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Foley JA, Chen C, Paget A, Cipolotti L. A Bayesian predictive processing account of Othello syndrome in Parkinson's disease. Cogn Neuropsychiatry 2023; 28:269-284. [PMID: 37366042 DOI: 10.1080/13546805.2023.2229080] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/04/2022] [Accepted: 03/24/2023] [Indexed: 06/28/2023]
Abstract
Introduction: Although delusions in Parkinson's disease (PD) are rare, when they occur they frequently take the form of "Othello syndrome": the irrational belief that a spouse or partner is being unfaithful. Hitherto dismissed as either a by-product of dopamine therapy or cognitive impairment, there are still no convincing theoretical accounts to explain why only some patients fall prey to this delusion, or why it persists despite clear disconfirmatory evidence.Methods: We discuss the limitations of existing explanations of this delusion, namely hyperdopaminergia-induced anomalous perceptual experiences and cognitive impairment, before describing how Bayesian predictive processing accounts can provide a more comprehensive explanation by foregrounding the importance of prior experience and its impact upon computation of probability. We illustrate this new conceptualisation with three case vignettes.Results: We suggest that in those with prior experience of romantic betrayal, hyperdominergic-induced aberrant prediction errors enable anomalous perceptual experiences to accrue greater prominence, which is then maintained through Bayes-optimal inferencing to confirm cognitive distortions, eliciting and shaping this dangerous delusion.Conclusions: We propose the first comprehensive mechanistic account of Othello syndrome in PD and discuss implications for clinical interventions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jennifer A Foley
- Department of Neuropsychology, National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery, London, UK
- UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology, London, UK
| | - Cliff Chen
- Department of Clinical Neuropsychology, Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust, Salford, UK
| | - Andrew Paget
- Department of Neuropsychology, National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery, London, UK
| | - Lisa Cipolotti
- Department of Neuropsychology, National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery, London, UK
- UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology, London, UK
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2
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Abstract
BACKGROUND Psychiatrists depend on their patients for clinical information and are obligated to regard them as trustworthy, except in special circumstances. Nevertheless, some critics of psychiatry have argued that psychiatrists frequently perpetrate epistemic injustice against patients. Epistemic injustice is a moral wrong that involves unfairly discriminating against a person with respect to their ability to know things because of personal characteristics like gender or psychiatric diagnosis. METHODS We review the concept of epistemic injustice and several claims that psychiatric practice is epistemically unjust. RESULTS While acknowledging the risk of epistemic injustice in psychiatry and other medical fields, we argue that most concerns that psychiatric practice is epistemically unjust are unfounded. CONCLUSIONS The concept of epistemic injustice does not add significantly to existing standards of good clinical practice, and that it could produce changes in practice that would be deleterious. Psychiatrists should resist calls for changes to clinical practice based on this type of criticism.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brent M Kious
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Utah, 501 Chipeta Way, Salt Lake City, UT 84108, USA
| | - Benjamin R Lewis
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Utah, 501 Chipeta Way, Salt Lake City, UT 84108, USA
| | - Scott Y H Kim
- Department of Bioethics, National Institutes of Health, 10 Center Drive, Bethesda, MD 20814, USA
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3
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Subjective experience and meaning of delusions in psychosis: a systematic review and qualitative evidence synthesis. Lancet Psychiatry 2022; 9:458-476. [PMID: 35523211 DOI: 10.1016/s2215-0366(22)00104-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 10.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/17/2022] [Revised: 03/07/2022] [Accepted: 03/16/2022] [Indexed: 02/07/2023]
Abstract
BACKGROUND Delusions are a common transdiagnostic feature of psychotic disorders, and their treatment remains suboptimal. Despite the pressing need to better understand the nature, meaning, and course of these symptoms, research into the lived experience of delusional phenomena in psychosis is scarce. Thus, we aimed to explore the lived experience and subjective apprehension of delusions in help-seeking individuals with psychosis, regardless of diagnosis and thematic content of the delusion. METHODS In our systematic review and qualitative evidence synthesis, we searched MEDLINE, Embase, PsycINFO, CINAHL, and Web of Science for qualitative studies published in English from database inception, with the last search on Sept 9, 2021. Grey literature search and hand-searching of relevant journals were also done. Studies were eligible if they provided an analysis of lived experience of delusions or predelusional phenomena presented from the perspective of individuals (age 14-65 years) who had developed a clinical high-risk stage of psychosis, or a diagnosable affective or non-affective psychotic disorder (as clinically defined, self-reported, or assessed within the primary study). Studies with only a subset of relevant participants were eligible only if data for the population of interest were reported separately. Studies that did not discriminate between the experience of delusion and other positive symptoms (eg, hallucinations) were included only if data for delusions were reported separately or could be extracted. First-person accounts (and author interpretations) discussing changes in the sense of self, lived world, and meaning in relation to delusions were extracted and synthesised using a novel thematic synthesis approach informed by a critical realist stance and a phenomenological theoretical framework. Analytic themes were developed into a new overarching framework for understanding the emergence of delusional phenomena. The study was registered with