Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia

The Nested States Model: A Phenomenologically-Grounded Model of the Mind

BACKGROUND

Subjective experience is central to the nature of mental illness, yet it has not played a central role in most empirical approaches to psychopathology. While phenomenological perspectives in psychiatry have seen a recent resurgence, there remains a need for more detailed models of psychopathological processes based on explicit phenomenological and enactive foundations.

SUMMARY

We present a framework derived from the Nested States Model (NSM) through which such phenomenologically-grounded models might be constructed. The NSM describes the dynamic structure of subjective experience as a system of nested states that reciprocally influence one another across hierarchical layers. Here, we show how the NSM provides a scheme for characterizing patterns of experience that comprise various psychopathological processes. We demonstrate the utility of this scheme both for clinical practice and for building our knowledge of psychopathological processes more broadly.

KEY MESSAGES

The NSM can advance three aims that we see as critical for the lasting integration of phenomenological approaches to psychopathology within psychiatry. First, we show that the NSM provides a means for constructing clinical formulations and treatment considerations that center squarely on an individual's subjective experiences. Second, the NSM supplies a framework for organizing findings from clinical-phenomenological research that can guide the construction of broader phenomenologically-grounded models of psychopathological processes. Lastly, the NSM aligns our perspective on subjective experience with emerging perspectives on brain dynamics, helping to bridge phenomenological work with ongoing neurophysiological research.

The phenomenological nature of schizophrenia and disorder of selfhood

Schizophrenia continues its resistance to the pathogenetic understanding. We believe that one of the reasons is an oblivion of schizophrenia's characteristic Gestalt expressive of its psychopathological structure. In this article we argue for a crucial role of disorders of selfhood in the constitution of this Gestalt. First, we present a phenomenological account of the self. This is followed by an exposition of basic complains in schizophrenia which are reflective of a disordered selfhood and which often date back to childhood. We then present characteristic features of the schizophrenic psychosis with its phenomenon of "double bookkeeping". Hallucinations, delusions and double bookkeeping are all associated with the instability of the self. Finally, we briefly address characteristic aspects of the encounter with a schizophrenia patient and argue that self-disorders play an important diagnostic role. We conclude by emphasizing the role of phenomenology in psychiatric research.

Major Depression as a Disorder of the Narrative Self: A Qualitative Study

INTRODUCTION

Abnormal self-experiences are a common feature of major depression despite their absence from current diagnostic manuals. Current diagnostic criteria leave us with an impoverished conception of depressive disorders, and they fail to exploit the diverse experiential alterations that might be useful for understanding and diagnosing patients, and last but not least for explaining the aetiology of these disorders. Although some phenomenological descriptions of abnormal self-experiences in major depression are available, further research is needed to validate these through detailed clinical interviews.

METHODS

To characterize these phenomena in more detail and to verify and consolidate previous accounts, we conducted a qualitative study using the Consensual Qualitative Research method.

RESULTS

Our findings identified three categories of abnormal self-experiences: (1) impossibility to project oneself forward, (2) not recognizing one's self, and (3) losing control on one's self.

CONCLUSION

Before delving into these results, we briefly described how the self is conceptualized in phenomenological psychopathology and explored in the literature on the self-experience in major depression. After discussing our results in the light of recent and contemporary phenomenological literature, we suggest that the inability to recognize otherness as part of oneself - which is the core of depressive experiences - ends in specific symptoms of depersonalization that differ from schizophrenic ones. We conclude that the self-experience, and in particular narrative identity, is central to the development and maintenance of depression.

Is self-awareness necessary to have a theory of mind?

Forty years ago, Gallup proposed that theory of mind presupposes self-awareness. Following Humphrey, his hypothesis was that individuals can infer the mental states of others thanks to the ability to monitor their own mental states in similar circumstances. Since then, advances in several disciplines, such as comparative and developmental psychology, have provided empirical evidence to test Gallup's hypothesis. Herein, we review and discuss this evidence.

