Judging those who judge: Perceivers infer the roles of affect and cognition underpinning others' moral dilemma responses

Consensus, controversy, and chaos in the attribution of characteristics to the morally exceptional

OBJECTIVE

What do people see as distinguishing the morally exceptional from others? To handle the problem that people may disagree about who qualifies as morally exceptional, we asked subjects to select and rate their own examples of morally exceptional, morally average, and immoral people.

METHOD

Subjects rated each selected exemplar on several enablers of moral action and several directions of moral action. By applying the logic underlying stimulus sampling in experimental design, we evaluated perceivers' level of agreement about the characteristics of the morally exceptional, even though perceivers rated different targets.

RESULTS

Across three studies, there was strong subjective consensus on who is morally exceptional: those who are empathetic and prone to guilt, those who reflect on moral issues and identify with morality, those who have self-control and actually enact moral behaviors, and those who care about harm, compassion, fairness, and honesty. Deep controversies also existed about the moral directions pursued by those seen as morally exceptional: People evaluated those who pursued similar values and made similar decisions more favorably.

CONCLUSION

Strong consensus suggests characteristics that may push a person to go beyond normal expectations, that the study of moral exceptionality is not overly hindered by disagreement over who is morally exceptional, and that there is some common ground between disagreeing camps.

You're heartless, I'm less: self-image and social norms in moral judgment

Are moral judgments to sacrificial dilemmas shaped by a latent social norm? The present research addresses this issue. We report a set of six studies (plus a supplementary one) which question the existence of a social norm in the longstanding deontism/utilitarian debate by relying on two original tools, namely substitution technique and self-presentation paradigm. Study 1 showed that American participants asked to answer like most Americans would do gave more utilitarian responses than control participants who answered in their own name (Study 1). Study 2 showed that participants instructed to answer in a disapproval fashion were more utilitarian than both participants instructed to answer in an approval fashion and control participants. Importantly, no difference was observed between the approval and control conditions, suggesting that participants naturally align their moral judgments with a latent norm they think is the most socially desirable. Studies 3-5 explored in addition the effect of the activation of a deontism-skewed norm using the substitution instruction on subsequent impression formation. For the latter task, participants were instructed to evaluate a random participant selected from a previous study who gave utilitarian-like responses (Studies 3a-3b), or to evaluate a fictitious politician who endorsed either a deontic or utilitarian orientation (Studies 4-5). Although we consistently replicated the effect of substitution instruction, we failed to show that attempts to activate a norm in a given individual shaped their evaluation of other people who do not align with this norm. Finally, we report a mini meta-analysis targeting the pooled effect and homogeneity among our studies.

Beyond Trolleyology: The CNI Model of Moral-Dilemma Responses

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

How do people make judgments about actions that violate moral norms yet maximize the greater good (e.g., sacrificing the well-being of a small number of people for the well-being of a larger number of people)? Research on this question has been criticized for relying on highly artificial scenarios and for conflating multiple distinct factors underlying responses in moral dilemmas. The current article reviews research that used a computational modeling approach to disentangle the roles of multiple distinct factors in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. By disentangling sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general preference for inaction versus action in responses to realistic dilemmas, the reviewed work provides a more nuanced understanding of how people make judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas.

Persuasive Messages for Improving Adherence to COVID-19 Prevention Behaviors: Randomized Online Experiment

BACKGROUND

Adherence to nonpharmaceutical interventions for COVID-19, including physical distancing, masking, staying home while sick, and avoiding crowded indoor spaces, remains critical for limiting the spread of COVID-19.

OBJECTIVE

The aim of this study was to test the effectiveness of using various persuasive appeals (deontological moral frame, empathy, identifiable victim, goal proximity, and reciprocity) at improving intentions to adhere to prevention behaviors.

METHODS

A randomized online experiment using a representative sample of adult Canadian residents with respect to age, ethnicity, and province of residence was performed from March 3 to March 6, 2021. Participants indicated their intentions to follow public health guidelines, saw one of six flyers featuring a persuasive appeal or no appeal, and then rated their intentions a second time. Known correlates of attitudes toward public health measures were also measured.

RESULTS

Intentions to adhere to public health measures increased in all appeal conditions. The message featuring an empathy appeal resulted in a greater increase in intentions than the control (no appeal) message. Moreover, the effectiveness of persuasive appeals was moderated by baseline intentions. Deontological, empathy, identifiable victim, and reciprocity appeals improved intentions more than the control message, but only for people with lower baseline intentions to adhere to nonpharmaceutical interventions.

