Flexible use of source information: Processing components of the inconsistency effect in person memory

The "good is up" metaphoric effects on recognition: True for source guessing but false for item memory

The "good is up" metaphor, which links valence and verticality was found to influence affective judgement and to direct attention, but its effects on memory remain unclear with contradictory research findings. To provide a more accurate assessment of memory components involved in recognition, such as item memory and source-guessing biases, a standard source monitoring paradigm was applied in this research. A series of three experiments provided a conceptual replication and extension of Experiment 2 by Crawford et al., (2014) and yielded a consistent result pattern suggesting that the "good is up" metaphor biases participants' guessing of source location. That is, when source memory failed, participants were more inclined to guess the "up" location versus "down" location for positive items (and vice versa for negative items). It did, however, not affect source memory or item memory for valenced stimuli learned from metaphor-congruent versus incongruent locations (i.e., no metaphor-(in)congruent effects in memory). We suggest that the "good is up" metaphor may affect cognitive processes in a more subtle way than originally suggested.

Does Expecting Matter? The Impact of Experimentally Established Expectations on Subsequent Memory Retrieval of Emotional Words

Previous studies have confirmed that different degrees of expectation, including the bipolarity of the expected and unexpected, as well as an intermediate level (no expectation), can affect memory. However, only a few investigations have manipulated expectation through experimentally established schema, with no consideration of how expectation impacts both item and source memory. Furthermore, stimulus emotionality may also impact memory. Therefore, we conducted a study to investigate the effects of three levels of expectation on item and source memory while considering the impact of stimulus emotionality. The experiment began with a phase dedicated to learning the rules. In the subsequent study phase, negative and neutral words were manipulated as expected, no expectation, and unexpected, based on these rules. This was followed by tasks focused on item and source memory. The study found that there was a "U-shape" relationship between expectation and item memory. Additionally, the study revealed the distinct impacts of expectation on item and source memory. When it came to item memory, both expected and unexpected words were better remembered than those with no expectations. In source memory, expected words showed memory inferiority for expectation-irrelevant source information, but an advantage for expectation-relevant source information. Stimulus emotionality modulated the effect of expectation on both item and source memory. Our findings provide behavioral evidence for the schema-linked interactions between medial prefrontal and medial temporal regions (SLIMM) theory, which proposes that congruent and incongruent events enhance memory through different brain regions. The different patterns between item and source memory also support dual-process models. Moreover, we speculate that processing events with varying levels of emotionality may undermine the impact of expectation, as implied by other neural investigations.

Remedying the Metamemory Expectancy Illusion in Source Monitoring: Are there Effects on Restudy Choices and Source Memory?

Metamemory monitoring, study behavior, and memory are presumably causally connected. When people misjudge their memory, their study behavior should be biased accordingly. Remedying metamemory illusions should debias study behavior and improve memory. One metamemory illusion concerns source memory, a critical aspect of episodic memory. People predict better source memory for items that originated from an expected source (e.g., toothbrush in a bathroom) rather than an unexpected source (e.g., shampoo in a kitchen), whereas actual source memory shows the opposite: an inconsistency effect. This expectancy illusion biases restudy choices: Participants restudy more unexpected than expected source-item pairs. The authors tested the causal relationships between metamemory and source memory with a delay and a source-retrieval attempt between study and metamemory judgment to remedy the expectancy illusion and debias restudy choices. Debiased restudy choices should enhance source memory for expected items, thereby reducing the inconsistency effect. Two groups studied expected and unexpected source-item pairs. They made metamemory judgments and restudy choices immediately at study or after delay, restudied the selected pairs, and completed a source-monitoring test. After immediate judgments, participants predicted better source memory for expected pairs and selected more unexpected pairs for restudy. After delayed judgments, participants predicted a null effect of expectancy on source memory and selected equal numbers of expected and unexpected pairs. Thus, the expectancy illusion was partially remedied and restudy choices were debiased. Nevertheless, source memory was only weakly affected. The results challenge the presumed causal relationships between metamemory monitoring, study behavior, and source memory.

