“How many bad apples does it take to spoil the whole barrel?”: Social exclusion and toleration for bad apples

Cooperation after social exclusion: To reconnect or to harm?

Predicting a person's reaction after experiencing exclusion is an important question, which is accompanied by paradoxical answers. An excluded person may tend to harm others (antisocial reaction hypothesis), treat them with increased ingratiation (prosocial reaction hypothesis), or withdraw from further social contacts. The aim of this study was to test the hypotheses about the prosocial and antisocial responses in the social dilemma context, specifically, to examine whether social exclusion will result in reduced or increased cooperation in the Trust Game. The sample included 175 participants (females = 142), first- and second-year psychology students. There was a between-subject design 3 exclusion (exclusion vs. inclusion vs. neutral) × 2 history (known vs. unknown partner), with Social value orientation being treated as a covariate. Social exclusion was manipulated using the get-acquainted paradigm, and the Trust Game was used to measure the willingness to cooperate. The level of social value orientation was measured using the Social Value Orientations (SVO) Slider Measure. Despite the successful manipulation of social exclusion, the results do not support studies showing that exclusion influences cooperation in a mixed-motive situation. Only the main effects of the history were observed (p = .012, η2  = .04.), and social value orientation was a significant predictor of the level of cooperation (p ≤ .001, η2  = .08.). The conclusion is that the experience of social exclusion made participants no less able to analyze social cues and willing to cooperate in the Trust Game.

Cooperation in Networked Collective-Action Groups: Information Access and Norm Enforcement in Groups of Different Sizes

Norms, typically enforced via sanctions, are key to resolving collective-action problems. But it is often impossible to know what each individual member is contributing to group efforts and enforce cooperation accordingly. Especially as group size increases, people commonly have access to the behaviors of—and can sanction—only those to whom they are tied in a broader network. Here we integrate two streams of research: one conceptualizing ties in networked collective-action groups as access to information about what others are doing and a second where ties represent information plus opportunities to enforce cooperation via punishment. While both have pointed to the cooperation benefits of more ties in the network, we argue that these benefits will depend on group size and whether ties provide access to information about what others are doing or whether they also entail opportunities for norm enforcement. Our experiment demonstrates that densely tied information networks facilitate cooperation but only when the group size is small. When people can also enforce their ties’ cooperation, however, densely tied networks particularly benefit larger groups. The results demonstrate how network-level properties and individual-level tie patterns intersect to promote contributions in small and large collective-action groups.

Corrupt third parties undermine trust and prosocial behaviour between people

Corruption is a pervasive phenomenon that affects the quality of institutions, undermines economic growth and exacerbates inequalities around the globe. Here we tested whether perceiving representatives of institutions as corrupt undermines trust and subsequent prosocial behaviour among strangers. We developed an experimental game paradigm modelling representatives as third-party punishers to manipulate or assess corruption and examine its relationship with trust and prosociality (trust behaviour, cooperation and generosity). In a sequential dyadic die-rolling task, the participants observed the dishonest behaviour of a target who would subsequently serve as a third-party punisher in a trust game (Study 1a, N = 540), in a prisoner's dilemma (Study 1b, N = 503) and in dictator games (Studies 2-4, N = 765, pre-registered). Across these five studies, perceiving a third party as corrupt undermined interpersonal trust and, in turn, prosocial behaviour. These findings contribute to our understanding of the critical role that representatives of institutions play in shaping cooperative relationships in modern societies.

Early exclusion leads to cyclical cooperation in repeated group interactions

Explaining the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among selfish individuals from an evolutionary perspective remains a grand challenge in biology, economy and social sciences. Social exclusion is believed to be an answer to this conundrum. However, previously related studies often assume one-shot interactions and ignore how free-riding is identified, which seem to be too idealistic. In this work, we consider repeated interactions where excluders need to pay a monitoring cost to identify free-riders for exclusion and free-riders cannot participate in the following possible game interactions once they are identified and excluded by excluders in the repeated interaction process. We reveal that the introduction of such exclusion can prevent the breakdown of cooperation in repeated group interactions. In particular, we demonstrate that an evolutionary oscillation among cooperators, defectors and excluders can appear in infinitely large populations when early exclusion is implemented. In addition, we find that the population spends most of the time in states where cooperators dominate for early exclusion when stochastic mutation-selection is considered in finite populations. Our results highlight that early exclusion is successful in solving the mentioned enigma of cooperation in repeated group interactions.

