When skeptical, stick with the norm: Low dilemma plausibility increases deontological moral judgments

Beyond Trolleyology: The CNI Model of Moral-Dilemma Responses

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

How do people make judgments about actions that violate moral norms yet maximize the greater good (e.g., sacrificing the well-being of a small number of people for the well-being of a larger number of people)? Research on this question has been criticized for relying on highly artificial scenarios and for conflating multiple distinct factors underlying responses in moral dilemmas. The current article reviews research that used a computational modeling approach to disentangle the roles of multiple distinct factors in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. By disentangling sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general preference for inaction versus action in responses to realistic dilemmas, the reviewed work provides a more nuanced understanding of how people make judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas.

Deontology and Utilitarianism in Real Life: A Set of Moral Dilemmas Based on Historic Events

Moral dilemmas are frequently used to examine psychological processes that drive decisions between adhering to deontological norms and optimizing the outcome. However, commonly used dilemmas are generally unrealistic and confound moral principle and (in)action so that results obtained with these dilemmas might not generalize to other situations. In the present research, we introduce new dilemmas that are based on real-life events. In two studies (a European student sample and a North American MTurk sample, total N = 789), we show that the new factual dilemmas were perceived to be more realistic and less absurd than commonly used dilemmas. In addition, factual dilemmas induced higher participant engagement. From this, we draw the preliminary conclusion that factual dilemmas are more suitable for investigating moral cognition. Moreover, factual dilemmas can be used to examine the generalizability of previous results concerning action (vs. inaction) and concerning a wider range of deontological norms.

Are people really less moral in their foreign language? Proficiency and comprehension matter for the moral foreign language effect in Russian speakers

Previous work has demonstrated that people are more willing to sacrifice one person to save five in a foreign language (FL) than in their native tongue. This may be due to the FL either reducing concerns about sacrificial harm (deontological inclinations) or increasing concerns about overall outcomes (utilitarian inclinations). Moreover, proficiency in a foreign language (FL) may moderate results. To test these possibilities, we investigated the moral foreign language effect (MFLE) in a novel sample of Russian L1/English FL speakers. We employed process dissociation (PD)-a technique that independently assesses concerns about rejecting harm and maximizing outcomes in sacrificial dilemmas, and we assessed measures of objective and subjective foreign language proficiency and of dilemma comprehension. Results replicated the pattern of increased acceptance of sacrificial harm in FL demonstrated in earlier studies, but a PD analysis showed no evidence of increased concerns for utilitarian outcomes in a FL; instead, this pattern was driven by reduced concerns regarding sacrificial harm. However, people who reported better dilemma comprehension in the FL demonstrated both stronger deontological and utilitarian responding, and people with higher objective proficiency displayed stronger utilitarian responding in the FL than those with lower proficiency. These findings show that utilitarian inclinations are affected by reading dilemmas in a foreign language mainly in low-proficiency speakers, and that while emotional concerns for sacrifice are reduced in FL, better comprehension can increase such concerns as well as concern for outcomes.

Moral decision-making in pettism: The influence of animal type, pet ownership status, and social distance

Speciesism prioritizes humans over animals and pets. Nevertheless, pet owners have a strong attachment bond with their pets, which makes their hierarchical view of pets less clear. Aiming to examine this issue, we present a dilemma involving animals and humans that allowed us to investigate whether animal type, social distance, and pet ownership status can affect moral decision-making related to pets. Save-willingness results showed that in the moral dilemmas of pets versus livestock versus wild animals (Studies 1a and 2a) and their own pets versus strangers (Studies 1b and 2b), pet owners prioritize pets whereas non-owners prioritize pets (Studies 1a and 2a) and strangers (Studies 1b and 2b). Pet owners prefer to save pets more than do non-owners (Study 1a), and this effect was only observed in females (Study 2a). Save-decision results showed that in the moral dilemmas of pets versus livestock versus wild animals (Study 2a), pet owners prioritize pets whereas in the dilemmas of pets versus strangers (Study 2b), pet owners prioritize strangers. The same result was found in non-owners. Pet owners prefer more than do non-owners to save pets (Study 2). Overall, the separation of save-willingness and save-decision results revealed that pet owners show special speciesism (i.e., pettism).