Self-Disorder in Schizophrenia: A Revised View (1. Comprehensive Review-Dualities of Self- and World-Experience)

A growing body of research supports the role of self-disorders as core phenotypic features of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. Self-disorders comprise various alterations of conscious experience whose theoretical understanding continues to present a challenge. The following 2 articles aim to provide further clarification of the nature of self-disorders in schizophrenia by offering a comprehensive review (article 1) and theoretical revision (article 2) of the currently most influential model of altered selfhood in schizophrenia: the basic-self-disturbance or ipseity-disorder model (IDM). This article presents a state-of-the-art overview of the current self-disturbance model and critically assesses its descriptive adequacy with respect to the clinical variability and heterogeneity of the alterations in self- and world-awareness characteristic of schizophrenia. Special attention is paid to experiences of exaggerated basic self, increased "grip" or "hold" on the world, and paradoxical combinations. The next article proposes a theoretical revision of the self-disturbance model by considering how hyperreflexivity might form the crucial common thread or generating factor that unifies the phenomenologically heterogeneous, and sometimes even contradictory features of schizophrenic self-disorders. We outline the implications of our revised model for explanatory research, therapeutic practice, and our general understanding of the abnormalities in question.

Self-Disorder in Schizophrenia: A Revised View (2. Theoretical Revision-Hyperreflexivity)

A growing body of research supports the role of self-disorders as core phenotypic features of schizophrenia-spectrum conditions. Self-disorders comprise various alterations of conscious experience whose theoretical understanding continues to present a challenge. This is the second of two articles that aim to clarify the nature of self-disorders in schizophrenia by considering the currently most influential, phenomenological model of schizophrenia: the basic-self-disturbance or ipseity-disorder model (IDM). The previous paper (article 1) presented a state-of-the-art overview of this model and critically assessed its descriptive adequacy with respect to the clinical heterogeneity and variability of the alterations in self- and world-awareness characteristic of schizophrenia. This paper (article 2) proposes a theoretical revision by considering how hyperreflexivity might form the crucial common thread or generating factor that unifies the heterogeneous, and sometimes even contradictory features of schizophrenic self-disorders. We outline implications of our revised model (IDMrevised) for explanatory research, therapeutic practice, and our general understanding of the abnormalities in question.

Breathing in waves: Understanding respiratory-brain coupling as a gradient of predictive oscillations

Breathing plays a crucial role in shaping perceptual and cognitive processes by regulating the strength and synchronisation of neural oscillations. Numerous studies have demonstrated that respiratory rhythms govern a wide range of behavioural effects across cognitive, affective, and perceptual domains. Additionally, respiratory-modulated brain oscillations have been observed in various mammalian models and across diverse frequency spectra. However, a comprehensive framework to elucidate these disparate phenomena remains elusive. In this review, we synthesise existing findings to propose a neural gradient of respiratory-modulated brain oscillations and examine recent computational models of neural oscillations to map this gradient onto a hierarchical cascade of precision-weighted prediction errors. By deciphering the computational mechanisms underlying respiratory control of these processes, we can potentially uncover new pathways for understanding the link between respiratory-brain coupling and psychiatric disorders.

Selfhood and alterity: schizophrenic experience between Blankenburg and Tatossian

This paper presents a critical comparison between two phenomenological accounts of schizophrenic experience: on the one side, Blankenburg's seminal work on the basal disturbance (Grundstörung) of schizophrenia as loss of natural self-evidence (Natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit); on the other side, Tatossian's insight, briefly elaborated in a lecture presented in Heidelberg in 1994 and largely forgotten by the relevant literature. Whereas the former mainly develops an intersubjective reading of schizophrenia, the latter suggests an intrasubjective understanding. Indeed, for Blankenburg, schizophrenic experience can be broadly characterized as a progressive impoverishment of our rootedness in the social world, leading to derealization and depersonalization. In this respect, Tatossian takes schizophrenic autism not as the effect of a loss of originary sociality but as the result of a deeper disproportion. For Tatossian, schizophrenia is characterized, ultimately, by a basic self-disorder or alteration that consists in the breakdown of the twofold dimension of transcendental subjectivity, encompassing both constituting consciousness and phenomenologizing onlooker. In this sense, his interpretation of schizophrenic disorders is closer to the ipseity-disturbance model. I show that while Blankenburg and Tatossian share a dialectical understanding of schizophrenia by pointing to basic modifications of the "transcendental organization" of experience, their divergence originates from a different reading of the phenomenological epoché. Except for the clinical perspective, the point of contention between Blankenburg and Tatossian seems to concern their use of internal resources of the Husserlian phenomenology. By presenting the philosophical presuppositions of their analyses, I discuss two key figures of phenomenological psychopathology by showing how their debate on the meaning of schizophrenic experience can be reframed by looking at the relationship between transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity in Husserl's phenomenology.

