You should read this! Perceiving and acting upon action primes influences one's sense of agency

The reliability of assistance systems modulates the sense of control and acceptability of human operators

Individuals are increasingly required to interact with complex and autonomous technologies, which often has a significant impact on the control they experience over their actions and choices. A better characterization of the factors responsible for modulating the control experience of human operators is therefore a major challenge to improve the quality of human-system interactions. Using a decision-making task performed in interaction with an automated system, we investigated the influence of two key properties of automated systems, their reliability and explicability, on participants' sense of agency (SoA), as well as the perceived acceptability of system choices. The results show an increase in SoA associated with the most explicable system. Importantly, the increase in system explicability influenced participants' ability to regulate the control resources they engaged in the current decision. In particular, we observed that participants' SoA varied with system reliability in the "explained" condition, whereas no variation was observed in the "non-explained" condition. Finally, we found that system reliability had a direct impact on system acceptability, such that the most reliable systems were also considered the most acceptable systems. These results highlight the importance of studying agency in human-computer interaction in order to define more acceptable automation technologies.

Action prediction modulates self-other integration in joint action

People often coordinate actions with others, requiring an adjustable amount of self-other integration between actor's and co-actor's actions. Previous research suggests that such self-other integration (indexed by the joint Simon effect) is enhanced by agent similarity of the co-actor (e.g., high in intentionality). In this study, we aimed to extend this line of research by testing whether experiencing agency over a co-actor's actions (vicarious agency) and/or action prediction strengthens the joint Simon effect. For this purpose, we manipulated experienced agency by varying the experienced control over a co-actor's actions (Experiment 1), and action prediction regarding the co-actor's actions (Experiment 2). Vicarious agency could effectively be induced, but did not modulate the size of the joint Simon effect. The joint Simon effect was decreased when the co-actor's actions were unpredictable (vs. predictable) during joint task performance. These findings suggest social agency can be induced and effectively measured in joint action. Action prediction can act as an effective agency cue modulating the amount of self-other integration in joint action.

Non-motor cues do not generate the perception of self-agency: A critique of cue-integration

How does one know that (s)he is the causal agent of their motor actions? Earlier theories of sense of agency have attributed the capacity for perception of self-agency to the comparator process of the motor-control/action system. However, with the advent of the findings implying a role of non-motor cues (like affective states, beliefs, primed concepts, and social instructions or previews of actions) in the sense of agency literature, the perception of self-agency is hypothesized to be generated even by non-motor cues (based on their relative reliability or weighting estimate); and, this theory is come to be known as the cue-integration of sense of agency. However, the cue-integration theory motivates skepticism about whether it is falsifiable and whether it is plausible that non-motor cues that are sensorily unrelated to typical sensory processes of self-agency have the capacity to produce a perception of self-agency. To substantiate this skepticism, I critically analyze the experimental operationalizations of cue-integration-with the (classic) vicarious agency experiment as a case study-to show that (1) the participants in these experiments are ambiguous about their causal agency over motor actions, (2) thus, these participants resort to reports of self-agency as heuristic judgments (under ambiguity) rather than due to cue-integration per se, and (3) there might not have occurred cue-integration based self-agency reports if these experimental operationalizations had eliminated ambiguity about the causal agency. Thus, I conclude that the reports of self-agency (observed in typical non-motor cues based cue-integration experiments) are not instances of perceptual effect-that are hypothesized to be produced by non-motor cues-but are of heuristic judgment effect.

A Social Psychological Toolbox for Clinical Psychology

Abstract. Translational science involves the fruitful interplay between basic research paradigms and related fields of application. One promising candidate for such synergy is the relationship between social and clinical psychology. Although the relation is principally bi-directional, such that either discipline can take the role of the basic and the applied science, we take the perspective of transfer from basic social and cognitive social psychology to applications in the clinical realm. Starting from a historical sketch of some of the earliest topics in the interface of both disciplines, we first come to conclude that truly integrative co-theorizing is conspicuously missing. Then, however, we recognize the strong potential for productive collaboration at the pragmatic level of an adaptive research toolbox containing approved methods and compact theoretical tools that carry over between disciplines. We outline the notion of a generic, provisional toolbox as distinguished from a fixed repertoire of established standard procedures. We provide examples of two subsets of tools, methods and logical principles required proper diagnostic reasoning, and theoretically founded influence tools that can enrich the repertoire of therapeutic interventions. Rather than propagating a normatively prescriptive toolbox, we interpret translational science as a pluralistic endeavor, such that different clinicians complete their personalized toolboxes in manifold ways.

