Psychophysical "blinding" methods reveal a functional hierarchy of unconscious visual processing

Individual differences in intracortical inhibition predict action control when facing emotional stimuli

Efficient inhibitory control in the context of prepotent actions is vital. However, such action inhibition may be profoundly influenced by affective states. Interestingly, research indicates that action control can be either impaired or improved by emotional stimuli. Thus, a great deal of confusion surrounds our knowledge of the complex dynamics subtending emotions and action control. Here, we aimed to investigate whether negative stimuli, even when non-consciously presented and task-irrelevant, can affect action control relative to neutral stimuli. Additionally, we tested whether individual differences in intracortical excitability may predict action control capabilities. To address these issues, we asked participants to complete a modified version of the Stop Signal Task (SST) in which fearful or neutral stimuli were subliminally presented before the go signals as primes. Moreover, we assessed participants' resting-state corticospinal excitability, short intracortical inhibition (SICI), and intracortical facilitation (ICF). Results demonstrated better action control capabilities when fearful stimuli were subliminally presented and interindividual SICI predicted stronger action inhibition capabilities. Taken together, these results shed new light on the intricate dynamics between action, consciousness, and motor control, suggesting that intracortical measures can be used as potential biomarkers of reduced motor inhibition in research and clinical settings.

Unconscious Perception of Vernier Offsets

The comparison between conscious and unconscious perception is a cornerstone of consciousness science. However, most studies reporting above-chance discrimination of unseen stimuli do not control for criterion biases when assessing awareness. We tested whether observers can discriminate subjectively invisible offsets of Vernier stimuli when visibility is probed using a bias-free task. To reduce visibility, stimuli were either backward masked or presented for very brief durations (1-3 milliseconds) using a modern-day Tachistoscope. We found some behavioral indicators of perception without awareness, and yet, no conclusive evidence thereof. To seek more decisive proof, we simulated a series of Bayesian observer models, including some that produce visibility judgements alongside type-1 judgements. Our data are best accounted for by observers with slightly suboptimal conscious access to sensory evidence. Overall, the stimuli and visibility manipulations employed here induced mild instances of blindsight-like behavior, making them attractive candidates for future investigation of this phenomenon.

Taking consciousness for real: Increasing the ecological validity of the study of conscious vs. unconscious processes

The study of consciousness has developed well-controlled, rigorous methods for manipulating and measuring consciousness. Yet, in the process, experimental paradigms grew farther away from everyday conscious and unconscious processes, which raises the concern of ecological validity. In this review, we suggest that the field can benefit from adopting a more ecological approach, akin to other fields of cognitive science. There, this approach challenged some existing hypotheses, yielded stronger effects, and enabled new research questions. We argue that such a move is critical for studying consciousness, where experimental paradigms tend to be artificial and small effect sizes are relatively prevalent. We identify three paths for doing so-changing the stimuli and experimental settings, changing the measures, and changing the research questions themselves-and review works that have already started implementing such approaches. While acknowledging the inherent challenges, we call for increasing ecological validity in consciousness studies.

Serial dependence requires visual awareness: Evidence from continuous flash suppression

The visual system often undergoes a relatively stable perception even in a noisy visual environment. This crucial function was reflected in a visual perception phenomenon-serial dependence, in which recent stimulus history systematically biases current visual decisions. Although serial dependence effects have been revealed in numerous studies, few studies examined whether serial dependence would require visual awareness. By using the continuous flash suppression (CFS) technique to render grating stimuli invisible, we investigated whether serial dependence effects could emerge at the unconscious levels. In an orientation adjustment task, subjects viewed a randomly oriented grating and reported their orientation perception via an adjustment response. Subjects performed a series of three type trial pairs. The first two trial pairs, in which subjects were instructed to make a response or no response toward the first trial of the pairs, respectively, were used to measure serial dependence at the conscious levels; the third trial pair, in which the grating stimulus in the first trial of the pair was masked by a CFS stimulus, was used to measure the serial dependence at the unconscious levels. One-back serial dependence effects for the second trial of the pairs were evaluated. We found significant serial dependence effects at the conscious levels, whether absence (Experiment 1) or presence (Experiment 2) of CFS stimuli, but failed to find the effects at the unconscious levels, corroborating the view that serial dependence requires visual awareness.

A new 'CFS tracking' paradigm reveals uniform suppression depth regardless of target complexity or salience

When the eyes view separate and incompatible images, the brain suppresses one image and promotes the other into visual awareness. Periods of interocular suppression can be prolonged during continuous flash suppression (CFS) - when one eye views a static 'target' while the other views a complex dynamic stimulus. Measuring the time needed for a suppressed image to break CFS (bCFS) has been widely used to investigate unconscious processing, and the results have generated controversy regarding the scope of visual processing without awareness. Here, we address this controversy with a new 'CFS tracking' paradigm (tCFS) in which the suppressed monocular target steadily increases in contrast until breaking into awareness (as in bCFS) after which it decreases until it again disappears (reCFS), with this cycle continuing for many reversals. Unlike bCFS, tCFS provides a measure of suppression depth by quantifying the difference between breakthrough and suppression thresholds. tCFS confirms that (i) breakthrough thresholds indeed differ across target types (e.g. faces vs gratings, as bCFS has shown) - but (ii) suppression depth does not vary across target types. Once the breakthrough contrast is reached for a given stimulus, all stimuli require a strikingly uniform reduction in contrast to reach the corresponding suppression threshold. This uniform suppression depth points to a single mechanism of CFS suppression, one that likely occurs early in visual processing because suppression depth was not modulated by target salience or complexity. More fundamentally, it shows that variations in bCFS thresholds alone are insufficient for inferring whether the barrier to achieving awareness exerted by interocular suppression is weaker for some categories of visual stimuli compared to others.