A validation of the two-high threshold eyewitness identification model by reanalyzing published data

The two-high threshold (2-HT) eyewitness identification model serves as a new measurement tool to measure the latent cognitive processes underlying eyewitness identification performance. By simultaneously taking into account correct culprit identifications, false innocent-suspect identifications, false filler identifications in culprit-present and culprit-absent lineups as well as correct and false lineup rejections, the model capitalizes on the full range of data categories that are observed when measuring eyewitness identification performance. Thereby, the model is able to shed light on detection-based and non-detection-based processes underlying eyewitness identification performance. Specifically, the model incorporates parameters for the detection of culprit presence and absence, biased selection of the suspect and guessing-based selection among the lineup members. Here, we provide evidence of the validity of each of the four model parameters by applying the model to eight published data sets. The data sets come from studies with experimental manipulations that target one of the underlying processes specified by the model. Manipulations of encoding difficulty, lineup fairness and pre-lineup instructions were sensitively reflected in the parameters reflecting culprit-presence detection, biased selection and guessing-based selection, respectively. Manipulations designed to facilitate the rejection of culprit-absent lineups affected the parameter for culprit-absence detection. The reanalyses of published results thus suggest that the parameters sensitively reflect the manipulations of the processes they were designed to measure, providing support of the validity of the 2-HT eyewitness identification model.

The influence of cue probability on item and source judgments in item method directed forgetting

The current study examined how selective rehearsal strategies in item method directed forgetting are influenced by the probability of remember or forget cues from different sources. In four experiments, study words were presented by one of two sources in an item method directed forgetting paradigm. In all experiments, one source was mostly-remember (presenting twice as many remember as forget words) and the other source was mostly-forget (presenting twice as many forget as remember words). Participants completed item recognition tests (providing cue tags in Experiment 2) with source judgments. Item recognition of forget words was generally greater for the mostly-remember source than for the mostly forget source, whereas recognition of remember words was largely unaffected by source cue probability. Source judgments were consistent with heuristic guessing based on memory strength and knowledge of source cue probability. Experiment 4 analysed overt rehearsal, and showed that words from the mostly-remember source were more likely to be rehearsed prior to the memory cue. Results are discussed in terms of the influence that source cue probability knowledge has on selective rehearsal strategies, recognition decisions, and source memory attributions.

Guess what? Different source-guessing strategies for old versus new information

The probability-matching account states that learned specific episodic contingencies of item types and source dominate over general schematic expectations in source guessing. However, recent evidence from Bell et al. [(2020). Source attributions for detected new items: Persistent evidence for schematic guessing. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 73(9), 1407-1422] suggest that this only applies to source guessing for information that is recognised as belonging to a previously encoded episode. When information was detected as being new, participants persisted in applying schematic knowledge about the sources' profession. This dissociation in source guessing for detected-old and detected-new information may have been fostered by the specific source-monitoring paradigm by Bell et al. (2020) in which sources were a group of individuals in a certain profession rather than fixed persons from that profession for whom episodic contingencies are more likely to persist also for new information. The aim of the present study was to test whether source guessing for detected-old versus detected-new information also dissociates in a more typical source-monitoring task, the doctor-lawyer paradigm, in which one individual doctor and one lawyer present profession-related information. Despite this change in paradigm, source guessing was based on the item-source contingency only for detected-old information, whereas schematic knowledge persisted for detected-new information. The present study thus adds evidence for persistent schema-based source guessing for new information.

The metamemory expectancy illusion in source monitoring affects metamemory control and memory

In source monitoring, schematic expectations affect both memory and metamemory. In metamemory judgments, people predict better source memory for items that originated from an expected source (e.g., oven in the kitchen) than for items that originated from an unexpected source (e.g., hairdryer in the kitchen; expectancy effect; Schaper et al., 2019a). By contrast, actual source memory is either unaffected by expectations or better for unexpected sources (inconsistency effect; Kuhlmann & Bayen, 2016). Thus, the metamemory expectancy effect is illusory. This research is the first to test the hypotheses that such metamemory monitoring of source memory affects metamemory control (i.e., measures taken to achieve a desired level of memory; Nelson & Narens, 1990) and memory. Due to their expectancy illusion, people should choose to restudy unexpected source-item pairs more often. Three participant groups (n = 36 each) studied expected and unexpected source-item pairs. One group rendered metamemory judgments and chose pairs for restudy. A second group made restudy choices only. These two groups then restudied the chosen pairs. A third group did not make restudy choices and restudied a random half of the pairs. All participants completed a source-monitoring test. As predicted, participants chose unexpected pairs more often for restudy based on their illusory conviction that they would remember unexpected sources more poorly. These restudy choices concurred with an inconsistency effect on source memory not shown in the group without restudy choices. Thus, the metamemory illusion related to control and memory in source monitoring.

