Need-based transfers on a network: a model of risk-pooling in ecologically volatile environments

More Satisfaction, Less Equality: Distributive Effects of Transparent Needs in a Laboratory Experiment

Societies are confronted with the dilemma that need satisfaction requires transparent individual needs. We study the effect of information about others' needs on the distribution of a joint endowment in a three-player network exchange game in a laboratory experiment. Need levels are exogenously given and either transparent (known to all three network members) or opaque (only known to the players themselves). The three players negotiate in dyads until two players agree on a distribution. We expect that the transparency of need thresholds raises need satisfaction but lowers equality. The results suggest that the members of the dyad who agree on the distribution can satisfy their own need thresholds even when information about thresholds is opaque. The effect of transparency on the remaining network member is antithetical: while transparency increases the rate of need satisfaction, it decreases the average share of allocations when needs are low. In the opaque condition, allocated shares are larger, but need satisfaction is lower. This reveals the ambivalent distributive effects of transparent need thresholds: Transparency helps those with the highest need thresholds, but it can hurt those with lower need thresholds, and it barely affects the ones with the most influence on the decision.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11211-024-00434-0.

Wealth, health and inequality in Agta foragers

Background and objectives

There is significant evidence from large-scale, industrial and post-industrial societies that greater income and wealth inequality is negatively associated with both population health and increasing health inequalities. However, whether such relationships are inevitable and should be expected to impact the health of small-scale societies as they become more market-integrated is less clear.

Methodology

Here, using mixed-effect models, we explore the relationship between health, wealth, wealth inequality and health inequalities in a small-scale foraging population from the Philippines, the Agta.

Results

Across 11 camps, we find small to moderate degrees of wealth inequality (maximal Gini Coefficient 0.44) which is highest in the most permanent camps, where individuals engage more heavily in the formal market. However, in both adults (n = 161) and children (n = 215), we find little evidence that either wealth or wealth inequality associates with ill health, except for one measure of nutritional condition-red blood cell count.

Conclusions and implications

We interpret these results in the light of high levels of cooperation among the Agta which may buffer against the detrimental effects of wealth inequality documented in industrial and post-industrial societies. We observe little intergenerational wealth transmission, highlighting the fluid nature of wealth, and thus wealth inequality, particularly in mobile communities. The deterioration of nutritional status, as indicated by red blood cell counts, requires further investigation before concluding the Agta's extensive cooperation networks may be beginning to breakdown in the face of increasing inequality.

Ancestral Diversity: A Socioecological Account of Emotion Culture

Cultural differences in emotion expression, experience, and regulation can cause misunderstandings with lasting effects on interpersonal, intergroup, and international relations. A full account of the factors responsible for the emergence of different cultures of emotion is therefore urgent. Here we propose that the ancestral diversity of regions of the world, determined by colonization and sometimes forced migration of humans over centuries, explains significant variation in cultures of emotion. We review findings that relate the ancestral diversity of the world's countries to present-day differences in display rules for emotional expression, the clarity of expressions, and the use of specific facial expressions such as the smile. Results replicate at the level of the states of the United States, which also vary in ancestral diversity. Further, we suggest that historically diverse contexts provide opportunities for individuals to exercise physiological processes that support emotion regulation, resulting in average regional differences in cardiac vagal tone. We conclude that conditions created by the long-term commingling of the world's people have predictable effects on the evolution of emotion cultures and provide a roadmap for future research to analyze causation and isolate mechanisms linking ancestral diversity to emotion.

