Illusory own body perceptions: Case reports and relevance for bodily self-consciousness

Hierarchical and dynamic relationships between body part ownership and full-body ownership

What is the relationship between experiencing individual body parts and the whole body as one's own? We theorised that body part ownership is driven primarily by the perceptual binding of visual and somatosensory signals from specific body parts, whereas full-body ownership depends on a more global binding process based on multisensory information from several body segments. To examine this hypothesis, we used a bodily illusion and asked participants to rate illusory changes in ownership over five different parts of a mannequin's body and the mannequin as a whole, while we manipulated the synchrony or asynchrony of visual and tactile stimuli delivered to three different body parts. We found that body part ownership was driven primarily by local visuotactile synchrony and could be experienced relatively independently of full-body ownership. Full-body ownership depended on the number of synchronously stimulated parts in a nonlinear manner, with the strongest full-body ownership illusion occurring when all parts received synchronous stimulation. Additionally, full-body ownership influenced body part ownership for nonstimulated body parts, and skin conductance responses provided physiological evidence supporting an interaction between body part and full-body ownership. We conclude that body part and full-body ownership correspond to different processes and propose a hierarchical probabilistic model to explain the relationship between part and whole in the context of multisensory awareness of one's own body.

Depersonalization and derealization as sequelae of a temporal lobe lesion: a case report

BACKGROUND

Depersonalization and derealization can occur not just from psychiatric causes but also from various organic etiologies, such as seizures and intracerebral structural abnormalities. However, there have been no previous reported cases to the authors' knowledge detailing isolated depersonalization and derealization in the absence of clinical seizure activity or other psychiatric pathology, as sequelae of structural intracerebral lesions.

CASE PRESENTATION

In this case report, we detail the unique presentation of a 68-year-old woman under the care of palliative medicine who experienced depersonalization and derealization secondary to a metastatic lesion in her temporal lobe, in the parahippocampal gyrus to medial occipitotemporal gyrus region. These symptoms were present in the absence of any clinical seizure activity or other psychiatric symptomatology and largely resolved with the use of steroidal therapy, before returning secondary to disease progression.

CONCLUSIONS

We discuss the relationship among isolated depersonalization and derealization with pathology of the left posterior temporal lobe in the context of this interesting case. This case expands our knowledge of the neurobiology of these phenomena, given the specific localization of the intracerebral pathology and temporal specificity of symptoms relative to tumor growth and treatment course.

Neural signatures of visuo-motor integration during human-robot interactions

Visuo-motor integration shapes our daily experience and underpins the sense of feeling in control over our actions. The last decade has seen a surge in robotically and virtually mediated interactions, whereby bodily actions ultimately result in an artificial movement. But despite the growing number of applications, the neurophysiological correlates of visuo-motor processing during human-machine interactions under dynamic conditions remain scarce. Here we address this issue by employing a bimanual robotic interface able to track voluntary hands movement, rendered in real-time into the motion of two virtual hands. We experimentally manipulated the visual feedback in the virtual reality with spatial and temporal conflicts and investigated their impact on (1) visuo-motor integration and (2) the subjective experience of being the author of one's action (i.e., sense of agency). Using somatosensory evoked responses measured with electroencephalography, we investigated neural differences occurring when the integration between motor commands and visual feedback is disrupted. Our results show that the right posterior parietal cortex encodes for differences between congruent and spatially-incongruent interactions. The experimental manipulations also induced a decrease in the sense of agency over the robotically-mediated actions. These findings offer solid neurophysiological grounds that can be used in the future to monitor integration mechanisms during movements and ultimately enhance subjective experience during human-machine interactions.

