Deep down my enemy is good: Thinking about the true self reduces intergroup bias

Why Do God and Humans Punish? Perceived Retributivist Punishment Motives Hinge on Views of the True Self

Laypeople often believe that God punishes transgressions; however, their inferences about God's punishment motives remain unclear. We addressed this topic by asking laypeople to indicate why God punishes. We also examined participants' inferences about why humans punish to contribute to scholarly conversations regarding the extent to which people may anthropomorphize God's mind. In Studies 1A to 1C, participants viewed God as less retributive than humans. In Study 2, participants expected God (vs. humans) to view humans' true selves more positively; this difference mediated participants' views of God as less retributive than humans. Study 3 manipulated agents' views of humans' true selves and examined how such information influenced each agent's perceived motives. Participants viewed a given agent as less retributive when that agent regarded the true self as good (versus bad). These findings extend scholarship on lay theories of punishment motives and highlight links between religious and moral cognition.

People believe political opponents accept blatant moral wrongs, fueling partisan divides

Efforts to bridge political divides often focus on navigating complex and divisive issues, but eight studies reveal that we should also focus on a more basic misperception: that political opponents are willing to accept basic moral wrongs. In the United States, Democrats, and Republicans overestimate the number of political outgroup members who approve of blatant immorality (e.g. child pornography, embezzlement). This "basic morality bias" is tied to political dehumanization and is revealed by multiple methods, including natural language analyses from a large social media corpus and a survey with a representative sample of Americans. Importantly, the basic morality bias can be corrected with a brief, scalable intervention. Providing information that just one political opponent condemns blatant wrongs increases willingness to work with political opponents and substantially decreases political dehumanization.

Authentic for Thee But Not for Me: Perceived Authenticity in Self-Control Conflicts

Is self-control authentic? Across several hypothetical scenarios, participants perceived impulsive actions as more authentic for others (Study 1a) but self-control as more authentic for themselves (Study 1b). Study 2 partially replicated this asymmetry. Study 3 accounted for behavior positivity because self-control was typically the more positive action in the previous studies. Study 4 minimized the influence of positivity by framing the same behaviors as either impulsive or controlled; impulsive actions were deemed more authentic than self-control, but only for other people. An internal meta-analysis controlling for behavior positivity revealed that (a) more positive behaviors are more authentic, and (b) impulsive actions are more authentic than self-controlled actions, especially for others. This actor-observer asymmetry suggests that, even in the face of a strong tendency to perceive positive actions as authentic, there exists a competing tendency to view others' impulsive actions as more authentic than self-control.

Why do evaluative judgments affect emotion attributions? The roles of judgments about fittingness and the true self

Past research has found that the value of a person's activities can affect observers' judgments about whether that person is experiencing certain emotions (e.g., people consider morally good agents happier than morally bad agents). One proposed explanation for this effect is that emotion attributions are influenced by judgments about fittingness (whether the emotion is merited). Another hypothesis is that emotion attributions are influenced by judgments about the agent's true self (whether the emotion reflects how the agent feels "deep down"). We tested these hypotheses in six studies. After finding that people think a wide range of emotions can be fitting and reflect a person's true self (Study 1), we tested the predictions of these two hypotheses for attributions of happiness, love, sadness, and hatred. We manipulated the emotions' fittingness (Studies 2a-b and 4) and whether the emotions reflected an agent's true self (Studies 3 and 5), measuring emotion attributions as well as fittingness judgments and true self judgments. The fittingness manipulation only impacted emotion attributions in the cases where it also impacted true self judgments, whereas the true self manipulation impacted emotion attribution in all cases, including those where it did not impact fittingness judgments. These results cast serious doubt on the fittingness hypothesis and offer some support for the true self hypothesis, which could be developed further in future work.