When perception fades, the hippocampus may support implicit memory

Steinkrauss and Slotnick (2024) conclude that current evidence is insufficient to sustain a link between implicit memory and the hippocampus. However, behavioral protocols designed to minimize visual awareness, so that memoranda are objectively invisible both at study and at test, can yield brain-based signals of implicit memory, which circumvent several of the identified constraints. Furthermore, while differences in novelty and attention complicate the interpretation of hippocampal involvement in implicit memory tasks, these processes can occur with and without conscious awareness, suggesting a more complex interplay between the hippocampus and memory-related processes than an exclusive association with consciousness would indicate.

Using virtual reality to induce multi-trial inattentional blindness despite trial-by-trial measures of awareness

Unconscious processing has been widely examined using diverse and well-controlled methodologies. However, the extent to which these findings are relevant to real-life instances of information processing without awareness is limited. Here, we present a novel inattentional blindness (IB) paradigm in virtual reality (VR). In three experiments, we managed to repeatedly induce IB while participants foveally viewed salient stimuli for prolonged durations. The effectiveness of this paradigm demonstrates the close relationship between top-down attention and subjective experience. Thus, this method provides an ecologically valid setup to examine processing without awareness.

The reach of reactivation: Effects of consciously triggered versus unconsciously triggered reactivation of associative memory

Consolidating memories for long-term storage depends on reactivation. Reactivation occurs both consciously, during wakefulness, and unconsciously, during wakefulness and sleep. While considerable work has examined conscious awake and unconscious sleep reactivation, in this study, we directly compare the consequences of conscious and unconscious reactivation during wakefulness. Forty-one participants learned associations consisting of adjective-object-position triads. Objects were clustered into distinct semantic groups (e.g., fruits, vehicles) such that we could examine consequences of reactivation on semantically related memories. After an intensive learning protocol, we systematically reactivated some of the triads by presenting the adjective as a cue. Reactivation was done so that it was consciously experienced for some triads, and only unconsciously processed for others. Memory for spatial positions, the most distal part of the association, was affected by reactivation in a consciousness-dependent and memory-strength-dependent manner. Conscious reactivation resulted in weakening of semantically related memories that were strong initially, resonating with prior findings of retrieval-induced forgetting. Unconscious reactivation, on the other hand, selectively benefited weak reactivated memories, as previously shown for reactivation during sleep. Semantically linked memories were not impaired, but rather were integrated with the reactivated memory. These results taken together demonstrate that conscious and unconscious reactivation have qualitatively different consequences. Results support a consciousness-dependent inhibition account, whereby unconscious reactivation entails less inhibition than conscious reactivation, thus allowing more liberal spread of activation. Findings set the stage for additional exploration into the role of conscious experience in memory storage and structuring.

Stimulus awareness is necessary for both instrumental learning and instrumental responding to previously learned stimuli

Instrumental conditioning is a crucial part of adaptive behaviour, allowing agents to selectively interact with stimuli in their environment. Recent evidence suggests that instrumental conditioning cannot proceed without stimulus awareness. However, whether accurate unconscious instrumental responding can emerge from consciously acquired knowledge of the stimulus-action-outcome contingencies is unknown. We studied this question using instrumental trace conditioning, where participants learned to make approach/avoid decisions in two within-subject modes: conscious (stimuli in plain view) and unconscious (visually masked). Both tasks were followed by an unconscious-only instrumental performance task. We show that even when the contingencies are reliably learned in the conscious mode, participants fail to act upon them in the unconscious responding task. We also replicate the previous results that no instrumental learning occurs in the unconscious mode. Consequently, the absence of stimulus awareness not only precludes instrumental conditioning, but also precludes any kind of instrumental responding to already known stimuli. This suggests that instrumental behaviour is entirely supported by conscious awareness of the world, and corroborates the proposals that consciousness may be necessary for adaptive behaviours requiring selective action.

Progressing, not regressing: A possible solution to the problem of regression to the mean in unconscious processing studies

How convincing is current evidence for unconscious processing? Recently, a major criticism suggested that some, if not much, of this evidence might be explained by a mere statistical phenomenon: regression to the mean (RttM). Excluding participants based on an awareness assessment is a common practice in studies of unconscious processing, and this post hoc data selection might lead to false effects that are driven by RttM for aware participants wrongfully classified as unaware. Here, we examined this criticism using both simulations and data from 12 studies probing unconscious processing (35 effects overall). In line with the original criticism, we confirmed that the reliability of awareness measures in the field is concerningly low. Yet, using simulations, we showed that reliability measures might be unsuitable for estimating error in awareness measures. Furthermore, we examined other solutions for assessing whether an effect is genuine or reflects RttM; all suffered from substantial limitations, such as a lack of specificity to unconscious processing, lack of power, or unjustified assumptions. Accordingly, we suggest a new nonparametric solution, which enjoys high specificity and relatively high power. Together, this work emphasizes the need to account for measurement error in awareness measures and evaluate its consequences for unconscious processing effects. It further suggests a way to meet the important challenge posed by RttM, in an attempt to establish a reliable and robust corpus of knowledge in studying unconscious processing.

