Psychological distance increases uncompromising consequentialism

Institutional design and moral conflict in health care priority-setting

Priority-setting policy-makers often face moral and political pressure to balance the conflicting motivations of efficiency and rescue/non-abandonment. Using the conflict between these motivations as a case study can enrich the understanding of institutional design in developed democracies. This essay presents a cognitive-psychological account of the conflict between efficiency and rescue/non-abandonment in health care priority-setting. It then describes three sets of institutional arrangements-in Australia, England/Wales, and Germany, respectively-that contend with this conflict in interestingly different ways. The analysis yields at least three implications for institutional design in developed democracies: (1) indeterminacy at the level of moral psychology can increase the probability of indeterminacy at the level of institutional design; (2) situational constraints in effect require priority-setting policy-makers to adopt normative-moral pluralism; and (3) the U.S. health care system may be in an anti-priority-setting equilibrium.

The Wise Mind Balances the Abstract and the Concrete

We explored how individuals' mental representations of complex and uncertain situations impact their ability to reason wisely. To this end, we introduce situated methods to capture abstract and concrete mental representations and the switching between them when reflecting on social challenges. Using these methods, we evaluated the alignment of abstractness and concreteness with four integral facets of wisdom: intellectual humility, open-mindedness, perspective-taking, and compromise-seeking. Data from North American and UK participants (N = 1,151) revealed that both abstract and concrete construals significantly contribute to wise reasoning, even when controlling for a host of relevant covariates and potential response bias. Natural language processing of unstructured texts among high (top 25%) and low (bottom 25%) wisdom participants corroborated these results: semantic networks of the high wisdom group reveal greater use of both abstract and concrete themes compared to the low wisdom group. Finally, employing a repeated strategy-choice method as an additional measure, our findings demonstrated that individuals who showed a greater balance and switching between these construal types exhibited higher wisdom. Our findings advance understanding of individual differences in mental representations and how construals shape reasoning across contexts in everyday life.

Egoistic value is positively associated with pro-environmental attitude and behaviour when the environmental problems are psychologically close

Egoistic value is conceptualized as anti-environmental in many environmental value theories, yet contradictory evidence exists for its relation with pro-environmental attitude and behaviour. To provide insights into these inconsistent findings, this research examined the moderating role of the psychological distance of environmental problems on their relationship. Across one cross-sectional survey study (1008 community participants from the United States) and one World Values Survey study (66,704 nationally representative participants from 46 countries/regions), results converged in showing that psychological distance of environmental problems (i.e. climate change and local pollution) moderated the relationship between egoistic value and pro-environmental attitude and behaviour. Their association became more positive as that psychological distance got closer. Different patterns were observed for altruistic and biospheric values. These findings highlight the potential pro-environmental utility of egoistic value and the importance of paying attention to contexts when theorizing its relation with pro-environmental attitude and behaviour.

Influence of Social Distance on Foreign Language Effect in Moral Judgment

Previous research has shown that moral choice depends on language, a phenomenon known as the moral foreign language effect (mFLE). The current study examines the influence of social distance on the mFLE. In Experiment 1, 200 participants were randomly assigned to either close or distant social distance in English or Chinese. In Experiment 2, 188 participants were randomly assigned to either English or Chinese and were presented with eight moral dilemmas, each with five different levels of social distance. After reading the dilemma, participants made a choice on a binary scale (Yes/No) in both Experiments 1 and 2 or on a more sensitive 100-point scale in Experiment 2. The results showed that the mFLE was present in distant social distance but absent in close social distance. Finally, a meta-analysis of the results from both studies confirmed the effect of social distance on the mFLE. These findings demonstrate that social distance might play an important role in moderating the mFLE in moral judgment.

Beyond Trolleyology: The CNI Model of Moral-Dilemma Responses

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

How do people make judgments about actions that violate moral norms yet maximize the greater good (e.g., sacrificing the well-being of a small number of people for the well-being of a larger number of people)? Research on this question has been criticized for relying on highly artificial scenarios and for conflating multiple distinct factors underlying responses in moral dilemmas. The current article reviews research that used a computational modeling approach to disentangle the roles of multiple distinct factors in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. By disentangling sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general preference for inaction versus action in responses to realistic dilemmas, the reviewed work provides a more nuanced understanding of how people make judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas.

What language does your heart speak? The influence of foreign language on moral judgements and emotions related to unrealistic and realistic moral dilemmas

Emotional attenuation in a second language is believed to be one of the main causes of the Moral Foreign Language effect (MFLe). However, evidence on the mediating role of emotion in the relationship between language and moral judgements is limited and mainly derives from unrealistic moral dilemmas. We conducted two studies to investigate (1) whether the MFLe is present in both unrealistic (Study 1) and realistic (Study 2) moral dilemmas, and (2) whether this effect can be attributed to reduced emotionality. In Study 1, the MFLe was found in the moral judgements made by Spanish-English bilinguals. However, the same pattern was not observed in Greek Cypriot-English bilinguals' moral judgements, and this result was attributed to the prominent role of English in Cyprus. In Study 2, the MFLe extended to realistic moral dilemmas when the outcome of the action entailed the violation of a social norm. Study 1 and Study 2 also revealed that these bilinguals experienced a wide range of emotions in their L1 and L2, which did not differ significantly across languages. Mediation analyses further indicated that the MFLe was not mediated by emotional blunting, which made us consider alternative explanations for the MFLe.