The Effect of the Quantity and Distribution of Teammates' Tendency Toward Self-Interest and Altruism on Individual Decision-Making

Previous studies have explored the impact of the cost ratio of individual solutions versus collective solutions on people's cooperation tendency in the presence of individual solutions. This study further explored the impact of team credibility on people's propensity to cooperate in the presence of individual solutions. Study 1 investigated the influence of different level of altruistic tendencies or the self-interest tendencies of teammates on participants' decision-making. Study 2 explored the influence of the distribution of altruistic tendencies or self-interest tendencies on participants' decision-making. The results of Study 1 showed that the proportion of participants who chose the collective solution increased with an increase in the altruistic tendencies of the team. When the altruistic tendencies of the teammates reached a certain value, the proportion of participants taking the collective solution showed a trend to stabilize. Furthermore, the proportion of participants who chose the individual solution increased with the increase in the self-interest tendencies of the team. When the self-interest tendencies of the teammates reached a certain value, the individual solution was stably adopted. The results of Study 2 showed that with the total altruistic tendency remaining unchanged, the more altruistic group members that altruistic tendencies were allocated to, the higher a participant's level of trust in the team would be, which showed the decentralized effect of altruistic tendencies. In the case that the total self-interest tendency was unchanged, the fewer self-interest group members the self-interest tendencies were allocated to, the higher a participant's level of trust in the team would be, which showed the convergent effect of self-interest tendencies.

Avoiding Crowded Places During COVID-19: Common Sense or a Complex Strategic Decision?

Introduction: Following a period of strict lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic, most countries introduced policies in which citizens were expected to avoid crowded places using common sense, as advised by the WHO. We argue that the ambiguity in the recommendation to “avoid crowded places” implicitly forces individuals to make a complex strategic decision.

Methods: Using a Dutch representative sample of 1,048 participants [42% male, mean age=43.78years (SD=12.53), we examine the effect of context on the decision to visit a hypothetical recreational hotspot under the policy recommendation to “avoid crowded places.” We randomize four levels of context on the crowdedness “on the streets” (no context, low, medium, and high context). Subsequently, participants are asked to estimate the percentage of others going out in the same situation. Finally, we assess the impact of a selection of personal characteristics on the likelihood of visiting a crowded place.

Results: Respondents are proportionally more likely to go in a low context and high context, compared to no context (diff=0.121, p<0.000, and diff=0.034, p<0.05, respectively) and middle context (diff=0.125, p<0.000, and diff=0.037, p<0.05, respectively). Low context information also decreases the expectation of others going out (−2.63%, z=4.68, p<0.000). High context information increases the expected percentage of others going out (significant only for medium to high context; 2.94%, z=7.34, p<0.001). Furthermore, we show that education, age, and health and risk attitude are all predictive of the likelihood to visit a crowded place, notwithstanding the context.

Discussion: Although there is a strong inclination to avoid crowded places during the COVID-19 pandemic (81%), we find two context-driven exceptions: when people expect to avoid crowded spots (in the “low” context, i.e., strategical decision-making) and when people expect others to go (social influence). The freedom provided by ambiguous public policy is implicitly asking more from the population than it initially seems. “Use your common sense” is often the accompanied advice, but our results show that more and better information concerning the context is essential to enable us to make an optimal decision for ourselves, and for society.