A Conceptual Framework for Food Sharing as Collaborative Consumption

Food waste has increased significantly and become a global issue amidst a growing concern regarding famine in several countries. Food sharing constitutes the solution to the problem provided an appropriate framework is developed that guides its application. The sharing economy was touted as the appropriate framework, yet it is excessively macroscopic to be able to capture the dynamics of food sharing activities. A microscopic framework is required to overcome this problem, the concept of collaborative consumption with its focus on activity level being one potential solution. However, an investigation into how food sharing activities can be viewed as collaborative consumption should be completed. This paper presents an analysis of the relationship between food sharing activities and collaborative consumption. The authors employed a systematic literature review conducted by meta-analysis and content analysis to identify the commonalities between the two and the theories underlying them. The result is a conceptual framework of food sharing activities as a collaborative consumption practice. The framework highlights eight propositions that can explain the intention, performance, and continuity of food sharing activities. At the end of the paper, the authors outline the theoretical and managerial contributions and recommend future research activities.

"A Solidarity-Type World": Need-Based Helping among Ranchers in the Southwestern United States

To better understand risk management and mutual aid among American ranchers, we interviewed and mailed a survey to ranchers in Hidalgo County, New Mexico, and Cochise County, Arizona, focusing on two questions: (1) When do ranchers expect repayment for the help they provide others? (2) What determines ranchers' degrees of involvement in networks of mutual aid, which they refer to as "neighboring"? When needs arise due to unpredictable events, such as injuries, most ranchers reported not expecting to be paid back for the help they provide. When help is provided for something that follows a known schedule or that can be scheduled, such as branding, most ranchers did expect something in return for the help they provide. This pattern makes sense in light of computational modeling that shows that transfers to those in need without expectations of repayment pool risk more effectively than transfers that create debt. Ranchers reported helping other ranchers more often when they belonged to more religious and civic organizations, when they owned larger ranches, when they relied less on ranch vs. other income, and when they had more relatives in the area. Operators of midsize ranches reported helping other ranchers more frequently than did those on smaller and larger ranches. None of our independent variables predicted how many times ranchers reported receiving help from other ranchers. Although ranch culture in the American West is often characterized by an ethic of individualism and independence, our study suggests that this ethic stands alongside an ethic of mutual aid during times of need.

Informal risk-sharing between smallholders may be threatened by formal insurance: Lessons from a stylized agent-based model

Microinsurance is promoted as a valuable instrument for low-income households to buffer financial losses due to health or climate-related risks. However, apart from direct positive effects, such formal insurance schemes can have unintended side effects when insured households lower their contribution to traditional informal arrangements where risk is shared through private monetary support. Using a stylized agent-based model, we assess impacts of microinsurance on the resilience of those smallholders in a social network who cannot afford this financial instrument. We explicitly include the decision behavior regarding informal transfers. We find that the introduction of formal insurance can have negative side effects even if insured households are willing to contribute to informal risk arrangements. However, when many households are simultaneously affected by a shock, e.g. by droughts or floods, formal insurance is a valuable addition to informal risk-sharing. By explicitly taking into account long-term effects of short-term transfer decisions, our study allows to complement existing empirical research. The model results underline that new insurance programs have to be developed in close alignment with established risk-coping instruments. Only then can they be effective without weakening functioning aspects of informal risk management, which could lead to increased poverty.

Variable Cognition in ABM Decision-Making: An Application to Livestock Vaccine Choice

Modeling realistic human decision-making is an important feature of good policy design processes. The use of an agent-based modeling framework allows for quantitative human decision-models that assume fully rational agents. This research introduces a dynamic human decision-making sub-model. The parameterisation of human memory and "rationality" in a decision-making model represents an important extension of decision-making in ABMs. A data driven model of herd movement within a dynamic natural environment is the context for evaluating the cognitive decision-making model. The natural and human environments are linked via memory and rationality that affect herdsmen decision-making to vaccinate cattle using a once-for-life vaccine (Rift Valley fever) and an annual booster vaccine (Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia). The simulation model uses environmental data from Samburu county, Kenya from 2004 to 2015. The cognitive parameters of memory and "rationality" are shown to successfully differentiate between vaccination decisions that are characterized by annual and once-for-life choices. The preliminary specifications and findings from the dynamic cognition-pastoralist agent-based model (PastoralScape) indicate that the model offers much to livestock vaccination modeling among small-scale herders.