PROSPERO, CRD42020222104. FINDINGS Of the 3265 records screened, 2115 were identified after duplicate removal. Of these, 1982 were excluded after title and abstract screening and 106 after full-text eligibility assessment. Of the 27 studies entering quality assessment, 24 eligible studies were included in the qualitative evidence synthesis, representing the perspectives of 373 help-seeking individuals with lived experience of delusions in the context of psychosis. Gender was reported as male (n=210), female (n=110), transgender (n=1), or not reported (n=52). Only 13 studies reported ethnicity, with White being predominant. The age of most participants ranged from 15 to 65 years. We found no eligible studies investigating subclinical or predelusional experiences in at-risk mental state populations through qualitative methods. Most studies were undertaken in western, educated, industrialised, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and most included participants had received or self-reported a diagnosis within the schizophrenia spectrum. Studies differed in relation to whether they focused on one kind or theme of delusion or delusional phenomena more generally as a unified category. Three superordinate themes relating to experiential changes and meanings in delusion were identified: (1) a radical rearrangement of the lived world dominated by intense emotions; (2) doubting, losing, and finding oneself again within delusional realities; and (3) searching for meaning, belonging, and coherence beyond mere dysfunction. Based on the review findings and thematic synthesis, we propose the Emergence Model of Delusion to advance understanding of delusional phenomena in psychosis. INTERPRETATION Delusions are best understood as strongly individualised and inherently complex phenomena emerging from a dynamic interplay between interdependent subpersonal, personal, interpersonal, and sociocultural processes. Integrative approaches to research on delusion, which consider their potential adaptiveness and favour explanatory pluralism, might be advantageous. Effective clinical care for individuals with psychosis might need adapting to match more closely, and take account of, the subjective experience and meaning of delusions as they are lived through, which might also help redress power imbalances and enduring epistemic injustices in mental health. FUNDING Priestley Scholars, Wellcome Trust.
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Letheby C, Mattu J. Philosophy and classic psychedelics: A review of some emerging themes. JOURNAL OF PSYCHEDELIC STUDIES 2022. [DOI: 10.1556/2054.2021.00191] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
Serotonergic (or “classic”) psychedelics have struck many researchers as raising significant philosophical questions that, until recently, were largely unexplored by academic philosophers. This paper provides an overview of four emerging lines of research at the intersection of academic philosophy and psychedelic science that have gained considerable traction in the last decade: selfless consciousness, psychedelic epistemology, psychedelic ethics, and spiritual/religious naturalism. In this paper, we highlight philosophical questions concerning (i) psychedelics, self-consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness, (ii) the epistemic profile of the psychedelic experience; (iii) ethical concerns about the appropriate use of psychedelics; and (iv) whether spiritual or religious dimensions of psychedelic use are compatible with a naturalistic worldview.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chris Letheby
- Department of Philosophy, University of Western Australia, 35 Stirling Hwy, Crawley WA 6009, Australia
- Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, North Terrace, Adelaide SA 5005, Australia
| | - Jaipreet Mattu
- Department of Philosophy, Rotman Institute of Philosophy, Western University, 7170 Western Interdisciplinary Research Building, 1151 Richmond St., London, Ontario, N6A 5B8, Canada
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Abstract
Because of the traditional conceptualization of delusion as “irrational belief,” cognitive models of delusions largely focus on impairments to domain-general reasoning. Nevertheless, current rationality-impairment models do not account for the fact that (a) equivalently irrational beliefs can be induced through adaptive social cognitive processes, reflecting social integration rather than impairment; (b) delusions are overwhelmingly socially themed; and (c) delusions show a reduced sensitivity to social context both in terms of how they are shaped and how they are communicated. Consequently, we argue that models of delusions need to include alteration to coalitional cognition—processes involved in affiliation, group perception, and the strategic management of relationships. This approach has the advantage of better accounting for both content (social themes) and form (fixity) of delusion. It is also supported by the established role of mesolimbic dopamine in both delusions and social organization and the ongoing reconceptualization of belief as serving a social organizational function.
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Affiliation(s)
- Vaughan Bell
- Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, University College London.,Psychological Interventions Clinic for Outpatients with Psychosis, South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, London, England
| | - Nichola Raihani
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London
| | - Sam Wilkinson
- Department of Sociology, Philosophy and Anthropology, Exeter University
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Crutchfield P. Delusion, Proper Function, and Justification. NEUROETHICS-NETH 2020. [DOI: 10.1007/s12152-020-09429-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
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Rationalization in the pejorative sense: Cushman's account overlooks the scope and costs of rationalization. Behav Brain Sci 2020; 43:e35. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x19002152] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
According to Cushman, rationalization occurs when a person has performed an action and then concocts beliefs and desires that would have made it rational. We argue that this isn't the paradigmatic form of rationalization. Consequently, Cushman's explanation of the function and usefulness of rationalization is less broad-reaching than he intends. Cushman's account also obscures some of rationalization's pernicious consequences.