What am I doing? It depends: agency and action identification

Actions can be identified at a range of levels, from higher level, outcome-related descriptions to lower level, movement-related descriptions. But how do these levels of identification influence the experience of control (agency) over a task? We addressed the relation between the level of action identification and agency using a hierarchical task modeled from typing. Participants memorized letter sequences and reported them by moving a cursor to targets that contained letters. To manipulate lower level (aiming) difficulty, the targets were either large or small. To manipulate higher level (memory) difficulty, the letter sequences were either constant or random within a block. We found effects of higher and lower level difficulty on agency and action identification. Moreover, we found interactive effects of higher and lower level difficulty on performance. We discuss these findings in terms of contributions to the study of agency, and some differences from the results of previous studies of action identification.

Modulation of Reaction Times and Sense of Agency via Subliminal Priming in Functional Movement Disorders

Background: In functional movement disorders, explicit movements are impaired, while implicit movements are preserved. Furthermore, there is evidence that the sense of agency is abnormal. Aim: We aimed to investigate how motor responses and sense of agency were affected by subliminal or supraliminal cues in people with functional movement disorders. Methods: Twenty-three people with a functional movement disorder and 26 healthy controls took part in a subliminal and supraliminal priming experiment which investigated reaction times, choice and sense of agency. Participants pressed a left or right arrow key in response to an imperative left or right pointing arrow. Either key could be pressed in response to bidirectional arrows. The imperative arrow was preceded by a small left or right pointing prime arrow, that was non-predictive (50% correct) and was presented in either subliminal or supraliminal conditions. The participant's response caused the appearance of a colored circle and they rated the degree of control they felt over its appearance (sense of agency). The circle's color depended on whether their response was congruent or incongruent with the prime arrow direction. After exclusion, 19 participants remained in each group. Results: Prime-compatible responses led to faster reaction times in both the subliminal and supraliminal condition. Subliminal prime-compatible responses were chosen more frequently in the free choice condition. The sense of agency did not depend on prime-response congruency. There were no significant differences in any of these measures between the two groups. Conclusion: With non-predictive cues, reaction times, choices, and the sense of agency remain normal in people with functional movement disorders, for both subliminal and supraliminal primes. The findings suggest that it is not so much conscious awareness of the movement, but rather conscious motor preparation that is detrimental to motor function in functional movement disorders.

The effect of cognitive effort on the sense of agency

While we are performing a demanding cognitive task, not only do we have a sense of cognitive effort, we are also subjectively aware that we are initiating, executing and controlling our thoughts and actions (i.e., sense of agency). Previous studies have shown that cognitive effort can be both detrimental and facilitative for the experienced sense of agency. We hypothesized that the reason for these contradictory findings might lie in the use of differential time windows in which cognitive effort operates. The current study therefore examined the effect of cognitive effort exerted on the current trial, on the previous trial or across a block of trials on sense of agency, using implicit (Experiment 1) and explicit (Experiment 2) measures of sense of agency. We showed that the exertion of more cognitive control on current trials led to a higher explicit sense of agency. This surprising result was contrasted to previous studies to establish potential reasons for this surprising finding and to formulate recommendations for future studies.

Time for Action: Verbal Action Cues Influence Temporal Binding

Prior research has shown that our perception of time is compressed when we volitionally perform actions, a phenomenon referred to as temporal binding. In three studies, we investigated the degree to which contextual cues that signaled other agents and related to actions would influence binding, given that those cues may affect individual's feelings of independent action performance. Participants heard action verbalizations that did or did not match actions that participants had already begun performing. Participants' time estimates of the intervals between action initiations and action effects were higher on trials in which they heard verbalizations that matched their ongoing actions, and lower on trials in which the verbalizations and actions did not match. Such effects did not occur when participants passively observed actions and effects being caused by the computer. These results show that the compatibility of action cues with ongoing actions influences temporal binding effects, suggesting that they influence our feelings of having been an independent agent.

