Sense of agency, associative learning, and schizotypy

Evaluating the Bayesian causal inference model of intentional binding through computational modeling

Intentional binding refers to the subjective compression of the time interval between an action and its consequence. While intentional binding has been widely used as a proxy for the sense of agency, its underlying mechanism has been largely veiled. Bayesian causal inference (BCI) has gained attention as a potential explanation, but currently lacks sufficient empirical support. Thus, this study implemented various computational models to describe the possible mechanisms of intentional binding, fitted them to individual observed data, and quantitatively evaluated their performance. The BCI models successfully isolated the parameters that potentially contributed to intentional binding (i.e., causal belief and temporal prediction) and generally better explained an observer's time estimation than traditional models such as maximum likelihood estimation. The estimated parameter values suggested that the time compression resulted from an expectation that the actions would immediately cause sensory outcomes. Furthermore, I investigated the algorithm that realized this BCI and found probability-matching to be a plausible candidate; people might heuristically reconstruct event timing depending on causal uncertainty rather than optimally integrating causal and temporal posteriors. The evidence demonstrated the utility of computational modeling to investigate how humans infer the causal and temporal structures of events and individual differences in that process.

Sense of agency and its disturbances: A systematic review targeting the intentional binding effect in neuropsychiatric disorders

Sense of agency (SoA) indicates a person's ability to perceive her/his own motor acts as actually being her/his and, through them, to exert control over the course of external events. Disruptions in SoA may profoundly affect the individual's functioning, as observed in several neuropsychiatric disorders. This is the first article to systematically review studies that investigated intentional binding (IB), a quantitative proxy for SoA measurement, in neurological and psychiatric patients. Eligible were studies of IB involving patients with neurological and/or psychiatric disorders. We included 15 studies involving 692 individuals. Risk of bias was low throughout studies. Abnormally increased action-outcome binding was found in schizophrenia and in patients with Parkinson's disease taking dopaminergic medications or reporting impulsive-compulsive behaviors. A decreased IB effect was observed in Tourette's disorder and functional movement disorders, whereas increased action-outcome binding was found in patients with the cortico-basal syndrome. The extent of IB deviation from healthy control values correlated with the severity of symptoms in several disorders. Inconsistent effects were found for autism spectrum disorders, anorexia nervosa, and borderline personality disorder. Findings pave the way for treatments specifically targeting SoA in neuropsychiatric disorders where IB is altered.

Increased temporal binding during voluntary motor task under local anesthesia

Temporal binding refers to a systemic bias in the perceived time interval between two related events, most frequently voluntary motor actions and a subsequent sensory effect. An inevitable component of most instrumental motor actions is tactile feedback. Yet, the role of tactile feedback within this phenomenon remains largely unexplored. Here, we used local anesthesia of the index finger to temporarily inhibit incoming sensory input from the finger itself, while participants performed an interval-estimation task in which they estimated the delay between a voluntary motor action (button press) and a second sensory event (click sound). Results were compared to a control condition with intact sensation. While clear binding was present in both conditions, the effect was significantly enhanced when tactile feedback was temporarily removed via local anesthesia. The results are discussed in light of current debates surrounding the underlying mechanisms and function of this temporal bias.

Neural correlates of performance monitoring vary as a function of competition between automatic and controlled processes: An ERP study

Dual process theories of attitude formation propose that an evolutionary old associative system automatically generates subjective judgments by processing mere spatiotemporal contiguity between paired objects, subjects, or events. These judgments can potentially contradict our well-reasoned evaluations and highjack decisional or behavioral outcomes. Contrary to this perspective, other models stress the exclusive work of a single propositional system that consciously process co-occurrences between environmental cues and produce propositions, i.e., mental statements that capture the specific manner through which stimuli are linked. We constructed an experiment on the premise that it would be possible, if the associative system does produce attitudes in a parallel non-conscious fashion, to condition two mutually exclusive attitudes (one implicit, the other explicit) toward a same stimulus. Through explicit ratings, inhibition performance, and neural correlates of performance monitoring, we assessed whether there was a discrepancy between stimuli that were conditioned with (1) the two systems working in harmony (i.e., producing congruent attitudes), or (2) the two systems working in competition (i.e., producing incongruent attitudes). Compared with congruent stimuli, incongruent stimuli consistently elicited more neutral liking scores, higher response times and error rates, as well as a diminished amplitudes in two well-studied neural correlates of automatic error detection (i.e., error-related negativity) and conscious appraisal of error commission (i.e., error-related positivity). Our findings are discussed in the light of evolutionary psychology, dual-process theories of attitude formation and theoretical frameworks on the functional significance of error-related neural markers.