Neuro-functional modeling of near-death experiences in contexts of altered states of consciousness

Near-death experiences (NDEs) including out-of-body experiences (OBEs) have been fascinating phenomena of perception both for affected persons and for communities in science and medicine. Modern progress in the recording of changing brain functions during the time between clinical death and brain death opened the perspective to address and understand the generation of NDEs in brain states of altered consciousness. Changes of consciousness can experimentally be induced in well-controlled clinical or laboratory settings. Reports of the persons having experienced the changes can inform about the similarity of the experiences with those from original NDEs. Thus, we collected neuro-functional models of NDEs including OBEs with experimental backgrounds of drug consumption, epilepsy, brain stimulation, and ischemic stress, and included so far largely unappreciated data from fighter pilot tests under gravitational stress generating cephalic nervous system ischemia. Since we found a large overlap of NDE themes or topics from original NDE reports with those from neuro-functional NDE models, we can state that, collectively, the models offer scientifically appropriate causal explanations for the occurrence of NDEs. The generation of OBEs, one of the NDE themes, can be localized in the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) of the brain, a multimodal association area. The evaluated literature suggests that NDEs may emerge as hallucination-like phenomena from a brain in altered states of consciousness (ASCs).

The Development of a Flexible Bodily Representation: Behavioral Outcomes and Brain Oscillatory Activity During the Rubber Hand Illusion in Preterm and Full-Term School-Age Children

During childhood, the body undergoes rapid changes suggesting the need to constantly update body representation based on the integration of multisensory signals. Sensory experiences in critical periods of early development may have a significant impact on the neurobiological mechanisms underpinning the development of the sense of one’s own body. Specifically, preterm children are at risk for sensory processing difficulties, which may lead to specific vulnerability in binding together sensory information in order to modulate the representation of the bodily self. The present study aims to investigate the malleability of body ownership in preterm (N = 21) and full-term (N = 19) school-age children, as reflected by sensitivity to the Rubber Hand Illusion. The results revealed that multisensory processes underlying the ability to identify a rubber hand as being part of one’s own body are already established in childhood, as indicated by a higher subjective feeling of embodiment over the rubber hand during synchronous visual-tactile stimulation. Notably, the effect of visual-tactile synchrony was related to the suppression of the alpha band oscillations over frontal, central, and parietal scalp regions, possibly indicating a greater activation of somatosensory and associative areas underpinning the illusory body ownership. Moreover, an interaction effect between visual-tactile condition and group emerged, suggesting that preterm children showed a greater suppression of alpha oscillatory activity during the illusion. This result together with lower scores of subjective embodiment over the rubber hand reported by preterm children indicate that preterm birth may affect the development of the flexible representation of the body. These findings provide an essential contribution to better understand the processes of identification and differentiation of the bodily self from the external environment, in both full-term and preterm children, paving the way for a multisensory and embodied approach to the investigation of social and cognitive development.

Depersonalization- and derealization-like phenomena of epileptic origin

Objective

Depersonalization refers to the sensation of being detached from one’s body, often associated with feelings of loss of control over one’s own body, actions, or thoughts. Derealization refers to the altered perception of one’s surroundings that is experienced as unreal. Although usually reported by psychiatric patients suffering from depression or anxiety, single case reports and small case series have described depersonalization‐ and derealization‐like symptoms in the context of epilepsy.

Methods

We investigated the brain mechanisms of ictal depersonalization– and derealization like symptoms by analyzing clinical and neuropsychological data as well as the epileptogenic zone based on a multimodal approach in a group of patients reporting depersonalization‐ (n = 9) and derealization‐like symptoms (n = 7), from a single presurgical epilepsy center with focal epilepsy. We compared them with a group of control patients with experiential phenomena due to temporal lobe epilepsy (n = 28).

Results

We show that all patients with ictal depersonalization‐like symptoms report altered self‐identification with their body and mostly suffer from frontal lobe epilepsy with the epileptogenic zone in the dorsal premotor cortex, while patients with derealization‐like symptoms suffer from temporal lobe epilepsy. This finding is supported by post‐ictal neuropsychological deficits, showing that depersonalization‐like symptoms were significantly more often associated with frontal lobe dysfunction as compared to the control patients and patients with derealization‐like symptoms.