Understanding subjective experience in psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy: The need for phenomenology

Psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy is being investigated as a treatment for a range of psychiatric illnesses. Current research suggests that the kinds of subjective experiences induced by psychedelic compounds play key roles in producing therapeutic outcomes. To date, most knowledge of therapeutic psychedelic experiences are derived from psychometric assessments with scales such as the Mystical Experience Questionnaire. While these approaches are insightful, more nuanced and detailed descriptions of psychedelic-induced changes to subjective experience are required. Drawing on recent advancements in qualitative methods arising from the interdisciplinary field of phenomenological psychopathology, we propose a systematic and comprehensive investigation into how psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy alters subjective experience. This research programme aims to characterise the nature of therapeutic psychedelic experiences by drawing on concepts from philosophical phenomenology. Such characterisations should, moreover, contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms of psychedelic therapy, the role of integration therapy, and related philosophical debates.

More phenomenology in psychiatry? Applied ontology as a method towards integration

There have been renewed calls to use phenomenology in psychiatry to improve knowledge about causation, diagnostics, and treatment of mental health conditions. A phenomenological approach aims to elucidate the subjective experiences of mental health, which its advocates claim have been largely neglected by current diagnostic frameworks in psychiatry (eg, DSM-5). The consequence of neglecting rich phenomenological information is a comparatively more constrained approach to theory development, empirical research, and care programmes. Although calls for more phenomenology in psychiatry have been met with enthusiasm, there is still relatively little information on how to practically facilitate this integration. In this Personal View, we argue that phenomenological approaches need a shared semantic framework to drive their innovative potential, thus enabling consistent data capture, exchange, and interoperability with current mental health data and informatics approaches (eg, the Research Domain Criteria project). We show how an applied ontology of phenomenological psychopathology offers a suitable method to address these challenges.

“An illness of isolation, a disease of disconnection”: Depression and the erosion of we-experiences

Depression is an affective disorder involving a significant change in an individual’s emotional and affective experiences. While the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM) mentions that social impairment may occur in depression, first-person reports of depression consistently name isolation from others as a key feature of depression. I present a phenomenological analysis of how certain interpersonal relations are experienced in depression. In particular, I consider whether depressed individuals are able to enter into “we-experiences” with other people. We-experiences are experiences had with two or more people as a we (rather than having an experience as an I), experiences that allow one to enter into robustly shared experiences with others. I claim that the ability to enter into we-experiences (both actual and habitual) is eroded in depression due to an overwhelming feeling of being different to and misunderstood by others. As such, I suggest that depression should be conceived of as fixing an individual in their first-person singular perspective, thus inhibiting their ability to experience in the first-person plural and to feel a sense of connectedness or togetherness with others as part of a we. By attending to on-going impacts of a diminished ability to enter into we-experiences, we can provide a situated and more nuanced account of the changes of interpersonal relations in depression that captures the progressive (rather than static) nature of the disorder. In turn, this analysis furthers our understanding of the emergence, frustration, and erosion of actual and habitual we-experiences.