Connecting action control and agency: Does action-effect binding affect temporal binding?

The sense of agency, i.e., the notion that we, as agents, are in control of our own actions and can affect our environment by acting, is an integral part of human volition. Recent work has attempted to ground agency in basic mechanisms of human action control. Along these lines, action-effect binding has been shown to affect explicit judgments of agency. Here, we investigate if such action-effect bindings are also related to temporal binding which is often used as an implicit measure of agency. In two experiments, we found evidence for the establishment of short-term action-effect bindings as well as temporal binding effects. However, the two phenomena were not associated with each other. This finding suggests that the relation of action control and agency is not a simple one, and it adds to the evidence in favor of a dissociation between subjective agency and perceptual biases such as temporal binding.

Control used and control felt: Two sides of the agency coin

Agency has been defined as the sense of ownership and control of our actions, and the metacognition of agency has now been examined in a number of studies. Here we examined the relations between task demands, the feeling of being in control, and the feeling of using control. As task demands increase, we might feel as if we use a lot of control while feeling little control over the task. It therefore seems possible that the amount of control one feels they have used and how much in control one feels are separable components of the metacognition of control. In two experiments, we manipulated task demands and assessed these two aspects of metacognition. The source of task demand differed for the two experiments. In Experiment 1, we manipulated task demands by varying the sizes of targets in an aiming task. As predicted, we found that reports of control used increased, while reports of control felt decreased, for more difficult aiming conditions. In Experiment 2, we found a similar relation using a different source of demand: response conflict. We connect these reports of control to previous investigations of task demand and agency, as well as prominent conceptions of cognitive control.

Sense of Agency as a predictor of risk-taking

Previous research suggests that people tend to underestimate risks that are under their control. It is however unclear which processes underlie the control-risk relation. The present research investigated the feeling of causal control known as agency as a predictor of risk-perception and risk-taking. In two studies, participants performed a risk-taking task in which their actions either caused immediate or delayed outcomes - a validated manipulation of agency. Results show that when outcomes were shown immediately rather than delayed, and respectively, when agency was high rather than low, participants reported a higher ability to control risks (Study 1). Furthermore, they were also more inclined to take risks (Study 2). The present research, the first to apply principles that emerged from fundamental research on agency into the societally relevant domain of risk-related perception and behavior, therefore showed a clear relation between agency and risk.

Cultural group perception enhances sense of agency in a multicultural society

Group, which involves collective actions for achieving shared goals, can be conceptually understood as an important source of agency and control. The current research investigated whether group identity salience can enhance sense of agency within the individual. Specifically, we examined whether an activated cultural group identity, through presenting different types of cultural photographs in a predictable way, would facilitate people's sense of agency by using an implicit method, namely, intentional binding effect paradigm. Experiment 1a found that an activated cultural group identity enhanced the sense of agency. Next, Experiment 1b replicated the findings by recruiting a different ethnic group in the same society. Experiment 2 explored what may affect the intensity of induced sense of agency and found that perceived representativeness of the presented cultural stimuli was positively correlated with the intensity of induced sense of agency. Finally, Experiment 3 explored whether ethnic minority and majority groups would demonstrate different intensity of agency when their cultural identity was activated. The results showed that the sense of agency induced by the mainstream cultural stimuli was greater than that induced by the foreign cultural photographs. These patterns were not different between the two ethnic groups. Taken together, these findings reflected the dynamic nature of cultural identity construction in a multicultural society.

An examination of the sequential trial effect on experiences of agency in the Simon task

Previous research shows that agency experiences are reduced when response selection is dysfluent. Expanding on this work, we report two experiments addressing the influence of Simon response conflict on agency. Participants responded to congruent and incongruent Simon task trials and indicated their experienced agency after each response. Results show that incongruent trials were related to reduced agency experiences, thus replicating earlier work on the response-selection agency-link. Furthermore, the data further showed an interesting sequence effect: The congruency effect on experienced agency mainly emerged when a trial was preceded by a congruent trial. There was however no congruency effect on experienced agency when a trial was preceded by an incongruent trial. These findings are briefly discussed in the context of research on response selection and experiences of agency.