Metacontrast masking is ineffective in the first 6 months of life

Metacontrast masking is one of the most widely studied types of visual masking, in which a visual stimulus is rendered invisible by a subsequent mask that does not spatially overlap with the target. Metacontrast has been used for many decades as a tool to study visual processing and conscious perception in adults. However, there are so far no infant studies on metacontrast and it remains unknown even whether it occurs in infants. The present study examined metacontrast masking in 3- to 8-month-old infants (N = 168) using a habituation paradigm. We found that metacontrast is ineffective for infants under 7 months and that younger infants can perceive a masked stimulus that older infants cannot. Our results suggest that metacontrast is distinct from other simple types of masking that occur in early infancy, and would be consistent with the idea that metacontrast results from the disruption of recurrent processing.

Inaccessible time to visual awareness during attentional blinks in macaques and humans

Even when we attend to successive visual events, we often cannot notice an event occurring during a certain temporal window. Such an inaccessible time for visual awareness is known as "attentional blink" (AB). Whether AB is a phenomenon unique to humans or exists also in other animals is unclear. Using a dual-task paradigm shared between macaques and humans, we here demonstrate a nonhuman primate model of AB. Although macaques also showed behavioral signatures of AB, their AB effect lasted longer than that of humans. To map the relation between macaque and human ABs, we introduced a time warping analysis. The analysis revealed a formal structure behind the interspecies difference of AB; the temporal window of macaque AB was scaled from that of human AB. The present study opens the door to combining the approaches of neuroscience, psychophysics, and theoretical models to further identify a scale-invariant biological substrate of visual awareness.

Short-term auditory priming in freely-moving mice

Priming, a change in the mental processing of a stimulus as a result of prior encounter with a related stimulus, has been observed repeatedly and studied extensively in humans. Yet currently, there is no behavioral model of short-term priming in lab animals, precluding research on the neurobiological basis of priming. Here, we describe an auditory discrimination paradigm for studying response priming in freely moving mice. We find a priming effect in success rate in all mice tested on the task. In contrast, we do not find a priming effect in response times. Compared to non-primed discrimination trials, the addition of incongruent prime stimuli reduces success rate more than congruent prime stimuli, suggesting a cognitive mechanism based on differential interference. The results establish the short-term priming phenomenon in rodents, and the paradigm opens the door to studying the cellular-network basis of priming.

Beyond facial expressions: A systematic review on effects of emotional relevance of faces on the N170

The N170 is the most prominent electrophysiological signature of face processing. While facial expressions reliably modulate the N170, there is considerable variance in N170 modulations by other sources of emotional relevance. Therefore, we systematically review and discuss this research area using different methods to manipulate the emotional relevance of inherently neutral faces. These methods were categorized into (1) existing pre-experimental affective person knowledge (e.g., negative attitudes towards outgroup faces), (2) experimentally instructed affective person knowledge (e.g., negative person information), (3) contingency-based affective learning (e.g., fear-conditioning), or (4) the immediate affective context (e.g., emotional information directly preceding the face presentation). For all categories except the immediate affective context category, the majority of studies reported significantly increased N170 amplitudes depending on the emotional relevance of faces. Furthermore, the potentiated N170 was observed across different attention conditions, supporting the role of the emotional relevance of faces on the early prioritized processing of configural facial information, regardless of low-level differences. However, we identified several open research questions and suggest venues for further research.

VWM-based bias in conscious access can be extended to a new sandwich masking task and real-life stimuli

Previous studies using breaking continuous flash suppression observed that the content of visual working memory (VWM) influences the priority for accessing visual awareness. However, most studies have used simple stimuli, whereas real-life objects are typically more meaningful and contain more perceptual information than simple objects. In this study, we intermixed a delayed match-to-sample task to manipulate the content of VWM, and a breaking repeated masking suppression (b-RMS) task to investigate whether this memory-based effect in conscious access can be extended to a new sandwich masking task and real-life stimuli. The results revealed that memory-congruent objects broke RMS faster than incongruent objects for both simple and real-life objects. Specifically, for simple objects, color-matching targets broke RMS faster than color-mismatching targets, whereas state-matching targets broke RMS faster than state-mismatching targets for real-life objects. These results suggest that the faster detection of VWM-matching over VWM mismatching stimuli-which has been mostly studied using only one type of task (b-CFS) and stimulus (colored shapes)-extends to (1) yet another masking technique (b-RMS) and to (2) a novel stimulus type (real-life objects), providing evidence that memory-based biases in conscious access are a ubiquitous phenomenon.

Masked priming under the Bayesian microscope: Exploring the integration of local elements into global shape through Bayesian model comparison

To investigate whether local elements are grouped into global shapes in the absence of awareness, we introduced two different masked priming designs (e.g., the classic dissociation paradigm and a trial-wise probe and prime discrimination task) and collected both objective (i.e., performance based) and subjective (using the perceptual awareness scale [PAS]) awareness measures. Prime visibility was manipulated using three different prime-mask stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) and an unmasked condition. Our results showed that assessing prime visibility trial-wise heavily interfered with masked priming preventing any prime facilitation effect. The implementation of Bayesian regression models, which predict priming effects for participants whose awareness levels are at chance level, provided strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that local elements group into global shape in the absence of awareness for SOAs longer than 50 ms, suggesting that prime-mask SOA is a crucial factor in the processing of the global shape without awareness.

Perceptual organization and visual awareness: the case of amodal completion

We investigated the involvement of visual awareness in amodal completion, and specifically, whether visual awareness plays a differential role in local versus global completion, using a primed shape discrimination paradigm and the color-opponent flicker technique to render the prime invisible. In four experiments, participants discriminated the shape of a target preceded by a partly occluded or a neutral prime. All primes were divergent occlusion patterns in which the local completion is based on good continuation of the contours at the point of occlusion and the global completion is based on maximum symmetry. The target corresponded to the shape that could arise as a result of local or global completion of the occluded prime. For each experiment with an invisible prime we conducted a version with a visible prime. Our results suggest that local completion, but not global completion, of a partly occluded shape can take place in the absence of visual awareness, but apparently only when the visible occluded shape generates a single, local completion. No completion, either local or global, appears to take place in the absence of visual awareness when the visible occluded shape generates multiple completions. The implications of these results to the differential role of visual awareness in local and global completions and to the relationship between multiple completions and unconscious amodal completions are discussed.

