Expanding the moral circle: Inclusion and exclusion mindsets and the circle of moral regard

Perceived contact with friends from lower socioeconomic status reduces exclusion based on social class

This study investigated children's and adolescents' reasoning about intergroup exclusion based on social class from educational opportunities in Türkiye. The role of children's and adolescents' perceived contact with friends from different socioeconomic backgrounds on their evaluations of exclusion and personal solutions to the exclusion was also examined. Participants (N = 270) included 142 children (8-10 years old, Mage = 9.80; SD = 0.82; 53.5% girls) and 128 adolescents (14-16 years old, Mage = 15.46; SD = 0.91, 61.7% girls) from lower (N = 144) and higher (N = 126) socioeconomic backgrounds. Results showed that while most participants viewed social class-based exclusion as wrong, adolescents were more likely to view it as wrong than were children. Adolescents from lower SES approached social class-based exclusion as less acceptable than did adolescents from higher SES who referred to expectations about conformity to authority and the status quo. Moderation analyses showed that for adolescents from higher SES, higher perceived contact with friends from lower SES was associated with decreased acceptability of exclusion and increased motivation to provide equity. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Overall, adolescents living in a country with economic instability evaluated social class-based exclusion from educational opportunities among peers as unfair and wrong. Adolescents from lower SES viewed social class-based exclusion as less acceptable than did adolescents from higher SES. Adolescents from higher SES expected that excluders' intentions were motivated by conforming to authority and supporting the status quo more frequently than did children. For adolescents from higher SES, perceived contact with friends from lower SES was associated with decreased acceptability of exclusion and increased motivation to provide equity.

Children Value Animals More Than Adults Do: A Conceptual Replication and Extension

Recent psychological research finds that U.S. American children have a weaker tendency than U.S. American adults to value humans more than animals. We aimed to conceptually replicate and extend this finding in a preregistered study (N = 412). We investigated whether 6- to 9-year-old Polish children (Study 1a) are less likely to prioritize humans over animals than Polish adults are (Studies 1b and 1c). We presented participants with moral dilemmas where they had to prioritize either humans or animals (dogs or chimpanzees) in situations that involved harming (i.e., a trolley problem) or benefiting (i.e., giving a snack). We found that Polish children prioritized humans over animals less than Polish adults did. This was the case both in dilemmas that involved preventing harm and in dilemmas that involved providing snacks. Both children and adults prioritized humans over chimpanzees more than humans over dogs.

The Relative Importance of Target and Judge Characteristics in Shaping the Moral Circle

People's treatment of others (humans, nonhuman animals, or other entities) often depends on whether they think the entity is worthy of moral concern. Recent work has begun to investigate which entities are included in a person's moral circle, examining how certain target characteristics (e.g., species category, perceived intelligence) and judge characteristics (e.g., empathy, political orientation) shape moral inclusion. However, the relative importance of target and judge characteristics in predicting moral inclusion remains unclear. When predicting whether a person will deem an entity worthy of moral consideration, how important is it to know who is making the judgment (i.e., characteristics of the judge), who is being judged (i.e., characteristics of the target), and potential interactions between the two factors? Here, we address this foundational question by conducting a variance component analysis of the moral circle. In two studies with participants from the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (N = 836), we test how much variance in judgments of moral concern is explained by between-target differences, between-judge differences, and by the interaction between the two factors. We consistently find that all three components explain substantial amounts of variance in judgments of moral concern. Our findings provide two important insights. First, an increased focus on interactions between target and judge characteristics is needed, as these interactions explain as much variance as target and judge characteristics separately. Second, any theoretical account that aims to provide an accurate description of moral inclusion needs to consider target characteristics, judge characteristics, and their interaction.