The "Hard Problem of Consciousness" Arises from Human Psychology

Consciousness presents a "hard problem" to scholars. At stake is how the physical body gives rise to subjective experience. Why consciousness is "hard", however, is uncertain. One possibility is that the challenge arises from ontology-because consciousness is a special property/substance that is irreducible to the physical. Here, I show how the "hard problem" emerges from two intuitive biases that lie deep within human psychology: Essentialism and Dualism. To determine whether a subjective experience is transformative, people judge whether the experience pertains to one's essence, and per Essentialism, one's essence lies within one's body. Psychological states that seem embodied (e.g., "color vision" ∼ eyes) can thus give rise to transformative experience. Per intuitive Dualism, however, the mind is distinct from the body, and epistemic states (knowledge and beliefs) seem particularly ethereal. It follows that conscious perception (e.g., "seeing color") ought to seem more transformative than conscious knowledge (e.g., knowledge of how color vision works). Critically, the transformation arises precisely because the conscious perceptual experience seems readily embodied (rather than distinct from the physical body, as the ontological account suggests). In line with this proposal, five experiments show that, in laypeople's view (a) experience is transformative only when it seems anchored in the human body; (b) gaining a transformative experience effects a bodily change; and (c) the magnitude of the transformation correlates with both (i) the perceived embodiment of that experience, and (ii) with Dualist intuitions, generally. These results cannot solve the ontological question of whether consciousness is distinct from the physical. But they do suggest that the roots of the "hard problem" are partly psychological.

People See Political Opponents as More Stupid Than Evil

Affective polarization is a rising threat to political discourse and democracy. Public figures have expressed that "conservatives think liberals are stupid, and liberals think conservatives are evil." However, four studies (N = 1,660)-including a representative sample-reveal evidence that both sides view political opponents as more unintelligent than immoral. Perceiving the other side as "more stupid than evil" occurs both in general judgments (Studies 1, 3, and 4) and regarding specific issues (Study 2). Study 4 also examines "meta-perceptions" of how Democrats and Republicans disparage one another, revealing that people correctly perceive that both Democrats and Republicans see each other as more unintelligent than immoral, although they exaggerate the extent of this negativity. These studies clarify the way everyday partisans view each other, an important step in designing effective interventions to reduce political animosity.

"They're Not True Humans:" Beliefs about Moral Character Drive Denials of Humanity

A puzzling feature of paradigmatic cases of dehumanization is that the perpetrators often attribute uniquely human traits to their victims. This has become known as the "paradox of dehumanization." I address the paradox by arguing that the perpetrators think about their victims as human in one sense, while denying that they are human in another sense. I do so by providing evidence that people harbor a dual character concept of humanity. Research has found that dual character concepts have two independent sets of criteria for their application, one of which is descriptive and one of which is normative. Four experiments provided evidence that people deploy a descriptive criterion according to which being human is a matter of being a Homo sapiens; as well as a normative criterion according to which being human is a matter of possessing a deep-seated commitment to do the morally right thing. Importantly, I found that people are willing to affirm that someone is human in the descriptive sense, while denying that they are human in the normative sense, and vice versa. In addition to providing a solution to the paradox of dehumanization, these findings suggest that perceptions of moral character have a central role to play in driving dehumanization.

Receptiveness to Opposing Views: Conceptualization and Integrative Review

The present article reviews a growing body of research on receptiveness to opposing views-the willingness to access, consider, and evaluate contradictory opinions in a relatively impartial manner. First, we describe the construct of receptiveness and consider how it can be measured and studied at the individual level. Next, we extend our theorizing to the interpersonal level, arguing that receptiveness in the course of any given interaction is mutually constituted by the dispositional tendencies and observable behaviors of the parties involved. We advance the argument that receptiveness should be conceptualized and studied as an interpersonal construct that emerges dynamically over the course of an interaction and is powerfully influenced by counterpart behavior. This interpersonal conceptualization of receptiveness has important implications for intervention design and raises a suite of novel research questions.

To Be Authentic, to Be Eco: Exploring the Link Between Authenticity and Pro-environmental Behavior

Authentic self is believed to be morally good. The current research proposes that the authentic self is also environmentally good. Across two studies, we tested the link between authenticity and pro-environmental attitude and behavior. In Study 1 (N=2,646), dispositional authenticity was found to be a predictor of pro-environmental behavior (PEB). In Study 2 (N=474), participants in the authentic condition (recalling their experiences of being authentic) were more willing to donate money to protect the environment than those in the inauthentic (recalling their experiences of being inauthentic) or the neutral (recalling their experiences of a typical day) conditions. Participants in the authentic condition also reported higher intention to conduct PEB than their peers in the other conditions. The results of the present research provide initial evidence that people are more likely to endorse pro-environmental attitude and behave pro-environmentally when being authentic.