The over-estimation of distance for self-voice versus other-voice

Self-related stimuli are important cues for people to recognize themselves in the external world and hold a special status in our perceptual system. Self-voice plays an important role in daily social communication and is also a frequent input for self-identification. Although many studies have been conducted on the acoustic features of self-voice, no research has ever examined the spatial aspect, although the spatial perception of voice is important for humans. This study proposes a novel perspective for studying self-voice. We investigated people's distance perception of their own voice when the voice was heard from an external position. Participants heard their own voice from one of four speakers located either 90 or 180 cm from their sitting position, either immediately after uttering a short vowel (i.e., active session) or hearing the replay of their own pronunciation (i.e., replay session). They were then asked to indicate which speaker they heard the voice from. Their voices were either pitch-shifted by ± 4 semitones (i.e., other-voice condition) or unaltered (i.e., self-voice condition). The results of spatial judgment showed that self-voice from the closer speakers was misattributed to that from the speakers further away at a significantly higher proportion than other-voice. This phenomenon was also observed when the participants remained silent and heard prerecorded voices. Additional structural equation modeling using participants' schizotypal scores showed that the effect of self-voice on distance perception was significantly associated with the score of delusional thoughts (Peters Delusion Inventory) and distorted body image (Perceptual Aberration Scale) in the active speaking session but not in the replay session. The findings of this study provide important insights for understanding how people process self-related stimuli when there is a small distortion and how this may be linked to the risk of psychosis.

The Role of the Medial Prefontal Cortex in Self-Agency in Schizophrenia

Schizophrenia is a disorder of the self. In particular, patients show cardinal deficits in self-agency (i.e., the experience and awareness of being the agent of one’s own thoughts and actions) that directly contribute to positive psychotic symptoms of hallucinations and delusions and distort reality monitoring (defined as distinguishing self-generated information from externally-derived information). Predictive coding models suggest that the experience of self-agency results from a minimal prediction error between the predicted sensory consequence of a self-generated action and the actual outcome. In other words, the experience of self-agency is thought to be driven by making reliable predictions about the expected outcomes of one’s own actions. Most of the agency literature has focused on the motor system; here we present a novel viewpoint that examines agency from a different lens using distinct tasks of reality monitoring and speech monitoring. The self-prediction mechanism that leads to self-agency is necessary for reality monitoring in that self-predictions represent a critical precursor for the successful encoding and memory retrieval of one’s own thoughts and actions during reality monitoring to enable accurate self-agency judgments (i.e., accurate identification of self-generated information). This self-prediction mechanism is also critical for speech monitoring where we continually compare auditory feedback (i.e., what we hear ourselves say) with what we expect to hear. Prior research has shown that the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) may represent one potential neural substrate of this self-prediction mechanism. Unfortunately, patients with schizophrenia (SZ) show mPFC hypoactivity associated with self-agency impairments on reality and speech monitoring tasks, as well as aberrant mPFC functional connectivity during intrinsic measures of agency during resting states that predicted worsening psychotic symptoms. Causal neurostimulation and neurofeedback techniques can move the frontiers of schizophrenia research into a new era where we implement techniques to manipulate excitability in key neural regions, such as the mPFC, to modulate patients’ reliance on self-prediction mechanisms on distinct tasks of reality and speech monitoring. We hypothesize these findings will show that mPFC provides a unitary basis for self-agency, driven by reliance on self-prediction mechanisms, which will facilitate the development of new targeted treatments in patients with schizophrenia.

Not all stress is created equal: Acute, not ambient stress, impairs learning in high schizotypes

Learning from feedback is essential for daily functioning, with factors that impact learning having implications for healthy and clinical populations. Reinforcement learning appears impaired across the psychosis continuum, with deficits reported in patients with psychotic disorders as well as high schizotypes from the general population. Stress can impair learning, and sensitivity to stress is present along the psychosis continuum. The aim of the present study was to understand if stress impairs reinforcement learning in those at the lower end of the psychosis continuum. We investigated both naturalistic stress in everyday life using daily hassles (Study 1: n = 70; 31% male, M age = 22.67 years) and acute psychosocial stress using the Trier Social Stress Test (Study 2: n = 57; 32% male, M age = 22.43 years). In the presence of naturalistic stress, learning did not differ across schizotypes. However, under acute psychosocial stress, high schizotypes experienced impaired learning. Our results suggest trail-and-error learning is robust to the ebbs and flows of everyday stress for high schizotypes; however, acute stress is associated with decrements in learning. This indicates that the magnitude of stressors should be considered when designing cognitive and functional interventions for those along the psychosis continuum.