Word embeddings reveal growing moral concern for people, animals and the environment

The Enlightenment idea of historical moral progress asserts that civil societies become more moral over time. This is often understood as an expanding moral circle and is argued to be tightly linked with language use, with some suggesting that shifts in how we express concern for others can be considered an important indicator of moral progress. Our research explores these notions by examining historical trends in natural language use during the 19th and 20th centuries. We found that the associations between words denoting moral concern and words referring to people, animals, and the environment grew stronger over time. The findings support widely-held views about the nature of moral progress by showing that language has changed in a way that reflects greater concern for others.

Subjective socioeconomic status and income inequality are associated with self-reported morality across 67 countries

Individuals can experience a lack of economic resources compared to others, which we refer to as subjective experiences of economic scarcity. While such experiences have been shown to shift cognitive focus, attention, and decision-making, their association with human morality remains debated. We conduct a comprehensive investigation of the relationship between subjective experiences of economic scarcity, as indexed by low subjective socioeconomic status at the individual level, and income inequality at the national level, and various self-reported measures linked to morality. In a pre-registered study, we analyze data from a large, cross-national survey (N = 50,396 across 67 countries) allowing us to address limitations related to cross-cultural generalizability and measurement validity in prior research. Our findings demonstrate that low subjective socioeconomic status at the individual level, and income inequality at the national level, are associated with higher levels of moral identity, higher morality-as-cooperation, a larger moral circle, and increased prosocial intentions. These results appear robust to several advanced control analyses. Finally, exploratory analyses indicate that observed income inequality at the national level is not a statistically significant moderator of the associations between subjective socioeconomic status and the included measures of morality. These findings have theoretical and practical implications for understanding human morality under experiences of resource scarcity.

Conflict experience and resolution underlying obedience to authority

Definitions of obedience require the experience of conflict in response to an authority's demands. Nevertheless, we know little about this conflict and its resolution. Two experiments tested the suitability of the 'object-destruction paradigm' for the study of conflict in obedience. An experimenter instructed participants to shred bugs (among other objects) in a manipulated coffee grinder. In contrast to the demand condition, participants in the control condition were reminded of their free choice. Both received several prods if they defied the experimenter. Results show that participants were more willing to kill bugs in the demand condition. Self-reported negative affect was increased after instructions to destroy bugs relative to other objects (Experiments 1 and 2). In Experiment 2, compliant participants additionally showed an increase in tonic skin conductance and, crucially, self-reported more agency and responsibility after alleged bug-destruction. These findings elucidate the conflict experience and resolution underlying obedience. Implications for prominent explanations (agentic shift, engaged followership) are discussed.

Awe promotes moral expansiveness via the small-self

The experience of awe has been shown to challenge how people think about themselves and the world around them, linking them to something greater than themselves. We investigated whether this emotional experience of awe may also challenge the boundaries of our moral consideration, leading to a generalized expansion in our moral worlds. Across five studies (N = 990), we examined whether awe might promote moral expansiveness; that is, increased moral concern across a broad range of entities (e.g., out-groups, animals, plants, environments). Cross-sectional Studies 1a and 1b, found dispositional awe was related to greater moral expansiveness. Experimental Studies 2 and 3, using video-induced awe, found consistent indirect effects on moral expansiveness, via self-reported awe and the small-self sense of vastness. Experimental Study 4, using Virtual Reality induced awe, found those in the awe condition (vs. control) reported greater moral expansiveness, and this was fully mediated by the small-self sense of vastness. Our findings show awe expands our sense of connectedness to the broader world, and through this, increases the breath of our moral concern.

To speed or not to speed: Thematic analysis of American driving narratives

INTRODUCTION

Speeding is a major cause of unintentional roadway death in the United States. Existing data show that U.S. drivers tend to speed less as they age, but reasons for this change remain largely unknown. Limited research has examined why U.S. drivers decide to speed or why U.S. drivers decide not to speed, and none to date has determined why speeding behaviors change over the life course. Research into these issues can provide insight that may be harnessed for more effective anti-speeding interventions that catalyze decisions not to speed.

METHODS

The current study asked a national sample of U.S. drivers (N = 309) about their driving behaviors and how they have changed over time using an open-ended prompt in an online survey. The authors qualitatively coded responses using a narrative analysis lens to identify common themes.