The reach of reactivation: Effects of consciously-triggered versus unconsciously-triggered reactivation of associative memory

Newly formed memories are not passively stored for future retrieval; rather, they are reactivated offline and thereby strengthened and transformed. However, reactivation is not a uniform process: it occurs throughout different states of consciousness, including conscious rehearsal during wakefulness and unconscious processing during both wakefulness and sleep. In this study, we explore the consequences of reactivation during conscious and unconscious awake states. Forty-one participants learned associations consisting of adjective-object-position triads. Objects were clustered into distinct semantic groups (e.g., multiple fruits, vehicles, musical instruments) which allowed us to examine the consequences of reactivation on semantically-related memories. After an extensive learning phase, some triads were reactivated consciously, through cued retrieval, or unconsciously, through subliminal priming. In both conditions, the adjective was used as the cue. Reactivation impacted memory for the most distal association (i.e., the spatial position of associated objects) in a consciousness-dependent and memory-strength-dependent manner. First, conscious reactivation of a triad resulted in a weakening of other semantically related memories, but only those that were initially more accurate (i.e., memories with lower pre-reactivation spatial errors). This is similar to what has been previously demonstrated in studies employing retrieval-induced forgetting designs. Unconscious reactivation, on the other hand, benefited memory selectively for weak cued items. Semantically linked associations were not impaired, but rather integrated with the reactivated memory. Taken together, our results demonstrate that conscious and unconscious reactivation of memories during wakefulness have qualitatively different consequences on memory for distal associations. Effects are memory-strength-dependent, as has been shown for reactivation during sleep. Results support a consciousness-dependent inhibition account, according to which unconscious reactivation involves less inhibitory dynamics than conscious reactivation, thus allowing more liberal spread of activation. Our findings set the stage for additional exploration into the role of consciousness in memory structuring.

Comparison of Frequentist and Bayesian Statistics for Studying Unconscious Perception: Differences Between Null Awareness Dissociation and Relative Sensitivity Dissociation

For unconscious perception research, Bayesian statistics are more appropriate for assessing null awareness of masked stimuli than traditional (frequentist) statistics. This assertion is based mostly upon the theoretical features of Bayesian statistics and modeling studies. To further assess the potential advantages, we compared frequentist and Bayesian statistical tests in a masked Stroop priming experiment in which the prime stimuli were presented at varying degrees of visibility. A novel contribution was to compare a null awareness dissociation approach (i.e., stimulus awareness = 0) to a relative sensitivity approach (indirect or priming effects > direct effects) for the same data. From a null awareness perspective, the frequentist t-tests for the Stroop effect (i.e., perception) for the briefest display conditions had non-significant outcomes. Similar Bayesian t-tests were inconclusive. In contrast, the relative sensitivity dissociation approach was more interpretable, with strong evidence against unconscious perception from a single Bayesian t test. For the longer display conditions, both statistical approaches suggested large conscious perception effects. We conclude that the utility of Bayesian statistics is highly dependent upon the type of dissociation approach, with a relative sensitivity approach being more straightforward to interpret than a null awareness approach.

Distinct ventral stream and prefrontal cortex representational dynamics during sustained conscious visual perception

Instances of sustained stationary sensory input are ubiquitous. However, previous work focused almost exclusively on transient onset responses. This presents a critical challenge for neural theories of consciousness, which should account for the full temporal extent of experience. To address this question, we use intracranial recordings from ten human patients with epilepsy to view diverse images of multiple durations. We reveal that, in sensory regions, despite dramatic changes in activation magnitude, the distributed representation of categories and exemplars remains sustained and stable. In contrast, in frontoparietal regions, we find transient content representation at stimulus onset. Our results highlight the connection between the anatomical and temporal correlates of experience. To the extent perception is sustained, it may rely on sensory representations and to the extent perception is discrete, centered on perceptual updating, it may rely on frontoparietal representations.

Feasibility of unconscious instrumental conditioning: A registered replication

The extent to which high-level, complex functions can proceed unconsciously has been a topic of considerable debate. While unconscious processing has been demonstrated for a range of low-level processes, from feature integration to simple forms of conditioning and learning, theoretical contributions suggest that increasing complexity requires conscious access. Here, we focus our attention on instrumental conditioning, which has been previously shown to proceed without stimulus awareness. Yet, instrumental conditioning also involves integrating information over a large temporal scale and distinct modalities in order to deploy selective action, constituting a process of substantial complexity. With this in mind, we revisit the question of feasibility of instrumental conditioning in the unconscious domain. Firstly, we address the theoretical and practical considerations relevant to unconscious learning in general. Secondly, we aim to replicate the first study to show instrumental conditioning in the absence of stimulus awareness (Pessiglione et al., 2008), following the original design and supplementing the original crucial analyses with a Bayesian approach (Experiment 1). We found that apparent unconscious learning took place when replicating the original methods directly and according to the tests of awareness used. However, we could not establish that the full sample was unaware in a separate awareness check. We therefore attempted to replicate the effect yet again with improved methods to address the issues related to sensitivity and immediacy (Experiment 2), including an individual threshold-setting task and a trial-by-trial awareness check permitting exclusion of individual aware trials. Here, we found evidence for absence of unconscious learning. This result provides evidence that instrumental conditioning did not occur without stimulus awareness in this paradigm, supporting the view that complex forms of learning may rely on conscious access. Our results provides support for the proposal that perceptual consciousness may be necessary for complex, flexible processes, especially where selective action and behavioural adaptation are required.