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Lancellotta E, Bortolotti L. Are clinical delusions adaptive? WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2019; 10:e1502. [PMID: 31056862 PMCID: PMC6899558 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1502] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/02/2018] [Revised: 04/06/2019] [Accepted: 04/08/2019] [Indexed: 12/31/2022]
Abstract
Delusions are symptoms of psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and dementia. By and large, delusions are characterized by their behavioral manifestations and defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. In this overview paper, we ask whether delusions can be adaptive notwithstanding their negative features. Can they be a response to a crisis rather than the source of the crisis? Can they be the beginning of a solution rather than the problem? Some of the psychological, psychiatric, and philosophical literature has recently suggested that they can. We consider different types of delusions and different ways in which they can be considered as adaptive: psychologically (e.g., by increasing wellbeing, purpose in life, intrapsychic coherence, or good functioning) and biologically (e.g., by enhancing genetic fitness). Although further research is needed to map the costs and benefits of adopting and maintaining delusional beliefs, a more nuanced picture of the role of delusions in people's lives has started to emerge. This article is categorized under:
Philosophy > Representation Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief Neuroscience > Cognition
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Affiliation(s)
- Eugenia Lancellotta
- Philosophy Department and Institute for Mental Health, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
| | - Lisa Bortolotti
- Philosophy Department and Institute for Mental Health, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
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Metzinger TK. Why Is Virtual Reality Interesting for Philosophers? Front Robot AI 2018; 5:101. [PMID: 33500980 PMCID: PMC7805639 DOI: 10.3389/frobt.2018.00101] [Citation(s) in RCA: 29] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/10/2017] [Accepted: 07/31/2018] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
This article explores promising points of contact between philosophy and the expanding field of virtual reality research. Aiming at an interdisciplinary audience, it proposes a series of new research targets by presenting a range of concrete examples characterized by high theoretical relevance and heuristic fecundity. Among these examples are conscious experience itself, “Bayesian” and social VR, amnestic re-embodiment, merging human-controlled avatars and virtual agents, virtual ego-dissolution, controlling the reality/virtuality continuum, the confluence of VR and artificial intelligence (AI) as well as of VR and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), VR-based social hallucinations and the emergence of a virtual Lebenswelt, religious faith and practical phenomenology. Hopefully, these examples can serve as first proposals for intensified future interaction and mark out some potential new directions for research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas K Metzinger
- Philosophisches Seminar, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz, Germany.,Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
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Bortolotti L, Sullivan‐Bissett E. The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions. MIND & LANGUAGE 2018; 33:263-279. [PMID: 30008501 PMCID: PMC6033119 DOI: 10.1111/mila.12175] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/21/2023]
Abstract
In some neuropsychological disorders, distorted reports seem to fill gaps in people's memory of their past, where people's self-image, history, and prospects are often enhanced. False beliefs about the past compromise both people's capacity to construct a reliable autobiography and their trustworthiness as communicators. However, such beliefs contribute to people's sense of competence and self-confidence, increasing psychological well-being. Here, we consider both the psychological benefits and epistemic costs and argue that distorting the past is likely to also have epistemic benefits that cannot be obtained otherwise, such as enabling people to exchange information, receive feedback, and retain key beliefs about themselves.