Generosity among the Ik of Uganda

According to Turnbull's 1972 ethnography The Mountain People, the Ik of Uganda had a culture of selfishness that made them uncooperative. His claims contrast with two widely accepted principles in evolutionary biology, that humans cooperate on larger scales than other species and that culture is an important facilitator of such cooperation. We use recently collected data to examine Ik culture and its influence on Ik behaviour. Turnbull's observations of selfishness were not necessarily inaccurate but they occurred during a severe famine. Cooperation re-emerged when people once again had enough resources to share. Accordingly, Ik donations in unframed Dictator Games are on par with average donations in Dictator Games played by people around the world. Furthermore, Ik culture includes traits that encourage sharing with those in need and a belief in supernatural punishment of selfishness. When these traits are used to frame Dictator Games, the average amounts given by Ik players increase. Turnbull's claim that the Ik have a culture of selfishness can be rejected. Cooperative norms are resilient, and the consensus among scholars that humans are remarkably cooperative and that human cooperation is supported by culture can remain intact.

Common knowledge promotes risk pooling in an experimental economic game

Risk management is a problem humans have faced throughout history and across societies. One way to manage risk is to transfer it to other parties through formal and informal insurance systems. One informal method of self-insurance is limited risk pooling, where individuals can ask for help only when in need. Models suggest that need-based transfer systems may require coordination and common knowledge to be effective. To explore the impact of common knowledge on social coordination and risk pooling in volatile environments, we designed and ran a Risk Pooling Game. We compared participants who played the game with no advance priming or framing to participants who read one of two texts describing real-world systems of risk pooling. Players in the primed games engaged in more repetitive asking and repetitive giving than those in the control games. Players in the primed games also gave more in response to requests and were more likely to respond positively to requests than players in the control games. In addition, players in the primed games were more tolerant of wide differences between what the two players gave and received. These results suggest that the priming texts led players to pay less attention to debt and repayment and more attention to the survival of the other player, and thus to more risk pooling. These results are consistent with findings from fieldwork in small-scale societies that suggest that humans use need-based transfer systems to pool risk when environmental volatility leads to needs with unpredictable timing. Models suggest that the need-based transfer strategy observed in this experiment can outperform debt-based strategies. The results of the present study suggest that the suite of behaviors associated with need-based transfers is an easily triggered part of the human behavioral repertoire.

Why cooperation is not running away

A growing number of experimental and theoretical studies show the importance of partner choice as a mechanism to promote the evolution of cooperation, especially in humans. In this paper, we focus on the question of the precise quantitative level of cooperation that should evolve under this mechanism. When individuals compete to be chosen by others, their level of investment in cooperation evolves towards higher values, a process called competitive altruism, or runaway cooperation. Using a classic adaptive dynamics model, we first show that when the cost of changing partner is low, this runaway process can lead to a profitless escalation of cooperation. In the extreme, when partner choice is entirely frictionless, cooperation even increases up to a level where its cost entirely cancels out its benefit. That is, at evolutionary equilibrium, individuals gain the same payoff than if they had not cooperated at all. Second, importing models from matching theory in economics we, however, show that when individuals can plastically modulate their choosiness in function of their own cooperation level, partner choice stops being a runaway competition to outbid others and becomes a competition to form the most optimal partnerships. In this case, when the cost of changing partner tends towards zero, partner choice leads to the evolution of the socially optimum level of cooperation. This last result could explain the observation that human cooperation seems to be often constrained by considerations of social efficiency.

Property Damage and Exposure to Other People in Distress Differentially Predict Prosocial Behavior After a Natural Disaster

The persistent threat of natural disasters and their attendant resource shocks has likely shaped our prosocial drives throughout human evolution. However, it remains unclear how specific experiences during these events might impact cooperative decision making. We conducted two waves of four modified dictator-game experiments with the same individuals in Vanuatu ( N = 164), before and after Cyclone Pam in 2015. After the cyclone, participants were generally less likely to show prosocial motives toward both in-group and out-group members and more likely to show parochialism when sharing between groups. Experiencing greater property damage predicted a general decrease in prosocial allocations and preference for participants’ in-group. By contrast, exposure to other people in distress predicted increased prosocial allocations to both participants’ in-group and out-groups. Our results suggest that people adjust their prosocial behavior in response to natural disasters but that the nature and direction of the effect depend on the type and severity of their experiences.