Conclusion

We argue that depersonalization of epileptic origin constitutes a distinct disorder due to frontal lobe epilepsy. We discuss these findings with respect to earlier accounts of depersonalization and the recent concept of bodily self‐consciousness.

Illusory own body perceptions mapped in the cingulate cortex-An intracranial stimulation study

Body awareness is the result of sensory integration in the posterior parietal cortex; however, other brain structures are part of this process. Our goal is to determine how the cingulate cortex is involved in the representation of our body. We retrospectively selected patients with drug-resistant epilepsy, explored by stereo-electroencephalography, that had the cingulate cortex sampled outside the epileptogenic zone. The clinical effects of high-frequency electrical stimulation were reviewed and only those sites that elicited changes related to body perception were included. Connectivity of the cingulate cortex and other cortical structures was assessed using the h2 coefficient, following a nonlinear regression analysis of the broadband EEG signal. Poststimulation changes in connectivity were compared between two sets of stimulations eliciting or not eliciting symptoms related to body awareness (interest and control groups). We included 17 stimulations from 12 patients that reported different types of body perception changes such as sensation of being pushed toward right/left/up, one limb becoming heavier/lighter, illusory sensation of movement, sensation of pressure, sensation of floating or detachment of one hemi-body. High-frequency stimulation in the cingulate cortex (1 anterior, 15 middle, 1 posterior part) elicits body perception changes, associated with a decreased connectivity of the dominant posterior insula and increased coupling between other structures, located particularly in the nondominant hemisphere.

Functional Connectivity Analysis of NIRS Data under Rubber Hand Illusion to Find a Biomarker of Sense of Ownership

The self-identification, which is called sense of ownership, has been researched through methodology of rubber hand illusion (RHI) because of its simple setup. Although studies with neuroimaging technique, such as fMRI, revealed that several brain areas are associated with the sense of ownership, near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) has not yet been utilized. Here we introduced an automated setup to induce RHI, measured the brain activity during the RHI with NIRS, and analyzed the functional connectivity so as to understand dynamical brain relationship regarding the sense of ownership. The connectivity was evaluated by multivariate Granger causality. In this experiment, the peaks of oxy-Hb on right frontal and right motor related areas during the illusion were significantly higher compared with those during the nonillusion. Furthermore, by analyzing the NIRS recordings, we found a reliable connectivity from the frontal to the motor related areas during the illusion. This finding suggests that frontal cortex and motor related areas communicate with each other when the sense of ownership is induced. The result suggests that the sense of ownership is related to neural mechanism underlying human motor control, and it would be determining whether motor learning (i.e., neural plasticity) will occur. Thus RHI with the functional connectivity analysis will become an appropriate biomarker for neurorehabilitation.

Distinct vestibular effects on early and late somatosensory cortical processing in humans

In non-human primates several brain areas contain neurons that respond to both vestibular and somatosensory stimulation. In humans, vestibular stimulation activates several somatosensory brain regions and improves tactile perception. However, less is known about the spatio-temporal dynamics of such vestibular-somatosensory interactions in the human brain. To address this issue, we recorded high-density electroencephalography during left median nerve electrical stimulation to obtain Somatosensory Evoked Potentials (SEPs). We analyzed SEPs during vestibular activation following sudden decelerations from constant-velocity (90°/s and 60°/s) earth-vertical axis yaw rotations and SEPs during a non-vestibular control period. SEP analysis revealed two distinct temporal effects of vestibular activation: An early effect (28-32ms post-stimulus) characterized by vestibular suppression of SEP response strength that depended on rotation velocity and a later effect (97-112ms post-stimulus) characterized by vestibular modulation of SEP topographical pattern that was rotation velocity-independent. Source estimation localized these vestibular effects, during both time periods, to activation differences in a distributed cortical network including the right postcentral gyrus, right insula, left precuneus, and bilateral secondary somatosensory cortex. These results suggest that vestibular-somatosensory interactions in humans depend on processing in specific time periods in somatosensory and vestibular cortical regions.