Is knowledge reliance in source guessing a cognitive trait? Examining stability across time and domain

When people need to infer the source of information in the absence of memory, they may rely on general knowledge (e.g., stereotypes) to guess the source. Prior research documented task-related determinants and individual differences of stereotype reliance in source guessing, but little is known about the underling nature of this process. In two experiments, we tested whether a cognitive trait could account for the knowledge reliance in source guessing. Participants performed two distinct study-test cycles of a classical source-monitoring paradigm in which two person sources present stereotypical information that in a later test phase had to be attributed to its origin. In Experiment 1, both tasks used item material from the same knowledge domain (age stereotypes) and were either separated by 10 minutes or 7 days. In Experiment 2, we used item material from two different knowledge domains (Task 1: age stereotypes; Task 2: gender stereotypes). Although cross-task correlations of source-guessing parameters from Bayesian-hierarchical multinomial processing tree model analyses showed only weak positive correlations, absolute source guessing remained fairly stable within individuals across time (Experiment 1) and knowledge domains (Experiment 2). Considering statistical challenges of the assessment of relative stability via correlations, we suggest based on the stricter absolute stability criterion that source guessing rather encompasses trait-like features. We discuss implications regarding the generalizability and nature of source guessing in comparison to other cognitive processes involved in source attribution, which were highly stable in both experiments.

In-Group Versus Out-Group Source Memory

A common finding in the source monitoring literature is that greater similarity impairs source discriminability. Experiments traditionally manipulate similarity overtly by describing or showing sources with explicitly differentiable features. However, people may also infer source characteristics themselves, which should also affect discriminability. Two studies examined inferred source characteristics by capitalizing on the out-group homogeneity effect, whereby in-group members are conceptualized as more diverse than out-group members. Participants learned about two sources who were described only as members of an in-group or an out-group and whose actions did not have higher a priori association with either group. Source memory was superior when participants believed the sources to be in-group members. This demonstrates that people spontaneously include inferred features with source representations and can capitalize on these features during source monitoring. Interestingly, information suggesting membership in one's in-group improved performance even for sources who had previously been considered out-group members (Experiment 2).

Cognitive Load Does Not Affect the Behavioral and Cognitive Foundations of Social Cooperation

The present study serves to test whether the cognitive mechanisms underlying social cooperation are affected by cognitive load. Participants interacted with trustworthy-looking and untrustworthy-looking partners in a sequential Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Facial trustworthiness was manipulated to stimulate expectations about the future behavior of the partners which were either violated or confirmed by the partners' cheating or cooperation during the game. In a source memory test, participants were required to recognize the partners and to classify them as cheaters or cooperators. A multinomial model was used to disentangle item memory, source memory and guessing processes. We found an expectancy-congruent bias toward guessing that trustworthy-looking partners were more likely to be associated with cooperation than untrustworthy-looking partners. Source memory was enhanced for cheating that violated the participants' positive expectations about trustworthy-looking partners. We were interested in whether or not this expectancy-violation effect-that helps to revise unjustified expectations about trustworthy-looking partners-depends on cognitive load induced via a secondary continuous reaction time task. Although this secondary task interfered with working memory processes in a validation study, both the expectancy-congruent guessing bias as well as the expectancy-violation effect were obtained with and without cognitive load. These findings support the hypothesis that the expectancy-violation effect is due to a simple mechanism that does not rely on demanding elaborative processes. We conclude that most cognitive mechanisms underlying social cooperation presumably operate automatically so that they remain unaffected by cognitive load.

The infamous among us: Enhanced reputational memory for uncooperative ingroup members

People remember uncooperative individuals better than cooperative ones. We hypothesize that this is particularly true when uncooperative individuals belong to one's ingroup, as their behavior violates positive expectations. Two studies examined the effect of minimal group categorization on reputational memory of the social behavior of particular ingroup and outgroup members. We manipulated uncooperative behavior as the unfair sharing of resources with ingroup members (Study 1), or as descriptions of cheating (Study 2). Participants evaluated several uncooperative and cooperative (and neutral) ingroup and outgroup members. In a surprise memory test, they had to recognize target faces and recall their behavior. We disentangled face recognition, reputational memory, and guessing biases with multinomial models of source monitoring. The results show enhanced reputational memory for uncooperative ingroup members, but not uncooperative outgroup members. In contrast, guessing behavior indicated that participants assumed more ingroup cooperation than outgroup cooperation. Our findings integrate prior research on memory for uncooperative person behavior and person memory in group contexts. We suggest that the ability to remember the uncooperative amidst the supposedly cooperative ingroup could stabilize intragroup cooperation.