How German and Italian Laypeople Reason about Distributive Shortages during COVID-19

(1) Background: The COVID-19 pandemic provided a unique opportunity to investigate how moral reasoning is influenced by individuals' exposure to a crisis and by personal, societal and temporal proximity. We examined how Italians and Germans judged different behaviors that arose because of the pandemic, which affected health and societal matters. (2) Methods: Over the course of four months and three assessment periods, we used an observational online survey to assess participants' judgments regarding seven scenarios that addressed distributive shortages during the pandemic. (3) Results: Overall, there was no clear answering pattern across all scenarios. For a variation of triage and pandemic restrictions, most participants selected a mean value, which can be interpreted as deferring the choice. For the other scenarios, most participants used the extremes of the scale, thereby reflecting a clear opinion of the public regarding the moral issue. In addition, moral reasoning varied across the two countries, assessment periods, fear, and age. (4) Conclusions: By using scenarios that were taken from real-life experiences, the current study addresses criticism that moral research mostly relies on unrealistic scenarios that lack in external validity, plausibility, and proximity to everyday situations. In addition, it shows how lay people regard measures of public health and societal decision-making.

Contextualizing sacrificial dilemmas within Covid-19 for the study of moral judgment

"Sacrificial dilemmas" are the scenarios typically used to study moral judgment and human morality. However, these dilemmas have been criticized regarding their lack of ecological validity. The COVID-19 pandemic offers a relevant context to further examine individuals' moral judgment and choice of action with more realistic sacrificial dilemmas. Using this context, the purpose of the present study is to investigate how moral responses are influenced by the contextualization of the dilemma (i.e., contextualized or not within the Covid-19 pandemic). By comparing two versions of one dilemma, Experiment 1 revealed that the more realistic version (the one contextualized within the Covid-19 pandemic) did not elicit more utilitarian responses than the less realistic version (the one not contextualized within the Covid-19 pandemic). In Experiment 2, we examined more specifically whether both the perceived realism of the dilemma and the plausibility of a utilitarian action influence moral responses. Results confirmed that the contextualization of the dilemma does not make any difference in moral responses. However, the plausibility of an action appears to exert an influence on the choice of action. Indeed, participants were more inclined to choose the utilitarian action in the plausible action versions than in the implausible action versions of the dilemma. Overall, these results shed light on the importance for future research of using mundane and dramatic realistic dilemmas displaying full information regarding a sacrificial action and its consequences.

When Dark Humor and Moral Judgment Meet in Sacrificial Dilemmas: Preliminary Evidence With Females

The influence of dark humor on moral judgment has never been explored, even though this form of humor is well-known to push the boundaries of social norms. In the present study, we examined whether the presence of dark humor leads female participants to approve a utilitarian response (i.e., to kill one to save many) in sacrificial dilemmas. The effects of two types of humorous contexts were compared (i.e., dark vs. nondark) on dilemmas, which differed according to whom benefits from the crime (i.e., oneself and others vs. others only). In addition to collecting moral responses, individuals’ emotional states were assessed at three critical steps: Before and after reading the jokes and also after performing the moral judgment task. Our results revealed that dark and nondark humor similarly elicited a positive emotional state. However, dark humor increased the permissiveness of the moral violation when this violation created benefits for oneself. In self and other beneficial dilemmas, female participants in the dark humorous condition judged the utilitarian response more appropriate than those in the nondark condition. This study represents a first attempt in deepening our understanding of the context-dependent nature of moral judgment usually assessed in sacrificial dilemmas.

Moral judgment, decision times and emotional salience of a new developed set of sacrificial manual driving dilemmas

The growing interest in the subject of moral judgment in driver and autonomous vehicle behavior highlights the importance of investigating the suitability of sacrificial dilemmas as experimental tools in the context of traffic psychology. To this aim a set of validated sacrificial trolley problems and a new set of trolley-like driving dilemmas were compared through an online survey experiment, providing normative values for rates of participants' choices; decision times; evaluation of emotional valence and arousal experienced during the decision process; and ratings of the moral acceptability. Results showed that while both sets of dilemmas led to a more frequent selection of utilitarian outcomes, the driving-type dilemmas seemed to enhance faster decisions mainly based on the utilitarian moral code. No further differences were observed between the two sets, confirming the reliability of the moral dilemma tool in the investigation of moral driving behaviors. We suggest that as moral judgments and behaviors become more lifelike, the individual's moral inclination emerge more automatically and effectively. This new driving-type dilemma set may help researchers who work in traffic psychology and moral decision-making to approach the complex task of developing realistic moral scenarios more easily in the context of autonomous and nonautonomous transportation.