Cannabis Use, Schizotypy and Kamin Blocking Performance

Cannabis use has been associated with increased risk for a first episode of psychosis and inappropriate assignment of salience to extraneous stimuli has been proposed as a mechanism underlying this association. Psychosis-prone (especially schizotypal) personality traits are associated with deficits in associative learning tasks that measure salience allocation. The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between history of cannabis use and Kamin blocking (KB), a form of selective associative learning, in a non-clinical sample. Additionally, KB was examined in relation to self-reported schizotypy and aberrant salience scale profiles. A cross-sectional study was conducted in 307 healthy participants with no previous psychiatric or neurological history. Participants were recruited and tested using the Testable Minds behavioural testing platform. KB was calculated using Oades' "mouse in the house task", performance of which is disrupted in schizophrenia patients. Schizotypy was measured using the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ), and the Aberrant Salience Inventory (ASI) was used to assess self-reported unusual or inappropriate salience. The modified Cannabis Experience Questionnaire (CEQm) was used to collect detailed history of use of cannabis and other recreational drugs. Regression models and Bayesian t-tests or ANOVA (or non-parametric equivalents) examined differences in KB based on lifetime or current cannabis use (frequent use during previous year), as well as frequency of use among those who had previously used cannabis. Neither lifetime nor current cannabis use was associated with any significant change in total or trial-specific KB scores. Current cannabis use was associated with higher Disorganised SPQ dimension scores and higher total and sub-scale values for the ASI. A modest positive association was observed between total KB score and Disorganised SPQ dimension scores, but no relationships were found between KB and other SPQ measures. Higher scores on "Senses Sharpening" ASI sub-scale predicted decreased KB score only in participants who have not engaged in recent cannabis use. These results are discussed in the context of our understanding of the effects of long-term cannabis exposure on salience attribution, as well as inconsistencies in the literature with respect to both the relationship between KB and schizotypy and the measurement of KB associative learning phenomena.

Altered sense of agency in Gilles de la Tourette syndrome: behavioural, clinical and functional magnetic resonance imaging findings

Current neurocognitive models of motor control postulate that accurate action monitoring is crucial for a normal experience of agency-the ability to attribute the authorship of our actions and their consequences to ourselves. Recent studies demonstrated that action monitoring is impaired in Gilles de la Tourette syndrome, a movement disorder characterized by motor and vocal tics. It follows that Tourette syndrome patients may suffer from a perturbed sense of agency, the hypothesis tested in this study. To this end, we recruited 25 Tourette syndrome patients and 25 matched healthy controls in a case-control behavioural and functional magnetic resonance imaging study. As an implicit index of the sense of agency, we measured the intentional binding phenomenon, i.e., the perceived temporal compression between voluntary movements and their external consequences. We found evidence of an impaired sense of agency in Tourette syndrome patients who, as a group, did not show a significant intentional binding. The more reduced was the individual intentional binding, the more severe were the motor symptoms. Specific differences between the two groups were also observed in terms of brain activation patterns. In the healthy controls group, the magnitude of the intentional binding was associated with the activity of a premotor-parietal-cerebellar network. This relationship was not present in the Tourette syndrome group, suggesting an altered activation of the agency brain network for self-generated acts. We conclude that the less accurate action monitoring described in Tourette syndrome also involves the assessment of the consequences of actions in the outside world. We discuss that this may lead to difficulties in distinguishing external consequences produced by their own actions from the ones caused by others in Tourette syndrome patients.

Embodied Predictions, Agency, and Psychosis

Psychotic symptoms, i.e., hallucinations and delusions, involve gross departures from conscious apprehension of consensual reality; respectively, perceiving and believing things that, according to same culture peers, do not obtain. In schizophrenia, those experiences are often related to abnormal sense of control over one's own actions, often expressed as a distorted sense of agency (i.e., passivity symptoms). Cognitive and computational neuroscience have furnished an account of these experiences and beliefs in terms of the brain's generative model of the world, which underwrites inferences to the best explanation of current and future states, in order to behave adaptively. Inference then involves a reliability-based trade off of predictions and prediction errors, and psychotic symptoms may arise as departures from this inference process, either an over- or under-weighting of priors relative to prediction errors. Surprisingly, there is empirical evidence in favor of both positions. Relatedly, there is evidence for both an enhanced and a diminished sense of agency in schizophrenia. How can this be? We argue that there is more than one generative model in the brain, and that ego- and allo-centric models operate in tandem. In brief, ego-centric models implement corollary discharge signals that cancel out the effects of self-generated actions while allo-centric models compare several hypothesis regarding the causes of sensory inputs (including the self among the potential causes). The two parallel hierarchies give rise to different levels of agency, with ego-centric models subserving "feelings of agency" and allo-centric predictions giving rise to "judgements of agency." Those two components are weighted according to their reliability and combined, generating a higher-level "sense of agency." We suggest that in schizophrenia a failure of corollary discharges to suppress self-generated inputs results in the absence of a "feeling of agency" and in a compensatory enhancement of allo-centric priors, which might underlie hallucinations, delusions of control but also, under certain circumstances, the enhancement of "judgments of agency." We discuss the consequences of such a model, and potential courses of action that could lead to its falsification.