What is obsession? Differentiating obsessive-compulsive disorder and the schizophrenia spectrum

Obsessive-compulsive symptoms are frequent in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders and often cause differential diagnostic challenges, especially in first-contact patients. Drawing upon phenomenology of cognition, we critically review classic and contemporary psychopathological notions of obsessive-compulsive phenomena and discuss their relevance for differential diagnosis between obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. The classic psychopathological literature defines true obsession as intrusions with intact resistance and insight and regards these features as essential to the diagnosis of OCD. In schizophrenia, the classic literature describes pseudo-obsessive-compulsive phenomena characterized by lack of resistance and an affinity with other symptoms such as thought disorder and catatonia. By contrast, the notions of obsession and compulsion are broader and conceptually vague in current diagnostic systems and research instruments. Here, these phenomena overlap with delusions as well as various subjective and behavioral anomalies, which we discuss in detail. Furthermore, we examine a link between obsessive-compulsive phenomena and disturbances of basic structures of experience in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders addressed in contemporary psychopathological research. We suggest that these experiential alterations have relevance for differential diagnosis and early detection in this complex symptom domain.

Recontextualizing the subject of phenomenological psychopathology: Establishing a new paradigm case

Recently, there have been calls to develop a more contextual approach to phenomenological psychopathology-an approach that attends to the socio-cultural as well as personal and biographical factors that shape experiences of mental illness. In this Perspective article, we argue that to develop this contextual approach, phenomenological psychopathology should adopt a new paradigm case. For decades, schizophrenia has served as the paradigmatic example of a condition that can be better understood through phenomenological investigation. And recent calls for a contextual approach continue to use schizophrenia as their primary example. We argue, in contrast, that substance misuse provides a better paradigm case around which to develop a contextually sensitive phenomenological psychopathology. After providing a brief vignette and analysis of a case of substance misuse, we explain why this kind of condition requires considerable sensitivity and attention to context, better motivating the incorporation and development of new contextually sensitive approaches.

Self-disorders and psychopathology: a systematic review

In foundational texts on schizophrenia, the mental disorder was constitutively linked to a specific disintegration of subjectivity (often termed a self-disorder). Apart from Scharfetter's work on ego-pathology, research on self-disorders generally faded into oblivion, and self-disorders were only rediscovered as notable psychopathological features of the schizophrenia spectrum nearly two decades ago. Subsequently, the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE) scale was constructed to allow systematic assessment of non-psychotic self-disorders. This Review is the first systematic review of empirical studies on self-disorders based on the EASE or other related scales. The results consistently show that self-disorders hyper-aggregate in schizophrenia spectrum disorders but not in other mental disorders; that self-disorders are found in individuals at a clinical risk of developing psychosis; that self-disorders show a high degree of temporal stability; that self-disorders predict the later development of schizophrenia spectrum disorders; and that self-disorders correlate with the canonical dimensions of the psychopathology of schizophrenia, impaired social functioning, and suicidality. Issues with the methods of the reviewed literature are critically discussed and the role of self-disorders in clinical psychiatry and future research is outlined.

Disordered Selfhood in Schizophrenia and the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience: Accumulated Evidence and Experience

Disordered selfhood in schizophrenia was rediscovered at the turn of the millennium. In 2005, Psychopathology published the psychometric instrument, the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE). In this article, we summarize the historical background of the creation of the EASE, explicate the notion of the disorder of basic or minimal self with the help of phenomenological philosophy, and provide a brief description of clinical manifestations targeted by the EASE. We also present our personal experience using and teaching the EASE and summarize the empirical evidence obtained so far. We conclude that the basic self-disorder represents a crucial phenotype of schizophrenia spectrum disorders and that this phenotype offers a potential avenue to empirical pathogenetic research and psychotherapeutic treatment.

Reduced readiness potential and post-movement beta synchronization reflect self-disorders in early course schizophrenia

Disturbances of conscious awareness, or self-disorders, are a defining feature of schizophrenia. These include symptoms such as delusions of control, i.e. the belief that one's actions are controlled by an external agent. Models of self-disorders point at altered neural mechanisms of source monitoring, i.e. the ability of the brain to discriminate self-generated stimuli from those driven by the environment. However, evidence supporting this putative relationship is currently lacking. We performed electroencephalography (EEG) during self-paced, brisk right fist closures in ten (M = 9; F = 1) patients with Early-Course Schizophrenia (ECSCZ) and age and gender-matched healthy volunteers. We measured the Readiness Potential (RP), i.e. an EEG feature preceding self-generated movements, and movement-related EEG spectral changes. Self-disorders in ECSCZ were assessed with the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE). Patients showed a markedly reduced RP and altered post-movement Event-Related Synchronization (ERS) in the beta frequency band (14-24 Hz) compared to healthy controls. Importantly, smaller RP and weaker ERS were associated with higher EASE scores in ECSCZ. Our data suggest that disturbances of neural correlates preceding and following self-initiated movements may reflect the severity of self-disorders in patients suffering from ECSCZ. These findings point towards deficits in basic mechanisms of sensorimotor integration as a substrate for self-disorders.