RESULTS

Results show U.S. drivers often make deliberate choices to speed and some do not consider speeding to be dangerous after achieving perceived mastery of driving skills. Participants tended to report speeding less over time, citing increased concern for family and other roadway users, which may help explain national speeding data trends. Several other themes emerged identifying individual cognitive factors, environmental contexts, and key persons impacting speeding decisions. Practical Applications: Findings show that the most effective means of encouraging U.S. drivers to decide not to speed may be multi-pronged intervention approaches highlighting how speeding reduces roadway driver control, connecting speeding with safety, and encompassing road design and law enforcement strategies.

From Warranty Voids to Uprising Advocacy: Human Action and the Perceived Moral Patiency of Social Robots

Moral status can be understood along two dimensions: moral agency [capacities to be and do good (or bad)] and moral patiency (extents to which entities are objects of moral concern), where the latter especially has implications for how humans accept or reject machine agents into human social spheres. As there is currently limited understanding of how people innately understand and imagine the moral patiency of social robots, this study inductively explores key themes in how robots may be subject to humans’ (im)moral action across 12 valenced foundations in the moral matrix: care/harm, fairness/unfairness, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, purity/degradation, liberty/oppression. Findings indicate that people can imagine clear dynamics by which anthropomorphic, zoomorphic, and mechanomorphic robots may benefit and suffer at the hands of humans (e.g., affirmations of personhood, compromising bodily integrity, veneration as gods, corruption by physical or information interventions). Patterns across the matrix are interpreted to suggest that moral patiency may be a function of whether people diminish or uphold the ontological boundary between humans and machines, though even moral upholdings bare notes of utilitarianism.

Tree-Huggers Versus Human-Lovers: Anthropomorphism and Dehumanization Predict Valuing Nature Over Outgroups

Previous examinations of the scope of moral concern have focused on aggregate attributions of moral worth. However, because trade-offs exist in valuing different kinds of entities, tabulating total amounts of moral expansiveness may conceal significant individual differences in the relative proportions of moral valuation ascribed to various entities. We hypothesized that some individuals ("tree-huggers") would ascribe greater moral worth to animals and ecosystems than to humans from marginalized or stigmatized groups, while others ("human-lovers") would ascribe greater moral worth to outgroup members than to the natural world. Additionally, because moral valuation is often treated as being zero-sum, we hypothesized that there would be no difference in aggregate levels of moral concern between tree-huggers and human-lovers. Finally, because attributions of mental capacities substantially contribute to moral valuation, we predicted that tree-huggers and human-lovers would show different patterns of mind attribution for animals versus humans. Three studies (N = 985) yielded evidence in support of our hypotheses. First, over one-third of participants valued nature over outgroups. Second, extending moral value to animals and nature was not indicative of more expansive moral concern overall; instead, tree-huggers and human-lovers were identical in their aggregate ascriptions of moral worth. Third, tree-huggers had relatively amplified tendencies to attribute mental capacities to animals and relatively reduced tendencies to attribute mental capacities to outgroup members-thus having elevated rates of both anthropomorphism and dehumanization. These findings necessitate a reconceptualization of both the extension of moral worth and the attribution of minds.

Recognizing animal personhood in compassionate conservation

Compassionate conservation is based on the ethical position that actions taken to protect biodiversity should be guided by compassion for all sentient beings. Critics argue that there are 3 core reasons harming animals is acceptable in conservation programs: the primary purpose of conservation is biodiversity protection; conservation is already compassionate to animals; and conservation should prioritize compassion to humans. We used argument analysis to clarify the values and logics underlying the debate around compassionate conservation. We found that objections to compassionate conservation are expressions of human exceptionalism, the view that humans are of a categorically separate and higher moral status than all other species. In contrast, compassionate conservationists believe that conservation should expand its moral community by recognizing all sentient beings as persons. Personhood, in an ethical sense, implies the individual is owed respect and should not be treated merely as a means to other ends. On scientific and ethical grounds, there are good reasons to extend personhood to sentient animals, particularly in conservation. The moral exclusion or subordination of members of other species legitimates the ongoing manipulation and exploitation of the living worlds, the very reason conservation was needed in the first place. Embracing compassion can help dismantle human exceptionalism, recognize nonhuman personhood, and navigate a more expansive moral space.