When is an Out-of-Body Experience (Not) an Out-of-Body Experience? Reflections about Out-of-Body Phenomena in Neuroscientific Research

In recent years there has been an increased interest in the study of out-of-body experiences (obes) by cognitive and neuro-scientists. Nowadays, far-reaching claims regarding the uncovering of the neural mechanisms and pathways, as well as the mystery ofobes in the anthropological and historical record are on offer. In this article the implicit assumption thatobes are much better understood and that real progress has been made are questioned on the basis of the definitional and conceptual problems that still haunt this area of research. It is suggested that progress will only be registered once the spectrum of out-of-body phenomena (obp) is recognized and attention is paid to the neurocultural complexity of distinct instances ofobes.

Visual hallucinations of autobiographic memory and asomatognosia: a case of epilepsy due to brain cysticercosis

The current study describes the case of a woman with symptomatic epilepsy due to brain cysticercosis acquired during childhood. During her adolescence, she developed seizures characterized by metamorphopsia, hallucinations of autobiographic memory and, finally, asomatognosia. Magnetic brain imaging showed a calcified lesion in the right occipitotemporal cortex, and positron emission tomography imaging confirmed the presence of interictal hypometabolism in two regions: the right parietal cortex and the right lateral and posterior temporal cortex. We discuss the link between these brain areas and the symptoms described under the concepts of epileptogenic lesion, epileptogenic zone, functional deficit zone, and symptomatogenic zone.

[Neurophenomenology: Project for a Science of Past Experiences]

INTRODUCTION

Since the middle of 20(th) Century, cognitive science has been recognized as the genuine convergence field for all scientific advances in human mind studies with the mechanisms enabling knowledge. Since then, it has become a multidisciplinary area where several research disciplines and actors have acquired citizenship, allowing new expectations on the scientific study of human uniqueness.

OBJECTIVES

Critical assessment of the discussion that the discourse of theoretical biology has been assuming regarding the study of the cognitive phenomenon with special attention to the enactive project and, extensively, to the neuro-phenomenology of Francisco J. Varela.

METHODS

Starting with a brief and synthesized history of cognitive science, we will establish the key principles for understanding the emergence of the enactive paradigm and the "embodied" turn influenced by continental phenomenology in the cognitive science, as well as the general guidelines of Neurophenomenology.

CONCLUSIONS

The "hard problem" of consciousness still faces several types of reductionism relegating the cognitive issue to a kind of merely rational, individual, abstract and disembodied mechanism, thus strengthening the functionalist paradigm in mind philosophy. A solution to classic dichotomies in mind sciences must start rejecting such assumptions.

Suppression of the auditory N1-component for heartbeat-related sounds reflects interoceptive predictive coding

Although many studies have elucidated the neurocognitive mechanisms supporting the processing of externally generated sensory signals, less is known about the processing of interoceptive signals related to the viscera. Drawing a parallel with research on agency and the perception of self-generated action effects, in the present EEG study we report a reduced auditory N1 component when participants listened to heartbeat-related sounds compared to externally generated sounds. The auditory suppression for heartbeat sounds was robust and persisted after controlling for ECG-related artifacts, the number of trials involved and the phase of the cardiac cycle. In addition, the auditory N1 suppression for heartbeat-related sounds had a comparable scalp distribution as the N1 suppression observed for actively generated sounds. This finding indicates that the brain automatically differentiates between heartbeat-related and externally generated sounds through a process of sensory suppression, suggesting that a comparable predictive mechanism may underlie the processing of heartbeat and action-related information. Extending recent behavioral data about cardio-visual integration, the present cardio-auditory EEG data reveal that the processing of sounds in auditory cortex is systematically modulated by an interoceptive cardiac signal. The findings are discussed with respect to theories of interoceptive awareness, emotion, predictive coding, and their relevance to bodily self-consciousness.