Inconsistency effects in source memory and compensatory schema-consistent guessing

The attention–elaboration hypothesis of memory for schematically unexpected information predicts better source memory for unexpected than expected sources. In three source-monitoring experiments, the authors tested the occurrence of an inconsistency effect in source memory. Participants were presented with items that were schematically either very expected or very unexpected for their source. Multinomial processing tree models were used to separate source memory, item memory, and guessing bias. Results show an inconsistency effect in source memory accompanied by a compensatory schema-consistent guessing bias when expectancy strength is high, that is, when items are very expected or very unexpected for their source.

Analyzing Stochastic Dependence of Cognitive Processes in Multidimensional Source Recognition

Stochastic dependence among cognitive processes can be modeled in different ways, and the family of multinomial processing tree models provides a flexible framework for analyzing stochastic dependence among discrete cognitive states. This article presents a multinomial model of multidimensional source recognition that specifies stochastic dependence by a parameter for the joint retrieval of multiple source attributes together with parameters for stochastically independent retrieval. The new model is equivalent to a previous multinomial model of multidimensional source memory for a subset of the parameter space. An empirical application illustrates the advantages of the new multinomial model of joint source recognition. The new model allows for a direct comparison of joint source retrieval across conditions, it avoids statistical problems due to inflated confidence intervals and does not imply a conceptual imbalance between source dimensions. Model selection criteria that take model complexity into account corroborate the new model of joint source recognition.

Influences of Source - Item Contingency and Schematic Knowledge on Source Monitoring: Tests of the Probability-Matching Account

The authors investigated conditions under which judgments in source-monitoring tasks are influenced by prior schematic knowledge. According to a probability-matching account of source guessing (Spaniol & Bayen, 2002), when people do not remember the source of information, they match source guessing probabilities to the perceived contingency between sources and item types. When they do not have a representation of a contingency, they base their guesses on prior schematic knowledge. The authors provide support for this account in two experiments with sources presenting information that was expected for one source and somewhat unexpected for another. Schema-relevant information about the sources was provided at the time of encoding. When contingency perception was impeded by dividing attention, participants showed schema-based guessing (Experiment 1). Manipulating source - item contingency also affected guessing (Experiment 2). When this contingency was schema-inconsistent, it superseded schema-based expectations and led to schema-inconsistent guessing.

Multinomial Processing Tree Models

Multinomial processing tree (MPT) models have become popular in cognitive psychology in the past two decades. In contrast to general-purpose data analysis techniques, such as log-linear models or other generalized linear models, MPT models are substantively motivated stochastic models for categorical data. They are best described as tools (a) for measuring the cognitive processes that underlie human behavior in various tasks and (b) for testing the psychological assumptions on which these models are based. The present article provides a review of MPT models and their applications in psychology, focusing on recent trends and developments in the past 10 years. Our review is nontechnical in nature and primarily aims at informing readers about the scope and utility of MPT models in different branches of cognitive psychology.

Multinomiale Verarbeitungs- baummodelle in der Sozialpsychologie

Zusammenfassung: Multinomiale Verarbeitungsbaummodelle (MVB-Modelle) werden in der kognitiven Psychologie seit über 15 Jahren angewendet. Der Vorteil der Überführung einer Theorie in ein MVB-Modell ist zunächst in der mathematisch exakten Formulierung zu sehen; derart formulierte Hypothesen gewinnen an Überprüfbarkeit und empirischem Gehalt. Darüber hinaus erlaubt ein validiertes MVB-Modell die Interpretation seiner Parameter als Wahrscheinlichkeiten der zugrunde liegenden Prozesse und damit die getrennte Erfassung dieser Prozesse. In der Sozialpsychologie wurden MVB-Modelle unter anderem in der Forschung zur illusorischen Korrelation, zum Inkongruenzvorteil im Gedächtnis für schemarelevantes Material, und zu sozialer Kategorisierung eingesetzt und haben in diesen Bereichen entscheidend zum Erkenntnisgewinn beigetragen. Eine methodische Weiterentwicklung ermöglicht die Modellierung von Parameterheterogenität und eröffnet damit neue Möglichkeiten der Anwendung von MVB-Modellen in der Sozialpsychologie.