Does It Matter What I Say? Using Language to Examine Reactions to Ostracism as It Occurs

Most of our knowledge related to how social exclusion affects those who ostracize and those who are being ostracized is based on questionnaires administered after the ostracism situation is over. In this research, we strived to further our understanding of the internal dynamics of an ostracism situation. We therefore examined individuals' language-specifically, function words-as a behavior indicative of psychological processes and emergent states that can be unobtrusively recorded right in the situation. In online chats, 128 participants talked about a personal topic in groups of three. In the experimental group (n = 79), two conversation partners ignored every contribution by the third. We found that, compared to the control group, these targets of ostracism used language indicative of a self-focus and worsened mood, but not of social focus or positivity, although positivity was related to a writer's likeability. Sources of ostracism used language suggesting that they were distancing themselves from the situation, and they further engaged in victim derogation. We discuss how our results highlight the severity and potential self-sustainability of ostracism.

Being the chosen one: social inclusion modulates decisions in the ultimatum game. An ERP study

In the present study, participants played a modified ultimatum game simulating a situation of inclusion/exclusion, in which either the participant or a rival could be selected to play as the responder. This selection was made either randomly by a computer (i.e. random pairing mode) or by the proposer (i.e. choice mode), based on physical appearance. Being chosen by the proposer triggered positive reciprocal behavior in participants, who accepted unfair offers more frequently than when they had been selected by the computer. Independently of selection mode, greater P200 amplitudes were found when participants received fair offers than when they received unfair offers and when unfair shares were offered to their rivals rather than to them, suggesting that receiving fair offers or observing a rival’s misfortune was rewarding for participants. While participants generally showed more interest in the offers they themselves received (i.e. greater P300 responses to these offers), observing their rivals receive fair shares after the latter had been chosen by the proposer triggered an increase in P300 amplitude likely to reflect a feeling of envy. This study provides new insights into both the cognitive and affective processes underpinning economic decision making in a context of social inclusion/exclusion.

Cultural Variation in Reactions to a Group Member's Vicarious Choice and the Role of Rejection Avoidance

Extending the literature on culture and the personal or interpersonal construction of choices, this research investigates consequences of an ingroup member’s vicarious decision for the entire group and the mechanism behind cultural variation. In Study 1, Japanese people showed, compared to Germans, greater acceptance of vicarious choice and evaluated the ingroup member who had chosen on their behalf more positively. Using mediation analyses and priming methods, Studies 2 and 3 identified rejection avoidance to partly explain culturally diverse reactions to vicarious choices. These findings suggest that the mechanism behind cultural differences in choice is related to variation in strength of the motivation to maintain social approval.

Climate Change: What Psychology Can Offer in Terms of Insights and Solutions

Can psychological science offer evidence-based solutions to climate change? Using insights and principles derived from the literature on social dilemmas and human cooperation, we discuss evidence in support of three solutions: crossing the borders of thought, time, and space. First, borders of thought could be crossed by using persuasion that is concrete and tailored to local circumstances and by highlighting information about people’s efforts as evidence against the myth of self-interest. Second, borders of time could be crossed by using kinship cues, which can help make the future less distant, and relatively uninvolved advisors, who may help make the future salient. And third, borders of space could be crossed by showing group representatives how they might benefit from a frame of altruistic competition—focusing on the benefits of being seen as moral and global in orientation. Our overall conclusion is that psychological science can offer evidence-based solutions to climate change.

A qualitative study of speaking out about patient safety concerns in intensive care units

Much policy focus has been afforded to the role of "whistleblowers" in raising concerns about quality and safety of patient care in healthcare settings. However, most opportunities for personnel to identify and act on these concerns are likely to occur much further upstream, in the day-to-day mundane interactions of everyday work. Using qualitative data from over 900 h of ethnographic observation and 98 interviews across 19 English intensive care units (ICUs), we studied how personnel gave voice to concerns about patient safety or poor practice. We observed much low-level social control occurring as part of day-to-day functioning on the wards, with challenges and sanctions routinely used in an effort to prevent or address mistakes and norm violations. Pre-emptions were used to intervene when patients were at immediate risk, and included strategies such as gentle reminders, use of humour, and sharp words. Corrective interventions included education and evidence-based arguments, while sanctions that were applied when it appeared that a breach of safety had occurred included "quiet words", bantering, public exposure or humiliation, scoldings and brutal reprimands. These forms of social control generally functioned effectively to maintain safe practice. But they were not consistently effective, and sometimes risked reinforcing norms and idiosyncratic behaviours that were not necessarily aligned with goals of patient safety and high-quality healthcare. Further, making challenges across professional boundaries or hierarchies was sometimes problematic. Our findings suggest that an emphasis on formal reporting or communication training as the solution to giving voice to safety concerns is simplistic; a more sophisticated understanding of social control is needed.