The Prospective Sense of Agency is Rooted in Local and Global Properties of Intrinsic Functional Brain Networks

The sense of agency (SoA) refers to a constitutional aspect of the self describing the extent to which individuals feel in control over their actions and consequences thereof. Although the SoA has been associated with mental health and well-being, it is still unknown how interindividual variability in the SoA is embedded in the intrinsic brain organization. We hypothesized that the prospective component of an implicit SoA is associated with brain networks related to SoA and sensorimotor predictions on multiple spatial scales. We replicated previous findings by showing a significant prospective SoA as indicated by intentional binding effects. Then, using task-free fMRI and graph analysis, we analyzed associations between intentional binding effects and the intrinsic brain organization at regional, modular, and whole-brain scales. The results showed that intermodular connections of a frontoparietal module including the premotor cortex, supramarginal gyrus, and dorsal precuneus are associated with individual differences in prospective intentional binding. Notably, prospective intentional binding effects were also related to global brain modularity within a specific structural resolution range. These findings suggest that an implicit SoA generated through sensorimotor predictions relies on the intrinsic organization of the brain connectome on both local and global scales.

The evolving sense of agency: Context recency and quality modulate the interaction between prospective and retrospective processes

Humans acquire a sense of agency through their interactions with the world and their sensory consequences. Previous studies have highlighted stable agency-related phenomena like intentional binding, which depend on both prospective, context-dependent and retrospective, outcome-dependent processes. In the current study, we investigated the interaction between prospective and retrospective processes underlying the adaptation of an ongoing sense of agency. The results showed that prospective intentional binding developed during a temporal window of up to 20 prior events was independent of the nature of the ongoing event. By contrast, the characteristics of the ongoing event retrospectively influenced prospective intentional binding developed during a temporal window narrower than 6 prior events. These findings characterize the interaction between prospective and retrospective mechanisms as a fundamental process to continuously update the sense of agency through sensorimotor learning. High psychosis-like experience traits weakened this interaction, suggesting that reduced adaption to the context contributes to altered self-experience.

Neural Mechanisms of Strategic Adaptation in Attentional Flexibility

Individuals are able to adjust their readiness to shift spatial attention, referred to as "attentional flexibility," according to the changing demands of the environment, but the neural mechanisms underlying learned adjustments in flexibility are unknown. In the current study, we used fMRI to identify the brain structures responsible for learning shift likelihood. Participants were cued to covertly hold or shift attention among continuous streams of alphanumeric characters and to indicate the parity of target stimuli. Unbeknown to the participants, the stream locations were predictive of the likelihood of having to shift (or hold) attention. Participants adapted their attentional flexibility according to contextual demands, such that the RT cost associated with shifting attention was smallest when shift cues were most likely. Learning model-derived shift prediction error scaled positively with activity within dorsal and ventral frontoparietal regions, documenting that these regions track and update shift likelihood. A complementary inverted encoding model analysis revealed that the pretrial difference in attentional selection strength between to-be-attended and to-be-ignored locations did not change with increasing shift likelihood. The behavioral improvement associated with learned flexibility may primarily arise from a speeding of the shift process rather than from preparatory broadening of attentional selection.

Environmental control and psychosis-relevant traits modulate the prospective sense of agency in non-clinical individuals

The sense of agency concerns the experience of being the source of one's own actions and their consequences. An altered sense of agency can occur due to task automation and in psychosis. We tested in a non-clinical sample the hypothesis that reducing voluntary task control diminishes intentional binding as an implicit indicator of the sense of agency, possibly interacting with psychosis-relevant personality traits. Agent-device interactions were manipulated obtaining positive-control (voluntary interaction), no-control (automation), and negative-control (device-commanded interaction) groups. The main results showed reduced prospective intentional binding (predictive coding of action consequences) in the no-control and negative-control groups, compared to the positive-control group. Psychosis-like experiences covaried positively with intentional binding in the no-control group, but negatively in the negative-control group. Moreover, positive-social traits were associated with increased intentional binding in the positive-control group. These findings demonstrate the interplay between environmental and individual differences variables in establishing the implicit sense of agency.

