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Chen N, Hu X, Zhai Y. Effects of morality and reputation on sharing behaviors in human-robot teams. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1280127. [PMID: 38144990 PMCID: PMC10739295 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1280127] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/19/2023] [Accepted: 11/22/2023] [Indexed: 12/26/2023] Open
Abstract
Introduction The relationship between robots and humans is becoming increasingly close and will become an inseparable part of work and life with humans and robots working together. Sharing, which involves distributing goods between individuals and others, involves individuals as potential beneficiaries and the possibility of giving up the interests of others. In human teams, individual sharing behaviors are influenced by morality and reputation. However, the impact on individuals' sharing behaviors in human-robot collaborative teams remains unclear-individuals may consider morality and reputation differently when sharing with robot or human partners. In this study, three experiments were conducted using the dictator game paradigm, aiming to compare the effects and mechanisms of morality and reputation on sharing behaviors in human and human-robot teams. Methods Experiment 1 involving 18 participants was conducted. Experiment 2 involving 74 participants was conducted. Experiment 3 involving 128 participants was conducted. Results Experiment 1 validated the differences in human sharing behaviors when the agents were robots and humans. Experiment 2 verifies that moral constraints and reputation constraints affect sharing behaviors in human-robot teams. Experiment 3 further reveals the mechanism of differences in sharing behaviors in human-robot teams, where reputation concern plays a mediating role in the impact of moral constraint on sharing behaviors, and the agent type plays a moderating role in the impact of moral constraint on reputation concern and sharing behaviors. Discussion The results of this study contribute to a better understanding of the interaction mechanism of human-robot teams. In the future, the formulation of human-robot collaborative team rules and the setting of interaction environments can consider the potential motivation of human behavior from both morality and reputation perspectives and achieve better work performance.
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Affiliation(s)
- Na Chen
- School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Beijing, China
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Boyer P. Ownership psychology as a cognitive adaptation: A minimalist model. Behav Brain Sci 2022; 46:e323. [PMID: 36254791 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x22002527] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
Ownership is universal and ubiquitous in human societies, yet the psychology underpinning ownership intuitions is generally not described in a coherent and computationally tractable manner. Ownership intuitions are commonly assumed to derive from culturally transmitted social norms, or from a mentally represented implicit theory. While the social norms account is entirely ad hoc, the mental theory requires prior assumptions about possession and ownership that must be explained. Here I propose such an explanation, arguing that the intuitions result from the interaction of two cognitive systems. One of these handles competitive interactions for the possession of resources observed in many species including humans. The other handles mutually beneficial cooperation between agents, as observed in communal sharing, collective action and trade. Together, these systems attend to specific cues in the environment, and produce definite intuitions such as "this is hers," "that is not mine." This computational model provides an explanation for ownership intuitions, not just in straightforward cases of property, but also in disputed ownership (squatters, indigenous rights), historical changes (abolition of slavery), as well as apparently marginal cases, such as the questions, whether people own their seats on the bus, or their places in a queue, and how people understand "cultural appropriation" and slavery. In contrast to some previous theories, the model is empirically testable and free of ad hoc stipulations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Pascal Boyer
- Departments of Anthropology and Psychology & Brain Sciences, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA ; http://www.pascalboyer.net
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Mahr JB, Csibra G. The effect of source claims on statement believability and speaker accountability. Mem Cognit 2021; 49:1505-1525. [PMID: 34128185 PMCID: PMC8563530 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-021-01186-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 05/05/2021] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
What is the effect of source claims (such as "I saw it" or "Somebody told me") on the believability of statements, and what mechanisms are responsible for this effect? In this study, we tested the idea that source claims impact statement believability by modulating the extent to which a speaker is perceived to be committed to (and thereby accountable for) the truth of her assertion. Across three experiments, we presented participants with statements associated with different source claims, asked them to judge how much they believed the statements, and how much the speaker was responsible if the statement turned out to be false. We found that (1) statement believability predicted speaker accountability independently of a statement's perceived prior likelihood or associated source claim; (2) being associated with a claim to first-hand ("I saw that . . .") or second-hand ("Somebody told me that . . .") evidence strengthened this association; (3) bare assertions about specific circumstances were commonly interpreted as claims to first-hand evidence; and (4) (everything else being equal) claims to first-hand evidence increased while claims to second-hand evidence decreased both statement believability and speaker accountability. These results support the idea that the believability of a statement is closely related to how committed to its truth the speaker is perceived to be and that source claims modulate the extent of this perceived commitment.