Groups and teams: a review of bad apple behavior

Purpose

The purpose of this conceptual paper is to broaden the understanding of the three negative member (bad apple) behaviors – withholding of effort, interpersonal deviance and negative affect – put forth by Felps et al. (2006).

Design/methodology/approach

An integrative review of extant literature was conducted to understand the impact of the negative member behaviors on other team members. Potential interventions to control this bad apple behavior are identified with supporting evidence from recent empirical studies.

Findings

A review of empirical findings in the literature indicate that perceived coworker loafing may lead to counterproductive work behavior toward coworkers and interpersonal deviance may affect the task cohesion of the group. However, the presence of affectively negative individuals is empirically proven to improve the group performance, especially when the group task is related to creativity or information processing (decision-making and idea generation).

Originality/value

Despite the empirical attention paid to “bad apple” behaviors, the implications for managing negative member behaviors are unclear and scattered. In this paper, building on the framework proposed by Felps et al. (2006), the authors focus on three behaviors and provide a concise review of literature and interventions to control or exploit these behaviors.

The infamous among us: Enhanced reputational memory for uncooperative ingroup members

People remember uncooperative individuals better than cooperative ones. We hypothesize that this is particularly true when uncooperative individuals belong to one's ingroup, as their behavior violates positive expectations. Two studies examined the effect of minimal group categorization on reputational memory of the social behavior of particular ingroup and outgroup members. We manipulated uncooperative behavior as the unfair sharing of resources with ingroup members (Study 1), or as descriptions of cheating (Study 2). Participants evaluated several uncooperative and cooperative (and neutral) ingroup and outgroup members. In a surprise memory test, they had to recognize target faces and recall their behavior. We disentangled face recognition, reputational memory, and guessing biases with multinomial models of source monitoring. The results show enhanced reputational memory for uncooperative ingroup members, but not uncooperative outgroup members. In contrast, guessing behavior indicated that participants assumed more ingroup cooperation than outgroup cooperation. Our findings integrate prior research on memory for uncooperative person behavior and person memory in group contexts. We suggest that the ability to remember the uncooperative amidst the supposedly cooperative ingroup could stabilize intragroup cooperation.

Does information about others’ behavior undermine cooperation in social dilemmas?

This project addresses how and why behavior in a resource dilemma differs when one only knows the choices of others versus only knows the state of the resource. Study 1 suggested that resource information is more valuable than social information, in that if the resource can be monitored, whether or not others’ choices can also be monitored has no impact on behavior. However, if the state of the resource is not known, the ability to know what others are doing is critical for cooperation. This seems to be because resource information encourages planning and long-term thinking, and social information encourages comparative thinking. Study 2 replicated the behavior pattern, revealed—surprisingly—that warnings that a resource is critically low undermine (rather than promote) cooperation, and that such responses depend on the availability of social and environmental information. Discussion focuses on how incomplete information about a resource might be addressed.

The Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Intragroup Trust

Recent work shows that both reward and punishment systems increase short-term cooperation in social dilemmas. Yet, a growing body of research finds that punishment systems generate a range of negative side effects, including an undermining of trust in fellow group members’ cooperative intentions. The present work asks whether reward systems can generate the same positive effects as punishment systems (increased cooperation) without the negative side effects (decreased interpersonal trust) or whether reward systems also lead to detrimental effects on trust. In two experiments we find that once removed, reward systems, like punishment systems, reduced trust to levels below a control group who never experienced sanctions. This research highlights the detrimental effects of punishment and reward systems on intragroup trust and thus shows that while reward systems can generate the same positive effects as punishment systems, they also generate the same negative side effects.