When all life counts in conservation

Conservation science involves the collection and analysis of data. These scientific practices emerge from values that shape who and what is counted. Currently, conservation data are filtered through a value system that considers native life the only appropriate subject of conservation concern. We examined how trends in species richness, distribution, and threats change when all wildlife count by adding so-called non-native and feral populations to the International Union for Conservation of Nature Red List and local species richness assessments. We focused on vertebrate populations with founding members taken into and out of Australia by humans (i.e., migrants). We identified 87 immigrant and 47 emigrant vertebrate species. Formal conservation accounts underestimated global ranges by an average of 30% for immigrants and 7% for emigrants; immigrations surpassed extinctions in Australia by 52 species; migrants were disproportionately threatened (33% of immigrants and 29% of emigrants were threatened or decreasing in their native ranges); and incorporating migrant populations into risk assessments reduced global threat statuses for 15 of 18 species. Australian policies defined most immigrants as pests (76%), and conservation was the most commonly stated motivation for targeting these species in killing programs (37% of immigrants). Inclusive biodiversity data open space for dialogue on the ethical and empirical assumptions underlying conservation science.

Anthropomorphism in comparative affective science: Advocating a mindful approach

Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human-like capacities and traits to non-human entities. Anthropomorphism is ubiquitous in everyday life and in scientific domains, operating both implicitly and explicitly as a function of the human lens through which we view the world. A rich history of work in psychology, animal behavior, cognitive science, and philosophy has highlighted the negative and, to a lesser degree, the positive implications of anthropomorphism. In this article, we aim to provide a nuanced perspective of how anthropomorphism impacts the work of comparative affective science. Specifically, we discuss three domains of empirical inquiry in which lessons can be drawn about the benefits and pitfalls of anthropomorphism: responses to death, inequity aversion, and prosocial behavior. On balance, we advocate a mindful approach to anthropomorphizing in comparative affective science, and comparative science more generally.

Groups as moral boundaries: A developmental perspective

In this chapter we present the perspective that social groups serve as moral boundaries. Social groups establish the bounds within which people hold moral obligations toward one another. The belief that people are morally obligated toward fellow social group members, but not toward members of other groups, is an early-emerging feature of human cognition, arising out of domain-general processes in conceptual development. We review evidence that supports this account from the adult and child moral cognition literature, and we describe the developmental processes by which people come to view social groups as shaping moral obligation. We conclude with suggestions about how this account can inform the study of social cognitive development more broadly, as well as how it can be used to promote positive moral socialization.

Animal Images Database: Validation of 120 Images for Human-Animal Studies

Simple Summary

With the general goal of increasing knowledge about how individuals perceive and evaluate different animals, we provide normative data on an extensive set of open-source animal images, spanning a total of 12 biological categories (e.g., mammals, insects, reptiles, arachnids), on 11 evaluative dimensions (e.g., valence, cuteness, capacity to think, acceptability to kill for human consumption). We found that animal evaluations were affected by individual characteristics of the perceiver, particularly gender, diet and companion animal ownership. Moral attitudes towards animals were predominantly predicted by ratings of cuteness, edibility, capacity to feel and familiarity. We hope this free resource may help advance research into the many different ways we relate to animals.