The brain network reflecting bodily self-consciousness: a functional connectivity study

Several brain regions are important for processing self-location and first-person perspective, two important aspects of bodily self-consciousness. However, the interplay between these regions has not been clarified. In addition, while self-location and first-person perspective in healthy subjects are associated with bilateral activity in temporoparietal junction (TPJ), disturbed self-location and first-person perspective result from damage of only the right TPJ. Identifying the involved brain network and understanding the role of hemispheric specializations in encoding self-location and first-person perspective, will provide important information on system-level interactions neurally mediating bodily self-consciousness. Here, we used functional connectivity and showed that right and left TPJ are bilaterally connected to supplementary motor area, ventral premotor cortex, insula, intraparietal sulcus and occipitotemporal cortex. Furthermore, the functional connectivity between right TPJ and right insula had the highest selectivity for changes in self-location and first-person perspective. Finally, functional connectivity revealed hemispheric differences showing that self-location and first-person perspective modulated the connectivity between right TPJ, right posterior insula, and right supplementary motor area, and between left TPJ and right anterior insula. The present data extend previous evidence on healthy populations and clinical observations in neurological deficits, supporting a bilateral, but right-hemispheric dominant, network for bodily self-consciousness.

Visual capture and the experience of having two bodies - Evidence from two different virtual reality techniques

In neurology and psychiatry the detailed study of illusory own body perceptions has suggested close links between bodily processing and self-consciousness. One such illusory own body perception is heautoscopy where patients have the sensation of being reduplicated and to exist at two or even more locations. In previous experiments, using a video head-mounted display, self-location and self-identification were manipulated by applying conflicting visuo-tactile information. Yet the experienced singularity of the self was not affected, i.e., participants did not experience having multiple bodies or selves. In two experiments presented in this paper, we investigated self-location and self-identification while participants saw two virtual bodies (video-generated in study 1 and 3D computer generated in study 2) that were stroked either synchronously or asynchronously with their own body. In both experiments, we report that self-identification with two virtual bodies was stronger during synchronous stroking. Furthermore, in the video generated setup with synchronous stroking participants reported a greater feeling of having multiple bodies than in the control conditions. In study 1, but not in study 2, we report that self-location – measured by anterior posterior drift – was significantly shifted towards the two bodies in the synchronous condition only. Self-identification with two bodies, the sensation of having multiple bodies, and the changes in self-location show that the experienced singularity of the self can be studied experimentally. We discuss our data with respect to ownership for supernumerary hands and heautoscopy. We finally compare the effects of the video and 3D computer generated head-mounted display technology and discuss the possible benefits of using either technology to induce changes in illusory self-identification with a virtual body.

Turning Body and Self Inside Out

Prominent theories highlight the importance of bodily perception for self-consciousness, but it is currently not known whether bodily perception is based on interoceptive or exteroceptive signals or on integrated signals from these anatomically distinct systems. In the research reported here, we combined both types of signals by surreptitiously providing participants with visual exteroceptive information about their heartbeat: A real-time video image of a periodically illuminated silhouette outlined participants’ (projected, “virtual”) bodies and flashed in synchrony with their heartbeats. We investigated whether these “cardio-visual” signals could modulate bodily self-consciousness and tactile perception. We report two main findings. First, synchronous cardio-visual signals increased self-identification with and self-location toward the virtual body, and second, they altered the perception of tactile stimuli applied to participants’ backs so that touch was mislocalized toward the virtual body. We argue that the integration of signals from the inside and the outside of the human body is a fundamental neurobiological process underlying self-consciousness.

