate about levels of conscious awareness in implicit learning.

Cross cultural differences in unconscious knowledge

Previous studies have indicated cross cultural differences in conscious processes, such that Asians have a global preference and Westerners a more analytical one. We investigated whether these biases also apply to unconscious knowledge. In Experiment 1, Japanese and UK participants memorized strings of large (global) letters made out of small (local) letters. The strings constituted one sequence of letters at a global level and a different sequence at a local level. Implicit learning occurred at the global and not the local level for the Japanese but equally at both levels for the English. In Experiment 2, the Japanese preference for global over local processing persisted even when structure existed only at the local but not global level. In Experiment 3, Japanese and UK participants were asked to attend to just one of the levels, global or local. Now the cultural groups performed similarly, indicating that the bias largely reflects preference rather than ability (although the data left room for residual ability differences). In Experiment 4, the greater global advantage of Japanese rather English was confirmed for strings made of Japanese kana rather than Roman letters. That is, the cultural difference is not due to familiarity of the sequence elements. In sum, we show for the first time that cultural biases strongly affect the type of unconscious knowledge people acquire.

Conscious and unconscious thought in artificial grammar learning

Unconscious Thought Theory posits that a period of distraction after information acquisition leads to unconscious processing which enhances decision making relative to conscious deliberation or immediate choice (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Support thus far has been mixed. In the present study, artificial grammar learning was used in order to produce measurable amounts of conscious and unconscious knowledge. Intermediate phases were introduced between training and testing. Participants engaged in conscious deliberation of grammar rules, were distracted for the same period of time, or progressed immediately from training to testing. No differences in accuracy were found between intermediate phase groups acting on decisions made with meta-cognitive awareness (either feeling-based intuitive responding or conscious rule- or recollection-based responding). However, the accuracy of guess responses was significantly higher after distraction relative to immediate progression or conscious deliberation. The results suggest any beneficial effects of 'unconscious thought' may not always transfer to conscious awareness.

Monitoring, metacognition, and executive function: elucidating the role of self-reflection in the development of self-regulation

While an abundance of research has investigated the development of the automatic and controlled processes through which individuals control their thoughts, emotions, and actions, less research has emphasized the role of the self in self-regulation. This chapter synthesizes four literatures that have examined the mechanisms through which the individual acts in a managerial role, evaluating the current status of the system and initiating regulatory actions as necessary. Taken together, these literatures (on executive function, error monitoring, metacognition, and uncertainty monitoring) suggest that self-reflection plays a critical role in self-regulation, and that developmental improvements in self-reflection (via increasing levels of conscious awareness and enhanced calibration of monitoring systems) may serve as driving forces underlying developmental improvement (and temperamental individual differences) in children's ability to control their thoughts and actions.

The contribution of phonological short-term memory to artificial grammar learning

Three experiments investigated the contribution of phonological short-term memory (STM) to grammar learning by manipulating rehearsal during study of an auditory artificial grammar made up from a vocabulary of spoken Mandarin syllables. Experiment 1 showed that concurrent, irrelevant articulation impaired grammar learning compared with a nonverbal control task. Experiment 2 replicated and extended this finding, showing that repeating the grammatical strings at study improved grammar learning compared with suppressing rehearsal or remaining silent during learning. Experiment 3 found no effects of rehearsal on grammar learning once participants had learned the component syllables. The findings suggest that phonological STM aids artificial grammar learning via effects on vocabulary learning.