Unconscious integration: Current evidence for integrative processing under subliminal conditions

Integrative processing is traditionally believed to be dependent on consciousness. While earlier studies within the last decade reported many types of integration under subliminal conditions (i.e. without perceptual awareness), these findings are widely challenged recently. This review evaluates the current evidence for 10 types of subliminal integration that are widely studied: arithmetic processing, object-context integration, multi-word processing, same-different processing, multisensory integration and 5 different types of associative learning. Potential methodological issues concerning awareness measures are also taken into account. It is concluded that while there is currently no reliable evidence for subliminal integration, this does not necessarily refute 'unconscious' integration defined through non-subliminal (e.g. implicit) approaches.

No effect of attentional modulation by spatial cueing in a masked numerical priming paradigm using continuous flash suppression (CFS)

One notion emerging from studies on unconscious visual processing is that different "blinding techniques" seem to suppress the conscious perception of stimuli at different levels of the neurocognitive architecture. However, even when only the results from a single suppression method are compared, the picture of the scope and limits of unconscious visual processing remains strikingly heterogeneous, as in the case of continuous flash suppression (CFS). To resolve this issue, it has been suggested that high-level semantic processing under CFS is facilitated whenever interocular suppression is attenuated by the removal of visuospatial attention. In this behavioral study, we aimed to further investigate this "CFS-attenuation-by-inattention" hypothesis in a numerical priming study using spatial cueing. Participants performed a number comparison task on a visible target number ("compare number to five"). Prime-target pairs were either congruent (both numbers smaller, or both larger than five) or incongruent. Based on the "CFS-attenuation-by-inattention" hypothesis, we predicted that reaction times (RTs) for congruent prime-target pairs should be faster than for incongruent ones, but only when the prime was presented at the uncued location. In the invisible condition, we observed no priming effects and thus no evidence in support of the "CFS-attenuation-by-inattention" hypothesis. In the visible condition, we found an inverse effect of prime-target congruency. Our results agree with the notion that the representation of CF-suppressed stimuli is fractionated, and limited to their basic, elemental features, thus precluding semantic processing.

The functions of consciousness in visual processing

Conscious experiences form a relatively diverse class of psychological phenomena, supported by a range of distinct neurobiological mechanisms. This diversity suggests that consciousness occupies a variety of different functional roles across different task domains, individuals, and species; a position I call functional pluralism. In this paper, I begin to tease out some of the functional contributions that consciousness makes to (human) visual processing. Consolidating research from across the cognitive sciences, I discuss semantic and spatiotemporal processing as specific points of comparison between the functional capabilities of the visual system in the presence and absence of conscious awareness. I argue that consciousness contributes a cluster of functions to visual processing; facilitating, among other things, (i) increased capacities for semantically processing informationally complex visual stimuli, (ii) increased spatiotemporal precision, and (iii) increased capacities for representational integration over large spatiotemporal intervals. This sort of analysis should ultimately yield a plurality of functional markers that can be used to guide future research in the philosophy and science of consciousness, some of which are not captured by popular theoretical frameworks like global workspace theory and information integration theory.

The role of conscious perception in semantic processing: Testing the action trigger hypothesis

Finding that invisible primes affect categorization of visible targets (response priming) is held to demonstrate that semantic processing does not require conscious perception. However, the effects are typically very small, they do not indicate whether conscious perception enhances response priming and they often reflect visuo-motor rather than semantic processing. Here, we compared response priming elicited by liminal words when these were clearly seen vs missed, while participants categorized target animals' names. We varied task demands to induce visuo-motor vs semantic processing. Conscious perception strongly enhanced both visuo-motor and semantic response priming. In line with the Action Trigger Hypothesis, task demands modulated processing of both missed and consciously perceived primes. Finally, conscious and unconscious response priming showed diverging patterns on fast and on slow trials, a dissociation suggesting that priming was not contaminated by conscious priming. We conclude that the impact of unconscious stimuli is small and task-dependent.

Consciousness as a Memory System

We suggest that there is confusion between why consciousness developed and what additional functions, through continued evolution, it has co-opted. Consider episodic memory. If we believe that episodic memory evolved solely to accurately represent past events, it seems like a terrible system-prone to forgetting and false memories. However, if we believe that episodic memory developed to flexibly and creatively combine and rearrange memories of prior events in order to plan for the future, then it is quite a good system. We argue that consciousness originally developed as part of the episodic memory system-quite likely the part needed to accomplish that flexible recombining of information. We posit further that consciousness was subsequently co-opted to produce other functions that are not directly relevant to memory per se, such as problem-solving, abstract thinking, and language. We suggest that this theory is compatible with many phenomena, such as the slow speed and the after-the-fact order of consciousness, that cannot be explained well by other theories. We believe that our theory may have profound implications for understanding intentional action and consciousness in general. Moreover, we suggest that episodic memory and its associated memory systems of sensory, working, and semantic memory as a whole ought to be considered together as the conscious memory system in that they, together, give rise to the phenomenon of consciousness. Lastly, we suggest that the cerebral cortex is the part of the brain that makes consciousness possible, and that every cortical region contributes to this conscious memory system.