Full body illusion is associated with widespread skin temperature reduction

A central feature of our consciousness is the experience of the self as a unified entity residing in a physical body, termed bodily self-consciousness. This phenomenon includes aspects such as the sense of owning a body (also known as body ownership) and has been suggested to arise from the integration of sensory signals from the body. Several studies have shown that temporally synchronous tactile stimulation of the real body and visual stimulation of a fake or virtual body can induce changes in bodily self-consciousness, typically resulting in a sense of illusory ownership over the fake body. The present study assessed the effect of anatomical congruency of visuo-tactile stimulation on bodily self-consciousness. A virtual body was presented and temporally synchronous visuo-tactile stroking was applied simultaneously to the participants' body and to the virtual body. We manipulated the anatomical locations of the visuo-tactile stroking (i.e., on the back, on the leg), resulting in congruent stroking (stroking was felt and seen on the back or the leg) or incongruent stroking (i.e., stroking was felt on the leg and seen on the back). We measured self-identification with the virtual body and self-location as well as skin temperature. Illusory self-identification with the avatar as well as changes in self-location were experienced in the congruent stroking conditions. Participants showed a decrease in skin temperature across several body locations during congruent stimulation. These data establish that the full-body illusion (FBI) alters bodily self-consciousness and instigates widespread physiological changes in the participant's body.

Abnormal brain activation of adolescent internet addict in a ball-throwing animation task: possible neural correlates of disembodiment revealed by fMRI

While adolescent internet addicts are immersed in cyberspace, they are easily able to experience 'disembodied state'. The purposes of this study were to investigate the difference of brain activity between adolescent internet addicts and normal adolescents in a state of disembodiment, and to find the correlation between the activities of disembodiment-related areas and the behavioral characteristics related to internet addiction. The fMRI images were taken while the addiction group (N=17) and the control group (N=17) were asked to perform the task composed with ball-throwing animations. The task reflected on either self-agency about ball-throwing or location of a ball. And each block was shown with either different (Changing View) or same animations (Fixed View). The disembodiment-related condition was the interaction between Agency Task and Changing View. Within-group analyses revealed that the addiction group exhibited higher activation in the thalamus, bilateral precentral area, bilateral middle frontal area, and the area around the right temporo-parietal junction. And between-group analyses showed that the addiction group exhibited higher activation in the area near the left temporo-parieto-occipital junction, right parahippocampal area, and other areas than the control group. Finally, the duration of internet use was significantly correlated with the activity of posterior area of left middle temporal gyrus in the addiction group. These results show that the disembodiment-related activation of the brain is easily manifested in adolescent internet addicts. Internet addiction of adolescents could be significantly unfavorable for their brain development related with identity formation.

Impaired consciousness in epilepsy

Consciousness is essential to normal human life. In epileptic seizures consciousness is often transiently lost, which makes it impossible for the individual to experience or respond. These effects have huge consequences for safety, productivity, emotional health, and quality of life. To prevent impaired consciousness in epilepsy, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms that lead to brain dysfunction during seizures. Normally the consciousness system-a specialised set of cortical-subcortical structures-maintains alertness, attention, and awareness. Advances in neuroimaging, electrophysiology, and prospective behavioural testing have shed light on how epileptic seizures disrupt the consciousness system. Diverse seizure types, including absence, generalised tonic-clonic, and complex partial seizures, converge on the same set of anatomical structures through different mechanisms to disrupt consciousness. Understanding of these mechanisms could lead to improved treatment strategies to prevent impairment of consciousness and improve the quality of life of people with epilepsy.

Emerging Roles of the Brain’s Default Network

During periods of inactivity, global metabolism does not decrease in the brain, and small but consistent increases in activity occur in a specific set of regions called the “default network”. Although much is known about the topological and connectional properties of the default network, its functions remain a matter of debate. Functional neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies have suggested two apparently contrasting functions for this network: spontaneous cognition and monitoring the environment. Spontaneous cognition, however, is by default situated in a given external context, an external milieu to which we align ourselves and which must be monitored. This review integrates recent literature suggesting that the two proposed functions of the default network functions need not to be mutually exclusive, and that spontaneous cognition and monitoring of the environment represent complementary instances of conscious experiences occurring during idle moments of daily life.