From aesthetics to ethics: Testing the link between an emotional experience of awe and the motive of quixoteism on (un)ethical behavior

According to the awe-quixoteism hypothesis, one experience of awe may lead to the engagement in challenging actions aimed at increasing the welfare of the world. However, what if the action involves damaging one individual? Across four experiments (N = 876), half participants were induced to feel either awe or a different (pleasant, activating, or neutral-control) emotion, and then decided whether achieving a prosocial goal (local vs. global). In the first three experiments this decision was assessed through a dilemma that involved to sacrifice one individual's life, additionally in Experiments 2 and 3 we varied the quality of the action (ordinary vs. challenging). In Experiment 4, participants decided whether performing a real helping action. Overall, in line with the awe-quixoteism hypothesis, the results showed that previously inducing awe enhanced the willingness to sacrifice someone (Experiments 1, 2 and 3) or the acceptance to help (Experiment 4) when the decision involved engaging in challenges aimed at improving the welfare of the world.

Do People Believe That They Are More Deontological Than Others?

The question of how we decide that someone else has done something wrong is at the heart of moral psychology. Little work has been done to investigate whether people believe that others' moral judgment differs from their own in moral dilemmas. We conducted four experiments using various measures and diverse samples to demonstrate the self-other discrepancy in moral judgment. We found that (a) people were more deontological when they made moral judgments themselves than when they judged a stranger (Studies 1-4) and (b) a protected values (PVs) account outperformed an emotion account and a construal-level theory account in explaining this self-other discrepancy (Studies 3 and 4). We argued that the self-other discrepancy in moral judgment may serve as a protective mechanism co-evolving alongside the social exchange mechanism and may contribute to better understanding the obstacles preventing people from cooperation.

Disfluent fonts lead to more utilitarian decisions in moral dilemmas

Previous research suggests that utilitarian decisions to moral dilemmas often stem from analytic, controlled cognitive processes. Furthermore, processing disfluency can trigger analytic thinking and improve performance on tasks that require logic and cognitive reflection. In the present study we investigated how processing fluency affects the readiness with which people give utilitarian responses to both personal and impersonal dilemmas. Participants were presented in two different experimental blocks with dilemmas written in both easy- (fluent) and hard-to-read (disfluent) fonts. We expected that dilemmas written in a disfluent font would be associated with more utilitarian responses. Results supported this prediction, albeit only when the disfluent dilemmas appeared first, showing that participants endorsed more utilitarian actions in the disfluent condition than in the fluent condition across dilemma types. These data suggest that increasing processing disfluency by manipulating the font affects decisions in the moral domain.

On Language Processing Shaping Decision Making

Recent research has revealed that people’s preferences, choices, and judgments are affected by whether information is presented in a foreign or a native language. Here, we review this evidence, focusing on various decision-making domains and advancing a variety of potential explanations for this foreign-language effect on decision making. We interpret the findings in the context of dual-system theories of decision making, entertaining the possibility that foreign-language processing reduces the impact of intuition and/or increases the impact of deliberation on people’s choices. In closing, we suggest future research directions for progressing our understanding of how language and decision-making processes interact when guiding people’s decisions.

Cold-hearted or cool-headed: physical coldness promotes utilitarian moral judgment

In the current study, we examine the effect of physical coldness on personal moral dilemma judgment. Previous studies have indicated that utilitarian moral judgment—sacrificing a few people to achieve the greater good for others—was facilitated when: (1) participants suppressed an initial emotional response and deliberately thought about the utility of outcomes; (2) participants had a high-level construal mindset and focused on abstract goals (e.g., save many); or (3) there was a decreasing emotional response to sacrificing a few. In two experiments, we exposed participants to extreme cold or typical room temperature and then asked them to make personal moral dilemma judgments. The results of Experiment 1 indicated that coldness prompted utilitarian judgment, but the effect of coldness was independent from deliberate thought or abstract high-level construal mindset. As Experiment 2 revealed, coldness facilitated utilitarian judgment via reduced empathic feelings. Therefore, physical coldness did not affect the “cool-headed” deliberate process or the abstract high-level construal mindset. Rather, coldness biased people toward being “cold-hearted,” reduced empathetic concern, and facilitated utilitarian moral judgments.

Eliciting preferences for prioritizing treatment of rare diseases: the role of opportunity costs and framing effects

BACKGROUND

Understanding societal preferences regarding resource allocation in the health sector has gained importance as countries increasingly base reimbursement decisions on economic evaluations. Preference elicitation using surveys, a common practice in the health sector, is subject to a range of framing effects.

OBJECTIVE

This research investigates the importance of (theoretically relevant) opportunity costs and (theoretically irrelevant) framing effects on stated preferences for prioritizing treatment of rare (orphan) diseases.

METHODS

We elicited preferences from Norwegians, aged 40-67, using simple trade-off exercises. Respondents were randomised to different opportunity costs of the rare disease or to different framings of the trade-off exercises.

RESULTS

Respondents were quite sensitive to the visual presentation of the choice problem, and, to a lesser extent, to focusing and labelling effects. Elicited preferences varied little in response to large changes in opportunity costs, suggesting scope-insensitivity among respondents.

CONCLUSIONS

Preferences for prioritizing treatment of rare diseases elicited using trade-off exercises are insensitive to (theoretically relevant) opportunity costs, but sensitive to (theoretically irrelevant) framing effects.