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Kelly BD. Love as delusion, delusions of love: erotomania, narcissism and shame. MEDICAL HUMANITIES 2018; 44:15-19. [PMID: 28689196 DOI: 10.1136/medhum-2017-011198] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 05/18/2017] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
Erotomania has a long, colourful history in psychiatry. It is a rare condition in which the patient ('subject') develops the belief that he or she is loved from afar by another person ('object'). The subject is generally female, though men predominate in forensic samples. The object is generally perceived to belong to a higher social class, reflecting a sociopolitical element in the construction of love. Erotomania requires active treatment and risk management as it can be associated with stalking and other offending behaviour. In addition to featuring in the psychiatry literature, erotomania features in the biography of the economist John Maynard Keynes (the apparent 'object' of a woman's erotomanic delusions in the early 1900s) and in fiction (eg, Ian McEwan's Enduring Love); this reflects, in part, the general popularity of romantic themes in broader literature and society. In psychological terms, certain cases of erotomania might be underpinned by combinations of longing, disappointment, shame and narcissism in specific social contexts. Lesser forms of delusional exaggeration of true love might also exist in some stable relationships, and might even be essential for their continued existence. Overall, the division between love and delusions of love is not as distinct as one might imagine. The potential presence of an element of delusional love in many relationships might well serve important social functions, conferring specific advantages on the parties involved and increasing social and community stability. After all, delusions persist; love dies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brendan D Kelly
- Department of Psychiatry, Trinity College Dublin, Trinity Centre for Health Sciences, Tallaght Hospital, Dublin, Ireland
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Self-exploration accounts for delusional-like experiences in non-clinical adults. CURRENT ISSUES IN PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 2016. [DOI: 10.5114/cipp.2016.63556] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
<b>Background</b><br />
Previous research on non-clinical samples found that younger age may predispose to delusional-like experiences (DLEs). We propose to seek its explanation within the process of identity formation and personality factors (i.e., fantasy proneness and need for cognitive closure).<br />
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<b>Participants and procedure</b><br />
The study involved 201 individuals (131 women) ranging in age from 18 to 99 years (M = 29, SD = 13). The participants were recruited through social media sites in which we distributed a link to the online survey.<br />
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<b>Results</b><br />
The results confirmed that DLEs were predicted in individuals with a younger age, identity exploration, fantasy proneness and decreased need for closure. Additionally, we found that identity exploration mediated the link between younger age and DLEs.<br />
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<b>Conclusions</b><br />
This preliminary study supports the view that DLEs may accompany the “continuously emergent” self represents the status of the matured identity of our time. Further investigations are needed to replicate our findings.
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Bortolotti L. Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia. THE BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2016; 67:879-900. [PMID: 27924116 PMCID: PMC4990704 DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axv024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/30/2023]
Abstract
In this article I ask whether elaborated and systematized delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia have the potential for epistemic innocence. Cognitions are epistemically innocent if they have significant epistemic benefits that could not be attained otherwise. In particular, I propose that a cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some significant epistemic benefit to a given agent at a given time, and if alternative cognitions delivering the same epistemic benefit are unavailable to that agent at that time. Elaborated and systematized delusions in schizophrenia are typically false and exemplify failures of rationality and self-knowledge. Empirical studies suggest that they may have psychological benefits by relieving anxiety and enhancing meaningfulness. Moreover, these delusions have been considered as adaptive in virtue of the fact that they enable automated learning to resume after a significant disruption caused by incorrect prediction-error signalling. I argue that such psychological benefits and adaptive features also have positive epistemic consequences. More precisely, delusions can be a means to restoring epistemic functionality in agents who are overwhelmed by hypersalient experiences in the prodromal stage of psychosis. The analysis leads to a more complex view of the epistemic status of delusions than is found in the contemporary philosophical literature and has some implications for clinical practice. 1 Introduction2 Types of Delusions3 What Is Wrong with Elaborated and Systematized Delusions?4 Finding Life Meaningful5 Learning Resumed6 Epistemic Innocence7 Epistemic Benefit8 No Alternatives9 Conclusions and Implications.
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Abstract
We reconsider delusions in terms of a "doxastic shear pin", a mechanism that errs so as to prevent the destruction of the machine (brain) and permit continued function (in an attenuated capacity). Delusions may disable flexible (but energetically expensive) inference. With each recall, delusions may be reinforced further and rendered resistant to contradiction. We aim to respond to deficit accounts of delusions - that delusions are only a problem without any benefit - by considering delusion formation and maintenance in terms of predictive coding. We posit that brains conform to a simple computational principle: to minimize prediction error (the mismatch between prior top-down expectation and current bottom-up input) across hierarchies of brain regions and psychological representation. Recent data suggest that delusions may form in the absence of constraining top-down expectations. Then, once formed, they become new priors that motivate other beliefs, perceptions, and actions by providing strong (sometimes overriding) top-down expectation. We argue that delusions form when the shear-pin breaks, permitting continued engagement with an overwhelming world, and ongoing function in the face of paralyzing difficulty. This crucial role should not be ignored when we treat delusions: we need to consider how a person will function in the world without them..
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Affiliation(s)
- S.K. Fineberg
- Yale University, Department of Psychiatry, Ribicoff Research Facility. 34 Park Street, New Haven, CT, USA 06519
| | - P.R. Corlett
- Yale University, Department of Psychiatry, Ribicoff Research Facility. 34 Park Street, New Haven, CT, USA 06519
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Letheby C. The epistemic innocence of psychedelic states. Conscious Cogn 2016; 39:28-37. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2015.11.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/28/2015] [Revised: 11/19/2015] [Accepted: 11/25/2015] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
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Sullivan-Bissett E. Implicit bias, confabulation, and epistemic innocence. Conscious Cogn 2015; 33:548-60. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2014.10.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/06/2014] [Revised: 10/13/2014] [Accepted: 10/14/2014] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
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