The Bad Apple Effect and Social Value Orientation in Public-Goods Dilemmas: Replication and Extension of Research Findings

Two studies were conducted to replicate and extend previous findings on the effect of uncooperative behavior on group cooperation (the “bad apple” effect). Study 1 (56 women, 40 men; M age = 23.5 yr.) manipulated information about contributions from the bad apple, controlling for overall contributions to a group account. Study 2 (50 women, 34 men; M age = 20.4 yr.) compared the effects of a bad apple and a good apple on cooperation. The social value orientation of participants was measured to explore individual differences in the bad apple effect. The results revealed a bad apple (a) decreased cooperation among individuals with proself and prosocial orientations in Study 1, and (b) had a greater effect than a good apple on those who were proself compared to prosocial in Study 2.

Just post it: the lesson from two cases of fabricated data detected by statistics alone

I argue that requiring authors to post the raw data supporting their published results has the benefit, among many others, of making fraud much less likely to go undetected. I illustrate this point by describing two cases of suspected fraud I identified exclusively through statistical analysis of reported means and standard deviations. Analyses of the raw data behind these published results provided invaluable confirmation of the initial suspicions, ruling out benign explanations (e.g., reporting errors, unusual distributions), identifying additional signs of fabrication, and also ruling out one of the suspected fraud's explanations for his anomalous results. If journals, granting agencies, universities, or other entities overseeing research promoted or required data posting, it seems inevitable that fraud would be reduced.

Cooperation, Trust, and Antagonism

One of the most continually vexing problems in society is the variability with which citizens support endeavors that are designed to help a great number of people. In this article, we examine the twin roles of cooperative and antagonistic behavior in this variability. We find that each plays an important role, though their contributions are, understandably, at odds. It is this opposition that produces seeming unpredictability in citizen response to collective need. In fact, we suggest that careful consideration of the research allows one to often predict when efforts to provide a collectively beneficial good will succeed and when they will fail.

To understand the dynamics of participation in response to collective need, it is necessary to distinguish between the primary types of need situations. A public good is an entity that relies in whole or in part on contributions to be provided. Examples of public goods are charities and public broadcasting. Public goods require that citizens experience a short-term loss (of their contribution) in order to realize a long-term gain (of the good). However, because everyone can use the good once it is provided, there is also an incentive to not contribute, let others give, and then take advantage of their efforts. This state of affairs introduces a conflict between doing what is best for oneself and what is best for the group. In a public goods situation, cooperation and antagonism impact how one resolves this conflict.

The other major type of need situation is a common-pool resource problem. Here, a good is fully provided at the outset, and citizens may sample from it. The resource is usually, but not necessarily, partially replenished. Examples of replenished resources are drinking water and trees; examples of resources that are functionally not replenished are oil and minerals. Common-pool resources allow citizens to experience a short-term gain (by getting what they want in the early life of the resource) but also present the possibility of a long-term loss (if the resource dries up). As with public goods, there is thus a conflict between, on the one hand, acting in one’s best interest and taking as much as one wants all the time and, on the other, acting for the good of the group, which requires taking a lesser amount so that the replenishment rate can keep up with the rate of use. As with public goods, both cooperation and antagonism affect this decision.