Dysconnectivity of the Agency Network in Schizophrenia: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study

Background: Self-disturbances in schizophrenia have recently been explained by an abnormality in the sense of agency (SoA). The cerebral structures of SoA in healthy people are considered to mainly include the insula and inferior parietal lobule. In contrast, the functional lesion of aberrant SoA in schizophrenia is not yet fully understood. Considering the recent explanation of establishing SoA from the standpoint of associative learning, the "agency network" may include not only the insula and inferior parietal lobule but also the striatum. We hypothesized that aberrant SoA in schizophrenia is based on a deficit in the "agency network." Methods: Functional magnetic resonance imaging data were acquired while patients with schizophrenia (n = 15) and matched controls (n = 15) performed our adaptation method of agency attribution task on a trial-by-trial basis to assess participants' explicit experience of the temporal causal relationship between an action and an external event with temporal biases. Analysis of functional connectivity was done using the right supramarginal gyrus and the right middle frontal gyrus as seed regions. Results: In healthy controls, analyses revealed increased activation of the right inferior parietal lobule (mainly the supramarginal gyrus), right insula, and right middle frontal gyrus as an activation of the agency condition. We defined activated Brodmann areas shown in the agency condition of healthy controls as the seed region for connectivity analysis. The connectivity analysis revealed lower connectivity between the head of the left caudate nucleus and right supramarginal gyrus in the patients compared to healthy controls. Conclusions: This dysconnectivity of the agency network in schizophrenia may lead to self-disturbance through deficits in associative learning of SoA. These findings may explain why pathological function of the striatum in schizophrenia leads to self-disturbance.

Individual Differences in Sensitivity to Visuomotor Discrepancies

This study explored whether sensitivity to visuomotor discrepancies, specifically the ability to detect and respond to loss of control over a moving object, is associated with other psychological traits and abilities. College-aged adults performed a computerized tracking task which involved keeping a cursor centered on a moving target using keyboard controls. On some trials, the cursor became unresponsive to participants' keypresses. Participants were instructed to immediately press the space bar if they noticed a loss of control. Response times (RTs) were measured. Additionally, participants completed a battery of behavioral and questionnaire-based tests with hypothesized relationships to the phenomenology of control, including measures of constructs such as locus of control, impulsiveness, need for cognition (NFC), and non-clinical schizotypy. Bivariate correlations between RTs to loss of control and high order cognitive and personality traits were not significant. However, a step-wise regression showed that better performance on the pursuit rotor task predicted faster RTs to loss of control while controlling for age, signal detection, and NFC. Results are discussed in relation to multifactorial models of the sense of agency.

Hallucinations and Strong Priors

Hallucinations, perceptions in the absence of objectively identifiable stimuli, illustrate the constructive nature of perception. Here, we highlight the role of prior beliefs as a critical elicitor of hallucinations. Recent empirical work from independent laboratories shows strong, overly precise priors can engender hallucinations in healthy subjects and that individuals who hallucinate in the real world are more susceptible to these laboratory phenomena. We consider these observations in light of work demonstrating apparently weak, or imprecise, priors in psychosis. Appreciating the interactions within and between hierarchies of inference can reconcile this apparent disconnect. Data from neural networks, human behavior, and neuroimaging support this contention. This work underlines the continuum from normal to aberrant perception, encouraging a more empathic approach to clinical hallucinations.

The influence of action-outcome contingency on motivation from control

The sense of agency is defined as one’s sense of control over one’s actions and their consequences. A recent theory, the control-based response selection framework (Karsh and Eitam, Motivation from control: a response selection framework. The sense of agency, Oxford University Press, New York, 2015a), suggests that actions associated with a high sense of agency are intrinsically rewarding and thus motivate response selection. Previous studies support this theory by demonstrating that factors impacting on sense of agency (e.g. probability of an outcome following an action) also motivate selection of actions. Here we report a novel test of the control-based response selection framework in the domain of action–outcome contingency. The contingency between actions and their outcome has previously been demonstrated to impact the sense of agency, but its impact on the motivation to perform actions has not yet been examined. Participants were asked to press one of four buttons as randomly as possible. Each of the buttons was assigned a different probability of causing an outcome when pressed. Additionally, a contingency manipulation was employed where the probability of an outcome occurring in the absence of a button press was also varied in blocks throughout the experiment. Results demonstrated a significant influence of contingency on response speed, and a significant effect of probability on response selection, consistent with predictions from the control-based response selection framework. Furthermore, some evidence was observed for a positive correlation between influence of contingency and autistic traits, with individuals with higher autistic traits showing a greater influence of contingency on reaction times. The current findings support the idea that actions associated with an increased sense of agency are intrinsically rewarding, and identify how individual differences may impact on this process.