Disturbances of Shared Intentionality in Schizophrenia and Autism

Schizophrenia and autism are today considered complex spectrum disorders characterized by difficulties in social behavior. Drawing on recent advances in collective or shared intentionality studies, we present a novel theoretical approach to these social difficulties by exploring them from the angle of shared intentionality. We begin by describing two forms of shared intentionality: joint intentionality and we-intentionality. Joint intentionality crucially relies on the agents' mentalizing abilities such as mind reading and the ability to factor in (or "to be moved" by) their partner's intentions in deliberation and action planning. By contrast, we-intentionality relies on the agents' capacity to understand themselves as group members and to adopt the group's perspective. In schizophrenia spectrum disorders, we propose that joint intentionality remains unaffected, but we-intentionality may be impaired. In severe autism spectrum disorder (i.e., infantile autism), we propose that both forms of shared intentionality are impaired. We suggest that the source of the problems affecting we-intentionality in schizophrenia spectrum disorders lies primarily in trait-like, anomalous self-experiences. In severe autism spectrum disorder, we suggest that problems with mind reading, the ability to "be moved" by others' intentions, and with the capacity for perspective-taking impede both forms of shared intentionality.

When the World Breaks Down: A 3-Stage Existential Model of Nihilism in Schizophrenia

The existential crisis of nihilism in schizophrenia has been reported since the early days of psychiatry. Taking first-person accounts concerning nihilistic experiences of both the self and the world as vantage point, we aim to develop a dynamic existential model of the pathological development of existential nihilism. Since the phenomenology of such a crisis is intrinsically subjective, we especially take the immediate and pre-reflective first-person perspective's (FPP) experience (instead of objectified symptoms and diagnoses) of schizophrenia into consideration. The hereby developed existential model consists of 3 conceptualized stages that are nested into each other, which defines what we mean by existential. At the same time, the model intrinsically converges with the phenomenological concept of the self-world structure notable inside our existential framework. Regarding the 3 individual stages, we suggest that the onset or first stage of nihilistic pathogenesis is reflected by phenomenological solipsism, that is, a general disruption of the FPP experience. Paradigmatically, this initial disruption contains the well-known crisis of common sense in schizophrenia. The following second stage of epistemological solipsism negatively affects all possible perspectives of experience, that is, the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of subjectivity. Therefore, within the second stage, solipsism expands from a disruption of immediate and pre-reflective experience (first stage) to a disruption of reflective experience and principal knowledge (second stage), as mirrored in abnormal epistemological limitations of principal knowledge. Finally, the experience of the annihilation of healthy self-consciousness into the ultimate collapse of the individual's existence defines the third stage. The schizophrenic individual consequently loses her/his vital experience since the intentional structure of consciousness including any sense of reality breaks down. Such a descriptive-interpretative existential model of nihilism in schizophrenia may ultimately serve as input for future psychopathological investigations of nihilism in general, including, for instance, its manifestation in depression.