Early and late electrophysiological correlates of gradual perceptual awareness in- and outside the Attentional Blink window

There is an ongoing debate on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in the attentional blink (AB). Theoretical accounts propose that NCC during the attentional blink occur late in the processing hierarchy and that this quality is specific to the AB. We investigated this question by recording event-related potentials during an AB experiment with faces as T2. We analyzed ERPs to T2 stimuli inside (short lag) and outside (long lag) the AB window after carefully calibrating T2 stimuli to ensure equal visibility ratings across lags. We found that the N170, the visual awareness negativity (VAN), and the P3b showed an increased amplitude for seen compared to unseen face stimuli regardless of stimulus lag and that all these components scale linearly with subjective visibility. These findings suggest similar early and late mechanisms of graded perceptual awareness within and outside the AB across perceptual (N170, VAN) and post-perceptual (P3b) processing stages.

Neuroscientific Evidence for Processing Without Awareness

The extent to which we are affected by perceptual input of which we are unaware is widely debated. By measuring neural responses to sensory stimulation, neuroscientific data could complement behavioral results with valuable evidence. Here we review neuroscientific findings of processing of high-level information, as well as interactions with attention and memory. Although the results are mixed, we find initial support for processing object categories and words, possibly to the semantic level, as well as emotional expressions. Robust neural evidence for face individuation and integration of sentences or scenes is lacking. Attention affects the processing of stimuli that are not consciously perceived, and such stimuli may exogenously but not endogenously capture attention when relevant, and be maintained in memory over time. Sources of inconsistency in the literature include variability in control for awareness as well as individual differences, calling for future studies that adopt stricter measures of awareness and probe multiple processes within subjects.

CFS-crafter: An open-source tool for creating and analyzing images for continuous flash suppression experiments

Continuous flash suppression (CFS) is a popular masking technique used to manipulate visual awareness. By presenting a rapidly changing stimulus to one eye (the 'mask'), a static image viewed by the other (the 'target') may remain invisible for many seconds. This effectiveness affords a means to assess unconscious visual processing, leading to the widespread use of CFS in several basic and clinical sciences. However, the lack of principled stimulus selection has impeded generalization of conclusions across studies, as the strength of interocular suppression is dependent on the spatiotemporal properties of the CFS mask and target. To address this, we created CFS-crafter, a point-and-click, open-source tool for creating carefully controlled CFS stimuli. The CFS-crafter provides a streamlined workflow to create, modify, and analyze mask and target stimuli, requiring only a rudimentary understanding of image processing that is well supported by help files in the application. Users can create CFS masks ranging from classic Mondrian patterns to those comprising objects or faces, or they can create, upload, and analyze their own images. Mask and target images can be custom-designed using image-processing operations performed in the frequency domain, including phase-scrambling and spatial/temporal/orientation filtering. By providing the means for the customization and analysis of CFS stimuli, the CFS-crafter offers controlled creation, analysis, and cross-study comparison. Thus, the CFS-crafter-with its easy-to-use image processing functionality-should facilitate the creation of visual conditions that allow a principled assessment of hypotheses about visual processing outside of awareness.

Unconscious Visual Working Memory: A critical review and Bayesian meta-analysis

The relationship between consciousness and working memory (WM) has been recently debated both at the theoretical and methodological levels (Persuh et al., 2018; Velichkovsky, 2017). While there is behavioral and neural evidence that argues for the existence of unconscious WM, several methodological concerns have been raised, rendering this issue highly controversial. To address the robustness of the previous findings, here we adopt a meta-analytic approach to estimate the effect size and heterogeneity of the previously reported unconscious WM results, also including unpublished results. We used meta-regression to isolate relevant experimental variables, in particular, consciousness manipulation and the WM paradigm to identify the source of the heterogeneity in the reported effect size of the unconscious WM. Our meta-analysis supports the existence of the unconscious WM effect and critically reveals several experimental variables that contribute to relevant heterogeneity. Our analysis clarifies several theoretical and methodological issues. We recommend that future studies explicitly operationalize the definition of consciousness, standardize the methodology and systematically explore the role of critical variables for the unconscious WM effect.

Apical amplification-a cellular mechanism of conscious perception?

We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations for network-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience. Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cells are summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. These inputs come from diverse sources and provide a context within which the transmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal and perisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apical amplification enables conscious perceptual experience and makes it more flexible, and thus more adaptive, by being sensitive to context. Apical amplification provides a possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strong loops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by global neuronal workspace theories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of the individual cells receiving the broadcast. It also provides mechanisms that contribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As apical amplification is highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, it relates the specific contents of conscious experience to global mental states and to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendrites provide a cellular mechanism for the context-sensitive selective amplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception.

Dimensions of Perception: 3D Real-Life Objects Are More Readily Detected Than Their 2D Images

Most of our interactions with our environment involve manipulating real 3D objects. Accordingly, 3D objects seem to enjoy preferential processing compared with 2D images, for example, in capturing attention or being better remembered. But are they also more readily perceived? Thus far, the possibility of preferred detection for real 3D objects could not be empirically tested because suppression from awareness has been applied only to on-screen stimuli. Here, using a variant of continuous flash suppression (CFS) with augmented-reality goggles ("real-life" CFS), we managed to suppress both real 3D objects and their 2D representations. In 20 healthy young adults, real objects broke suppression faster than their photographs. Using 3D printing, we also showed in 50 healthy young adults that this finding held only for meaningful objects, whereas no difference was found for meaningless, novel ones (a similar trend was observed in another experiment with 20 subjects, yet it did not reach significance). This suggests that the effect might be mediated by affordances facilitating detection of 3D objects under interocular suppression.