The sense of agency shapes body schema and peripersonal space

Body schema, a sensorimotor representation of the body used for planning and executing movements, is plastic because it extends by using a tool to reach far objects. Modifications of peripersonal space, i.e., a functional representation of reach space, usually co-occur with body schema changes. Here, we hypothesized that such plastic changes depend on the experience of controlling the course of events in space trough one’s own actions, i.e., the sense of agency. In two experiments, body schema and peripersonal space were assessed before and after the participants’ sense of agency over a virtual hand was manipulated. Body schema and peripersonal space enlarged or contracted depending on whether the virtual hand was presented in far space, or closer to the participants’ body than the real hand. These findings suggest that body schema and peripersonal space are affected by the dynamic mapping between intentional body movements and expected consequences in space.

Evidence of absence: no relationship between behaviourally measured prediction error response and schizotypy

INTRODUCTION

The predictive processing framework has attracted much interest in the field of schizophrenia research in recent years, with an increasing number of studies also carried out in healthy individuals with nonclinical psychosis-like experiences. The current research adopted a continuum approach to psychosis and aimed to investigate different types of prediction error responses in relation to psychometrically defined schizotypy.

METHODS

One hundred and two healthy volunteers underwent a battery of behavioural tasks including (a) a force-matching task, (b) a Kamin blocking task, and (c) a reversal learning task together with three questionnaires measuring domains of schizotypy from different approaches.

RESULTS

Neither frequentist nor Bayesian statistical methods supported the notion that alterations in prediction error responses were related to schizotypal traits in any of the three tasks.

CONCLUSIONS

These null results suggest that deficits in predictive processing associated with clinical states of psychosis are not always present in healthy individuals with schizotypal traits.

Altered awareness of action in Parkinson's disease: evaluations by explicit and implicit measures

Deficits in the integration of motor prediction and its feedback have been reported in Parkinson’s disease. Conscious awareness of action is proposed to emerge under the integration of motor prediction and its feedback. Thus, it may lead to changes in the awareness of the authorship of action (in other words, the sense of agency) in Parkinson’s disease. We have employed both explicit and implicit measures to assess the awareness of action in Parkinson’s disease and matched controls. As an explicit measure, an action recognition task requiring explicit judgments was used. Patients showed less attribution of their movements to non-biased and angular-biased visual feedbacks. As an implicit measure, the temporal attraction between the perceived time of actions and their effects, which is known as intentional binding task, was used. While action-effect association was observed in the control group, actions were not experienced as having shifted towards their subsequent effects in the patient group. These tendencies were consistent regardless of the side of the asymmetrical motor symptoms. These results may reflect an underlying abnormality in the awareness of voluntary action in Parkinson’s disease.

The influence of intrapersonal sensorimotor experiences on the corticospinal responses during action-observation

The coupling of perception and action has been strongly indicated by evidence that the observation of an action primes a response in the observer. It has been proposed that these primed responses may be inhibited when the observer is able to more closely distinguish between self- and other-generated actions - the greater the distinction, then the greater the inhibition of the primed response. This self-other distinction is shown to be enhanced following a period of visual feedback of self-generated action. The present study was designed to examine how sensorimotor experiences pertaining to self-generated action affect primed responses from observed actions. Single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation was used to investigate corticospinal activity elicited during the observation of index- and little-finger actions before and after training (self-generated action). For sensorimotor training, participants executed finger movements with or without visual feedback of their own movement. Results showed that the increases in muscle-specific corticospinal activity elicited from action-observation persisted after training without visual feedback, but did not emerge following training with visual feedback. This inhibition in corticospinal activity during action-observation following training with vision could have resulted from the refining of internal models of self-generated action, which then led to a greater distinction between "self" and "other" actions.

The ability to tickle oneself is associated with level of psychometric schizotypy in non-clinical individuals

A recent study (Lemaitre et al., 2016, Consciousness and Cognition, 41, 64-71) found that non-clinical individuals who scored highly on a psychometric scale of schizotypy were able to tickle themselves. The present study aimed to extend this finding by investigating whether the ability to tickle oneself was associated with level of psychometric schizotypy considered as a continuous variable. One hundred and eleven students completed the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ). A mechanical device delivered tactile stimulation to participants' palms. The device was operated by the experimenter (External) or the participant (Self). Participants were asked to rate the intensity, ticklishness and pleasantness of the stimulation. A significant association was observed between participants' tactile self-suppression (External minus Self) and their score on the SPQ. These results suggest that the ability to suppress the tactile consequences of self-generated movements varies across the general population, and maps directly onto the personality dimension of schizotypy.