The minimal self hypothesis

For millennia self has been conjectured to be necessary for consciousness. But scant empirical evidence has been adduced to support this hypothesis. Inconsistent explications of "self" and failure to design apt experiments have impeded progress. Advocates of phenomenological psychiatry, however, have helped explicate "self," and employed it to explain some psychopathological symptoms. In those studies, "self" is understood in a minimalist sense, sheer "for-me-ness." Unfortunately, explication of the "minimal self" (MS) has relied on conceptual analysis, and applications to psychopathology have been hermeneutic, allowing for many degrees of interpretive latitude. The result is that MS's current scientific status is analogous to that of the "atom," at the time when "atom" was just beginning to undergo transformation from a philosophical to a scientific concept. Fortunately, there is now an opportunity to promote a similar transformation for "MS." Discovery of the brain's Default Mode Network (DMN) opened the door to neuroimaging investigations of self. Taking the DMN and other forms of intrinsic activity as a starting point, an empirical foothold can be established, one that spurs experimental research and that enables extension of research into multiple phenomena. New experimental protocols that posit "MS" can help explain phenomena hitherto not thought to be related to self, thereby hastening development of a mature science of self. In particular, targeting phenomena wherein consciousness is lost and recovered, as in some cases of Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS), allow for design of neuroimaging probes that enable detection of MS during non-conscious states. These probes, as well as other experimental protocols applied to NREM Sleep, General Anesthesia (GA), and the waking state, provide some evidence to suggest that not only can self and consciousness dissociate, MS might be a necessary precondition for conscious experience. Finally, these findings have implications for the science of consciousness: it has been suggested that "levels of consciousness" (LoC) is not a legitimate concept for the science of consciousness. But because we have the conceptual and methodological tools with which to refine investigations of MS, we have the means to identify a possible foundation-a bifurcation point-for consciousness, as well as the means by which to measure degrees of distance from that foundation. These neuroimaging investigations of MS position us to better assess whether LoC has a role to play in a mature science of consciousness.

Thinking, believing, and hallucinating self in schizophrenia

In this Personal View, we discuss the history and concept of self-disturbance in relation to the pathophysiology and subjective experience of schizophrenia in terms of three approaches: the perceptual anomalies approach of the early Heidelberg School of Psychiatry, the ipseity model, and the predictive coding framework. Despite the importance of these approaches, there has been a notable absence of efforts to compare them and consider how they might be integrated. This Personal View compares the three approaches and offers suggestions as to how they might work together, which represents a novel position. We view self-disturbances as transformations of self that form the inseparable background against which psychotic symptoms emerge. Integrating computational psychiatric approaches with those used by phenomenologists in the first two listed approaches, we argue that delusions and hallucinations are inferences produced under extraordinary conditions and are both statistically and experientially as real for patients as other mental events. Such inferences still approximate Bayes-optimality, given the personal, neurobiological, and environmental circumstances, and might be the only ones available to minimise prediction error. The added contribution we hope to make focuses on how the dialogue between neuroscience and phenomenology might improve clinical practice. We hope this Personal View will act as a timely primer and bridging point for the different approaches of computational psychiatry and phenomenological psychopathology for interested clinicians.

Associations between Self-Disorders and First-Rank Symptoms: An Empirical Study

BACKGROUND

The diagnostic weight of the first-rank symptoms was deemphasized in DSM-5 and a similar change is expected in ICD-11. This change was motivated by a lack of solid, empirical evidence of the diagnostic significance of first-rank symptoms for schizophrenia. Yet, it seems that Schneider's original concept of first-rank symptoms was overly simplified when it was introduced in DSM-III. Specifically, it was overlooked that first-rank symptoms, in Schneider's understanding, fundamentally involve a disorder of the self. The aim here is to empirically test Schneider's claim that first-rank symptoms involve self-disorders.

METHODS

In a modified, cross-sectional study of 98 first-admission patients, the relation between lifetime presence of first-rank symptoms and self-disorders was examined. Self-disorders were examined with the EASE (Examination of Anomalous Self-Experiences).

RESULTS

We found an odds ratio of 1.56 (95% CI 1.10-2.21) for having first-rank symptoms for each 5-point increase in the EASE (measuring self-disorder) using a generalized linear mixed model regression. We did not find first-rank symptoms in the absence of self-disorders.

CONCLUSION

The close relation between first-rank symptoms and self-disorders seems to support Schneider's original concept of first-rank symptoms. We suggest that first-rank symptoms occurring without the pervasively altered self-experiences might not be different from other psychotic phenomena in terms of their diagnostic significance. Awareness of self-disorders can help clinicians in assessing and detecting first-rank symptoms.