On the matter of essence

A large literature suggests that people attribute the inborn properties of living things to their essence. Here, I explore the possibility that the essence of living things must be further embodied, and that this presumption guides intuitive reasoning about all of an organism's inherited properties, physical and psychological. Accordingly, when people reason about agentive living things (animals and humans), they presume that (a) Their essence must exhibit the properties of bodily matter- it must occupy a certain location in space, and it must be comprised of some appropriate organic substance that is anchored in the body; (b) Inborn (essentialized) traits must be embodied, and conversely, embodied traits are likely innate; and (c) The identity of biological kinds and by extension, one's psychological core, are defined by the material properties of their essence. I show that the embodiment hypothesis can capture numerous phenomena, ranging from laypeople's intuitions about which psychological traits are plausibly innate to their perception of the self and its capacity to migrate to humanoids and reemerge after death.

The automatic influence of advocacy on lawyers and novices

It has long been known that advocating for a cause can alter the advocate's beliefs. Yet a guiding assumption of many advocates is that the biasing effect of advocacy is controllable. Lawyers, for instance, are taught that they can retain unbiased beliefs while advocating for their clients and that they must do so to secure just outcomes. Across ten experiments (six preregistered; N = 3,104) we show that the biasing effect of advocacy is not controllable but automatic. Merely incentivizing people to advocate altered a range of beliefs about character, guilt and punishment. This bias appeared even in beliefs that are highly stable, when people were financially incentivized to form true beliefs and among professional lawyers, who are trained to prevent advocacy from biasing their judgements.

Is the true self truly moral? Identity intuitions across domains of sociomoral reasoning and age

Adults intuit that positive moral characteristics (e.g., being caring, being honest) reflect a person's true self. The current work aimed to extend research on the true self phenomenon (a) by directly comparing how moral and nonmoral norms are implicated in intuitions about the true self and (b) by examining intuitions about the true self across various age groups (children, adolescents, and adults). Participants from three age groups were presented with scenarios describing people undergoing change and reported the impact of that change on identity. The nature of the change varied in the type of characteristic (moral belief, social-conventional belief, or personal preference), the direction (positive change or negative change), and the target (self or other). Children and adolescents, like adults, judged that changes to moral beliefs were more disruptive to identity continuity than changes to social-conventional beliefs or personal preferences. All three age groups shared the intuition that negative moral change was more disruptive to identity than positive moral change, which is consistent with an understanding of the central role that morally good characteristics play in perceptions of the true self. Although these results suggest continuity between late childhood and early adulthood in understanding of the true self, age-related differences did emerge with regard to the target of the change. Children and adolescents reported that moral changes in others were more disruptive to identity than moral changes in themselves, unlike adults, whose intuitions were perspective invariant.

Moral Memories and the Belief in the Good Self

Most people believe they are morally good, and this belief plays an integral role in constructions of personal identity. Yet people commit moral transgressions with surprising frequency in everyday life. In this article, we characterize two mechanisms involving autobiographical memory that are utilized to foster a belief in a morally good self in the present—despite frequent and repeated immoral behavior. First, there is a tendency for people to willfully and actively forget details about their own moral transgressions but not about their own morally praiseworthy deeds. Second, when past moral transgressions are not forgotten, people strategically compare their more recent unethical behaviors with their more distant unethical behaviors to foster a perception of personal moral improvement over time. This, in turn, helps to portray the current self favorably. These two complementary mechanisms help to explain pervasive inconsistencies between people’s personal beliefs about their own moral goodness and the frequency with which they behave immorally.