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Affiliation(s)
- Johannes B Mahr
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 33 Kirkland St, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA.
| | - Gergely Csibra
- Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK
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Mermelstein S, German TC. Counterintuitive Pseudoscience Propagates by Exploiting the Mind's Communication Evaluation Mechanisms. Front Psychol 2021; 12:739070. [PMID: 34675845 PMCID: PMC8523830 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.739070] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/09/2021] [Accepted: 09/16/2021] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
Epidemiological models of culture posit that the prevalence of a belief depends in part on the fit between that belief and intuitions generated by the mind's reliably developing architecture. Application of such models to pseudoscience suggests that one route via which these beliefs gain widespread appeal stems from their compatibility with these intuitions. For example, anti-vaccination beliefs are readily adopted because they cohere with intuitions about the threat of contagion. However, other varieties of popular pseudoscience such as astrology and parapsychology contain content that violates intuitions held about objects and people. Here, we propose a pathway by which "counterintuitive pseudoscience" may spread and receive endorsement. Drawing on recent empirical evidence, we suggest that counterintuitive pseudoscience triggers the mind's communication evaluation mechanisms. These mechanisms are hypothesized to quarantine epistemically-suspect information including counterintuitive pseudoscientific concepts. As a consequence, these beliefs may not immediately update conflicting intuitions and may be largely restricted from influencing behavior. Nonetheless, counterintuitive pseudoscientific concepts, when in combination with intuitively appealing content, may differentially draw attention and memory. People may also be motivated to seek further information about these concepts, including by asking others, in an attempt to reconcile them with prior beliefs. This in turn promotes the re-transmission of these ideas. We discuss how, during this information-search, support for counterintuitive pseudoscience may come from deference to apparently authoritative sources, reasoned arguments, and the functional outcomes of these beliefs. Ultimately, these factors promote the cultural success of counterintuitive pseudoscience but explicit endorsement of these concepts may not entail tacit commitment.
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Affiliation(s)
- Spencer Mermelstein
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, United States
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de Courson B, Fitouchi L, Bouchaud JP, Benzaquen M. Cultural diversity and wisdom of crowds are mutually beneficial and evolutionarily stable. Sci Rep 2021; 11:16566. [PMID: 34400679 PMCID: PMC8368188 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-95914-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/17/2021] [Accepted: 08/02/2021] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Abstract
The ability to learn from others (social learning) is often deemed a cause of human species success. But if social learning is indeed more efficient (whether less costly or more accurate) than individual learning, it raises the question of why would anyone engage in individual information seeking, which is a necessary condition for social learning's efficacy. We propose an evolutionary model solving this paradox, provided agents (i) aim not only at information quality but also vie for audience and prestige, and (ii) do not only value accuracy but also reward originality-allowing them to alleviate herding effects. We find that under some conditions (large enough success rate of informed agents and intermediate taste for popularity), both social learning's higher accuracy and the taste for original opinions are evolutionarily-stable, within a mutually beneficial division of labour-like equilibrium. When such conditions are not met, the system most often converges towards mutually detrimental equilibria.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benoît de Courson
- LadHyX, UMR CNRS 7646, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128, Palaiseau Cedex, France
- Chair of Econophysics & Complex Systems, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128, Palaiseau Cedex, France
| | - Léo Fitouchi
- Institut Jean Nicod, Département d'études cognitives, ENS, EHESS, PSL Research University, CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Jean-Philippe Bouchaud
- Chair of Econophysics & Complex Systems, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128, Palaiseau Cedex, France
- Capital Fund Management, 23-25, Rue de l'Université, 75007, Paris, France
| | - Michael Benzaquen
- LadHyX, UMR CNRS 7646, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128, Palaiseau Cedex, France.