The Anatomy of Friendship

Friendship is the single most important factor influencing our health, well-being, and happiness. Creating and maintaining friendships is, however, extremely costly, in terms of both the time that has to be invested and the cognitive mechanisms that underpin them. Nonetheless, personal social networks exhibit many constancies, notably in their size and their hierarchical structuring. Understanding the processes that give rise to these patterns and their evolutionary origins requires a multidisciplinary approach that combines social and neuropsychology as well as evolutionary biology.

Indirect Reciprocity, Resource Sharing, and Environmental Risk: Evidence from Field Experiments in Siberia

Integrating information from existing research, qualitative ethnographic interviews, and participant observation, we designed a field experiment that introduces idiosyncratic environmental risk and a voluntary sharing decision into a standard public goods game. Conducted with subsistence resource users in rural villages on the Kamchatka Peninsula in Northeast Siberia, we find evidence consistent with a model of indirect reciprocity and local social norms of helping the needy. When participants are allowed to develop reputations in the experiments, as is the case in most small-scale societies, we find that sharing is increasingly directed toward individuals experiencing hardship, good reputations increase aid, and the pooling of resources through voluntary sharing becomes more effective. We also find high levels of voluntary sharing without a strong commitment device; however, this form of cooperation does not increase contributions to the public good. Our results are consistent with previous experiments and theoretical models, suggesting strategic risks tied to rewards, punishments, and reputations are important. However, unlike studies that focus solely on strategic risks, we find the effects of rewards, punishments, and reputations are altered by the presence of environmental factors. Unexpected changes in resource abundance increase interdependence and may alter the costs and benefits of cooperation, relative to defection. We suggest environmental factors that increase interdependence are critically important to consider when developing and testing theories of cooperation

Principles of cooperation across systems: from human sharing to multicellularity and cancer

From cells to societies, several general principles arise again and again that facilitate cooperation and suppress conflict. In this study, I describe three general principles of cooperation and how they operate across systems including human sharing, cooperation in animal and insect societies and the massively large‐scale cooperation that occurs in our multicellular bodies. The first principle is that of Walk Away: that cooperation is enhanced when individuals can leave uncooperative partners. The second principle is that resource sharing is often based on the need of the recipient (i.e., need‐based transfers) rather than on strict account‐keeping. And the last principle is that effective scaling up of cooperation requires increasingly sophisticated and costly cheater suppression mechanisms. By comparing how these principles operate across systems, we can better understand the constraints on cooperation. This can facilitate the discovery of novel ways to enhance cooperation and suppress cheating in its many forms, from social exploitation to cancer.

Node Survival in Networks under Correlated Attacks

We study the interplay between correlations, dynamics, and networks for repeated attacks on a socio-economic network. As a model system we consider an insurance scheme against disasters that randomly hit nodes, where a node in need receives support from its network neighbors. The model is motivated by gift giving among the Maasai called Osotua. Survival of nodes under different disaster scenarios (uncorrelated, spatially, temporally and spatio-temporally correlated) and for different network architectures are studied with agent-based numerical simulations. We find that the survival rate of a node depends dramatically on the type of correlation of the disasters: Spatially and spatio-temporally correlated disasters increase the survival rate; purely temporally correlated disasters decrease it. The type of correlation also leads to strong inequality among the surviving nodes. We introduce the concept of disaster masking to explain some of the results of our simulations. We also analyze the subsets of the networks that were activated to provide support after fifty years of random disasters. They show qualitative differences for the different disaster scenarios measured by path length, degree, clustering coefficient, and number of cycles.