Functional Freedom: A Psychological Model of Freedom in Decision-Making

The freedom of a decision is not yet sufficiently described as a psychological variable. We present a model of functional decision freedom that aims to fill that role. The model conceptualizes functional freedom as a capacity of people that varies depending on certain conditions of a decision episode. It denotes an inner capability to consciously shape complex decisions according to one’s own values and needs. Functional freedom depends on three compensatory dimensions: it is greatest when the decision-maker is highly rational, when the structure of the decision is highly underdetermined, and when the decision process is strongly based on conscious thought and reflection. We outline possible research questions, argue for psychological benefits of functional decision freedom, and explicate the model’s implications on current knowledge and research. In conclusion, we show that functional freedom is a scientific variable, permitting an additional psychological foothold in research on freedom, and that is compatible with a deterministic worldview.

Integrating prospective and retrospective cues to the sense of agency: a multi-study investigation

Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the experience of voluntary control over one’s own actions, and, through them, over events in the outside world. Recent accounts suggest that SoA involves an integration of various cues. These include prospective cues, for example, related to the fluency of action selection, and retrospective cues, linked to outcome monitoring. It remains unclear whether these cues may have independent effects on SoA, and, in particular, how their relative contributions may change during instrumental learning. In the present study, we explored these issues by conducting a multi-study analysis of seven published and unpublished studies on the role of prospective cues to the SoA. Our main question was how the effects of selection fluency on SoA might change as information about action–outcome contingencies is gathered. Results show that selection fluency can have a general and consistent influence on the SoA, independent of outcome monitoring. This suggests selection fluency is used as a heuristic cue, to prospectively inform our SoA. In addition, our results show that the influence of selection fluency on SoA may change systematically as action–outcome contingencies are gradually learned. We speculate that dysfluent selection may impair formation of mental associations between action and outcome.

Strength of Intentional Effort Enhances the Sense of Agency

Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the feeling of controlling one’s own actions, and the experience of controlling external events with one’s actions. The present study examined the effect of strength of intentional effort on SoA. We manipulated the strength of intentional effort using three types of buttons that differed in the amount of force required to depress them. We used a self-attribution task as an explicit measure of SoA. The results indicate that strength of intentional effort enhanced self-attribution when action-effect congruency was unreliable. We concluded that intentional effort importantly affects the integration of multiple cues affecting explicit judgments of agency when the causal relationship action and effect was unreliable.

Difficult action decisions reduce the sense of agency: A study using the Eriksen flanker task

The sense of agency refers to the feeling that we are in control of our actions and, through them, of events in the outside world. Much research has focused on the importance of retrospectively matching predicted and actual action outcomes for a strong sense of agency. Yet, recent studies have revealed that a metacognitive signal about the fluency of action selection can prospectively inform our sense of agency. Fluent, or easy, action selection leads to a stronger sense of agency over action outcomes than dysfluent, or difficult, selection. Since these studies used subliminal priming to manipulate action selection, it remained unclear whether supraliminal stimuli affecting action selection would have similar effects. We used supraliminal flankers to manipulate action selection in response to a central target. Experiment 1 revealed that conflict in action selection, induced by incongruent flankers and targets, led to reduced agency ratings over an outcome that followed the participant's response, relative to neutral and congruent flanking conditions. Experiment 2 replicated this result, and extended it to free choice between alternative actions. Finally, Experiment 3 varied the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between flankers and target. Action selection performance varied with SOA. Agency ratings were always lower in incongruent than congruent trials, and this effect did not vary across SOAs. Sense of agency is influenced by a signal that tracks conflict in action selection, regardless of the visibility of stimuli inducing conflict, and even when the timing of the stimuli means that the conflict may not affect performance.

The Designed Environment and How it Affects Brain Morphology and Mental Health

Background:

The environment is inextricably related to mental health. Recent research replicates findings of a significant, linear correlation between a childhood exposure to the urban environment and psychosis. Related studies also correlate the urban environment and aberrant brain morphologies. These findings challenge common beliefs that the mind and brain remain neutral in the face of worldly experience.

Aim:

There is a signature within these neurological findings that suggests that specific features of design cause and trigger mental illness. The objective in this article is to work backward from the molecular dynamics to identify features of the designed environment that may either trigger mental illness or protect against it.