Prediction error, ketamine and psychosis: An updated model

In 2007, we proposed an explanation of delusion formation as aberrant prediction error-driven associative learning. Further, we argued that the NMDA receptor antagonist ketamine provided a good model for this process. Subsequently, we validated the model in patients with psychosis, relating aberrant prediction error signals to delusion severity. During the ensuing period, we have developed these ideas, drawing on the simple principle that brains build a model of the world and refine it by minimising prediction errors, as well as using it to guide perceptual inferences. While previously we focused on the prediction error signal per se, an updated view takes into account its precision, as well as the precision of prior expectations. With this expanded perspective, we see several possible routes to psychotic symptoms - which may explain the heterogeneity of psychotic illness, as well as the fact that other drugs, with different pharmacological actions, can produce psychotomimetic effects. In this article, we review the basic principles of this model and highlight specific ways in which prediction errors can be perturbed, in particular considering the reliability and uncertainty of predictions. The expanded model explains hallucinations as perturbations of the uncertainty mediated balance between expectation and prediction error. Here, expectations dominate and create perceptions by suppressing or ignoring actual inputs. Negative symptoms may arise due to poor reliability of predictions in service of action. By mapping from biology to belief and perception, the account proffers new explanations of psychosis. However, challenges remain. We attempt to address some of these concerns and suggest future directions, incorporating other symptoms into the model, building towards better understanding of psychosis.

Social Transmission of Experience of Agency: An Experimental Study

The sense of controlling one’s own actions is fundamental to normal human mental function, and also underlies concepts of social responsibility for action. However, it remains unclear how the wider social context of human action influences sense of agency. Using a simple experimental design, we investigated, for the first time, how observing the action of another person or a robot could potentially influence one’s own sense of agency. We assessed how observing another’s action might change the perceived temporal relationship between one’s own voluntary actions and their outcomes, which has been proposed as an implicit measure of sense of agency. Working in pairs, participants chose between two action alternatives, one rewarded more frequently than the other, while watching a rotating clock hand. They judged, in separate blocks, either the time of their own action, or the time of a tone that followed the action. These were compared to baseline judgements of actions alone, or tones alone, to calculate the perceptual shift of action toward outcome and vice versa. Our design focused on how these two dependent variables, which jointly provide an implicit measure of sense of agency, might be influenced by observing another’s action. In the observational group, each participant could see the other’s actions. Multivariate analysis showed that the perceived time of action and tone shifted progressively toward the actual time of outcome with repeated experience of this social situation. No such progressive change occurred in other groups for whom a barrier hid participants’ actions from each other. However, a similar effect was observed in the group that viewed movements of a human-like robotic hand, rather than actions of another person. This finding suggests that observing the actions of others increases the salience of the external outcomes of action and this effect is not unique to observing human agents. Social contexts in which we see others controlling external events may play an important role in mentally representing the impact of our own actions on the external world.

The intentionality bias and schizotypy

The “intentionality bias” refers to our automatic tendency to judge other people's actions to be intentional. In this experiment we extended research on this effect in two key ways. First, we developed a novel nonlinguistic task for assessing the intentionality bias. This task used video stimuli of ambiguous movements. Second, we investigated the relationship between the strength of this bias and schizotypy (schizophrenia-like symptoms in healthy individuals). Our results showed that the intentionality bias was replicated for the video stimuli and also that this bias is stronger in those individuals scoring higher on the schizotypy rating scales. Overall these findings lend further support for the existence of the intentionality bias. We also discuss the possible relevance of these findings for our understanding of certain symptoms of schizophrenic illness.

Do implicit and explicit measures of the sense of agency measure the same thing?

The sense of agency (SoA) refers to perceived causality of the self, i.e. the feeling of causing something to happen. The SoA has been probed using a variety of explicit and implicit measures. Explicit measures include rating scales and questionnaires. Implicit measures, which include sensory attenuation and temporal binding, use perceptual differences between self- and externally generated stimuli as measures of the SoA. In the present study, we investigated whether the different measures tap into the same self-attribution processes by determining whether individual differences on implicit and explicit measures of SoA are correlated. Participants performed tasks in which they triggered tones via key presses (operant condition) or passively listened to tones triggered by a computer (observational condition). We replicated previously reported effects of sensory attenuation and temporal binding. Surprisingly the two implicit measures of SoA were not significantly correlated with each other, nor did they correlate with the explicit measures of SoA. Our results suggest that some explicit and implicit measures of the SoA may tap into different processes.