Abstract

There has been increasing interest in the study of human-animal relations. This contrasts with the lack of normative resources and materials for research purposes. We present subjective norms for a set of 120 open-source colour images of animals spanning a total of 12 biological categories (e.g., mammals, insects, reptiles, arachnids). Participants (N = 509, 55.2% female, M_Age = 28.05, SD = 9.84) were asked to evaluate a randomly selected sub-set of 12 animals on valence, arousal, familiarity, cuteness, dangerousness, edibility, similarity to humans, capacity to think, capacity to feel, acceptability to kill for human consumption and feelings of care and protection. Animal evaluations were affected by individual characteristics of the perceiver, particularly gender, diet and companion animal ownership. Moral attitudes towards animals were predominantly predicted by ratings of cuteness, edibility, capacity to feel and familiarity. The Animal Images Database (Animal.ID) is the largest open-source database of rated images of animals; the stimuli set and item-level data are freely available online.

Moral expansiveness short form: Validity and reliability of the MESx

Moral expansiveness refers to the range of entities (human and non-human) deemed worthy of moral concern and treatment. Previous research has established that the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES) is a powerful predictor of altruistic moral decision-making and captures a unique dimension of moral cognition. However, the length of the full MES may be restrictive for some researchers. Here we establish the reliability and validity of a reduced moral expansiveness scale, the MESx. Consistent with the full version, the MESx is strongly associated with (but not reducible to) theoretically related constructs, such as endorsement of universalism values, identification with all humanity, and connectedness to nature. The MESx also predicted measures of altruistic moral decision-making to the same degree as the full MES. Further, the MESx passed tests of discriminant validity, was unrelated to political conservatism (unlike the full MES), only mildly associated with the tendency to provide socially desirable responses, and produced moderate reliability over time. We conclude that the MESx is a psychometrically valid alternative for researchers requiring a short measure of moral expansiveness.

The developmental origins of moral concern: An examination of moral boundary decision making throughout childhood

Prominent theorists have made the argument that modern humans express moral concern for a greater number of entities than at any other time in our past. Moreover, adults show stable patterns in the degrees of concern they afford certain entities over others, yet it remains unknown when and how these patterns of moral decision-making manifest in development. Children aged 4 to 10 years (N = 151) placed 24 pictures of human, animal, and environmental entities on a stratified circle representing three levels of moral concern. Although younger and older children expressed similar overall levels of moral concern, older children demonstrated a more graded understanding of concern by including more entities within the outer reaches of their moral circles (i.e., they were less likely to view moral inclusion as a simple in vs. out binary decision). With age children extended greater concern to humans than other forms of life, and more concern to vulnerable groups, such as the sick and disabled. Notably, children's level of concern for human entities predicted their prosocial behavior. The current research provides novel insights into the development of our moral reasoning and its structure within childhood.

Toward a Psychology of Moral Expansiveness

Theorists have long noted that people’s moral circles have expanded over the course of history, with modern people extending moral concern to entities—both human and nonhuman—that our ancestors would never have considered including within their moral boundaries. In recent decades, researchers have sought a comprehensive understanding of the psychology of moral expansiveness. We first review the history of conceptual and methodological approaches in understanding our moral boundaries, with a particular focus on the recently developed Moral Expansiveness Scale. We then explore individual differences in moral expansiveness, attributes of entities that predict their inclusion in moral circles, and cognitive and motivational factors that help explain what we include within our moral boundaries and why they may shrink or expand. Throughout, we highlight the consequences of these psychological effects for real-world ethical decision making.

Solidarity with Animals: Assessing a Relevant Dimension of Social Identification with Animals

Interactions with animals are pervasive in human life, a fact that is reflected in the burgeoning field of human-animal relations research. The goal of the current research was to examine the psychology of our social connection with other animals, by specifically developing a measure of solidarity with animals. In 8 studies using correlational, experimental, and longitudinal designs, solidarity with animals predicted more positive attitudes and behaviors toward animals, over and above existing scales of identification, and even when this implied a loss of resources and privileges for humans relative to animals. Solidarity with animals also displayed predicted relationships with relevant variables (anthropomorphism, empathy). Pet owners and vegetarians displayed higher levels of solidarity with animals. Correlational and experimental evidence confirmed that human-animal similarity heightens solidarity with animals. Our findings provide a useful measure that can facilitate important insights into the nature of our relationships with animals.