Political Ideology and Moral Dilemma Judgments: An Analysis Using the CNI Model

Many real-world dilemmas involve disagreement about whether decisions should follow moral norms in an unconditional manner (deontology) or be based on the consequences for the greater good (utilitarianism). To examine how political ideology may account for some of these disagreements, the current research used a formal modeling approach to investigate the associations between political ideology and (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Across three studies (N = 996) with samples from the United States (Studies 1 and 3) and the United Kingdom (Study 2), conservatives were less influenced by overall consequences for the greater good in comparison with liberals. Political ideology was not significantly associated with sensitivity to moral norms and general action tendencies. The findings provide more nuanced insights into how political ideology may contribute to disagreements on real-world moral dilemmas.

Sensitivity to Moral Principles Predicts Both Deontological and Utilitarian Response Tendencies in Sacrificial Dilemmas

When facing sacrificial dilemmas in which harm maximizes outcomes, people appear sensitive to three moral principles: They are more averse to actively causing harm than passively allowing it ( action principle), causing harm directly than indirectly ( contact principle), and causing harm as a means than as a by-product of helping others ( intention principle). Across five studies and a meta-analysis ( N = 1,218), we examined whether individual differences in people’s sensitivity to these principles were related to participants’ moral preferences on sacrificial dilemmas. Interestingly, sensitivity to each of these principles was related to both elevated harm-rejection (i.e., deontological) as well as elevated outcome-maximization (i.e., utilitarian) response tendencies. Rather than increasing responses consistent with only one philosophical position, people sensitive to moral principles balanced moral concerns about causing harm and maximizing outcomes similar to people high in other measures of moral concern.

Reliability of moral decision-making: Evidence from the trolley dilemma

The application of framing effects in the field of moral judgement has offered a golden opportunity to assess the reliability of people's moral judgements and decisions. To date, however, these studies are still scarce and they suffer from multiple methodological issues. Therefore, this study aims to provide further insights into the reliability of moral judgements while fixing these methodological shortcomings. In this study, we employed the classic trolley dilemma moral decision-making paradigm to determine the extent to which moral decisions are susceptible to framing effects. A total of 1,040 participants were included in the study. The data revealed that choices of participants did not significantly differ between the two frames. Equivalence tests confirmed that the associated effect size was very small. Further exploratory analyses revealed an unplanned interaction between the framing effect and the target of the framing manipulation. This result became from marginally statistically significant to insignificant following different sensitivity analyses. The implications and limitations of these findings and directions for future research are discussed.

On the validity of the CNI model of moral decision-making: Reply to Baron and Goodwin (2020)

The CNI model of moral decision-making is a formal model that quantifies (1) sensitivity to consequences, (2) sensitivity to moral norms, and (3) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Based on a critique of the CNI model’s conceptual assumptions, properties of the moral dilemmas for research using the CNI model, and the robustness of findings obtained with the CNI model against changes in model specifications, Baron and Goodwin (2020) dismissed the CNI model as a valid approach to study moral dilemma judgments. Here, we respond to their critique, showing that Baron and Goodwin’s dismissal of the CNI model is based on: (1) misunderstandings of key aspects of the model; (2) a conceptually problematic conflation of behavioral effects and explanatory mental constructs; (3) arguments that are inconsistent with empirical evidence; and (4) reanalyses that supposedly show inconsistent findings resulting from changes in model specifications, although the reported reanalyses did not actually use the CNI model and proper analyses with the CNI model yield consistent findings across model specifications. Although Baron and Goodwin’s critique reveals a need for greater precision in the description of the three model parameters and for greater attention to properties of individual dilemmas, the available evidence indicates that the CNI model is a valid, robust, and empirically sound approach to gaining deeper insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, overcoming major limitations of the traditional approach that pits moral norms against consequences for the greater good (e.g., trolley dilemma).

Using the CNI Model to Investigate Individual Differences in Moral Dilemma Judgments

Typical moral dilemmas pitting the consequences of a given action against the action’s consistency with moral norms confound several determinants of moral judgments. Dissociating these determinants, the CNI model allows researchers to quantify sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to norms, and general preference for inaction over action regardless of consequences and norms. However, with the currently available set of dilemmas for research using the CNI model, the model is not suitable for studies with individual-difference designs. To overcome this limitation, the current research investigated the suitability of an extended dilemma battery to make the CNI model amenable for individual-difference research, examining relations of its parameters with psychopathy, empathic concern, need for cognition, self-reported utilitarianism, behavioral activation/inhibition, moral identity, and religiosity. The results support the suitability of the CNI model for individual-difference research with the extended dilemma battery, providing more nuanced insights into the underpinnings of individual differences in moral dilemma judgments.