Introduction to the Special Issue: Authenticity: Novel Insights Into a Valued, Yet Elusive, Concept

Authenticity is generally believed to play an important role in our daily lives. Empirical research thus far has made progress in understanding the nature of this important construct. We identify four broad conclusions about authenticity based on this research: (a) People value authenticity in their own behavior and other domains (e.g., life experiences, consumer products), (b) Self-reports of personal authenticity are linked to psychological well-being, (c) People generally believe authentic, or “true,” selves are morally good, and (d) Authenticity judgments are guided by cognitive tendencies related to psychological essentialism. Despite this progress, many basic questions about authenticity remain unresolved including (a) What is the best way to define the construct? (b) Why do people care so much about whether something or someone is authentic? and (c) Why is personal authenticity so strongly related to psychological well-being? This special issue presents articles aimed to shed light on some of these basic questions. Although each of the articles offers a unique perspective to understanding authenticity, these collections of articles provide a generative framework to help researchers continue to explore this elusive construct.

Addiction, Identity, Morality

Background: Recent literature on addiction and judgments about the characteristics of agents has focused on the implications of adopting a “brain disease” versus “moral weakness” model of addiction. Typically, such judgments have to do with what capacities an agent has (e.g., the ability to abstain from substance use). Much less work, however, has been conducted on the relationship between addiction and judgments about an agent’s identity, including whether or to what extent an individual is seen as the same person after becoming addicted. Methods: We conducted a series of vignette-based experiments (total N = 3,620) to assess lay attitudes concerning addiction and identity persistence, systematically manipulating key characteristics of agents and their drug of addiction. Conclusions: In Study 1, we found that U.S. participants judged an agent who became addicted to drugs as being closer to “a completely different person” than “completely the same person” as the agent who existed prior to the addiction. In Studies 2–6, we investigated the intuitive basis for this result, finding that lay judgments of altered identity as a consequence of drug use and addiction are driven primarily by perceived negative changes in the moral character of drug users, who are seen as having deviated from their good true selves.

The Self as Activity

The self is a complex and heterogeneous phenomenon that is often described through its subcomponents (e.g., self-control, self-esteem, self-compassion). The entity that unifies these subcomponents is more elusive and difficult to access, at least with standard psychological methods. In the current inquiry we set out to illuminate and extend the understanding of the self by exploring the differentiation of the self as a “content” versus a “process” (e.g., self-schema vs. self-activity). We also differentiate the “self” from the “I,” exploring characteristics of a 3rd- versus a 1st-person perspective to this core psychological entity. We pursue an empirical 1st-person inquiry that is interdisciplinary in nature, drawing on concepts from both psychology and religious studies (in particular the “essential” or “core” self in psychology, as well as the “real” or “ideal” self in religious studies in the form of the “I Am” statements in the Gospels). Our approach illustrates how a consideration of phenomenological, 1st-person qualities of selfhood allows for an enriched, empirically based understanding of crucially important but subtle dimensions of I-ness that remain inaccessible to 3rd-person exploration.

When do circumstances excuse? Moral prejudices and beliefs about the true self drive preferences for agency-minimizing explanations

When explaining human actions, people usually focus on a small subset of potential causes. What leads us to prefer certain explanations for valenced actions over others? The present studies indicate that our moral attitudes often predict our explanatory preferences far better than our beliefs about how causally sensitive actions are to features of the actor's environment. Study 1 found that high-prejudice participants were much more likely to endorse non-agential explanations of an erotic same-sex encounter, such as that one of the men endured a stressful event earlier that day. Study 2 manipulated participants' beliefs about how the agent's behavior depended on features of his environment, finding that such beliefs played no clear role in modeling participants' explanatory preferences. This result emerged both with low- and high-prejudice, US and Indian participants, suggesting that these findings probably reflect a species-typical feature of human psychology. Study 3 found that moral attitudes also predicted explanations for a woman's decision to abort her pregnancy (3a) and a person's decision to convert to Islam (3b). Study 4 found that luck in an action's etiology tends to undermine perceptions of blame more readily than perceptions of praise. Finally, Study 5 found that when explaining support for a rival ideology, both Liberals and Conservatives downplay agential causes while emphasizing environmental ones. Taken together, these studies indicate that our explanatory preferences often reflect a powerful tendency to represent agents as possessing virtuous true selves. Consequently, situation-focused explanations often appear salient because people resist attributing negatively valenced actions to the true self. There is a person/situation distinction, but it is normative.