- Chair of Econophysics & Complex Systems, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128, Palaiseau Cedex, France.
- Capital Fund Management, 23-25, Rue de l'Université, 75007, Paris, France.
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Mercier H, Boyer P. Truth-making institutions: From divination, ordeals and oaths to judicial torture and rules of evidence. EVOL HUM BEHAV 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2020.11.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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Mahr JB, Mascaro O, Mercier H, Csibra G. The effect of disagreement on children's source memory performance. PLoS One 2021; 16:e0249958. [PMID: 33836015 PMCID: PMC8034710 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0249958] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/17/2020] [Accepted: 03/27/2021] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
Source representations play a role both in the formation of individual beliefs as well as in the social transmission of such beliefs. Both of these functions suggest that source information should be particularly useful in the context of interpersonal disagreement. Three experiments with an identical design (one original study and two replications) with 3- to 4-year-old-children (N = 100) assessed whether children's source memory performance would improve in the face of disagreement and whether such an effect interacts with different types of sources (first- vs. second-hand). In a 2 x 2 repeated-measures design, children found out about the contents of a container either by looking inside or being told (IV1). Then they were questioned about the contents of the container by an interlocutor puppet who either agreed or disagreed with their answer (IV2). We measured children's source memory performance in response to a free recall question (DV1) followed by a forced-choice question (DV2). Four-year-olds (but not three-year-olds) performed better in response to the free recall source memory question (but not the forced-choice question) when their interlocutor had disagreed with them compared to when it had agreed with them. Children were also better at recalling 'having been told' than 'having seen'. These results demonstrate that by four years of age, source memory capacities are sensitive to the communicative context of assertions and serve social functions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Johannes B. Mahr
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, United States of America
| | - Olivier Mascaro
- Integrative Neuroscience and Cognition Center, CNRS & Université de Paris, Paris, France
| | - Hugo Mercier
- Département d’études cognitives, ENS, EHESS, Institut Jean Nicod, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Gergely Csibra
- Cognitive Development Center, Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, London, United Kingdom
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Kupfer TR, Giner-Sorolla R. Reputation management as an alternative explanation for the “contagiousness” of immorality. EVOL HUM BEHAV 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2020.08.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
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Silver I, Newman G, Small DA. Inauthenticity aversion: Moral reactance toward tainted actors, actions, and objects. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2020. [DOI: 10.1002/arcp.1064] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/22/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Ike Silver
- The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia PA USA
| | | | - Deborah A. Small
- The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia PA USA
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Altay S, Claidière N, Mercier H. It happened to a friend of a friend: inaccurate source reporting in rumour diffusion. EVOLUTIONARY HUMAN SCIENCES 2020; 2:e49. [PMID: 37588393 PMCID: PMC10427462 DOI: 10.1017/ehs.2020.53] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/15/2022] Open
Abstract
People often attribute rumours to an individual in a knowledgeable position two steps removed from them (a credible friend of a friend), such as 'my friend's father, who's a cop, told me about a serial killer in town'. Little is known about the influence of such attributions on rumour propagation, or how they are maintained when the rumour is transmitted. In four studies (N = 1824) participants exposed to a rumour and asked to transmit it overwhelmingly attributed it either to a credible friend of a friend, or to a generic friend (e.g. 'a friend told me about a serial killer in town'). In both cases, participants engaged in source shortening: e.g. when told by a friend that 'a friend told me …' they shared the rumour as coming from 'a friend' instead of 'a friend of friend'. Source shortening and reliance on credible sources boosted rumour propagation by increasing the rumours' perceived plausibility and participants' willingness to share them. Models show that, in linear transmission chains, the generic friend attribution dominates, but that allowing each individual to be exposed to the rumour from several sources enables the maintenance of the credible friend of a friend attribution.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sacha Altay
- Institut Jean Nicod, Département d’études cognitives, ENS, EHESS, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
| | | | - Hugo Mercier
- Institut Jean Nicod, Département d’études cognitives, ENS, EHESS, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
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