Method:

This review analyzes the discrete functions putatively assigned to the affected brain areas and a neurotransmitter called dopamine, which is the primary target of most antipsychotic medications. The intention is to establish what the correlations mean in functional terms, and more specifically, how this relates to the phenomenology of urban experience. In doing so, environmental mental illness risk factors are identified.

Conclusions:

Having established these relationships, the review makes practical recommendations for those in public health who wish to use the environment itself as a tool to improve the mental health of a community through design.

Parallel processing streams for motor output and sensory prediction during action preparation

Sensory consequences of one's own actions are perceived as less intense than identical, externally generated stimuli. This is generally taken as evidence for sensory prediction of action consequences. Accordingly, recent theoretical models explain this attenuation by an anticipatory modulation of sensory processing prior to stimulus onset (Roussel et al. 2013) or even action execution (Brown et al. 2013). Experimentally, prestimulus changes that occur in anticipation of self-generated sensations are difficult to disentangle from more general effects of stimulus expectation, attention and task load (performing an action). Here, we show that an established manipulation of subjective agency over a stimulus leads to a predictive modulation in sensory cortex that is independent of these factors. We recorded magnetoencephalography while subjects performed a simple action with either hand and judged the loudness of a tone caused by the action. Effector selection was manipulated by subliminal motor priming. Compatible priming is known to enhance a subjective experience of agency over a consequent stimulus (Chambon and Haggard 2012). In line with this effect on subjective agency, we found stronger sensory attenuation when the action that caused the tone was compatibly primed. This perceptual effect was reflected in a transient phase-locked signal in auditory cortex before stimulus onset and motor execution. Interestingly, this sensory signal emerged at a time when the hemispheric lateralization of motor signals in M1 indicated ongoing effector selection. Our findings confirm theoretical predictions of a sensory modulation prior to self-generated sensations and support the idea that a sensory prediction is generated in parallel to motor output (Walsh and Haggard 2010), before an efference copy becomes available.

Responsibility judgments of wins and losses in the 2013 chess championship

We report two studies on the perceived responsibility of opponents competing for a goal that can be attained by only one of them. Responsibility judgments were collected in seven samples of lay people and experts before, during, and after the World Chess Championship in 2013. Participants assessed the responsibility of the two players, their supporting teams, local conditions, and chance factors for four hypothetical outcomes (large and small loss/win for each player), along with probabilities for these outcomes, demonstrating subadditivity (sums exceeding 100%) in all samples, even among chess experts. The winner was consistently perceived to be more responsible than the loser, and more for outcomes with large than small margins. There was also an effect of focal player, as Carlsen was given more responsibility both for losses and wins than Anand, by the present (Norwegian) pro-Carlsen samples. However, this effect could be modified by describing the outcomes as Anand’s (rather than Carlsen’s) wins and losses. Thus the study adds to the valence framing literature by showing how responsibility judgments are affected by the way outcomes are framed.

From action intentions to action effects: how does the sense of agency come about?

Sense of agency refers to the feeling of controlling an external event through one's own action. On one influential view, agency depends on how predictable the consequences of one's action are, getting stronger as the match between predicted and actual effect of an action gets closer. Thus, sense of agency arises when external events that follow our action are consistent with predictions of action effects made by the motor system while we perform or simply intend to perform an action. According to this view, agency is inferred retrospectively, after an action has been performed and its consequences are known. In contrast, little is known about whether and how internal processes involved in the selection of actions may influence subjective sense of control, in advance of the action itself, and irrespective of effect predictability. In this article, we review several classes of behavioral and neuroimaging data suggesting that earlier processes, linked to fluency of action selection, prospectively contribute to sense of agency. These findings have important implications for better understanding human volition and abnormalities of action experience.

On the Other Hand

In two studies, we investigated the influence of hand dominance on the sense of self-causation or agency. Participants alternately used their dominant or nondominant hand to cause the occurrence of an effect (a tone) in a task in which agency was made ambiguous. Participants were subsequently asked to indicate the degree to which they felt they had caused that tone to occur. Results showed that the sense of agency was increased when individuals used their nondominant hand prior to the onset of the tone, compared to when they used their dominant hand. Furthermore, the degree of experienced agency was moderated by perceived effort. The difference in agency levels occurred independently of experimentally induced or naturally occurring differences in response latencies and even occurred in the absence of (major) arm movement.