CONCLUSIONS

Public health marketing campaigns aiming to increase adherence to COVID-19 protective behaviors could achieve modest gains by employing a range of persuasive appeals. However, to maximize impact, it is important that these campaigns be targeted to the right individuals.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

ClinicalTrials.gov NCT05722106; https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT05722106.

Contingencies of self-worth and the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations

Many studies have tried to understand what makes people adopt deontological or utilitarian inclinations when forming moral judgments or making moral choices. The present research examined the impact of motivational factors: contingencies of people's self-worth on the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations. Study 1 found positive correlations between two contingencies of self-worth: basing one's self-worth on being a virtuous, moral person (Virtue) and outperforming others (Competition), and the strength of deontological inclinations and utilitarian inclinations respectively. Studies 2 and 3 found that increasing saliency of Virtue as a source of one's self-worth selectively increased the strength of deontological inclinations, leaving utilitarian inclinations unchanged, while the opposite was true for increasing saliency of Competition as a source of self-worth and the strength of utilitarian inclinations: such priming increased utilitarian inclinations while deontological inclinations remained unchanged.

Testosterone and cortisol do not predict rejecting harm or maximizing outcomes in sacrificial moral dilemmas: A preregistered analysis

Contemporary moral psychology explores the biological underpinnings of morality, including how neuromodulators influence moral judgment and decision making. Some studies suggest that higher circulating testosterone is associated with increased acceptance of sacrificial harm, such as killing one person to save five lives, consistent with utilitarian ethics and inconsistent with deontological ethics. However, most studies employ conventional analytic techniques that conflate concern about outcomes with reduced concern about sacrificial harm, many are statistically underpowered, and none examine potential regulating effects of cortisol. Therefore, we examined whether salivary concentrations of testosterone and cortisol jointly predict sacrificial dilemma judgments among a large sample of undergraduates (n = 199). We utilized an advanced cognitive modeling technique (process dissociation) to independently assess sensitivity to causing harm and maximizing outcomes, preregistering the prediction that higher testosterone would predict reduced harm-rejection rather than increased concern for outcomes, especially among people low in cortisol. However, neither testosterone, nor cortisol, nor their interaction predicted sacrificial dilemma response tendencies. Such findings raise questions about the robustness of past evidence suggesting links between testosterone and sacrificial dilemma judgments.

Moral dilemmas and trust in leaders during a global health crisis

Trust in leaders is central to citizen compliance with public policies. One potential determinant of trust is how leaders resolve conflicts between utilitarian and non-utilitarian ethical principles in moral dilemmas. Past research suggests that utilitarian responses to dilemmas can both erode and enhance trust in leaders: sacrificing some people to save many others ('instrumental harm') reduces trust, while maximizing the welfare of everyone equally ('impartial beneficence') may increase trust. In a multi-site experiment spanning 22 countries on six continents, participants (N = 23,929) completed self-report (N = 17,591) and behavioural (N = 12,638) measures of trust in leaders who endorsed utilitarian or non-utilitarian principles in dilemmas concerning the COVID-19 pandemic. Across both the self-report and behavioural measures, endorsement of instrumental harm decreased trust, while endorsement of impartial beneficence increased trust. These results show how support for different ethical principles can impact trust in leaders, and inform effective public communication during times of global crisis. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION STATEMENT: The Stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 13 November 2020. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.13247315.v1 .

Moralizing mental states: The role of trait self-control and control perceptions

Which attributes of a person contribute to their tendency to moralize others' thoughts? Adopting an individual-difference approach to moral cognition, eight studies (N = 2,033) investigated how people's ability for self-control shapes their moral reactions to others' mental states. Specifically, Studies 1a-2b found positive predictive effects of trait self-control (TSC) on the moralization (e.g., blaming) of another person's fantasies about different immoral behaviors. While ruling out alternative explanations, they furthermore supported the mediating role of ascribing targets control over their mental states. Studies 3a-3b provided correlational evidence of the perceived ability to control one's own mental states as a mechanism in the relationship between TSC and ascriptions of control to others. Studies 4a-4b followed a causal-chain experimental approach: A manipulation of participants' self-perceived ability to control their emotions impacted their control ascriptions to others over their immoral mental states (Study 4a), and targets perceived as high (vs. low) in control over their immoral mental states elicited stronger moralizing reactions. Taken together, the present studies elucidate why people moralize others' purely mental states, even in the absence of overt behavior. More broadly, they advance our knowledge about the role of individual differences, particularly in self-control, in moral cognition.