Supernumerary phantom limb as a rare symptom of epileptic seizures--case report and literature review

Supernumerary phantom limbs, that is, the awareness of an illusory extra limb is a fascinating neurologic symptom that has been described in a number of neurologic diseases including stroke, spinal injury, and epilepsy. Herein we report a case of a 70-year-old male patient with new-onset focal seizures with left-sided supernumerary phantom arm and leg as the only seizure manifestation. Ictal single-photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) revealed a hyperperfusion in the right temporoparietal junction and allowed localization of the seizure-onset zone. This report is accompanied by a discussion of phenomenology and terminology in the context of existing literature.

Electrophysiological analysis of the perception of passive movement

The goal of the present study was to determine the electrophysiological correlate of the threshold of perception of passive motion (TPPM) in a group of healthy individuals. We expect a different pattern of activation over the frontoparietal network produced by the conscious perception of the passive movement. Ten right-handed male volunteers, between 20 and 30 years of age, were submitted to the threshold of perception of passive motion (TPPM) task in a proprioception testing device (PTD). The device was designed to passively move the arm in internal and external rotations about the shoulder joint. Participants were instructed to press a hand-held switch every time movement of the shoulder was detected. Electromyographic (EMG) and electroencephalographic (EEG) activities were acquired during the task. Passive movement of the shoulder joint was followed by a clear and prolonged decrease in the signal magnitude of the electroencephalogram. The electrophysiological correlate of the TPPM was characterized by the establishment of a frontoparietal network, during the processing of somatosensory information.

Leg muscle vibration modulates bodily self-consciousness: integration of proprioceptive, visual, and tactile signals

Behavioral studies have used visuo-tactile conflicts between a participant's body and a visually presented fake or virtual body to investigate the importance of bodily perception for self-consciousness (bodily self-consciousness). Illusory self-identification with a fake body and changes in tactile processing—modulation of visuo-tactile cross-modal congruency effects (CCEs)—were reported in previous findings. Although proprioceptive signals are deemed important for bodily self-consciousness, their contribution to the representation of the full body has not been studied. Here we investigated whether and how self-identification and tactile processing (CCE magnitude) could be modified by altering proprioceptive signals with 80-Hz vibrations at the legs. Participants made elevation judgments of tactile cues (while ignoring nearby lights) during synchronous and asynchronous stroking of a seen fake body. We found that proprioceptive signals during vibrations altered the magnitude of self-identification and mislocalization of touch (CCE) in a synchrony-dependent fashion: we observed an increase of self-identification and CCE magnitude during asynchronous stroking. In a second control experiment we studied whether proprioceptive signals per se, or those from the lower limbs in particular, were essential for these changes. We applied vibrations at the upper limbs (which provide no information about the position of the participant's body in space) and in this case observed no modulation of bodily self-consciousness or tactile perception. These data link proprioceptive signals from the legs that are conveyed through the dorsal column-medial lemniscal pathway to bodily self-consciousness. We discuss their integration with bodily signals from vision and touch for full-body representations.

Partial and full own-body illusions of epileptic origin in a child with right temporoparietal epilepsy

Partial and full own-body illusions of neurological origin have been claimed crucial to understand the contribution of bodily experience and perception to self-consciousness. Whereas partial body illusions are relatively common and well defined, much less is known about full own-body illusions, and even less is known about these illusions in children. Here we describe a 10-year-old patient with the association of partial and full own-body illusions (somatoparaphrenia and out-of-body experience) that occurred sequentially during an epileptic seizure caused by right temporoparietal epilepsy. This report shows that partial and full own-body illusions share functional and neuroanatomical properties and highlights the importance of the right temporoparietal junction for bodily self-consciousness. This is the first report of out-of-body experiences in a child with focal epilepsy.