Intentional Binding is independent of the validity of the action effect's identity

When an action produces an effect, both events are perceived to be shifted in time toward each other. This shift is called Intentional Binding (IB) effect. First evidence shows that this shift does not depend on the statistical predictability of the produced effect's identity (Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 2012). We confirm this result by comparing the perceived duration of action-effect intervals before valid and invalid action effects using the method of constant stimuli. The perceived duration of action-effect intervals did not differ for valid and invalid effects. This result was true for different durations of the action-effect interval (Experiments 1-4: 250 ms, Experiments 1 & 2: 400 ms), different effect modalities (Experiments 1 & 3: visual, Experiments 2-4: auditive), and two types of validity variations (Experiments 1 & 2: 80% valid, Experiments 3 & 4: 100% valid vs. random). We validated our results by using a clock paradigm and a numerical duration estimation task (Experiment 4). We conclude that the IB effect is not the result of internal prediction due to action-effect bindings, but might rely on higher-order processes.

Action, prediction, and temporal awareness

The brain needs to track changes in the relation between action and effect. In two experiments, participants made voluntary keypress actions. In an adaptation phase, these actions were followed after a fixed interval by a tone. During a subsequent test phase, the duration of the interval was unexpectedly changed. We used time perception as an implicit marker of the experience of participants' control over the effect, and confirmed a temporal binding between actions and effects. On test trials, participants perceived tones to occur as shifted towards their time of occurrence in the preceding adaptation phase. Therefore, the perceived time of a tone was partly based on learning of an internal prediction, rather than on the time of actual sensory input. This predictive model is rapidly updated over a few trials (Experiment 1), and requires attention to the tones (Experiment 2). The brain learns action-effect relations. This predictive learning influences the perception of effects, and underlies some temporal illusions associated with action.

Simple minds: a qualified defence of associative learning

Using cooperation in chimpanzees as a case study, this article argues that research on animal minds needs to steer a course between 'association-blindness'--the failure to consider associative learning as a candidate explanation for complex behaviour--and 'simple-mindedness'--the assumption that associative explanations trump more cognitive hypotheses. Association-blindness is challenged by the evidence that associative learning occurs in a wide range of taxa and functional contexts, and is a major force guiding the development of complex human behaviour. Furthermore, contrary to a common view, association-blindness is not entailed by the rejection of behaviourism. Simple-mindedness is founded on Morgan's canon, a methodological principle recommending 'lower' over 'higher' explanations for animal behaviour. Studies in the history and philosophy of science show that Morgan failed to offer an adequate justification for his canon, and subsequent attempts to justify the canon using evolutionary arguments and appeals to simplicity have not been successful. The weaknesses of association-blindness and simple-mindedness imply that there are no short-cuts to finding out about animal minds. To decide between associative and yet more cognitive explanations for animal behaviour, we have to spell them out in sufficient detail to allow differential predictions, and to test these predictions through observation and experiment.

The neurobiology of schizotypy: fronto-striatal prediction error signal correlates with delusion-like beliefs in healthy people

Healthy people sometimes report experiences and beliefs that are strikingly similar to the symptoms of psychosis in their bizarreness and the apparent lack of evidence supporting them. An important question is whether this represents merely a superficial resemblance or whether there is a genuine and deep similarity indicating, as some have suggested, a continuum between odd but healthy beliefs and the symptoms of psychotic illness. We sought to shed light on this question by determining whether the neural marker for prediction error - previously shown to be altered in early psychosis--is comparably altered in healthy individuals reporting schizotypal experiences and beliefs. We showed that non-clinical schizotypal experiences were significantly correlated with aberrant frontal and striatal prediction error signal. This correlation related to the distress associated with the beliefs. Given our previous observations that patients with first episode psychosis show altered neural responses to prediction error and that this alteration, in turn, relates to the severity of their delusional ideation, our results provide novel evidence in support of the view that schizotypy relates to psychosis at more than just a superficial descriptive level. However, the picture is a complex one in which the experiences, though associated with altered striatal responding, may provoke distress but may nonetheless be explained away, while an additional alteration in frontal cortical responding may allow the beliefs to become more delusion-like: intrusive and distressing.

Exploring implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency

Sense of agency refers to the sense of initiating and controlling actions in order to influence events in the outside world. Recently, a distinction between implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency has been proposed, analogous to distinctions found in other areas of cognition, notably learning. However, there is yet no strong evidence supporting separable implicit and explicit components of sense of agency. The so-called ‘Perruchet paradigm’ offers one of the few convincing demonstrations of separable implicit and explicit learning systems. We adopted this approach to evaluate the implicit–explicit distinction in the context of a simple task in which outcomes were probabilistically caused by actions. In line with our initial predictions, we found evidence of a dissociation. We discuss the implications of this result for theories of sense of agency.