With these situations in mind, we can now dig deeply into the dynamics of both cooperation and antagonism. Cooperation is one of the most heavily studied aspects of human behavior, yet despite this attention, there is much that is not understood about it, including its fundamental base. There are a number of different perspectives on the base. Interdependence theory argues that cooperation is driven by how one interprets the subjective value of the outcomes that will result from various combinations of behaviors. A person who sees a potential result of “50 to you, 50 to me” as “We both would do well” is more likely to cooperate than the person who sees it as “I would not outgain the other person.” Self-control theory suggests that cooperation is a function of how well a person can resist the impulse to benefit now and delay gratification. Evolutionary theory takes many forms but revolves around the extent to which cooperation is adaptive. Finally, the appropriateness framework takes a cognitive approach and assumes that cooperation is determined by a combination of social–cognitive (interpretation of self and the situation) and decision-heuristic factors. We propose that it is possible to integrate across these approaches and understand cooperation as a behavior that is influenced by all of these factors as well as other dynamics, such as cultural mores and personality traits.

Antagonism, as it relates to the collective welfare, is a phenomenon with a lesser history but one that is clearly influential. A number of facets of antagonism are relevant. Power, and its abuse, is a major factor, and a specific application to collective goods is the notion of a “gatekeeper,” or a person who can completely determine whether a public good exists or a common-pool resource can be used. Gatekeepers tend to demand ample compensation from others in order for the good or resource to go forward. If this demand is resisted, as it often is, the end result is that the good is not provided or the resource not accessed. Another facet is the desire to see an out-group be harmed. Sometimes, this motivation is so strong that people will deny themselves a good outcome in order to see the harm occur. Why someone would want to see an out-group be harmed is debatable, but it may be attributable to a desire to be seen as a winner, or it may be a strategy designed to produce a net benefit for one’s in-group. Emotions also play a role, with people tending to assume that out-group members have just basic emotions such as happiness and sadness and not secondary emotions such as guilt and shame. Because out-group members are emotionally simple, it is seen as acceptable to treat them badly. Complicating matters even further is that antagonism can sometimes be seen against in-group members who deviate, in either direction, from the group norm and against individuals who are behaving in a clearly selfless manner, like volunteers.

A number of approaches have been proposed to the resolution of public goods problems. Structural solutions act to alter the basic dynamic of the dilemma by means of interventions such as rewards for cooperation, punishment for noncooperation, and selection of a single group member to chart a course of action for everyone. Third-party solutions involve the bringing in of an external agent to help determine how group members should behave. These agents may be more passive and merely suggest solutions, or they may be more active and dictate how decisions will be made, what decision will be made, or both. Finally, psychological solutions involve changing how people view the situation.

We finish by discussing how policy makers can improve the chances of a publicly valuable good being supported. We particularly emphasize creation of a felt connection with future generations; clear demonstration of immediate and concrete consequences as a result of failure to provide the good; instillation of a sense of community; and isolation of the good from other, related issues. We also take up the general problem of distrust of those who establish policy and discuss some methods for helping minimize distrust.

Shining lights and bad apples: The effect of goal-setting on group performance

Management education programs increasingly use group work as a tool for developing teamwork knowledge and skills. A critical factor identified in prior research to influence group performance in student groups is goal-setting. We test in a sample of 37 groups the effect of group goal configurations and goal difficulty on group performance. We show that goal distance (as the distance between the lowest goal in the group and the rest of individual goals) has a positive impact on group performance. Moreover, we provide empirical evidence for an inverted U-shape association between goal difficulty and group performance. Therefore, our results question the linearity assumptions on the relation between goal difficulty and group performance and open new research directions in group goal-setting.

The group discussion effect: integrative processes and suggestions for implementation

One of the most consistent findings in experimental social dilemmas research is the positive effect group discussion has on cooperative behavior. At a time when cooperation and consensus is critical to tackle global problems, ranging from debt to deforestation, understanding the dynamics of group discussion is a pressing need. Unfortunately, research investigating the underlying processes and implementation of the effect has been inconclusive. The authors present a critical review of existing explanations and integrate these perspectives into a single process model of group discussion, providing a more complete theoretical picture of how interrelated factors combine to facilitate discussion-induced cooperation. On the basis of this theoretical analysis, they consider complimentary approaches to the indirect and feasible implementation of group discussion. They argue that such strategies may overcome the barriers to direct discussion observed across a range of groups and organizations.