The Effects of Social Perception on Moral Judgment

When people express a moral judgment, others make inferences about their personality, such as whether they are warm or competent. People may use this interpersonal process to present themselves in a way that is socially acceptable in the current circumstances. Across four studies, we investigated this hypothesis in Chinese culture and showed that college student participants tended to associate others' deontological moral judgments with warmth and utilitarian moral judgments with competence (Study 1, M _age = 21.1, SD = 2.45; Study 2, M _age = 20.53, SD = 1.87). In addition, participants made more deontological judgments after preparing to be interviewed for a job requiring them to be in a warm social role, and more utilitarian judgments after preparing for a job requiring them to be in a competent social role (Study 3, M _age = 19.5, SD = 1.63). This effect held true in moral dilemmas involving different degrees of hypothetical personal involvement, and appeared to be mediated by the perception of others' expectations (Study 4, M _age = 19.92, SD = 1.97). The results suggest an important role for social cognition as an influence on moral judgments in Chinese culture.

Psychopathy and Moral Dilemma Judgments: A CNI Model Analysis of Personal and Perceived Societal Standards

Research on moral dilemma judgment suggests that higher levels of psychopathy are associated with a greater preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments. The current research investigated whether this association reflects (1) differences in the understanding of what society considers right or wrong or (2) differences in personal standards about the acceptability of certain actions. Using the CNI model, we further explored whether the obtained differences are rooted in differential standards regarding the significance of consequences, moral norms, or general action preferences. The results suggest that (1) both differences in personal standards and differences in perceived societal standards contribute to associations between psychopathy and moral dilemma judgments and (2) personal and perceived societal standards play different roles for different determinants of moral dilemma judgments. Implications for clinical and moral psychology and for research at their intersection are discussed.

Type and amount of help as predictors for impression of helpers

Impression of helpers can vary as a function of the magnitude of helping (amount of help) and of situational and motivational aspects (type of help). Over three studies conducted in Sweden and the US, we manipulated both the amount and the type of help in ten diverse vignettes and measured participants' impressions of the described helpers. Impressions were almost unaffected when increasing the amount of help by 500%, but clearly affected by several type of help-manipulations. Particularly, helpers were less positively evaluated if they had mixed motives for helping, did not experience intense emotions or empathy, or if helping involved no personal sacrifice. In line with the person-centered theory of moral judgment, people seem to form impressions of helpers primarily based on the presumed underlying processes and motives of prosociality rather than its consequences.

Using the VIA Classification to Advance a Psychological Science of Virtue

The VIA Classification of Character Strengths and Virtue has received substantial attention since its inception as a model of 24 dimensions of positive human functioning, but less so as a potential contributor to a psychological science on the nature of virtue. The current paper presents an overview of how this classification could serve to advance the science of virtue. Specifically, we summarize previous research on the dimensional versus categorical characterization of virtue, and on the identification of cardinal virtues. We give particular attention to the three-dimensional model of cardinal virtues that includes moral, self-regulatory, and intellectual domains. We also discuss the possibility that these three clusters be treated as fundamental elements of a virtue model, meaning that they clearly and directly contribute to both individual and communal flourishing across various cultures. This discussion includes a summary of previous speculations about the evolution of adaptations underlying the human capacity for using behavioral repertoires associated with the three virtues, as well as discussing ways in which they simultaneously enhance community and individual, in the last case focusing particularly on evidence concerning mating potential. We then discuss the relationship between the evolutionary perspective on virtues and Aristotle’s concept of the reciprocity of the virtues. Finally, we provide speculations about the nature of practical wisdom. While accepting the potential value of future revisions to the VIA model, that model even under its current conditions has the potential to generate a number of intriguing and testable hypotheses about the nature of virtue.

Not all who ponder count costs: Arithmetic reflection predicts utilitarian tendencies, but logical reflection predicts both deontological and utilitarian tendencies

Conventional sacrificial moral dilemmas propose directly causing some harm to prevent greater harm. Theory suggests that accepting such actions (consistent with utilitarian philosophy) involves more reflective reasoning than rejecting such actions (consistent with deontological philosophy). However, past findings do not always replicate, confound different kinds of reflection, and employ conventional sacrificial dilemmas that treat utilitarian and deontological considerations as opposite. In two studies, we examined whether past findings would replicate when employing process dissociation to assess deontological and utilitarian inclinations independently. Findings suggested two categorically different impacts of reflection: measures of arithmetic reflection, such as the Cognitive Reflection Test, predicted only utilitarian, not deontological, response tendencies. However, measures of logical reflection, such as performance on logical syllogisms, positively predicted both utilitarian and deontological tendencies. These studies replicate some findings, clarify others, and reveal opportunity for additional nuance in dual process theorist's claims about the link between reflection and dilemma judgments.