Dissociating conscious and unconscious influences on visual detection effects

The scope of unconscious processing is highly debated, with recent studies showing that even high-level functions such as perceptual integration and category-based attention occur unconsciously. For example, upright faces that are suppressed from awareness through interocular suppression break into awareness more quickly than inverted faces. Similarly, verbal object cues boost otherwise invisible objects into awareness. Here, we replicate these findings, but find that they reflect a general difference in detectability not specific to interocular suppression. To dissociate conscious and unconscious influences on visual detection effects, we use an additional discrimination task to rule out conscious processes as a cause for these differences. Results from this detection-discrimination dissociation paradigm reveal that, while face orientation is processed unconsciously, category-based attention requires awareness. These findings provide insights into the function of conscious perception and offer an experimental approach for mapping out the scope and limits of unconscious processing.

Unconscious preparation: Effects of prime visibility on semantic generalization of task priming

Studies found that subliminal primes can be associated with specific tasks to facilitate task performance, and such learning is highly adaptive and generalizable. Meanwhile, conditioning studies suggest that aversive/reward learning and generalization actually occur at the semantic level. The current study shows that prime-task associations can also be generalized to novel word/neighbour primes from the same semantic category, and this occurs without contingency awareness. Previous studies have counterintuitively suggested that both the learning of task priming and the semantic priming of word neighbours depend on the lack of visibility. Here, we show that semantic generalization indeed depends on reduced visibility, but cannot occur subliminally. The current study shows for the first time that semantic learning and generalization can occur without any emotional or motivational factors, and that semantic priming can occur for arbitrary-linked stimuli in a context completely devoid of semantics.

Color Can Shorten Breakthrough Times in Continuous Flash Suppression through Increased Salience and Task Relevance

Color can enhance the perception of relevant stimuli by increasing their salience and guiding visual search towards stimuli that match a task-relevant color. Using Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS), the current study investigated whether color facilitates the discrimination of targets that are difficult to perceive due to interocular suppression. Gabor patterns of two or four cycles per degree (cpd) were shown as targets to the non-dominant eye of human participants. CFS masks were presented at a rate of 10 Hz to the dominant eye, and participants had the task to report the target’s orientation as soon as they could discriminate it. The 2-cpd targets were robustly suppressed and resulted in much longer response times compared to 4-cpd targets. Moreover, only for 2-cpd targets, two color-related effects were evident. First, in trials where targets and CFS masks had different colors, targets were reported faster than in trials where targets and CFS masks had the same color. Second, targets with a known color, either cyan or yellow, were reported earlier than targets whose color was randomly cyan or yellow. The results suggest that the targets’ entry to consciousness may have been speeded by color-mediated effects relating to increased (bottom-up) salience and (top-down) task relevance.

Windows of Integration Hypothesis Revisited

In the ongoing research of the functions of consciousness, special emphasis has been put on integration of information: the ability to combine different signals into a coherent, unified one. Several theories of consciousness hold that this ability depends on - or at least goes hand in hand with - conscious processing. Yet some empirical findings have suggested otherwise, claiming that integration of information could take place even without awareness. Trying to reconcile this apparent contradiction, the "windows of integration" (WOI) hypothesis claims that conscious access enables signal processing over large integration windows. The hypothesis applies to integration windows defined either temporally, spatially, or semantically. In this review, we explain the hypothesis and re-examine it in light of new studies published since it was suggested. In line with the hypothesis, these studies provide compelling evidence for unconscious integration, but also demonstrate its limits with respect to time, space, and semantic distance. The review further highlights open questions that still need to be pursued to demonstrate the applicability of the WOI hypothesis as a guiding principle for understanding the depth and scope of unconscious processes.

Visual Awareness Is Essential for Grouping Based on Mirror Symmetry

We examined whether symmetry-based grouping can take place in the absence of visual awareness. To this end, we used a priming paradigm, sandwich masking as an invisibility-inducing method, and primes and targets composed of two vertical symmetric or asymmetric lines. The target could be congruent or incongruent with the prime in symmetry. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with masked primes and clearly visible targets. In each trial, the participants performed a two-alternative discrimination task on the target, and then rated the visibility of the prime on a subjective visibility four-point scale (used to assess prime awareness). Subjectively invisible primes failed to produce response priming, suggesting that symmetry processing might depend on visual awareness. However, participants barely saw the prime, and the results for the visible primes were inconclusive, even when we used a conservative criterion for awareness. To rule out the possibility that our prime stimuli could not produce priming per se, we conducted a control visibility experiment (Experiment 2), in which participants were presented with unmasked, clearly visible primes and performed a target task. The results showed that our primes could elicit significant response priming when visible. Taken together, our findings indicate that symmetry-based grouping requires visual awareness.

Implicit processing during inattentional blindness: A systematic review and meta-analysis

The occurrence of implicit processing of visual stimuli during inattentional blindness is still a matter of debate. To assess the evidence available in this debate, we conducted a systematic review of articles that explored whether unexpected visual stimuli presented during inattentional blindness are implicitly processed despite not being reported. Additionally, we employed meta-analysis to combine 59 behavioral experiments and investigate the statistical support for such implicit processing across experiments. Results showed that visual stimuli can be processed when unattended and unnoticed. Additionally, we reviewed the measures used to assess participants' awareness of the unexpected stimuli. We also employed meta-analysis to search for differences in awareness of the unexpected stimuli that may result from adopting distinct criteria to categorize participants as aware or unaware. The results showed that the overall effect of awareness changed depending on whether more demanding or less demanding measures of awareness were employed. This suggests that the choice of awareness measure may influence conclusions about whether processing of the US is implicit or explicit. We discuss the implications of these results for the study of implicit processing and the role of attention in visual cognition.