Coworkers’ Relationship Quality and Interpersonal Emotions in Team-Member Dyads in China: the Moderating Role of Cooperative Team Goals

This study investigates the origins of discrete interpersonal emotions in team-member dyads using two independent samples from an education institute and a telecommunication services company in China. Results across both studies showed that the quality of team members’ dyadic relationships positively relates to interpersonal admiration, sympathy, and envy, and negatively relates to interpersonal contempt. Furthermore, teams’ cooperative goals moderate these dyad-level linkages. The association of relationship quality with interpersonal emotions is particularly pronounced in teams with less cooperative goals but buffered in teams with more cooperative goals. Finally, on the individual level of analysis, envy and contempt are inversely associated with team members’ work performance, objectively measured. These findings provide new insights about key antecedents and crucial moderators in the development of interpersonal emotions in Chinese work teams and reiterate the relevance of these emotions for tangible performance outcomes.

Cruel nature: Harmfulness as an important, overlooked dimension in judgments of moral standing

Entities that possess moral standing can be wronged and deserve our moral consideration. Past perspectives on the folk psychology of moral standing have focused exclusively on the role of "patiency" (the capacity to experience pain or pleasure) and "agency" (usually defined and operationalized in terms of intelligence or cognitive ability). We contend that harmfulness (i.e., having a harmful vs. benevolent disposition) is an equally if not more important determinant of moral standing. We provide support for this hypothesis across four studies using non-human animals as targets. We show that the effect of harmfulness on attributions of moral standing is independent from patiency and intelligence (Studies 1-2), that this effect pertains specifically to an animal's harmful disposition rather than its capacity to act upon this disposition (Study 3), and that it primarily reflects a parochial concern for human welfare in particular (Study 4). Our findings highlight an important, overlooked dimension in the psychology of moral standing that has implications for real-world decisions that affect non-human animals. Our findings also help clarify the conditions under which people perceive patiency and agency as related versus truly independent dimensions.

Ease of Retrieval and the Moral Circle

Two studies demonstrate that the ease with which moral circle exemplars come to mind influences the size of the moral circle and moral behavior. Participants who generated three exemplars had significantly larger circles than those asked to generate 15. Further, those who generated three exemplars were more likely to take a newsletter providing information on how to help circle members. These studies demonstrate the impact of metacognitive experiences on moral judgment and behavior, and highlight the importance of including metacognitive variables in any comprehensive account of moral judgment.

When Closing the Human–Animal Divide Expands Moral Concern

Humans and animals share many similarities. Across three studies, the authors demonstrate that the framing of these similarities has significant consequences for people’s moral concern for others. Comparing animals to humans expands moral concern and reduces speciesism; however, comparing humans to animals does not appear to produce these same effects. The authors find these differences when focusing on natural tendencies to frame human–animal similarities (Study 1) and following experimental induction of framings (Studies 2 and 3). In Study 3, the authors extend their focus from other animals to marginalized human outgroups, demonstrating that human–animal similarity framing also has consequences for the extension of moral concern to other humans. The authors explain these findings by reference to previous work examining the effects of framing on judgments of similarity and self-other comparisons and discuss them in relation to the promotion of animal welfare and the expansion of moral concern.

Don’t Mind Meat? The Denial of Mind to Animals Used for Human Consumption

Many people like eating meat, but most are reluctant to harm things that have minds. The current three studies show that this dissonance motivates people to deny minds to animals. Study 1 demonstrates that animals considered appropriate for human consumption are ascribed diminished mental capacities. Study 2 shows that meat eaters are motivated to deny minds to food animals when they are reminded of the link between meat and animal suffering. Finally, Study 3 provides direct support for our dissonance hypothesis, showing that expectations regarding the immediate consumption of meat increase mind denial. Moreover, this mind denial in turn reduces negative affect associated with dissonance. The findings highlight the role of dissonance reduction in facilitating the practice of meat eating and protecting cultural commitments.