Parental Personal Sense of Duty as a Foundation of Pediatric Medical Decision-making

We describe a model of parental (or more broadly, surrogate) decision-making that includes 5 aspects of decision-making that other models simplify or omit. First, we describe problem structuring recognizing that parents often face multiple potential problems or decisions with multiple potential solutions, rather than a single problem, and the initial challenge is deciding which of the problems to focus on. Second, we discuss sense-making recognizing that difficult decisions are not made in isolation but are often part of a confusing, labyrinthian situation in which disoriented parents must make a series of decisions over time in hopes of getting closer to 1 or more goals. Third, we describe path dependency recognizing that decisions influence what and how decisions are made later. Fourth, we discuss personal sense of duty recognizing that parents and other surrogate decision-makers have central personal roles, self-identities, and relationships with the patient, culminating in a personal sense of duty, such as what they perceive they should do to be in their own judgment a "good parent," which substantially affects their decision-making. Fifth, we describe self-judgments recognizing that parents experience distress when they judge themselves as falling short of their duties or if they think others are judging them for falling short. Clinical practice, medical ethics, and research regarding decision support can all benefit by acknowledging and addressing these key aspects of medical decision-making.

The costs of being consequentialist: Social inference from instrumental harm and impartial beneficence

Previous work has demonstrated that people are more likely to trust "deontological" agents who reject harming one person to save many others than "consequentialist" agents who endorse such instrumental harms, which could explain the higher prevalence of non-consequentialist moral intuitions. Yet consequentialism involves endorsing not just instrumental harm, but also impartial beneficence, treating the well-being of every individual as equally important. In four studies (total N = 2086), we investigated preferences for consequentialist vs. non-consequentialist social partners endorsing instrumental harm or impartial beneficence and examined how such preferences varied across different types of social relationships. Our results demonstrate robust preferences for non-consequentialist over consequentialist agents in the domain of instrumental harm, and weaker - but still evident - preferences in the domain of impartial beneficence. In the domain of instrumental harm, non-consequentialist agents were consistently viewed as more moral and trustworthy, preferred for a range of social roles, and entrusted with more money in economic exchanges. In the domain of impartial beneficence, preferences for non-consequentialist agents were observed for close interpersonal relationships requiring direct interaction (friend, spouse) but not for more distant roles with little-to-no personal interaction (political leader). Collectively our findings demonstrate that preferences for non-consequentialist agents are sensitive to the different dimensions of consequentialist thinking and the relational context.

Two-Faced Morality: Distrust Promotes Divergent Moral Standards for the Self Versus Others

People do not trust hypocrites, because they preach water, but drink wine. The current research shows that, ironically, when we distrust, we become moral hypocrites ourselves. We argue that experiencing distrust alerts us to the possibility that others may intent to exploit us, and that such looming exploitation differentially affects moral standards for the self versus others. Four studies ( N = 1,225) examined this possibility and its underlying motivational dynamic. Study 1 established a relationship between dispositional distrust and flexible, self-serving moral cognition. In Studies 2 and 3, participants experiencing distrust (vs. trust) endorsed more lenient moral standards for themselves than for others. Study 4 explored the role of the motivation to avoid exploitation in these effects. Specifically, participants' dispositional victim sensitivity moderated the effect of distrust on hypocrisy. Together, these findings suggest that individuals who distrust and fear to be exploited show self-serving, and hence untrustworthy, moral cognition themselves.

Clarifying Gender Differences in Moral Dilemma Judgments: The Complementary Roles of Harm Aversion and Action Aversion

Moral dilemmas entail situations where decisions consistent with deontological principles (following moral rules) conflict with decisions consistent with utilitarian principles (maximizing overall outcomes). Past work employing process dissociation (PD) clarified that gender differences in utilitarianism are modest, but women are substantially more deontological than men. However, deontological judgments confound two motivations: harm aversion and action aversion. The current work presents a mega-analysis of eight studies ( N = 1,965) using PD to assess utilitarian and deontological response tendencies both when deontology entails inaction and when it requires action, to assess the independent contributions of harm aversion and action aversion. Results replicate and clarify past findings: Women scored higher than men on deontological tendencies, and this difference was enhanced when the deontological choice required refraining from harmful action rather than acting to prevent harm. That is, gender differences in deontological inclinations are caused by both harm aversion and action aversion.