Getting to the heart of it: Multi-method exploration of nonconscious prioritization processes

Understanding the determinants of consciousness is crucial for theories that see it as functionally adaptive, and for explaining how consciousness affects higher-level cognition. The invention of continuous flash suppression (CFS), a long-duration suppression technique, resulted in a proliferation of research into the process of prioritization for consciousness. We developed a new technique, repeated masked suppression (RMS), that facilitates the measurement of long suppression times, but relies on different visual principles. RMS enables a theoretical leap: It allows scientists to examine the central process of prioritization across different suppression methods. In five experiments (n = 282) we collected chronometric RMS and CFS data, finding that the previously reported face inversion effect and the face priority-dimension generalize beyond CFS. Our results validate the use of multi-method designs in the study of prioritization for consciousness. Furthermore, we show how RMS could be used online to reach diverse samples, previously beyond the reach of consciousness science.

Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness

Consciousness is now a well-established field of empirical research. A large body of experimental results has been accumulated and is steadily growing. In parallel, many Theories of Consciousness (ToCs) have been proposed. These theories are diverse in nature, ranging from computational to neurophysiological and quantum theoretical approaches. This contrasts with other fields of natural science, which host a smaller number of competing theories. We suggest that one reason for this abundance of extremely different theories may be the lack of stringent criteria specifying how empirical data constrains ToCs. First, we argue that consciousness is a well-defined topic from an empirical point of view and motivate a purely empirical stance on the quest for consciousness. Second, we present a checklist of criteria that, we propose, empirical ToCs need to cope with. Third, we review 13 of the most influential ToCs and subject them to the criteria. Our analysis helps to situate these different ToCs in the theoretical landscapeand sheds light on their strengths and weaknesses from a strictly empirical point of view.

No evidence for mnemonic modulation of interocularly suppressed visual input

Visual working memory (VWM) allows for keeping visual information available for upcoming goal-directed behavior, while new visual input is processed concurrently. Interactions between the mnemonic and perceptual systems cause VWM to affect the processing of visual input in a content-specific manner: visual input that is initially suppressed from consciousness is detected faster when it matches rather than mismatches the content of VWM. It is currently under debate whether such mnemonic influences on perception occur prior to or after conscious access. To address this issue, we investigated whether VWM content modulates the neural response to visual input that remains suppressed from consciousness. We measured fMRI responses to interocularly suppressed stimuli in 20 human participants performing a delayed match-to-sample task: Participants were retro-cued to memorize one of two geometrical shapes for subsequent recognition. During retention, an interocularly suppressed peripheral stimulus (the probe) was briefly presented, which was either of the cued (memorized) or uncued (not memorized) shape category. We found no evidence that VWM content modulated the neural response to the probe. Substantial evidence for the absence of this modulation was found despite leveraging a highly liberal analysis approach: (1) selecting regions of interest that were particularly prone to detecting said modulation, and (2) using directional Bayesian tests favoring the presence of the hypothesized modulation. We did observe faster detection of memory-matching compared to memory-mismatching probes in a behavioral control experiment, thus validating the stimulus set. We conclude that VWM impacts the processing of visual input only once suppression is mostly alleviated.

Unconscious semantic priming from pictures under backward masking and continuous flash suppression

It is debated whether the meaning of invisible pictures can be processed unconsciously. We tested whether pictures of animals or objects presented under backward masking or continuous flash suppression could prime the subsequent categorization of target words into animal or non-animal. In Experiment 1, the backward masking part failed to replicate the priming effect reported in two previous studies, despite sufficient statistical power (N = 59). Similarly, the continuous flash suppression part provided no evidence for a priming effect. In Experiment 2 (N = 65) we shortened the prime-target SOA from 290 ms to 90 ms, but again failed to obtain unconscious semantic priming under backward masking. Thus, our study did not provide evidence for unconscious semantic processing of pictures. These findings support the emerging view that unconscious processing is rather limited in scope.

Novel procedure for generating continuous flash suppression: Seurat meets Mondrian

Continuous flash suppression (CFS) entails presentation of a stationary target to one eye and an animated sequence of arrays of geometric figures, the mask, to the other eye. The prototypical CFS sequence comprises different sized rectangles of various colors, dubbed Mondrians. Presented as a rapid, changing sequence to one eye, Mondrians or other similarly constructed textured arrays can abolish awareness of the target viewed by the other eye for many seconds at a time, producing target suppression durations much longer than those associated with conventional binocular rivalry. We have devised an animation technique that replaces meaningless Mondrian figures with recognizable visual objects and scenes as inducers of CFS, allowing explicit manipulation of the visual semantic content of those masks. By converting each image of these CFS sequences into successively presented objects or scenes each comprised of many small, circular patches of color, we create pointillist CFS sequences closely matched in terms of their spatio-temporal power spectra. Randomly rearranging the positions of the pointillist patches scrambles the images so they are no longer recognizable. CFS sequences comprising a stream of different objects produces more robust interocular suppression than do sequences comprising a stream of different scenes, even when the two categories of CFS are matched in root mean square contrast and spatial frequency content. Factors promoting these differences in CFS potency could range from low-level, image-based features to high-level factors including attention and recognizability. At the same time, object- and scene-based CFS sequences, when themselves suppressed from awareness, do not differ in their durations of suppression, implying that semantic content of those images comprising CFS sequences are not registered during suppression. The pointillist technique itself offers a potentially useful means for examining the impact of high-level image meaning on aspects of visual perception other than interocular suppression.